nothing to be desired. The claimants then proceeded to the Custom House to pay their duties according to the improved tariff. The Collector refused to receive such duties, but demanded the duties of the unmodified tariff of The United States (of the 31st March), which the claimants were compelled to pay, viz., on 54 bales woollen and worsted goods

It cannot be said that these duties were not levied according to law; nevertheless, as the modifications in the tariff were made at the suggestion of the claimants, it seems a hard case that they should be the only parties not allowed the benefit of the alteration. The documents appear to be in order and certified by F. M. Dimond, Collector. It is pretty certain that the authorities at Washington did not quite understand the case, or I think they would have allowed the claimants the benefit of the provisions of the modified tariff. I therefore award to Messrs. McCalmont, Greaves and Co., or their legal representatives, the sum of eleven thousand seven hundred and thirty-three dollars fifty-eight cents, on the fifteenth January, 1855.

The claim for $7154.29 for overcharge of duties on cotton goods I reject, believing it not right to select a particular kind of cotton goods from a large invoice on which to make a claim, when the duties on the other portion must have been far lower than they would have paid under the Mexican tariff. These duties as before stated, were levied in conformity with the law, and it is only the peculiar circumstances and hardships in the case of the woollens that could justify this Commission in granting any portion of the claim. JOSHUA BATES, Umpire.

MESSRS. KERFORD AND JENKIN.

MR. HORNBY, British Commissioner:

IN considering the case, stated that he came to a different result from his colleague; he regarded the special licence given to the claimants to continue their trade with Mexico, extended not merely to the frontier, but to the interior, and that The United States' Government having once given the licence, it was not competent for an officer of that Government at his own will and pleasure practically to revoke it, by detaining the claimant's goods; but if the necessities of war, or the public safety rendered this detention necessary, and the Government ratified the act of its officers, it was properly answerable for the loss occasioned.

He was of opinion also, that the burden of proof, showing the necessity of detention, was on the Government, and should not have been left as a mere matter of inference to be drawn from the general facts in the case, but that direct evidence should have been given on the point; and that substantially the same evidence existed in this case as in the case of Harmony v. Mitchell, cited by counsel, where the jury found for the plaintiffs.

MR. UPHAM, United States' Commissioner:

THE abstract of the case drawn up presents fully all the particulars necessary for its consideration. There is no doubt that the detention of the caravan, caused by the military forces, which were also proceeding to the same point in the enemy's country, was a serious damage to the claimants. There is good reason to believe the damage would have been far greater, however, had no permission been granted to proceed with the goods beyond Philadelphia, as they were ordered especially for the Mexican market.

The permission given was designed for the relief of the claimants on account of the particular circumstances of the case, and was so received. Injustice has been done to the Government by representing it as a pledge or guaranty that the caravan should proceed unmolested by the war existing between the two countries; but the exact reverse of this is the fact. The goods were allowed to proceed, with the benefit of a drawback for the return of duties, but they were to incur all the risks dependent on the condition of the two countries on their arrival at Santa Fé, on the frontier, and in their further progress to the interior of Mexico.

It was specially stated in the permit that it was granted on account of "the peculiar circumstances of the case, and without giving rise to any inferences as regards the condition of Santa Fé, or to act as a precedent in other cases."

Its evident purport, as I have stated it, could not have been misunderstood.

The sole question, then, which arises in the case is, whether the subjection of these parties to the incidents attending a state of war in Mexico constitutes a just ground of claim against The United States. It is not denied, I believe, that their detention was eminently demanded as a precautionary measure for the security of the American troops. The American forces were then proceeding on a

very desperate adventure into the heart of the enemy's country, against a force far greater than their own, and for the capture of an extensive province, having a large population.

Their sole security depended on the want of knowledge, on the part of the Mexicans, of the number and condition of the men sent against them. The claimants were also taking to the very forces arrayed against the Americans merchandise of immediate use to those forces, and upon which the enemy would receive at once a large amount of material aid in the duties to be levied upon the goods.

The detention of the claimants' caravan, under these circumstances, was evidently a military necessity.

The claimants voluntarily incurred the risk of this liability with the permission to do so, as a special favour from the American Government, and with full warning as to the contingencies to which they might be subjected.

The claim, then, which is made in this case comes with a bad grace from these parties. Had the goods been confiscated after they were permitted to proceed with them to the frontier, or had they been unnecessarily detained, or had there been any wilful harshness in the mode of carrying into effect the measures adopted, a claim might, perhaps, have been sustained; but there is no evidence of this character on either of the points named.

The learned counsel for the British Government has cited the case of Harmony v. Mitchell, 13, Howard Rep., 115, as in point, and, in other respects, has argued the case with his usual eminent ability. In the case cited, however, a large portion of the goods, then on their way to the Mexican market, under circumstances similar to the present case, were seized and converted to the public use, and the remainder were abandoned.

The jury also found that the seizure was not caused by urgent or immediate necessity. The case, therefore, is wholly diverse from the present.

There are serious doubts whether the finding of the jury in that case was warranted by the evidence as reported, but,

with the facts thus found by them, the judgment of court follows, of course.

In the case before us, there is no reason to doubt that the detention of the caravan was dictated by imperious necessity, and was an exercise of power clearly within the acknowledged and just right of the commander of the American forces. The claimants stood in no relation to The United States' Government that relieved them from such a necessity. Their venture was, moreover, a successful one, though their profits would have been much larger had no detention occurred. I see, therefore, no just ground to sustain this claim on any principle of law or equity.