Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brim-tion, if such matter is one which the Comson, 154 U. S. 447, 38 L. ed. 1047, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 545, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1125; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baird, 194 U. S. 25, 48 L. ed. 860, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 563; Harriman v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 211 U. S. 407, 53 L. ed. 253, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 115.

The Armour Car Lines is a common carrier within the meaning of the act to regulate commerce.

The Niagara v. Cordes, 21 How. 7, 22, 16 L. ed. 41, 46; Bouvier's Law Dict. "Common Carriers"; Pennsylvania Co. v. UnitCom-ed States, 236 U. S. 351, 362, 363, ante, 616, the 623, 624, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 370; Atchison, T.

& S. F. R. Co. v. United States, 232 U. S. 199, 58 L. ed. 568, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 291; Union Stockyards Co. v. United States,

Baird, 194 U. S. 25, 44, 48 L. ed. 860, 869, 94 C. C. A. 626, 169 Fed. 406.

It is proper to examine the legislative asked to give was relevant to the inquiry history of the act for the purpose of as

The act to regulate commerce was in-24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 563. tended to afford an effective means of redressing the wrongs resulting from unjust discrimination and undue preference.

Texas & P. R. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co. 204 U. S. 426, 439, 51 L. ed. 553, 558, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 350, 9 Ann. Cas. 1075.

Neither party has a right to insist upon This court has not given the statute a a wasteful or expensive service for which the technical construction, but has time and consumer must ultimately pay. The interagain brushed aside devices invented to sub-est of the public is to be considered as well vert its purposes, and consistently enforced as that of the shippers and carriers. the spirit of the law.

Interstate Commerce Commission v. Goodrich Transit Co. 224 U. S. 194, 213, 56 L. ed. 729, 737, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 436; New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. v. Interstate Com-icing of cars would be unjust and unreasonmerce Commission, 200 U. S. 361, 391, 50 L. ed. 515, 521, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 272; United States v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. 225 U. S. 306, 324, 56 L. ed. 1100, 1106, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 817.

Interstate Commerce Commission V. The Commission is not bound in its in- Baird, 194 U. S. 25, 48 L. ed. 860, 24 Sup.

Ct. Rep. 563; Interstate Commerce Com-erty in interstate commerce be made parties mission v. Brimson, 154 U. S. 447, 38 L. ed. also. In the proceedings thus ordered the 1047, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 545, 14 Sup. Ct. questions propounded were put to the apRep. 1125; Armour Packing Co. v. United pellant, the vice president and general manStates, 209 U. S. 56, 52 L. ed. 681, 28 Sup. ager of the Armour Car Lines. Ct. Rep. 428; United States v. Union Stock Yard & Transit Co. 226 U. S. 286, 309, 57 L. ed. 226, 235, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 83; Southern P. Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 219 U. S. 498, 55 L. ed. 310, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 279.

No corporation, whether public service or private, has any privilege of privacy which would justify a refusal to answer the questions and produce the documents demanded in this proceeding.

Interstate Commerce Commission v. Goodrich Transit Co. 224 U. S. 194, 215, 56 L. ed. 729, 737, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 436.

The Armour Car Lines is a New Jersey corporation that owns, manufactures, and maintains refrigerator, tank, and box cars, and that lets these cars to the railroad or to shippers. It also owns and operates icing stations on various lines of railway, and from these ices and re-ices the cars, when set by the railroads at the icing plant, by filling the bunkers from the top, after which the railroads remove the cars. The railroads pay a certain rate per ton, and charge the shipper according to tariffs on file with the Commission. Finally it furnishes cars for the shipment of perishable fruits, etc., and keeps them iced, the It has no

Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opin- railroads paying for the same. ion of the court:

This is an appeal from an order of the district court, made upon a petition of the appellee, the Interstate Commerce Commission, filed under the act to regulate commerce, § 12. The order directs the appellant to answer certain questions propounded and to produce certain documents called for by the appellee. There is no doubt that this appeal lies. The order is not like one made to a witness before an examiner or on the stand in the course of a proceeding inter alios in court. Alexander v. United States, 201 U. S. 117, 50 L. ed. 686, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 356. It is the end of a proceeding begun against the witness. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baird, 194 U. S. 25, 48 L. ed. 860, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 563. Therefore we pass at once to the statement of the case.

control over motive power or over the movement of the cars that it furnishes as above, and in short, notwithstanding some argument to the contrary, is not a common carrier subject to the act. It is true that the definition of transportation in § 1 of the act includes such instrumentalities as the Armour Car Lines lets to the railroads. But the definition is a preliminary to a requirement that the carriers shall furnish them upon reasonable request, [444] not that the owners and builders shall be regarded as carriers, contrary to the truth. The control of the Commission over private cars, etc., is to be effected by its control over the railroads that are subject to the act. The railroads may be made answerable for what they hire from the Armour Car Lines, if they would not be otherwise, but that does not affect the nature of the Armour Car Lines itself. The petition of the Interstate Commerce Commission to compel an answer to its questions hardly goes on any such ground.

