consummation; the same being all in writing. Bailey v. Railroad
Company, 96; and see Bank v. Kennedy, 19.
7. Evidence of fraud, not required to be more direct and positive than that
of facts and circumstances tending to the conclusion that it has been
practiced. Rea v. Missouri, 532.
8. A memorandum found upon the record of a patent and put there by
some unknown person eight years after the patent had issued is inad-
missible to contradict the record. Branson v. Worth, 32.
9. Evidence of a vendor of land, being positive, is sufficient to rebut a
presumption, arising from taking a note with surety for the payment
of the purchase-money of the land, that the vendor's lien had been
displaced. Cordova v. Hood, 1.
10. A decree in equity reversed as made on evidence not competent and in
the face of answers responsive to the bill. Moore v. Huntington, 417.
11. On a question by a creditor of A. of a fraudulent assertion by B., of
ownership of goods levied on as A.'s, any statements made by B. in
the absence of C., which are afterwards assented to by the latter or
were part of the res gesta, are evidence. Rea v. Missouri, 532.
12. Ordinarily, a witness who testifies to an affirmative is entitled to credit
in preference to one who testifies to a negative. Stitt v. Huidekopers,
384.
13. When one party gives notice to another to produce on trial a written
instrument, and the party who so receives the notice produces and
offers to verify it by his oath, the other party cannot refuse to use
that paper
and introduce a copy in the first instance, on the allegation
that the first is not genuine, although he might show wherein it was
erroneous or defective after it was once introduced. Ib.
14. Although a written agreement between persons not parties to the suit
may, as a general rule, be contradicted or explained by oral testi-
mony, this does not apply to an attempt to make good by parol evi-
dence a contract which the law requires to be made in writing to
make it valid. Ib.
15. In an action of ejectment, a letter of the plaintiff's grantor, written to
the ancestor of the defendant, is not competent evidence to show that
the ancestor entered into possession under the license of the plaintiff's
grantor, without some evidence that such letter was received or acted
on about the time of such entry by the ancestor. Smiths v. Shoe-
maker, 680.
16. The mere fact that the date found on the letter corresponds with the
time of such entry, is not of itself sufficient to show that the letter was
written at that time. Ib.
17 Where the purpose is to impeach a witness, the proper question is what
is the general "reputation" for truth of the witness? rather than
what is his general "character" for truth? Knode v. Williamson, 587.
18. The extent to which a cross-examination is carried not reviewable on
error. Rea v. Missouri, 532.
FINAL DECREE. See Supersedeas.
The order of seizure and sale called "executory process," made in Louis-
FINAL DECREE (continued).
iana when the mortgage "imports a confession of judgment," is in
substance a decree of foreclosure and sale, and therefore a "final de-
cree;" especially when made after objections have been made and
heard. Marin v. Lalley, 14.
FORECLOSURE. See Appeal, 1; Final Decree.
FOREIGN VESSEL. See Navigation. Laws.
1. Evidence of it not required to be more direct and positive than facts
and circumstances tending to the inference of it. Rea v. Missouri, 582.
2. Where a creditor of B. levied on certain goods as B.'s for which C. in-
terposed a claim of ownership, held that an intimate personal and
business relation between B. and C. having been shown, it was error
to instruct the jury that it was immaterial as to the ownership of the
goods how C. acquired his means, or whether his exhibit of them was
correct or not. Ib.
A device to avoid the revenue acts, and whose operation does avoid them,
is subject to no legal censure if the device be carried out by means of
legal forms. United States v. Isham, 496.
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE. See Fraud.
Under the statute of frauds of Missouri, a sale of household furniture in
a house occupied jointly by vendor and vendee, both using the furni-
ture alike, and there being no other change of possession than that the
vendor, after going around with the vendee and looking at the furni-
ture and agreeing on the price, turned it over to the vendee and exe-
cuted a bill of sale before a notary, both parties then, after the sale,
occupying the house and using the furniture exactly as before, is void
as against the vendor's creditors. Allen v. Massey, 352.
GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR. See Contract, 2, 3, 5.
IMPEACHING WITNESS. See Witness, 1.
IMPLIED CONTRACT.
Where a person has unlawfully procured and sold securities belonging to
another, the principal and interest of which is capable of being ascer-
tained by computation, the owner from whom they have been taken,
may waive the fraud in the conversion of the bonds, and claim as on
an implied contract. Allen v. United States, 207.
INCOME TAX. See Internal Revenue, 3, 4.
INDIAN TRIBES. See Cherokees; Breach of Condition.
Capable of taking as owners in fee simple by purchase from the United
States; and a sale to them is properly made by treaty. Holden v. Joy,
Where a statute defining an offence contains an exception, in the enacting
clause of the statute, which is so incorporated with the language defin-
ing the offence, that the ingredients of the offence cannot be accu-
rately and clearly described if the exception is omitted, an indictment
founded upon the statute must allege enough to show that the ac-
cused is not within the exception. But if the language of the section
defining the offence is so entirely separable from the exception, that
the ingredients constituting the offence may be accurately and clearly
defined without any reference to the exception, the indictment may
omit any such reference. The matter contained in the exception is
matter of defence, and to be shown by the accused. United States v.
Cook, 168.
INDORSER. See Negotiable Paper.
Need not himself have been free from fault to entitle him to recover dam-
ages resulting from the fault of another. Railroad Company v. Stout,
657.
INSOLVENT CORPORATION. See Equity, 1.
Where allowed, not under contract, but by way of damages, the rate must
be according to the lex fori. Goddard v. Foster, 124.
INTERNAL REVENUE. See Trespass.
1. The words "memorandum, check,” in that part of the schedule of in-
struments required by the statute of June 30th, 1864 (13 Stat. at
Large, p. 298, 158), to be stamped, which in the printed statute-books
are printed with a comma between them, should read, "memorandum-
check," with a hyphen instead of a comma. United States v. Isham,
2. In settling whether an instrument should be stamped or not, regard is
to be had to its form, rather than to its operation. Though the form
adopted may be a device to avoid the revenue acts, and though it may
avoid them, yet if the device be carried out by means of legal forms
it is subject to no legal censure. 1b.
3. Under the 116th, 119th, and 122d sections of the Internal Revenue Act
of June 30th, 1864, as subsequently amended, the interest due or divi-
dends declared by any railroad or canal company, &c., which accrued
prior to the 1st of January, 1870, were taxable under the act, though
payable on or after the date named. Barnes v. The Railroads, 294.
4. This tax is a tax on the creditor and not upon the corporation. United
States v. Railroad Company, 322.
5. Under the 110th section of the internal revenue act of 1864, as amended
by the act of July 13th, 1866, taxing deposits in banks, an entry
made in the depositor's pass-book of a deposit or payment, is “a cer-
tificate of deposit," or " check," or "draft" within the meaning of
the section. Oulton v. Savings Institution, 109.
6. Under the proviso to that section, savings banks are not exempt from
taxation if they have a capital stock, or if they do any other business
than receiving deposits to be lent or invested for the sole benefit of
the person making such deposits. Ib.
INTERNAL REVENUE (continued).
7. The fact that, by an agreement between the savings bank and the de..
positor, money deposited with the bank shall be reimbursed only out
of the first disposable funds that shall come into the hands of the
bank after demand, being a regulation adopted but for an emergency,
and not such as essentially impairs the just claim of a depositor, does
not change the case. Oulton v. Savings Institution, 109.
8. Under the 20th section of the act of July 20th, 1868, entitled “An act
imposing taxes on distilled spirits," &c., in the absence of a dis-
tiller's having appealed to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (as
under the 10th section of the act he may do), for the correction of any
error made by the assessor in fixing the "true producing capacity"
of his distillery, it is lawful for the government to assess and collect,
as for a deficiency, the taxes upon the difference between the said
"producing capacity" as estimated by the assessor and the amount of
spirits actually produced by such distillery, even though the distiller
have in good faith reported and paid taxes upon his whole produc-
tion, and though such production have exceeded 80 per centum of the
producing capacity aforesaid. The Collector v. Beggs, 182.
