tions which he delivered in the university of Edinburgh with so great reputation, he has contributed more than any living author to the popularity of these studies.

Mr Stewart has favoured the public with ten Essays, and the masterly manner in which he has executed his task will be acknowledged by all competent judges. The public have certainly, for a considerable number of years, looked forward to his completing the plan he had projected, and of which he gave intimation nearly twenty years ago; but, for reasons which are quite satisfactory, he has (we hope only for the present) relinquished that intention. The truth appears to us to be, that Mr S. is more fastidious respecting the merit of his own compositions than the public are disposed to be; and this, we are inclined to think, may be ascribed to his academical habits. Had he, like many eminent authors, been compelled to write, his fame, we have no doubt, would have been further extended. This also would have corrected some of the frequent allusions he makes to himself, to his works, what he has done, and purposes to do. This excellent work commences with a " Preliminary Dissertation," which contains many admirable observations respecting the proper method in which progress in the study of the human mind can alone be made. He justly remarks, that "as our notions both of matter and of mind are merely relative;-as we know the one only by such sensible qualities as extension, figure, and solidity, and the other by such operations as sensation, thought, and volition; we are entitled to say, that matter and mind, considered as objects of human study, are essentially different; the science of the former resting ultimately on phenomena exhibited to our senses, that of the latter on phenomena of which we are conscious. Instead, therefore, of objecting to the scheme of materialism that its conclusions are false, it would be more accurate to say that its aim is unphilosophical. It proceeds on a misapprehension of the extent and the limits of genuine science, the difficulty which it professes to remove being manifestly placed beyond the reach of our faculties. Surely, when we attempt to explain the nature of that principle which feels, and thinks, and wills, by saying that it is a material substance, or that it is the result of material organization, we impose on ourselves by words; forgetting that matter, as well as mind, is known to us by its qualities alone, and that we are equally ignorant of the qualities of either." P. ii.

These observations point out a distinction which has seldom or never been regarded by those who have espoused the theory of materialism. They have set out with a preconceived system which, they assume, can explain all the phenomena of human nature, and every circumstance and fact is made to bend to the favourite hypothesis. The popularity of this system in England can be very easily accounted for. The rayings of Hartley would never

have been attended to, had the paradoxes of this excellent man not attracted the attention of Priestley. The miscellaneous nature, and indeed the success, of the studies of the latter seem to have given a currency in England to opinions which never could have been propagated in any other circumstances. We are not afraid to affirm that Priestley's metaphysical doctrines were principally adopted by himself, in order to afford some aid to his theological opinions. The materialists have almost all proceeded from the same school. Darwin is confessedly an exception; but his most enthusiastic admirers must admit that his professional studies and habits had a great influence upon his metaphysical theories. Perhaps the tendency to account for our mental operations upon mechanical principles is universal; we are decidedly of opinion, however, that Mr Stewart has succeeded in proving that it is far from being the most philosophical. The truth is, that the jealousy which existed in England respecting Scotish literature, caused every effort made by our countrymen to be esteemed as an intrusion. It is a curious literary fact, which is well known to those who have had an opportunity of associating with the literary men in England, that what, by way of emphasis, may be called Reid's philosophy, has never been studied by a great majority of them. We congratulate our country men upon the great progress which the philosophy of the human mind is likely to acquire by the introduction of Bacon's mode of philosophizing to the speculations respecting the human mind. Of this Dr Reid afforded the first example. The preliminary dissertation, which consists of two chapters, contains admirable remarks upon this subject. The mode of philosophizing pursued by the admirers of Hartley is exploded; its disadvantages are accurately described, and its unscientific nature proved in the most satisfactory manner. Mr S. is a warm advocate for the inductive method first pointed out by Lord Bacon, whose works he recommends in the strongest terms. He observes justly, that "The effects which Bacon's writings have hitherto produced, have indeed been far more conspicuous in physics than in the science of mind. Even here, however, they have been great and most important, as well as in some collateral branches of knowledge (such as natural jurisprudence, political economy, criticism, and morals,) which spring up from the same root, or rather which are branches of that tree of which the science of mind is the trunk." P. lvii. It would have been a fortunate circumstance, if the line pointed out by this great man had been faithfully regarded by philosophers. Many theories and systems adopted by ingenious men would never have had an existence, and given place to what was rational, comprehensive, and consistent with the phenomena of nature.

