and the property and relations of the persons on board cannot, in such case, be interfered with by the local law, so as to obstruct her voyage or change such relations, so long as they do not conflict with the law of nations.

These positions do not seem to be contested, as a general rule; but it is said that since the abrogation of slavery by England, the principles thus laid down will not apply to slave property, and this brings me to the fourth point to be considered.

IV. That the Act of 3 & 4 Wm. IV, ch. 73, abolishing slavery in Great Britain and her dependencies, could not have the effect to overrule the rights laid down in the foregoing propositions.

It has been contended that the law abolishing slavery overruled the law of nations, on the ground that slavery is contrary to natural right, and is, in fact, beyond the protection of all law. Authorities have been cited as tending to sustain this doctrine, going back to the earliest adjudged case in France, where the question was elaborately examined, and it was held that the institution of slavery, in the absence of specific law, could not be sustained under any subsisting usage or custom of that country, as it was contrary to the laws of nature and humanity, and slaves could not breathe in France.

Long after this, the Somerset case, sustaining the same principle, came up in England, and from that time this has been considered the leading case on the subject; and the declaration founded upon it, "that slaves cannot breathe in England," has been usually regarded as a sentiment peculiarly applicable to British soil and institutions.

The doctrine of the Somerset case, and the expressions of numerous distinguished English and American jurists sustaining it, including Chief Justice Marshall, Mr. Justice Story, and Chief Justice Shaw, have been fully cited in this case, "that slavery is against the law of nature;" "has no foundation in natural or moral right;" "is odious," &c.

These doctrines are not novel on the American side of the Atlantic. They were the established sentiments there a

century before the revolution, and were reiterated again and again, from that period down to the time of the separation from England, in constant acts of the colonial legislatures, and in constant protests against the importation of slaves into the colonies. But the royal colonial governors were instructed to veto all such acts, and the institution of slavery was perseveringly forced upon America.

I see no occasion to dissent from the full effect of the adjudications cited, or the sentiments expressed; but they do not settle any question of international right arising in this case, or define any line of limitation betwixt conflicting jurisdictions, or sustain at all the point to which they are cited, that slavery cannot subsist by valid law.

What is law is a question of fact; and though its original institution may have been of doubtful morality or justice, it is still law. It is a dangerous doctrine that all law, not originally conceived and promulgated in abstract right, is invalid, or is to be instantly overthrown.

This is readily shown by extending the inquiry to other subjects. By what abstract or natural right, I might ask, is one man born to rule over another, or one set or class of men by birth to become legislators for others? There is no such natural inequality; there is no principle of abstract right to sustain such an order of things. But we must deal with institutions as they are, and relations as they subsist. Reforms must advance gradually. The time will doubtless come when all things not founded in right will cease; when there will be no privileged classes by birth; no compulsory support of one religious sect by another, to which it is conscientiously opposed; no sales of religious presentations; no slavery.

But these Gordian knots, that have been compacted for centuries, and are intertwined and bound up in all the relations of men, are not to be severed at a blow. Each nation must deal with them, in its own time and manner. Such measures of reform cannot be promoted by the illegal interference of one nation with another, or by forcing upon shipwrecked individuals, temporarily thrown within the limits of another land, laws in conflict with their own rights of

self-government, and the established relations of their country.

These views are sustained by the concurrence of some of the ablest English jurists, and the settled adjudications of English law. Thus it has been holden, though the slave trade is declared to be contrary to the principles of justice and humanity, no state has a right to control the action of any other government on the subject (The Amedie, 1 Dod. 84 n; The Fortuna, 1 Dod. 81; The Diana, 1 Dod. 101); and that no nation can add to the law of nations by its own arbitrary ordinances (Pollard v Bell, 8 Term rep. 434; 2 Park on Insurance, 731); or privilege itself to commit a crime against the law of nations by municipal regulations of its own (Le Louis, 2 Dod. 251).

It is also holden that a foreigner, in a British court of justice, may recover damages in respect of a wrongful seizure of slaves.-(Maddrazzo v. Willes, 3 Barn. & Ald. 353; The Diana, 1 Dod. 95.) And in the case of Le Louis, 2 Dod. 238, above cited, Sir William Scott (Lord Stowell) says, though the slave trade is unjust and condemned by the laws of England, it is not therefore a criminal traffic by the laws of nations; and every nation, independent of its relinquishment by treaty, has a legal right to carry it on. "No one nation," he says, "has a right to force the way to the liberation of Africa by trampling on the independence of other states; or to procure an eminent good by means that are unlawful; or to press forward to a great principle by breaking through other great principles that stand in the way."

And when pressed in the same case with the inquiry, "What would be done if a French ship laden with slaves should be brought into England?" he says. "I answer without hesitation, restore the possession which has been unlawfully divested; rescind the illegal act done by your own subjects, and leave the foreigner to the justice of his own country."

The doctrine that slavery cannot be sustained by valid law must be set at rest by these authorities.

There is but one other ground on which it can be con

tended that the act of 3 & 4 Will. IV. ch. 73, overrules the principles I have laid down, and that is, that the municipal law of England is paramount to the absolute rights of other governments when they come in conflict with each other. Such a position virtually abolishes the entire code of international law. If one State can at pleasure revoke such a law, any other State may do the same thing, and the whole system of international intercourse becomes a mere matter of arbitrary will, and of universal violence.

It appears to me from a full examination of the law applicable to the case, that the "Enteprize" was entitled, under the immediate perils of her condition, to refuge in the Bermudas; that she had a right to remain there a sufficient time to accomplish the purposes of her entry, and to depart as she came; that the local authorities could not legally enter on board of her for the purpose of interfering with the condition of persons or things as established by the laws of her country; and that such an exercise of authority over the commerce and institutions of a friendly State is not warranted by the laws of nations.

66

For these reasons I am of opinion that the claim before the Commission is sustained, and that the owners of slaves on board the " Enterprize" are entitled to compensation for the illegal interference with them by the authorities of Bermuda.

THE "ENTERPRIZE."

London, 23rd December, 1854. THE umpire reports that this claim is presented on behalf of the Charleston Marine Insurance Company of South Carolina, and of the Augusta Insurance Company in Georgia, for the recovery of the value of 72 slaves, forcibly taken from the brig" Enterprize," Elliot Smith, Master, on the 20th February, 1835, in the harbour of Hamilton, Bermuda. The following are the facts and circumstances of the case: The American brig, "Enterprize," Smith, Master, sailed from Alexandria, in the District of Colombia, United States, on the 22nd January, 1835, bound for Charleston, South Carolina. After encountering head winds and gales, and finding their provisions and water running short, it was deemed best by the master to put into Hamilton, in the Island of Bermuda for supplies. She arrived there on the 11th February, having taken in the supplies required, and having completed the repair of the sails, she was ready for sea on the 19th, with the pilot on board. During the repairs no one from the shore was allowed to communicate with the slaves. The vessel was kept at anchor in the harbour, not brought to the wharf. Being thus ready for sea, Captain Smith proceeded with his agent to the Custom-house to clear his vessel outward, the Collector stated that he had received a verbal order from the Council to detain the brig's papers until the Governor's pleasure could be known. The Comptroller and a Mr. Tucker then went to the other public offices, and on their return to the Custom-house the Comptroller, after consulting a few minutes with the Collector, declared that he would not give up the papers that evening, but would report the vessel out the next morning as early as the Captain might choose to call for the papers. In consequence of this decision the Captain immediately noted his protest in the Secretary's Office against the Collector and