INTERPRETATION OF CONTRACT.
Not to be governed by what either party to the contract understood or be-
lieved, unless such understanding or belief was induced by the con-
duct or declarations of the other party. Bank v. Kennedy, 19; and
see Bailey v. Railroad Company, 96.
INTERPRETATION OF LANGUAGE. See Construction, Rules of.
JUDGMENT. See Appearance; Res Judicata.
On a note or contract operates as a merger of it; and when the judgment is
binding personally it can be introduced in evidence, and relied on as
a bar to a second suit on the note. Eldred v. Bunk, 545.
JUDICIAL AUTHORITY. See Precedent, Value of
JUDICIAL COMITY. See Rebellion, 2.
1. In the construction of the statutes of a State, and especially those affect-
ing titles to real property, where no Federal question arises, this court
follows the adjudications of the highest court of the State, whatever
may be the opinion of this court of its soundness. Walker v. The State
Harbor Commissioners, 648; and sce Allen v. Massey, 351.
2. A personal judgment, rendered in one State against several parties
jointly, upon service of process on some of them, or their voluntary
appearance, and upon publication against the others, is not evidence
outside of the State where rendered of any personal liability to the
plaintiff of the parties proceeded against by publication. Board of
Public Works v. Columbia College, 521.
JURISDICTION. See Appeal; Constitutional Law, 2, 3.
I. OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.
1. Under the 25th section of the Judiciary Act, as well as under that of
JURISDICTION (continued).
the 5th of February amendatory of it, if it has, beyond all question,
decided every question at issue between the parties which it is neces-
sary to decide in order to dispose of the case on its merits, and the
State court has not carried out its mandate but in effect evaded it, on
a second writ of error to "proceed to a final judgment and award
execution." Tyler v. Maguire, 254.-
2. Under the same sections, to review the judgment of a State court when
the writ is issued to the highest court of the State in which a decision
of the case could be had, even if that court be an inferior court of the
State. Miller v. Joseph, 655.
II. OF THE CIRCUIT COURTS.
(b) They HAVE jurisdiction-
3. When objection is taken on the ground of citizenship, provided the
parties to whose citizenship the objection is taken be not indispensable
parties. Horn v. Lockhart, 570.
JURY. See Court and Jury.
1. Where a bill is filed by a third party to set aside, as fraudulent, com-
pleted judicial proceedings, regular on their face-the bill being filed
five years after the judicial proceedings which it is sought to set aside
have been completed-the cause of so considerable a delay should be
specifically set out. And if ignorance of the fraud is relied on to ex-
cuse the delay it should be shown specifically when knowledge of the
fraud was first obtained Harwood v. Railroad Company, 78
2. A bill by cestui que trusts was dismissed, where all the grounds of action
had occurred between twenty and thirty years, and the alleged breach
of trust had taken place thirty-seven years before the bill was filed,
and the trustee was dead. This, although the cestui que trusts were
women and the trustee a lawyer, who had married their half-sister.
Hume v. Beale's Executrix, 336.
Where a lessee, after letting to another, reserving a rent, has assigned all
his "right, title, and interest" in the lease, and "authorized the
assignee to sue for, collect, and recover the lease, and the rights to
the rent reserved under the same," declaring "it to be distinctly
understood" that it is the object and purpose to put the assignee in his
"place and stead, so far as concerns his rights under the lease"
the lessee, on a claim against him by the sub-tenant, cannot set up
a claim for arrears of rent due to him at the time when he assigned
the lease. The transfer has carried them to the assignee. United
States v. Hickey, 9.
LEASE. See Landlord and Tenant.
LEGAL TENDER. See Practice, 17; South Carolina.
"LICENSE TO TRADE." See Trading with Public Enemy, 2.
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