CASES ADJUDGED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES AT OCTOBER TERM, 1954. GRANVILLE-SMITH v. GRANVILLE-SMITH. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT. No. 261. Argued February 3-4, 1955-Decided April 11, 1955. By the Organic Act of the Virgin Islands, Congress delegated to their Legislative Assembly authority to enact laws on subjects "of local application." The Legislative Assembly enacted a divorce law, 89 (a) of which provides that, if the plaintiff has been continuously within the district for six weeks and the defendant has been personally served or enters a general appearance, the District Court of the Virgin Islands shall have jurisdiction "without further reference to domicile." Held: Section 9 (a) exceeds the power of the Legislative Assembly, and hence the District Court of the Virgin Islands has no jurisdiction to grant a divorce on a mere showing of continuous presence of the plaintiff in the Virgin Islands for six weeks and entry by the defendant of a general appearance and consent to a default decree. Pp. 2-16. (a) The Organic Acts of Alaska and Hawaii limit divorce jurisdiction to cases where the plaintiffs have resided in the territory for at least two years; and it is not reasonable to believe that Congress was less concerned with the scope of divorce jurisdiction in the Virgin Islands, an unincorporated territory, or that it intended to grant them unrestricted freedom in the field of divorce legislation. P. 9. (b) The term "local application" in the Organic Act of the Virgin Islands implies limitation to subjects having relevant ties within the territory, to laws growing out of the needs of the Islands and governing relations within them. P. 10. 1 Opinion of the Court. 349 U.S. (c) In the light of its legislative history, it is obvious that § 9 (a) of the Virgin Islands divorce law was not concerned with the needs and interests of the local population but was passed for the purpose of encouraging persons from other jurisdictions to visit the Virgin Islands to obtain divorces. Pp. 10-16. (d) In the circumstances, it cannot be concluded that, if Congress had consciously been asked to give the Virgin Islands Legislative Assembly power to do what no State has ever attempted, it would have done so. P. 16. 214 F.2d 820, affirmed. Abe Fortas argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were George H. T. Dudley and Milton V. Freeman. By invitation of the Court, 348 U. S. 885, Erwin N. Griswold argued the cause, as amicus curiae, in support of the judgment below. He also filed a brief. MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER delivered the opinion of the Court. This case concerns § 9 (a) of the divorce law of the Virgin Islands: "Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 8 and 9 hereof, [1] if the plaintiff is within the district at the time of the filing of the complaint and has been continuously for six weeks immediately prior thereto, this shall be prima facie evidence of domicile, and where the defendant 1 Section 8 deals with annulment and is not here relevant. Section 9 reads as follows: "In an action for the dissolution of the marriage contract or for a legal separation the plaintiff therein must be an inhabitant of the district at the commencement of the action and for six weeks prior thereto, which residence shall be sufficient to give the Court jurisdiction without regard to the place where the marriage was solemnized or the cause of action arose." Bill No. 14, 8th Legislative Assembly of the Virgin Islands of the United States, Sess., 1944. Section 9 (a) was added by amendment in 1953. Bill No. 55, 17th Legislative Assembly of the Virgin Islands of the United States, 3d Sess., 1953. 1 Opinion of the Court. has been personally served within the district or enters a general appearance in the action, then the Court shall have jurisdiction of the action and of the parties thereto without further reference to domicile or to the place where the marriage was solemnized or the cause of action arose." The circumstances of the case and the course of the litigation are briefly stated. Petitioner filed suit for divorce because of "irreconcilable incompatibility" in the District Court of the Virgin Islands on March 16, 1953. The complaint alleged that she had been a "resident and inhabitant" of the Islands for more than six weeks prior to the commencement of the action, that respondent was not a resident of the Islands, and that the couple had no children under 21. Through Virgin Islands counsel-authorized by a power of attorney executed in New York-respondent entered an appearance, waived personal service, denied petitioner's allegations, and filed a "Waiver and Consent" to "hearing of this cause as if by default" and to "such findings of fact and conclusions of law and decree as to the Court may seem just and reasonable." Solely on the basis of petitioner's testimony that she had resided in the Virgin Islands continuously for 43 days before bringing suit, the Commissioner who heard the case found that she was a resident and inhabitant of the Islands and had been so for more than six weeks prior to the action. Having also found that the claimed ground for divorce was substantiated, he recommended that she be granted a divorce. On petitioner's motion to confirm the Commissioner's recommendation, the District Court inquired of petitioner's counsel whether he had "any more evidence to offer on the question of domicile." Since no further evidence was proffered, the court, relying on its earlier opinion in Alton v. Alton, 121 F. Supp. 878, dis 2 Section 7 (8), Bill No. 14, 8th Legislative Assembly of the Virgin Islands of the United States, Sess., 1944. 340907 O-55-7 |