The ground of the petition is that it became the duty of the Commission to ascertain whether Armour & Company, an Illinois corporation shipping packing-house products in commerce among the states, was controlling Armour Car Lines and using it as a device to obtain concessions from the published rates of transportation, and whether Armour Car Lines was receiving for its refrigerating services unreasonable compensation that inured to the benefit of Armour & Company, all in violation of §§ 1, 2, 3, and 15 of the act.

The Interstate Commerce Commission, reciting that it appeared from complaint on file that the allowances paid for the use of private cars, the practices governing the handling and icing of such cars, and the minimum carload weights applicable to the commodities shipped [443] therein, on the part of carriers subject to the act to regulate commerce, violated that act in various ways, ordered that a proceeding of investigation be instituted by the Commission of its own motion to determine whether such allowances, practices, or minimum carload weights were in violation of the act as alleged, with a view to issuing such orders as might be necessary to correct discriminations and make applicable reasonable weights. It ordered that carriers by rail- If the price paid to the Armour Car road subject to the act be made parties Lines was made the cover for a rebate to respondent, and, later, that all persons and Armour & Company or if better cars were corporations owning or operating cars and given to Armour & Company than to others, other vehicles and instrumentalities and or if, in short, the act was violated, the facilities of shipment or carriage of prop- railroads are responsible on proof of the

fact.

But the only relation that is sub- 154 U. S. 447, 464, 38 L. ed. 1047, 1052, ject to the Commission is that between the 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 545, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. railroads and the shippers. It does not 1125. But still, until the Armour Car matter to the responsibility of the roads Lines is shown to be merely the tool of Arwhether they own or simply control the mour & Company, it has the general imfacilities, or whether they pay a greater munities that we have stated. With the or less price to their lessor. It was argued | [446] foregoing general principles in view that the Commission might look into the we proceed to dispose of the questions asked. profits and losses of the Armour Car Lines (one of the matters inquired about) in order to avoid fixing allowances to it at a confiscatory rate. But the Commission fixes nothing as to the Armour Car Lines except under § 15 in the event of which we shall speak.

It is not necessary to repeat the many pages of questions at length. They are grouped by the government into classes and numbered so that the result may be stated in comparatively few words. The first group concerning interlocking officers and relations between Armour Car Lines, Armour The appellant's refusal to answer the & Company, and Fowler Packing Company, series of questions [445] put was not based questions 1, 2, 3, and 7, should be answered. upon any objection to giving much of the in- The only objection was on account of the formation sought, but on the ground that general intent avowed as we have stated. the counsel who put them avowed that they So, also, questions 4, 5, 6, concerning the were the beginning of an attempt to go acquirement of cars previously owned by into the whole business of the Armour Car Armour & Company and Armour Packing Lines, a fishing expedition into the affairs Company making the second group. Also of a stranger for the chance that something questions 8, 9, 12, and 13, as to contracts discreditable might turn up. This was be- of Armour Car Lines with Armour & Comyond the powers of the Commission. Re pany and Colorado Packing Company for Pacific R. Commission, 32 Fed. 241; Inter- furnishing cars and icing service. The next state Commerce Commission v. Brimson, group, so far as the questions concern the 154 U. S. 447, 478, 479, 38 L. ed. 1047, ownership, manufacture, and repair of cars, 1057, 1058, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 545, 14 Nos. 10, 11, 14, 16, 17, and 19, need not be Sup. Ct. Rep. 1125; Harriman v. Inter- answered, except 11, "where are the cars state Commerce Commission, 211 U. S. 407, of Armour Car Lines repaired when not 53 L. ed. 253, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 115. The repaired in shops of railroads?" The last Armour Car Lines not being subject to two groups concern matters into which the regulation by the Commission, its position Commission was not authorized to inquire. was simply that of a witness interested in The fifth, questions 15, 20, 21, 25, 26, 27, but a stranger to the inquiry, and the Com- and 28, called for statements showing profit mission could not enlarge its powers by and loss, credits and debits to income etc., making the company a party to the proceedings and serving it with notice. There- so far as the same related to transporfore the matter to be considered here, sub- tation as defined in the act; and the sixth, ject to the qualification that we are about Nos. 22, 23, and 24, for statements showto state, is how far an ordinary witnessing the amount invested in each icing plant could be required to answer the questions

that are before the court.

