seizure; if, on the other hand, they were "goods, etc.," then, although the Captain was punishable to a certain extent, yet the "ship" was liable to forfeiture. Of this there could be no doubt. It is in fact impossible to find provisions more clear or explicit. The moment therefore it was ascertained that "stores" were smuggled, there could be no pretence for libelling the ship; and of the fact that it was "stores" that were smuggled, there could be no doubt, because the Captain was convicted of the offence under the 45th section. Moreover, as Judge Hoffman observed on the trial of the case, "It was not denied that the rice was landed without a permit, nor that it was taken on board bona fide for the use of the passengers on board, nor that what remained was remaining sea stores' according to the 23rd section of the Act of 1799. It was further admitted that it was reported as such by the master, according to the 30th section, and ascertained to be such according to the 45th section; and the master was permitted to clear with it by the collector as 'sea stores.""

After this then it is impossible not to hold that the libelling of the vessel was vexatious, and without any probable cause.

The "fact" relative to the smuggling, or the nature of the goods smuggled, was not doubtful, for the Court had convicted the master of the offence: the "construction of the law" was not doubtful, for the Act is perfectly explicit on the subject: nor did the circumstances warrant suspicion, for they were all known by the trial of the master.

There was therefore no reasonable pretext for granting the certificate of probable cause, and the Judge, in my opinion, was perfectly right in refusing it.

To the wrong done to the owner of the vessel, by this wholly unauthorized seizure of his ship, The United States' Attorney added another injury, by appealing against the judgment of the District Court to the Supreme Court of The United States. The effect of this course was to detain the ship for some months; but it does not clearly appear that this appeal was ever prosecuted, the order of release coming direct from the Department of State, and apparently in consequence of a representation by the British Government.

I had hoped that, in awarding to the claimant a fair sum in respect of the damages sustained by him in consequence of the seizure of his ship and its detention, I should have had the full concurrence of my colleague, as in the case of the American ship "Jones" on the coast of Africa, he expressed a strong opinion on the impropriety of the captors appealing against the judgment of the Vice-Admiralty Court of Sierra Leone decreeing the restitution of the vessel. This case is even stronger than that, for it did not appear in the case of the "Jones" that the appeal, which was never formally entered, had any effect upon the vessel; whereas in the present, the detention consequent on it is admitted. In the case also of the "Jones" he repudiated the notion of the claimant or his agents giving security for costs not amounting to 100%, on the ground of the intervening distance. I think that the same reason would apply here with greater force, as it would have been necessary for the claimant, "with one or more sureties," to have given a bond in the penal sum of 46,000 dollars, the amount at which the court appraised the value of the vessel. Nor do I understand that it is the custom of merchants or their consignees to give bonds under similar circumstances to those attending the seizure of the "Baron Renfrew."

In estimating the damages sustained by the claimant I find some difficulty, as there is no evidence offered by the Government of The United States in rebuttal of his estimate; and although it is supported by oath, and appears to be in every respect entitled to belief, I feel that it is still ex parte. It would have been more satisfactory to me, had the learned United States' Agent been prepared with some evidence. In the absence of it however, it is my duty to decide upon that which is offered, and which appears to be properly authenticated: I adjudge therefore to the claimant the sum of 27,250 dollars, in full satisfaction of all claims upon the Government of The United States.

Mr. Upham, American Commissioner, did not deliver any written judgment in this case.

THE "BARON RENFREW."

London, 23rd December, 1854.

THE umpire reports that this vessel was seized at San Francisco on a charge of smuggling, and libelled in the District Court of The United States. At the trial, it was shown that the merchandize smuggled (59 or 99 bags of rice) had been entered on the manifest of the ship as stores, and according to the laws of The United States, the smuggling of stores does not involve the forfeiture of the ship. She was accordingly cleared and restored to the claimants by Decree of the Court. The District Attorney held a different opinion, and appealed to the Supreme Court of The United States. The rice was condemned as forfeited, and the Captain of the ship incurred the penalty of three times the value (the rice sold for 2200 dollars) which being unable to pay, he was imprisoned. At Washington, the judgment of the District Court was confirmed, and the ship finally delivered up. The ship had been valued for bonding at 23,000 dollars, but for some reason, the claimant's Agents did not see fit to give bond.

The vessel was seized August 6th, 1852.

The libel was dismissed September 21st. 1852.

In custody of the Marshal four months and twenty-seven days; deducting the time from the 6th of August to the 21st of September, for which no reasonable claim for detention can be made; there appears to have been a detention of three months and-a-half, for which, and for a portion of legal expenses, I award to Duncan Gibb, Esquire, and owners of the ship "Baron Renfrew," or their legal representatives, the sum of six thousand dollars, on the fifteenth January, 1855.

JOSHUA BATES, Umpire.

THE BRIG "ENTERPRIZE."

THE brig "Enterprize " sailed from Alexandria, in the District of Columbia, on the 22nd of January, 1835, for Charleston, South Carolina.

She had on board seventy-three slaves, besides the owners of the vessel. She encountered severe weather on her passage, was driven from her course, and ultimately put into Port Hamilton, in Bermuda, to refit and procure provisions, in order to enable her to proceed on her voyage.

While in port, the slaves claimed and obtained their liberty.

A claim was subsequently made for indemnity, under the circumstances in which the vessel entered into port; and after much correspondence between the Governments in reference to it, the claim was still pending at the time the Convention was entered into, and it was then presented for adjustment by the Commission.

HANNEN, agent and counsel for Great Britain, resisted the claim on the several grounds following, viz:

1. That laws have no force in themselves beyond the territory of the country by which they are made.

2. That, while by the comity of nations, the laws of one country are, in some cases, allowed by another to have operation within its territory when it is so permitted, the foreign law has its authority in the other country from the sanction given to it there, and not from its original institution.

3. That every nation is the sole judge of the extent and the occasions on which it will permit such operation, and is not bound to give such permission when the foreign law is contrary to its interests or its moral sentiments.

4. That England does not admit within its territory the

application of any foreign law establishing slavery, having abolished the status of slavery throughout her dominions.

5. He contended that the condition of apprenticeship, as permitted to remain in the West India Islands, formed no exception to the abolition of slavery throughout the British dominions, as it was a system entirely different from slavery, and would not justify sustaining any other description of slavery.

6. That the liberty of any individual in British territory could not be restrained without some law to justify such restraint, and that neither the apprentice law nor any other law could be appealed to, to justify the detention of these

negroes.

7. That slavery was not a relation which the British Government, by the comity of nations, was bound to respect.