The first Essay is "On Locke's Account of the Sources of Vol. I. Human

3 U

Human Knowledge." The influence of Locke, in giving popularity to opinions respecting the mind, has been greater than that of any modern philosopher. The sources of our knowledge he considered to be sensation and reflection; by the first we acquire the knowledge of external objects, and by the second, "such ideas as the mind gets by reflecting on its own operations within itself." There can be little doubt that this excessive generalization of the sources of all our knowledge proceeded from a desire of simplifying the very difficult subject he had undertaken to handle. Succeeding inquirers, however, have affirmed that there are some ideas which cannot be traced to either of these sources. Mr S. as well as others, consider "the origin of our notions concerning our own existence, and our personal identity, as irreconcileable with Locke's hypothesis." In the concluding chapters he describes the influence of Locke's account of the origin of our knowledge upon the speculations of various eminent writers since his time, more particularly upon those of Berkeley and Hume. This naturally introduces the subject of the second Essay, which is "On the Idealism of Berkeley." Indeed, the one may be considered as a continuation of the other. Having ably shown the great influence, in this country, of Locke's writings, he next proceeds to delineate the influence of the same philosopher's authority upon the systems which prevailed in France during the latter part of the eighteenth century. The author here discovers an extensive acquaintance with continental literature, and has certainly proved the proposition with which he set out, “ that Locke's account of the origin of our ideas has for many years past, been adopted implicitly, and almost universally, as a fundamental and unquestionable truth, by the philosophers of France." The fourth Essay treats of the metaphysical theories of Hartley, Priestley, and Darwin; and the fifth, which is the last of the first part of the volume, is on the tendency of some late philosophical speculations. We consider this Essay as the most novel and ingenious of those which have as yet been mentioned. It would be impossible for us to follow the author in the various strictures he has made upon Mr Tooke's philosophical theories-our limits prevent this. It is necessary, however, to observe, that, while he is anxious to do ample justice to the merit of Mr T.'s discoveries, he yet conceives that they lead to materialism. It is this inference which he combats so successfully. The third chapter of the Essay is thus concluded:

ar

"When I study the intellectual powers of man, in the writings of Hartley, of Priestley, of Darwin, or of Tooke, I feel as if I were examining the sorry mechanism that gives motion to a puppet. If, for a moment, carried along by their theories of human knowledge, and of human life, I seem to myself to be admitted behind the curtain of what I had once conceived to be a magnificent theatre; and, while I survey the tinsel frippery of the wardrobe, and the paltry decorations of the scenery, am mortified

to

to discover the trick which had cheated my eye at a distance. This surely is not the characteristic of truth or of nature; the beauties of which invite our closest inspection; deriving new lustre from those microscopical researches which deform the most finished productions of art. If, in our physical inquiries concerning the material world, every step that has been hitherto gained, has at once exalted our conceptions of its universality, and of its order, can we reasonably suppose, that the genuine philosophy of the mind is to disclose to us a spectacie less pleasing, or less elevating, than fancy or vanity had disposed us to anticipate?

