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Opinion of the court.

enforce such a rule, or depart from it, is treated in that case as a matter resting in the discretion of the court. That it is. competent for courts to adopt such a rule has often been decided, and once, at least, if not oftener, in California.*

The remaining errors have been assigned to the charge of the court. The principal defence set up at the trial was that in the application for insurance false answers had been given to the questions propounded by the defendants. Those questions were, in substance, whether the person whose life was proposed for insurance had had certain diseases, or, during the next preceding seven years, any disease, and the answers given were that he had not. It was in reference to this that the court instructed the jury it was for them to determine from the evidence whether the person whose life was insured had, during the time mentioned in the questions propounded on making the application, any affliction that could properly be called a sickness or disease, within the meaning of the term as used, and said, "for example, a man might have a slight cold in the head, or a slight headache, that in no way seriously affected his health or interfered with his usual avocations, and might be forgotten in a week or a month, which might be of so trifling a character as not to constitute a sickness or a disease within the meaning of the term as used, and which the party would not be required to mention in answering the questions. But again, he might have a cold or a headache of so serious a character as to be a sickness or disease within the meaning of those terms as used which it would be his duty to mention, and a failure to mention which would make his answer false."

There is no just ground of complaint in this instruction, either considered abstractly or in its application to the evidence in the case. It was, in effect, saying that substantial truth in the answer was what was required. If, therefore, the defendants have been injured it was by the verdict of the jury rather than by any error of the court.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.

* People v. Sears, 18 California, 635.

APPENDIX.

THE twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act of 1789 and the second section of the act of 1867, much similar to it, being referred to in the body of this book more than once, are here given. Words in the former act omitted in the latter, or words in the latter not in the former, are here put in brackets; and words variant in the two acts in italics.

JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789.

[1 STAT. AT LARGE, 85.]

SECTION 25. And be it further enacted, That a final judgment or decrec in any suit, in the highest court [of law or equity] of a State in which a decision in the suit could be had,

Where is drawn in question the validity of a treaty or statute of or an authority exercised under the United States, and the decision is against their validity,

OR where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of, or an authority exercised under any State, on the ground of their being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States, and the decision is in favor of such their validity,

OR where is drawn in question the construction of any clause of the Constitution, or of a treaty, or statute of, or commission held under the United States, and the decision is against the title, right, privilege, or exemption specially set up or claimed by either party, under such [clause of the said] Constitution, treaty, statute, or commission,

JUDICIARY ACT OF 1867.

[14 STAT. AT LARGE, 385.] SECTION 2. And be it further enacted, That a final judgment or decree in any suit in the highest court of a . State in which a decision in the suit could be had,

Where is drawn in question the validity of a treaty or statute of or an authority exercised under the United States, and the decision is against their validity,

OR where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of or an authority exercised under any State, on the ground of their being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States, and the decision is in favor of such their validity,

OR where any title, right, privilege, or immunity is claimed under the Constitution, or any treaty or statute of, or commission held, or authority exercised under the United States, and the decision is against the title, right, privilege, or immunity especially set up or claimed by either party under such Constitution, treaty, statute, commission [or authority],

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May be re-examined and reversed or affirmed in the Supreme Court of the United States upon a writ of error, the citation being signed by the chief justice, or judge, or chancellor of the court rendering or passing the judgment or decree complained of, or by a justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, in the same manner and under the same regulations, and the writ shall have the same effect as if the judgment or decree complained of had been rendered or passed in a Circuit Court, and the proceeding upon the reversal shall also be the same, except that the Supreme Court [instead of remanding the cause for a final decision as before provided] may, at their discretion [if the cause shall have been once remanded before], proceed to a final decision of the same and award execution. [But no other error shall be assigned or regarded as a ground of reversal in any such case as aforesaid, than such as appears on the face of the record, and immediately respects the beforementioned questions of validity or construction of the said Constitution, treatics, statutes, commissions, or authorities in dispute.]

May be re-examined and reversed or affirmed in the Supreme Court of the United States, upon a writ of error, the citation being signed by the chief justice, or judge, or chancellor of the court rendering or passing the judgment or decree complained of, or by a justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, in the same manner, and under the same regulations, and the writ shall have the same effect as if the judgment or decree complained of had been rendered or passed in a court of the United States ; and the proceeding upon the reversal sball also be the same, except that the Supreme Court may, at their discretion, proceed to a final decision of the same, and award execution [or remand the same to an inferior court]. . . .

INDEX.

ADMIRALTY. See Prize; Practice, 15.

ANSWER IN CHANCERY.

