asserts part ownership of the property taken in him, and that is not evidence. The declaration that he was Soto's partner generally does not signify that he had an interest in this particular property. Even if the evidence was to the effect that he was partner with respect to this property, we should want to know to what extent he was partner-whether he owned the half, the fourth, the tenth, or what proportion. A partner's interest as between the partners depends upon the state of their accounts on settlement.

To allow claims of this character as for a moiety in the absence of proof, would open the door to fraud and the bringing in of claims actually in the interest of persons not entitled under the treaty in the name of citizens of the United States. If it were of a character that proof could not have been reasonably had on this point, it might be different. But we see no good reason for its absence here.

There is still another objection to this claim that could be urged with strong, if not convincing, reason against it.

In the treaty of 1803, between the United States and France, for the adjustment of claims, is this provision:

It is the express intention of the contracting parties not to extend the benefits of the present convention to reclamations of American citizens who shall have established houses of commerce in France, England, or other countries than the United States, in partnership with foreigners, and who by that reason and the nature of their commerce ought to be regarded as domiciliated in the places where such houses exist."

This provision, perhaps, simply embodies the international law on this subject.

If Finn was in partnership with Soto it is believed the business took its character from the place, and was Venezuelan.

As to the partnership business, was he not domiciliated in Venezuela, and a Venezuelan ?

The claim is disallowed, for these reasons, and under the doctrine of case No. 34.

This claim as originally presented to the Commission at Caracas in 1868, was submitted on a copy of a letter or petition addressed to the Minister of the United States accredited to Venezuela, soliciting his intervention in behalf of Clemencia Romerez de Willet, widow of William E. Willet, claiming in behalf of herself and "in representation of her minor children, Guillermo, Adriono, Neivet, Clemencia, and Dolores Willet, had in marriage with the North American citizen" the said Willet. This petition appears to have been presented to the said Minister on the 1st of March, 1864, and claimed 150,791.07 pesos for the injury inflicted upon her husband. Besides this paper Mrs. Willet, as administratrix of her husband, presented a petition to the Commission in which, without naming the amount, she prayed the allowance of such a sum as might be found to be due with interest.

She does not appear as a claimant before this Commission, having parted with her interest in the claim by the sale or the transfer of the certificates founded on the original award.

Besides the original claim, however, presented in this way, there are two secondary or derivative claims made by holders of certificates founded upon the award made by the Caracas Commission, as appears by the papers when this opinion was prepared. The first of these claims is made in behalf of Mrs. Sarah O. Allen, who claims, as the bona fide holder of ten certificates of award, each for $2,820, or $28,200 in all, with interest at the rate of five per cent. per annum from August 5, 1868, until paid, less $1,744 received on account

of accrued interest in the year 1871, and less also the sum of $2,256 received on the same account in the year 1876. The second claim is that of Mrs. Juliet C. Anderson, who claims, as the holder of certificate No. 318 for $2,820, with interest from July 29, 1868, to October 1, 1889, the whole claim, principal and interest, being $5,805.67, on which credits of $842.47 are allowed, showing a balance due on the date mentioned of $4,963.20. The first claimant, Mrs. Allen, appears to ground her claim on an agreement made with Mrs. Willet, by which, in consideration of an indebtedness due by her husband to the husband of Mrs. Allen, it was agreed that she should receive two-fifths of whatever sum should be awarded by the Caracas Commission on account of the original claim. The second claim is founded on the purchase by General Anderson, the father of Mrs. Anderson, of the certificate in question, for which, it is alleged, he paid full value, on the faith of the United States pledged by what is known as the finality act, that that Government would demand of Venezuela complete satisfaction of the awards made by the old Commission. The original award in this case was made by the umpire for 141,000 hard dollars, for which fifty certificates were issued for $2,820 each, running in consecutive numbers from 286 to 334 inclusive. The Commissioner for Venezuela, Señor Villafañe, was of the opinion that $30,000 would have been sufficient. The convention under which this Commission is sitting, as concluded on the 5th of December, 1885, in Article IX, provided as follows:

It is further agreed that if the Commission hereunder organized shall in whole or part annul any money awards made in any cases by the former Mixed Commission under the Convention of April 25, 1866, it shall be the duty of the Commission to examine and decide whether, under all the circumstances, and with due regard to principles of justice and equity there are any third parties who have, with the observance of due care and diligence, become possessed, prior to the date of the exchange of ratifications hereof, for a just and valuable consideration, of any portion of the certificates of award heretofore issued in said claims, and whether under the constitution or laws of either of the contracting parties, said third parties have acquired vested rights, by virtue of the awards of the former Commission under the Conven

tion of 1866, imposing the duty on the Government of the United States to collect from Venezuela the amount or proportion of said certificates of awards which may be held and owned by third parties.

If the present Commission shall decide that there are third parties who are possessed of vested rights, then it shall examine and ascertain the sum paid by each and all of said third parties for their respective interests or shares in said awards, and shall fix the amount of their said interest in said certificates of award, or each of them, and shall issue new certificates of award for the sums so adjudged due, which shall be paid by Venezuela to the United States in the manner hereinbefore stipulated, the same as all other certificates issued by the present Commission.

Had this article been permitted to stand it would have been our duty to ascertain whether these certificate holders had come honestly into possession of the certificates on which they claim, and after determining what had been paid by each, to issue new certificates of award for the sum so ascertained. But it appears that doubts arose in respect of the true intent and meaning of this article, and to remove these doubts a supplementary convention was concluded on March 15, 1888, by which in Article 1, it was provided as follows:

It is understood and agreed that in the event of any of the awards of the Mixed Commission under the Convention of April 25, 1866, being annulled in whole or in part by the Commission authorized and created by Article II of the Treaty of December 5, 1885, no new award shall in any case be made by said Commission, to the holders of certificates of any award or awards annulled as aforesaid, in excess of the sum which may be found to be justly due to the original claimant.

Although this article is somewhat ambiguously worded, we think that its true construction forbids us from making an award in favor of any certificate holder whose certificate was issued and was accepted on the faith of an award by the old Commission, or on the faith of the finality act referred to in any case where we may consider it our duty to annul the award altogether. It is only in the event of an annulment of an award in part, that certificate holders can claim an award from us, and then only in such a sum as may be found justly due the original claimant. The theory of vested rights on which the first convention was framed

has been completely changed by this article, and certificate holders can now only claim by virtue of such an award as we think the justice of the original claim calls for; and in consequence, no new certificate can be granted to a holder of the old certificates where the old award is annulled in whole, and where it is annulled in part the allowance cannot be made in excess of what we think is justly due on the original claim. It follows from this, that in any case in which we may make an award, less than the amount originally allowed, the holders of certificates based upon the original award will have to suffer an abatement of their claims in proportion to the difference between the two awards, and in any case where the original award is annulled altogether there can necessarily be no allowance made either to the original claimant or to any holder of certificates founded upon the award, even although full value was paid on the faith that the United States would exact full payment from Venezuela, or for any other reason. The main question in this case then is, whether the original claimant, Mrs. Willet, as the representative of her husband, had a claim against the Government of that country, which it has agreed shall be adjudicated by this tribunal, and if so, what is a just allowance to be made in satisfaction of her claim. The papers in the case show that her husband was a citizen of the United States, domiciled in Venezuela. She was a native of Venezuela; was married in that country; all her children were born there, and she never appears to have been in the United States, either before or during her marriage, or since her widowhood. Nor does it appear that any of the children have changed or attempted to change their domicile of origin. Her husband, it appears, had leased a warehouse in Caracas, where he conducted a large and, it would seem, a flourishing, business in the sale of a miscellaneous assortment of goods, such as furniture, agricultural machinery, wines, provisions, et cetera. There was also a gasometer connected with the establishment, valued at some $1,500.