"In dismissing this subject, it is, I hope, scarcely necessary for me to caution my readers against supposing, that the scope of the remarks now made, is to undervalue the researches of Mr Tooke and his followers. My wish is only to mark out the limits of their legitimate and very ample province. As long as tae philologer confines himself to the discussions of grammar and of etymology, his labours, while they are peculiarly calcu lated to gratify the natural and liberal curiosity of men of erudition, may often furnish important data for illustrating the progress of laws, of arts, and of manners;-for clearing up obscure passages in ancient writers;or for tracing the migrations of mankind, in ages of which we have no historical records. And although, without the guidance of more steady lights than their own, they are more likely to bewilder than to direct in the study of the mind, they may yet (as I shall attempt to exemplify in the second part of this volume) supply many useful materials towards a history of its natural progress; more particularly towards a history of imagination, considered in its relation to the principles of criticism. But, when the speculations of the mere scholar or glossarist presume to usurp, as they have too often done of late, the honours of philosophy, and that for the express purpose of lowering its lofty pursuits to a level with their own, their partisans stand in need of the admonition which Seneca addressed to his friend Lucilius, when he cautioned him against those grammatical sophists who, by the frivolous details of their verbal controversies, had brought discredit on the splendid disputations of the Stoical school:< Relinque istum ludum literarium philosophorum, qui rem magnificentissimam ad syllabas vocant, qui animum minuta docendo dimittunt et conterunt, et id agunt ut philosophia potius difficilis quam magna videatur*.”

We now proceed to the second part of Mr Stewart's Philosophical Essays. The first Essay is on the Beautiful, and we shall quote Mr Stewart's own words: "The essays which fill up the rest of the volume have no necessary dependence on the disquisitions to which they are subjoined; and may perhaps be read with some interest by readers who have little relish for scholastic controversy. The choice, however, even of these, was not altogether arbitrary; as, I trust, will appear evident to such as may honour the whole series with an attentive perusal." P. lxxv. We do not entertain the least doubt that such were actually the feelings of Mr Stewart. The connexion of human knowledge, however, is so great, and at other times so fugitive, as we are sometimes disposed to conceive of it, that perhaps some part of Mr Stewart's apology for publishing this separate work will be gratefully received by those who are inclined to controvert some of the leading sentiments of REID's philosophy, which he has so ably discussed. The state of My health having interrupted, for

Seneca, Epist. 71.

many

many months past, the continuation of my work on the human mind, I was induced to attempt, in the mean time, the easier task of preparing for the press a volume of essays." The public are well aware that the treatise which is referred to in the paragraph now quoted, was announced nearly eighteen years ago. With the state of Mr Stewart's health we are altogether disposed to sympathize. The public, however, may be perhaps of a similar opinion with us, that this has not been the sole cause. To a person little acquainted with the science he is appointed to teach, the task of preparing lectures must be very difficult. But we have the authority of Dr Smith for asserting, that, in process of time, a man even of a slender genius may by diligence render himself respectable as a professor. The time appropriated for our annual academical-course does not amount to one-half of the year, and the prelections, in general, only occupy one hour each day. What a noble opportunity for a man of genius and application to benefit mankind. And perhaps, during the whole course of Mr Stewart's splendid career as a professor, he never made a greater impression than when he was unexpectedly called to the chair of moral philosophy, and, upon shorter warning still, supplied the place of his friend Mr Robison, professor of natural philosophy in the university of Edinburgh. We do not mean, however, to insinuate in the smallest degree, that the volume now under review is unworthy of its author, or injurious to his fame.

The first essay of the second part of the Philosophical Essays is "On the Beautiful." This Essay, we are informed, (p. 340.) "has been lying by the author, much in the same state in which it now appears, for several years." The inquiry which Mr Stewart has instituted, has occupied the attention of speculative men from the earliest ages; and perhaps, were the matter thoroughly investigated, very little accession has been made to our knowledge, or at least to our modes of speaking of it, since the days of Aristotle. The aspect in which we view, and the manner in which we treat of it, may be different; but, to those whose taste is at all cultivated, the results cannot appear very dissimilar. Mr Stewart, in the first part of this Essay, treats of the Beautiful when presented immediately to our senses. This method is certainly natural, and perfectly accords with that inductive philosophy, of which Mr Stewart is justly so great an admirer. The author's theory will be best understood from his own words.

"Notwithstanding the great variety of qualities, physical, intellectual, and moral, to which the word beauty is applicable, I believe it will be admitted, that, in its primitive and most general acceptation, it refers to objects of sight. As the epithets sweet and delicious literally denote what is pleasing to the palate, and harmonious what is pleasing to the ear; as the epithets soft and warm denote certain qualities that are pleasing in objects of touch or of feeling ;-so the epithet beautiful literally denotes what is plea