the material nature of property with the spiritual nature of man. The law of nature and of nations, dealing solely in actual truths, does not recognize this local fiction; and although it refrains from interference within the limits of the nation establishing it, yet it takes every opportunity beyond these limits of asserting or vindicating its own principles.

"It is one of these first principles, that man has an immortal soul, and it will not recognize or protect any human institution that is at war, as slavery is, with this catholic and immutable truth.

"When, therefore, a man, either by force or not (and it may be added, by accident) on the part of his owner, escapes beyond the limits of the local law that fastens slavery upon him, he falls under the benign protection of the law of nature, which steps in and sets bounds to the local fiction, and declares that it shall only be respected within the jurisdiction of the community that promulgated it. The law of nature did not make man a slave, and, therefore, that law will not keep him one."

Lord Palmerston in effect states the principle thus announced when, with the concurrence of those eminent men who now fill the highest judicial seats in the country, -viz., the present Lord Chancellor, the Lord Chief Justice of England, and the Judge of the Admiralty Court, - he declares that a distinction exists between laws bearing upon the personal liberty of man, and laws bearing upon the property which man may claim in irrational animals or in inanimate things.

"If a ship," says his Lordship in a despatch upon this subject," containing such animals or things, were driven by stress of weather into a foreign port, the owner of the cargo would not be justly deprived of his property by the operation of any particular law which might be in existence in that port, because in such a case there would be but two parties interested in the transaction the foreign owner and the local authority; and it would be highly unjust that the former should be stripped of what belongs to him through the forcible

application of the municipal law of a State to which he had not voluntarily submitted himself.

"But in a case in which a ship so driven into a foreign port by stress of weather contains men over whose personal liberty another man claims to have an acquired right, there are three parties to the transaction-the owner of the cargo, the local authority, and the alleged slave; and the third party is no less entitled than the first to appeal to the local authority for such protection as the law of the land may afford him. But if men who have been held in slavery are brought into a country where the condition of slavery is unknown and forbidden, they are necessarily, and by the very nature of things, placed at once in the situation of aliens who have at all times from their birth been free.

"Such persons can in no shape be restrained of their liberty by their former master any more than by any other

person.

"If they were given up to such former master, they would be aggrieved, and would be entitled to sue for damages. But it would be absurd to say that when a State has prohibited slavery within its territory, this condition of things must arise, namely, that as often as a slave-ship shall take refuge in one of the ports of that State, liability must necessarily be incurred either to the former owner of the slaves, if the slaves be liberated, or to the slaves themselves, if they are delivered up to the former owner.

"If, indeed, a municipal law be made which violates the law of nations, a question of another kind may arise. But the municipal law which forbids slavery is no violation of the law of nations. It is, on the contrary, in strict harmony with the law of nature; and therefore, when slaves are liberated according to such municipal law, there is no wrong done, and there can be no compensation granted."

I have hitherto considered this case upon general principles, because, as other cases may occur, it is important to lay down general rules; but the special circumstances of the case would disentitle the claimants to compensation.

One ground, if indeed it be not the chief ground upon which this claim has been rested, is that the "Eterprize" was compelled by necessity to put into the port of Bermuda, and that on this account the owners of the slaves were entitled to claim exemption from the operation of English laws. I do not think, however, that any such case of necessity has been made out as would give rise to the exemption contended for, if under any circumstances it could arise. It is not pretended that the "Enterprize" was forced by storm into Bermuda. All that is asserted is, that her provisions had run short by reason of her having been driven out of her course. No case of pressing, overwhelming need is shown to have existed; but to avoid the inconvenience of short rations (and, considering the nature of the cargo, it was an inconvenience which a very slight delay was likely to occasion) the master put into an English harbour to procure supplies. These facts do not certainly disclose that paramount case of necessity which has been insisted on throughout the argument, and which alone (if any circumstances could give rise to the exemption upon which this claim is supported) could form the basis of such an appeal as the present. If a mere scarcity of provisions, which might arise from so many causes, is to be considered not only as a sufficient excuse for the entrance of a vessel into a British port with a prohibited cargo, but is also to entitle it to an exemption from the operation of English law, it is impossible to say to what the admission of such a principle might lead, or what frauds on the part of slave-speculators it might induce.

With respect to the cases of the "Comet" and "Encomium," it has been insisted that they are not distinguishable in principle from that of the "Enterprize;" and that, as the English Government granted compensation in these cases, we are bound by the precedent thus made. Those vessels, however, were driven into British ports, and the slaves on board were set free before the passing of the Act abolishing slavery. There was, therefore, no importation within the meaning of the Act 5 Geo. IV. ch. 113, which declared it

illegal to import slaves, and made it a felony to do so, and consequently there was no breach of the English law. Being then in an English port, the only question was whether there was any law which prevented their owners retaining possession of them. At that time there was not. Slavery was then in full force in the Bahamas, and of the same kind as that to which the American slaves were subject. The possession of the slaves was not therefore unlawful, nor was the relation between them and their masters liable to be dissolved by the mere accidental arrival of both in the colony. But at the time when the "Enterprize" was brought into the port of Hamilton, Great Britain had utterly and for ever abolished the status of slavery throughout the British colonies and plantations abroad (see Act of 3 & 4 Wm. IV. ch. 73, sec. 9). And by an Act of the Colonial Legislature, the apprenticeship system, created by the Act of William IV., was dispensed with. Slavery, therefore, in no form whatever, was known in the Bermudas at the time the "Enterprize" entered the port. It was impossible, therefore, that any judge called upon to administer the law within these islands could for any purpose, or under any circumstances, recognize the relation of master and slave as subsisting within the reach of his authority.

Under these circumstances, I am clearly of opinion that the claim of the owners of the slaves on board the "Enterprize" at the time she put into Port Hamilton, cannot be sustained, and that it ought, upon every principle of law, to be rejected.

"THE ENTERPRIZE."

MR. UPHAM, United States' Commissioner:

The "Enterprize" sailed from Alexandria, in the District of Columbia, on the 22nd of January, 1835, for Charleston, South Carolina. She had on board a cargo of merchandize and seventy-three slaves, with their owners. She was driven from her course, and, after being at sea three weeks, was compelled, through stress of weather and her leaky condition, to put into Port Hamilton, in the Island of Bermuda, until she could refit and proceed on her voyage. While there, the slaves on board were seized and liberated by the authorities of the island.

Claim for compensation was made on the British Government for the value of these slaves, and various communications have passed between the two Governments on the subject.

In March, 1840, resolutions were submitted to The United States' Senate relative to this claim, by Mr. Calhoun, which were adopted by that body, and which briefly set forth the principles on which the claim is based.

These principles are:-"That a vessel on the high seas, in time of peace, engaged in a lawful voyage, is, according to the law of nations, under the exclusive jurisdiction of the State to which she belongs; and that, if such vessel is forced, by stress of weather or other unavoidable circumstance, into the port of a friendly power, her country, in such case, loses none of the rights appertaining to her on the high seas, either over the vessel or the personal relations of those on board."

It was contended that the "Enterprize" came within these principles, and that the seizure and liberation of the negroes on board of her, by the authorities of Bermuda, was a violation of these principles and of the law of nations.

On the other hand, it was contended by the British Government that slavery had been abolished in the islands of Bermuda by the statute of 3 & 4 Wm. IV., ch. 73, passed August 28, 1833; and that the "Enterprize," being locally