KABULAYAT.-See CONSIDERATION.
KALI YUG.-See ADOPTION, 3.
KHOT.-See LANDLORD AND TENANT.
KNOWN LIMIT.-See PRINCIPAL
AND AGENT.
The defendants entered on land as
tenants of a Mirásdár on terms
which they could not prove, but
held it at a uniform rent for
three generations extending over
more than fifty years:
Held that the defendants, in the
absence of any special agreement
to the contrary, had not acquired
by prescription a right of perma-
nent tenancy.
Whatever right of permanent
tenancy a tenant may, by pre-
scription, acquire as against an
Inamdar, or a Khot, it would be
contrary to the custom of the
country and to the nature of
Mirás tenure, to hold that he
could acquire such a right as
against a Mirásdúr. Náráyan v.
Lakshuman
2. Government revenue being a
paramount charge on the land, it
adheres to the land and to every
portion of it independently of the
hands into which it passes, or the
subordinate rights that may have
been created by the occupant out
of his own qualified proprietor-
ship; so that, even after a valid
sale of the land by the occupant
to a purchaser, who neglects to
get his name registered in his
books, the Collector may, after
giving notice, of the failure to
pay the revenue, to the register-
ed occupant-in whom alone,
according to the Bombay Survey
Act I. of 1865, vests the right of
conditional occupancy-put up
land for sale, and the purchaser
gets occupancy rights free from
all claims on the part of the first
purchaser. Gundo v. Mardan...419
See MORTGAGE, 2. ASSESSMENT IN
PERPETUITY.
EJECTMENT. SMALL CAUSE LEGAL INJURY.-See COLLECTOR, 3.
sentatives as defendants;
Held that his claim is barred. Ká-
vasji Sorábji v. Barjorji Sorábji.
224
3. Suits to enforce the right to
share in any property, on the
ground that it is joint family
property, must be brought with-
in twelve years, exclusive of the
period during which the proper-
ty was under attachment by Go-
vernment and neither party was
in possession.
A custom of primogeniture in the
family of Desai in the Southern
Maratha Country supersedes, if
clearly proved, the general Hin-
du Law of descent.
Case of Subbaiyá v. Rajeswara (4)
Mad. H. C. Rep. 354) followed.
Shidhojiráo v. Naikojiráo......228
4. In a suit brought by the plain-
tiff to establish his right to a
Toda Giras hak, and for arrears
of it, it was held (reversing the
decision of the High Court),
that Toda Giras is an interest in
immoveable property, and, as
such, falls within clause 12, and
not within clause 16, of the first
section of Act XIV. of 1859.
The term "immoveable property,"
as used in that Act, is not limi-
ted to lands and houses only.
It comprehends certainly all that
would be real property according
to English law, and possibly
The principle, which prevailed in
Krishnabhat v. Kapábhat (6
Bom. H. C. Rep., 137 A. C. J.),
and in Balvantráv v. Purshotam
Sidheshvar (9 Bom. H. C. Rep.
99.), viz. that as the term
"immoveable property " is not
defined in the Act, it must,
when the question concerns the
rights of Hindus, be taken to
include whatever the Hindu law
classes as 'immoveable,' al-
though not so in the ordinary
acceptation of that word-
approved. Maháráná Fatesangji
v. Desári Kalliánráyáji Hukama-
trái ji
.281
5. To a suit to recover damages
caused by wrongful deprivation
of property, the limitation of six
years applies under Sec. 1, cl. 16
of Act. XIV. of 1859, and not of
one year under cl. 2. Pralhád
Maharudra v. A. C. Watt ....346
6. A suit by a reversioner during
a widow's lifetime, to declare a
conveyance made by her to be
void, must be brought within six
years from the date of convey-
ance, Act XIV. of 1859, sec. 1, cl.
16. Bhikaji v. Jaganáth......351
7. The limitation of six years pre-
scribed in clause 16, Sec. 1. of
Act XIV. of 1859, and not clause
12 of that section, applies to a
suit by a Muhammadan widow to
recover the amount of her dower
as her right does not constitute
an interest in immoveable pro-
perty Mahabubibi v. Amina.430
8. Plaintiff's father purchased a house
on the 11th June 1854 at a sale
made under a decree against G.D.,
but was not put into possession
of it; accordingly in 1866 he
obtained a decree for possession
which, however, was never exe-
cuted. The defendant in 1870
obtained possession of the house
by another sale made in execution
of another decree against G. D.
The present suit was instituted
by plaintiff in 1871.
Held that not only was the remedy
on the cause of action, which
accrued in 1854, and the decree
of 1866 barred, but also that Act
XXIII. of 1861, Sec. 11, prevent-
ed the plaintiff from bringing
a new suit on the fresh canse of
action accruing to him under the
decree of 1866, as that section
"took away from the parties to
the suit the right to raise by a
fresh suit any question as to
their rights and liabilities under
the decree." (Ranganasary v.
Shappani, 5 Mad. C. H. Rep.
