the Orders in Council were issued. The injury he sustained was, under these circumstances, in no way wrongful. The decision therefore was not, as we are now asked to decide, that the claimant being domiciled abroad, could not, under any circumstances, be entitled to the character of British subject; but that he was not a British subject, within the meaning of the instrument then under consideration, entitled to redress. The "Indian Chief," reported in 3 Rob. Rep. 12, as well as the "President," in 5 Rob. Rep. 107, are both cases in which the claimants had acquired a hostile character against their own country, and, as enemies, had sustained losses which were rightfully inflicted on enemies. It was impossible, therefore, for them to establish a claim against this country upon the ground that they were British subjects, in the face of the fact of their having been in a position of hostility to Great Britain. In these cases, however, the merits and justice of the claim were in question, and they did not depend, nor were they decided, upon a mere question of domicile. It does not appear to me necessary to examine the other cases in detail, inasmuch as none of them in my judgment show that the term "British subject" necessarily excludes every person domiciled out of the British dominions. And it becomes our duty to ascertain, from the object and language of the present Convention, the sense in which the words in question were employed by the Contracting Parties.

The object of the Convention is stated to effect "a speedy and equitable settlement" of certain claims pending, and which had become the subject of discussion between the two Governments; and it is not merely for the settlement of the claims themselves, but, rather, to remove them from the arena of discussion between the two Governments, that the present tribunal has been erected; and it is, therefore, provided that all claims, &c., which may have been, or might be, presented to either Government for its interposition with the other, should be referred to this Commission.

It is a fact that the applications to the English and American Governments for their interposition one with the other have not been confined to citizens or subjects domi

ciled in their own country, but the claims of persons domiciled abroad have, in several instances, become the subject of correspondence between the two Governments;-it appears to me, therefore, that if the sense in which the term "British subject" or "American citizen" are to be construed be sought in the context of the Convention, it will be found that the Contracting Parties contemplated American citizens or British subjects, wherever resident, whose claims had actually been, or might properly become, the subject of the interposition of the one Government with the other.

If, then, this be a correct mode of stating the question which we have to determine, it cannot be denied that the practice of Governments has been to extend their protection to such of their citizens as may be domiciled abroad, and to insist upon, and with success, redress for injuries. Instances in which the American Government has so extended its protection and demanded compensation have been mentioned; and the case of Don Pacifico shows that the English Government has considered itself entitled to interfere on behalf of an Englishman, though domiciled abroad. And many other instances might be collected from the history of recent times.

Having regard, therefore, to the fact that both the English and American Governments have, from time to time, interposed in respect of their subjects or citizens domiciled out of their respective countries, and that such interposition has in some instances led to the preferment of claims by the one Government on the other which were pending at the time that the present Convention was entered into, it is clear to me that the High Contracting Parties in entering into the present Treaty intended to provide a tribunal for the settlement of all claims, whether preferred on behalf of subjects domiciled in the British dominions or elsewhere, and consequently that the claim of the Messrs. Laurent is admissible before us.

I cannot find any force in the argument, that if the Messrs. Laurent are admitted under this Convention as British subjects, thousands of American citizens by birth

having claims against the American Government, might also have presented them before the Commissioners as British subjects by descent. If I am right in the rule of interpretation which I have adopted, it is clear that they could not; for it would be ridiculous to suppose that either of the Contracting Parties intended this international tribunal to adjudicate upon the claims of acknowledged citizens or subjects upon their own Governments. The effect also of acquiescence in the interpretation to be given to the words "British subjects" in the Treaty contended for by the learned Agent of The United States, would be that henceforth no merchant residing in a foreign country could ever claim the assistance and protection of the Governmet of the country of which he was a native, and to which country he owes allegiance. Thus an English merchant residing in France, or an American merchant residing in England, is to be considered as barred from appealing to England or America for protection and assistance.

Mr. Everett, in his correspondence with Lord Aberdeen on the Rough Rice question, incidentally maintains the same view of the law and practice of nations which I have already expressed, although he carries it somewhat further than is necessary for the purposes of the argument in the present case. The American Minister there insisted on his right to interfere, under the Treaty of Commerce between Great Britain and The United States, on behalf of an English firm, claiming compensation for pecuniary damage done in consequence of a non-observance of the Treaty, because one of the members of that firm was an American citizen, domiciled in England. If in that case domicile in England had ousted the American partner of his right to appeal to The United States Government for protection, or for its interference in obtaining for him the compensation due for an injury thus done to him, Mr. Everett was wrong in claiming the right to interfere, and Lord Aberdeen was wrong in admitting it.

My judgment is founded on the following conclusions, at which, after a careful consideration of the arguments that

have been advanced on either side, I have arrived. To recapitulate them, they are shortly as follows:

That the Messrs. Laurent are admitted to be-whatever else they may also be-British subjects.

That mere residence in a foreign country in time of peace or war, does not deprive a merchant of his original citizenship, or of the right to call for the protection of the Government of his native country; although his continued residence in the country in time of war, gives the right to the enemies of that country to consider and treat him as an

enemy.

That although such residence may clothe him with certain rights of citizenship and involve certain liabilities, it does not divest his original national character.

That the practice and usage of nations sanction the interference of a Government on behalf of its subjects or citizens resident abroad, as well as at home.

That Consuls and Diplomatic Agents are specially instructed to watch over and protect the subjects of the countries of their respective Governments, resident in the countries to which they may be accredited.

That such being the usage and practice of nations, the words used in this Treaty are to be interpreted in connection with, and by the aid of, such usage and practice.

That, consequently, it was the intention of the Contracting Parties to the Convention of 1853, that the Commissioners appointed under it should decide, according to justice and equity, upon the claims of individuals in the position of the Messrs. Laurent,

Mr. UPHAM, American Commissioner:

It appears from the memorial of the claimants, filed in this case, that they have been resident merchants, engaged in business in Mexico, from 1829 to the present time, a period of twenty-five years; that, in 1847, a law was passed by the Mexican Congress, authorizing a sale of certain Church property, for the purpose of raising the sum of 15,000,000 dollars for the necessities of the Government.

The claimants occupied a house belonging to the Church, and made proposals to the Government to purchase it. These proposals were accepted, and the Government ordered the contract to be duly drawn up, and executed by the authorized officer, appointed for this purpose. The contract was signed by the Messrs. Laurent, and the purchase-money was deposited in the hands of a banker, to await the execution of the instrument by the Government officer; but owing to some neglect it was not signed by him, and in the meantime a Revolution occurred, and the new President was authorized to annul the law for the sale of the Church property, which he did. The claimants remonstrated against the proceeding, and claimed the property under their contract with the Government.

While such was the existing state of things in reference to this property, war occurred between The United States and Mexico. The city of Mexico was taken, and the money of the Messrs. Laurent thus deposited, was confiscated by the commander of the American army as the property of the Mexican Government.

After peace was made between the two countries, the Church claimed the house as their property, and instituted suit to obtain possession of it. The Mexican courts sustained the claim of the Church, and dispossessed the Messrs. Laurent of the house; and they now seek remuneration against The United States, for the money confiscated, as British sub