A decree reversed as made on evidence not competent, and in the face of
answers responsive to the bill. Moore v. Huntington, 417.

APPEAL. See Practice, 7, 15, 19, 20; Supersedeas.

1. When a proceeding below is, in its essential nature, a foreclosure of a
mortgage in chancery, an appeal is the only proper mode of bringing
it to the Supreme Court. Marin v. Lalley, 14.

2. In prize cases, wherever it appears that notice of appeal or of intention
to appeal to the Supreme Court was filed with the clerk of the District
Court within thirty days next after the final decree therein, an appeal
will be allowed to the Supreme Court whenever the purposes of jus-
tice require it. The Nuestra Señora de Regla, 29.

3. Where the Circuit Court of the United States proceeds to exercise ju-
risdiction under the twenty-third section of the act of 31st May, 1870,
entitled "An act to enforce the rights of citizens of the United States
to vote in the several States of this Union, and for other purposes," an
appeal will lie to the Supreme Court from its final decree. Ex parte
Warmouth, 64.

4. That court has no power to issue the writ of prohibition in such a
cause until such appeal is taken. Ib.

5. Where the claim on a fund in the Registry of the Admiralty of several
mortgages secured in a body by one mortgage, exceeds $2000, an ap-
peal to the Supreme Court will lie by the mortgagees in a body,
though the claim of no one of them exceed the said sum.
Rodd v.
Heartt, 354.

APPEARANCE.

When a defendant has filed a plea to the merits, and afterwards, by leave
of the court, withdraws his plea, that does not withdraw his appear-
ance, and he is still in court so as to be bound personally by a judg-
ment rendered against him in the action. Eldred v. Bank, 545.

ARMY OFFICER.

1. One who shows that he received a commission from the proper source,
and who serves and is recognized as such officer by his superiors until
his regiment is mustered out, and who presented himself at the proper
time and place to be mustered in, and was refused, makes out a primâ

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ARMY OFFICER (continued).

facie case for full pay under the joint resolution of Congress of July
26th, 1866, "for the relief of certain officers of the army." United
States v. Henry, 405.

2. It does not rebut this primâ facie case to prove that the officer who re-
fused to muster him in, alleged that he was not entitled to such muster
because the company to which he was assigned as lieutenant was be-
low the minimum in numbers. Ib.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS.

Must be made as the rules of court require, or the judgment will be
affirmed. Ryan v. Koch, 19.

AUTHORITIES, JUDICIAL. See Precedent, Value of.

BANKRUPT ACT. See Fraudulent Conveyance.

1. Under the thirty-fifth and thirty-ninth sections of the, more than pas-
sive non-resistance in an insolvent debtor, is necessary to invalidate a
judgment and levy on his property when the debt is due and he has
no defence. Wilson v. City Bank, 473.

2. In such case there is no legal obligation on the debtor to file a petition
in bankruptcy to prevent the judgment and levy, and a failure to do
so is not sufficient evidence of an intent to give a preference to the
judgment creditor, or to defeat the operation of the Bankrupt law. Ib.
3. Though the judgment creditor in such a case may know the insolvent
condition of the debtor, his judgment and levy upon his property are
not, therefore, void, and are no violation of the act. Ib.

4. A lien thus obtained by him will not be displaced by subsequent pro-
ceedings in bankruptcy, though commenced within four months after
levy of the execution or rendition of the judgment. Ib.

5. Very slight circumstances, however (the value of which must be judged
of in each case as it arises), which tend to show the existence of an
affirmative desire on the part of the bankrupt to give a preference, or
to defeat the operation of the act, may, by giving color to the whole
transaction, render the lien void. Ib.

6. The twentieth section of the Bankrupt Act was not intended to enlarge
the doctrine of set-off beyond what the principles of legal or equitable
set-off previously authorized. Sawyer v. Hoag, 610.

7. Where personal property has been sold by one insolvent and immedi-
ately afterwards decreed a bankrupt, without any change of posses-
sion, and is thus void under the rule in Twyne's Case by the laws of
the State where the transfer is made, the assignee in bankruptcy may
pursue it, and, as auxiliary to its recovery, ask that the sale by the
bankrupt be annulled. Allen v. Massey, 352.

BILL IN EQUITY. See Laches; Parties.

BILL OF LADING.

Under one to deliver nuts in bags and boxes "in good order and condi-
tion, dangers of the seas, fire, and collisions excepted," a ship held
liable for damage done to nuts marked "in the cabin state-room," and
stowed in the hold on a voyage from San Francisco to New York,

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