"Second,-That in accordance with the terms of Annexation, Texas ceded to the General Government of The United States, among other public property, all her 'navy, navy-yards, arms, and armaments,' and that she has actually given up to The United States all that remained to her of the very navy furnished by the memorialists. Three of the vessels have been ordered to be sold, the proceeds to be paid into the Treasury of The United States, and one of them to be fitted for the immediate service of The United States.

"Third,―That by her annexation to The United States, Texas has been deprived of her duties on imports, almost her sole source of revenue, which were solemnly pledged to the memorialists for the faithful liquidation of the interest and principal of the aforesaid bonds.

66 Fourth, That The United States having thus become possessed of the identical vessels furnished by the memorialists, and also of the public revenues of Texas pledged for their payment, are properly responsible for the discharge of that obligation to the memorialists which the Republic of Texas justly incurred and uniformly regarded as binding and sacred.

"In view of all these facts, and after a careful and deliberate examination of the case, the Committee have agreed to recommend the speedy settlement of the claim of the memorialists, and for that purpose report the accompanying bill. "The form of the bond is as follows:

"REPUBLIC OF TEXAS.

"B. No. 1. Ten per Cent. Loan, 280,000 dollars.

"The Republic of Texas promises to pay to Frederick Dawson, or order, 280,000 dollars to be redeemed on the 1st day of December, 1843, with interest thereon at the rate of ten per cent. per annum from the date thereof, the said interest to be paid semi-annually, on the 1st days of June and December, at the Agency of The United States' Bank of Pennsylvania, in London, where the bond shall also be redeemed. The first payment of interest to be made on the

1st day of December, 1839. For the faithful redemption of this bond, interest and principal, at the agency aforesaid, the revenues and public faith of Texas are solemnly pledged, by virtue of an Act of the Congress of Texas, bearing date the 16th day of May, 1838. It is further stipulated, in conformity with a provision of the said Act, that the holder of this bond may at any time surrender the same, and in lieu of principal and interest due thereon, receive any of the public lands at the minimum prices fixed by the Government for the sale of their vacant lands.

"In testimony whereof we, the undersigned Commissioners duly authorized to that effect, have hereunto set our hands and seals this 13th day of November, in the city of Baltimore, the year 1838.

It is clear then, that so far as the merits of this claim. are concerned, they are identical with those involved in the claim of Mr. Holford; and it follows therefore that the reasons (which I have given at length in my judgment in that case, and which induced me to hold The United States responsible) are equally applicable, and govern my decision in the present case.

Two additional objections, however, have been made to the jurisdiction of the Commissioners, in respect of this claim of the representatives of Philip Dawson, by the learned Agent of The United States, which were not advanced as against that preferred by the executors of the late Mr. Holford. The first is, that this claim is only colourably the claim of Philip Dawson, being, in fact, that of Frederic

Dawson, a naturalized citizen of The United States, and therefore not entitled to be heard under this Convention; and the second is, that even if it be the claim of Philip Dawson, who was not naturalized, still, as he was domiciled in The United States at the period when the contract alluded to was made, he is to be considered, for the purpose of this investigation, and under the Convention of February, 1853, a citizen of The United States, and barred from claiming as a British subject.

With respect to the first assertion, it arises out of the fact that Frederic Dawson entered into the contract in his own name, but in fact as the partner of his brother, and for the benefit also of two other persons-a Mr. Schott and Mr. Whitney. The contract, however, is stated to have been. made on behalf of the firm, and thus Philip Dawson became beneficially entitled to a moiety. a moiety. Each applied for the benefit of the Bankrupt Acts, and in their respective schedules returned this debt as assets. Philip died before being adjudicated a bankrupt, but Frederic was declared one in the month of April 1843.

According to The United States' Bankrupt Act of the 19th of August, 1841, all the joint stock of the firm, as well as the separate estate of the partners, vests in the assignees. Philip Dawson dying, the joint property, as well as the separate estate of each, vested in the assignee by virtue of the decree in bankruptcy pronounced on Frederic Dawson's application.

The assignee, under the third section of the Act, took the estate of Philip Dawson as the latter held it, and by the fourteenth section the entire right and interest of both partners in the assets of the firm vested in him, and consequently he is the representative of Philip Dawson; and if Philip Dawson could, as most undoubtedly he could if he had not died or been made a bankrupt, have represented before any tribunal the whole of this claim, because a partner in the firm for whose benefit the contract was made, his assignee, on his being made a bankrupt, could also have represented it. And it makes no difference that the bank* Statutes at large, Vol. V, Page 448.

ruptcy of the firm was declared on the application of his brother, because, as is evident from the section to which I have already referred, the joint stock of the company and separate estate of each partner become vested in the assignee, if only one of the partners makes the application: and being so vested in the assignee, if Philip Dawson could as a British subject, although resident in The United States, have come before this Commission to recover his debt, the creditors might have used his name for the purpose of prosecuting his claim, and so therefore may his assignee. So far therefore as the right to prosecute this claim is concerned before this Commission, the assignee of Philip Dawson standing in the place of Philip Dawson, as the representative of Philip Dawson, and on behalf of his creditors and the creditors of the firm of Dawson and Company, is properly before us. And what to my mind is conclusive on this subject is this, that if, after payment of all the creditors, it should appear there is a surplus, that surplus would have to be handed over to the private estate of each bankrupt; and assuming for the moment the bankrupt Philip to be clearly a British subject, it would follow that he would have a clear right to claim under this Convention a debt due from the United States' Government to himsel and brother jointly, notwithstanding that brother was a naturalized citizen, and for the reason that he would not the less have a personal interest in its recovery. My colleague contends, with reference to other claims which have been brought before us, that no objection ought to be taken to the claim of an American citizen, although he may have a foreigner for a partner, domiciled in England, jointly interested with him in its recovery. I do not therefore understand how, consistently with this view, he can deny to a subject of Great Britain the right to present a claim under this Convention, on the ground of his having for a partner a naturalized citizen of The United States jointly interested with him. It is true that The United States' Agent refused to consider this claim in any other light than the claim of Frederic Dawson; but this cannot alter the fact that Philip Dawson had a clear

interest in an undivided moiety of the sums secured by the bonds.

Admitting then that Frederic Dawson, being a naturalized citizen of The United States, could not claim under this Convention as a British subject, I pass to the second objection, which, as I have already stated, is to the effect that, admitting, for the purposes of argument, that this is the claim of Philip Dawson, yet that, inasmuch as he was domiciled in The United States at the time the contract was made, he is not entitled to claim as a British subject under the terms of this Convention.

This objection, founded on the effect of domicile in altering the national character of the party domiciled, has been so constantly urged against every English claim presented to this Commission where the claimant has been resident abroad, and has been moreover as constantly held valid and good by my colleague, and, on my differing with him, by the umpire appointed under the Convention to decide upon all questions in difference between us, that I feel it my duty to point out, so far as I am able, the misapprehension under which, in my opinion, they labour.

What is then the proposition contended for? It is in effect this, that "an English subject domiciled abroad is to be held as having changed his national character, and to be disentitled to look to the British Government for protection." When this startling doctrine was first broached by the learned Agent of The United States, I confess that it took me by surprise, nor is that surprise diminished when I find that the effect of its being admitted by my colleague and the umpire will be the rejection of a large class of claims presented on behalf of British subjects engaged in trade abroad, which have actually been the subject of discussion between the two Governments, and with reference to which I must, therefore, conclude this Convention was entered into.

The first case in which the objection was taken was that of the Messrs. Laurent, who it was proved were British-born subjects, resident in Mexico, and there engaged in trade; their complaint being that they had been unjustly deprived