375.)-Kisan v. Anandrám...433
9. H. sued a police constable for
damages for having made a false
report against H. The plaint was
filed on the 6th May 1872 in the
Court of the Subordinate Judge at
Malwan. On the 5th August 1872
the Subordinate Judge rejected
the plaint on the ground of want
of jurisdiction, under Sec. 32 of
Act XIV. of 1869. On the 7th
August 1872 H. filed a fresh
plaint in the District Court of
Ratnagiri, but the Judge rejected
it on the ground that the claim
was barred under Section 42 of
Bombay Act. VII. of 1867.
In special appeal the High Court
affirmed the Judge's order, hold-
ing that Sec. 3 of Act XIV. of
1859 cannot be regarded as ren-
dering Sec. 14 of the same Act
applicable to Sec. 42 of Bombay
Act VII. of 1867. Hari Rám-
chandra v. Vishuu Krishnáji.....204
10. Under Act IX. of 1871, Sche-
dule II. Article 72, limitation be-
gins to run on a bill of exchange,
or promissory note, payable on de-
mand (not accompanied by any
writing, restraining, or postpon-
ing the right to sue), at the time
when the demand is first made;
and if the first demand is com-
plete and unqualified, the period
of limitation must be regarded
as beginning to run from the
time of such first demand.
Quare whether the bringing of an
action to recover the amount due
on such bill, or promissory note,
should be regarded as a sufficient
notice?
Jeáunnissá Ládli Beyam Sáheb v.
Manekji Kharsetji (7 Bom. H. C.
Rep. 36, O. C. J.) referred to and
distinguished. Mádhavbhái v.Fat-
tesing.....
.487
See ACCOUNT STATED. APPEAL, 2.
BANKER AND CUSTOMER. CONSIDE-
RATION. MAMLATDA'R. PLAINT.
LIS ALIBI PENDENS......128, 129
LOCAL GOVERNMENT.-See Mo-
FUSSIL SMALL CAUSE COUrt.
MAGISTRATE, SECONDCLASS-
A Second Class Magistrate, who
issues an order under Sec. 518
of the Criminal Procedure Code,
has no jurisdiction to punish for
its disobedience by reason of Sec.
473 of the Criminal Procedure
Code. Reg. v. Ranchhod ......424
A Magistrate of the third class can
try a person accused of a cog-
nizable offence, who has been
forwarded to him by an officer in
charge of a police station under
Sec. 123 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure. Reg. V.
Lálá
Shambhu
cution of the plaintiff by the first
defendant, and sanctioned by
the second defendant as a Sub-
ordinate Judge, the plaintiff
(though, stating in the plaint
that the second defendant "ma-
liciously and without authority"
sanctioned the prosecution, and
that the Magistrate, before
whom it was brought, held that
there was no cause whatever for
the charge,) did not allege in
the plaint that the 1st defendant
prosecuted him (plaintiff) mali-
ciously and without any reason-
able or probable cause, or that
the prosecution was sanctioned
by the 2nd defendant without
reasonable or probable cause:
Held that the plaint was properly
rejected, and that there was no
good ground for allowing the
plaint to be amended, the plain-
tiff having delayed the filing of
it until the last day but one al-
lowed by the law of limitation.
Quare-Whether the first and
second defendants could properly
be joined in such an action?
In every such plaint, plaintiff
should name the amount of dam-
ages which he seeks to recover
as compensation for the injury of
which he complains.-Girdharlál
v. Jagannath
See JUDGE, ACTION AGAINST.
MAINTENANCE.-See HINDU LAW,
MALICE.-See JUDGE, ACTION
AGAINST. MALICIOUS PROSECUTION.
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION—
In a plaint, claiming damages for
an unsuccessful criminal prose-
An order of the Court of the Mám-
latdár under the last clause of
Sec. 1 of Bombay Act. V. of
1864, recognizing the possession
of a party and enjoining others
from disturbing that possession
is not an order under Act. XVI.
of 1838; and the limitation of
three years, prescribed in Article
7 of Sec. 1 of Act. XIV. of 1859
In assessing the market value of
house property, situated in the
town of Bulsar, acquired for
public purposes under Act X. of MIRA'SDA'R.-See LANDLORD AND
1870, the court awarded a capi-
tal sum which, at the rate of six
per cent. per annum, would yield
interest equal to the ascertained
annual rental of the premises after
deducting the amount necessarily MISDIRECTION.-See Summing Up
expended for annual repairs, A.
D. Carey v. Banu Miya, A. D.
Carey v. Kalu Miya........
34 MISTAKE.-See HINDU LAW, 2.
Where a servant, who was engaged
by the month, served from the
1st November to the 3rd Decem-
ber 1872, and left his master's
service on the 4th December,
without giving notice:
It was held that the servant was en-
titled to be paid his wages up to
the end of November but forfeit-
ed the wages payable to him in
respect of his December services.
Ramji Manor v. F. D. Little... 57
The plaintiff sold to the defendant
a field containing a well. Tax was
payable to Government on the
field as well as a tax on the well.
The deed of sale expressly provid-
ed for the payment of the tax on
the field by the defendant, but
was silent as to the tax on the
well. Government recovered the
amount of the tax on the well
from the plaintiff for 1871, as the
well stood entered in the Govern-
ment Books in the plaintiff's
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