"I, Thomas W. Clerke, justice of the Supreme Court of the city of New York, do certify that Richard B. Connolly, whose name is subscribed to the preceding exemplification, is clerk of the city and county of New York, and clerk of the Supreme Court of said State for said county, duly elected and sworn; and that full faith and credit are due to his official acts. I further certify that the seal of said Supreme Court which is thereto affixed is the proper seal; and that the attestation of the above judgment roll (italics ours) is in due form of law."

Then follows the attestation and signature, and on the left of it the mutilated impression of the seal before mentioned. It would be impossible, however, to convey to the mind an exact impression of these papers except through the eye, by actual visual inspection.

The sheet containing an impression of a seal on yellow paper as described, has no signature of any kind authenticating its genuineness, and the last sheet purporting to contain the exemplification, while it is signed by Thos. W. Clerke, has the imperfect stamp of a seal on the paper. Which seal was he attempting to authenticate? If the first, there was no occasion for the second, and if the second, the first was not merely superfluous but out of place. But while the whole copy bears evidence of crudity and awkwardness in its preparation, and presents an unconventional and slovenly appearance, quite impossible to reconcile with the assumption that it actually passed through any clerk's office, as a copy purporting to be exemplified under act of Congress, still less the office of the clerk of New York, there is a blemish, or rather a blunder, patent upon its face, which stamps the paper in the connection in which it is used as a fraud.

The certificate of Clerke, the justice, is that "the attestation of the above judgment roll is in due form of law."

Now, not to say anything of the peculiar form of the attestation itself, what clerk or what judge would call the receipt and the depositions of Driggs and Smith and Barnes a judgment roll? To believe this paper genuine puts that

sort of a tax on one's credulity which, if borne patiently, is apt to stamp the victim as a fool. It looks very much as if a tentative and discarded sheet of paper with the signatures of these officials had been picked up somewhere, and made to do service with the printed blank, which could easily have been detached from some other papers, or might have been procured on one pretext or another not necessary to discuss. However this may be, we simply don't believe, not to put it more harshly, that there is any other connection between the papers except the string which holds them together. And what was the use of the exemplified copy except to give the claim an official sort of coloring in addition to what it already possessed? Each deposition purports to have been taken before judges of State, City, and Federal Courts, and to have been duly authenticated in the mode pointed out by law.

Had they been genuine why were they not sent on to the State Department under the seals of the respective courts out of which they issued? Why take Smith's deposition made in Albany, and Barnes and Driggs in the city of New York, all purporting to be regular in form and duly authenticated by the judges and clerks who performed the service, and file them in the office of the clerk of the county and city of New York, for the purpose of having him say that this had been done. And if this was the object, why didn't he say so instead of attempting to pass them off as an exemplified "judgment roll?" In the absence of proof of a contrary practice, we do not believe that a party can place on file in the clerk's office of the county and city of New York such matter as he pleases with a view merely of obtaining a copy of the papers filed, properly authenticated, to be used as evidence, as emergency may require. We know of no such practice anywhere else, and if it was feared that the originals of these precious documents might be lost in the transmission through the mails, why not leave the original deposition in the court where it was made and take out a copy for use?

If such a practice existed in New York there is no reason, for instance, why the deposition of Samuel Barnes, taken by Justice Florence McCarthy, of the Marine Court, might not have been permitted to remain there, and a copy procured for use at Washington. For some reason the claimant supposed that the distributive effect of three separate and distinct exemplifications issuing out of as many courts, although all combined in support of the same claim, would not equal in probative value the cumulative effect of a single record under one hand and seal; but when it comes to this the question may be well asked what is the value of the testimony in any shape, and assuming it to be genuine, irrespective of the mode of its presentation? Here are affidavits made ex parte twenty years after the occurrence of the events to which they depose by two witnesses of whom this Commission knows absolutely nothing, except that all the circumstances surrounding the case go to impeach their testimony.

We don't believe that the goods of Mr. Driggs remained for five months in the store of Mr. Goodrich in Carupano, in the original packages, and that Mr. Smith saw them there on the 5th of October, 1835.

Perhaps if Smith was alive and could come before us and show a stainless reputation for truth and veracity, we might be staggered in the effort to reconcile such a character with such a statement, but as it stands, we simply don't believe it. There is absolutely nothing in this claim to commend it to consideration.

Originating in 1835, the claimant failed to prepare his proofs until 1845, when some ex parte testimony of the loosest kind was taken in Cumana.

Numerous efforts were then made to induce the Ministers of the United States to make it the subject of a diplomatic representation to the Government of Venezuela, but without effect.

Messrs. Ellis, Shields, Steele, and Eames declined successively to interfere.

In 1855 the affidavits of Smith and Barnes were procured and with the affidavit of Driggs and the contract between him and Goodrich were forwarded to Caracas, with a request by Mr. Marcy for investigation.

What the result of this investigation was does not appear, except that Mr. Eames, who was to conduct it, did not present the claim. The next we hear of it is in 1859, when Mr. Turpin treats it with scorn and indignation.

In 1862 it was finally taken up by Mr. Culver, who would seem to have been imposed upon by Mr. Driggs, and then, for the first time, was presented in form to the Government of Venezuela. If it is not a fraud from beginning to end we can only say that the claimant has been very unfortunate in his method of dealing with it. The petition will be rejected and claim disallowed.

The great question in these cases is whether, assuming the lawfulness of Captain Clark's commission, issued by the Oriental Banda, and the unjustifiable snatching of the prey from his talons, by Commander Joly, of the Colombian Navy, the claim can be supported before a tribunal like this, and restitution decreed, without a violation of the principles of sound international law and morality. It is admitted that the courts of the United States would have been bound to order a restitution of the vessels to their proper owners had they been brought within the jurisdiction of that country. This was the ruling in many similar cases of contemporaneous date, most of which are cited in the brief of the learned counsel for the last mentioned claimants, but the law of which was laid down with great clearness and force by the Supreme Court in the earlier case of Talbot v. Jansen, in 3 Dal., p. 133.

While, however, it is conceded that the courts of the United States would be bound to respect and enforce the neutral obligations of the country, in any case of seizure arising out of the acts of one of its citizens, under color of a foreign commission, it is contended that when a controversy originates in a trespass of this kind, but does not concern the neutral who has been injured, but only the wrong-doer in his relations to a third party, who quoad him, is a tort feasor also, then the principle does not apply, and there would be no impropriety in the United States enforcing the