We have stated the nature and object of the investigation, and it is to be observed that not every advantage that may inure to a shipper as the result of the position of his plant, his ownership, or his wealth, is a preference. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Diffenbaugh, 222 U. S. 42, 46, 56 L. ed. 83, 87, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 22. But the intervening corporation may be a means by which an owner of property transported indirectly renders the services in question, and in that event its charges are subject to the Commission by § 15. The supposed unreasonable charge may be used as a device to attain the forbidden end, and therefore reasonable latitude should be allowed

and the detailed results of the operation of each, amount invested in each, cost per ton of ice at the source of supply, etc., etc., all matters belonging to the private business of the Armour Car Lines, and not open if our interpretation of the law is correct. Our decision, however, must be without prejudice to the possibility that the case may be brought within § 15 by evidence to the effect stated above.

Decree reversed without prejudice.

[447] Mr. Justice Day, while not differing from the general views taken by the court, is of opinion that the nature of the inquiry under § 15 made it proper that all the questions should be answered.

to see if any such device is used. Inter- Mr. Justice McReynolds took no part in state Commerce Commission v. Brimson, the consideration and decision of this cause.

CUMBERLAND GLASS MANUFACTUR-, Bankruptcy
ING COMPANY, Plff. in Err.,

V.

set-off.

3. The object of the provision of the bankrupt act of July 1, 1898 (30 Stat. at CHARLES DE WITT, Trading as Charles 9652), § 68a, that "in all cases of mutual L. 544, chap. 541, Comp. Stat. 1913, §§ 9585,

De Witt & Company.

(See S. C. Reporter's ed. 447–468.)

debts or mutual credits between the estate of a bankrupt and a creditor the account shall be stated and one debt shall be set off against the other, and the balance only shall be allowed or paid," was to give the bankruptcy court the right to apply the established principles of set-off to mutual Federal ques- credits when its action was invoked for that purpose.

[For other cases, see Bankruptcy, X. a, in
Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.]
Judgment res judicata

composition -set-off.

bankruptcy

1. A plea of res judicata, based upon a judgment of a Federal court adjudicating a right of Federal origin, asserts a right which, if denied by a state court, makes the case reviewable in the Federal Supreme Court under the provisions of the Judicial Code, § 237 (36 Ŝtat. at L. 1156, chap. 231, Comp. Stat. 1913, § 1214), gov-9586, 9652), § 68a, against the proved claim erning writs of error to state courts. [For other cases, see Appeal and Error, 19831992, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.]

Bankruptcy ·

effect of composition. 2. The effect of the composition proceeding authorized by the bankrupt act of July 1, 1898 (30 Stat. at L. 544, chap. 541, Comp. Stat. 1913, § 9585), § 12, as amended by the act of June 25, 1910 (36 Stat. at L. 838, chap. 412, Comp. Stat. 1913, §§ 9586, 9596), is to substitute composition for bankruptcy proceedings in a certain sense, and in a measure to supersede the bankruptcy proceeding, and to reinvest the bankrupt with all his property, free from the claims of his creditors.

[For other cases, see Bankruptcy, XII., in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.]

NOTE. On the general subject of writs of error from the United States Supreme Court to state courts-see notes to Martin

4. No adjudication setting off, under the bankrupt act of July 1, 1898 (30 Stat. at L. 544, chap. 541, Comp. Stat. 1913, §§

of a creditor, a claim against it which was listed among the bankrupt's unliquidated assets, was involved in bankruptcy proceedings terminating in a decree in composition, where such creditor, though objecting to the composition, made no attempt to have the set-off adjudicated in the bankruptcy court, made no opposition to the confirmation of the composition, and took and holds its composition dividend on the full amount of its claim in the same manner as other creditors.

[For other cases, see Judgment, III. 1: Bank

ruptcy, IV., in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.]

[No. 191.]

Argued March 10, 1915. Decided May 10, 1915.

State of Maryland to review a judg

N ERROR to the Court of Appeals of the

v. Hunter, 4 L. ed. U. S. 97; Hamblin v. Western Land Co. 37 L. ed. Ú. S. 267; Rement which affirmed a judgment of the Buchanan, 39 L. ed. U. S. 884; and Kipley v. Illinois, 42 L. ed. U. S. 998.

On set-off in bankruptcy cases-see note to Morgan v. Wordell, 55 L.R.A. 33.

On conclusiveness of judgments, generally -see notes to Sharon v. Terry, 1 L.R.A. 572; Bollong v. Schuyler Nat. Bank, 3 L.R.A. 142; Wiese v. San Francisco Musical Fund Soc. 7 L.R.A. 577; Morrill v. Morrill, 11 L.R.A. 155; Shores v. Hooper, 11 L.R.A. 308; Bank of United States v. Beverly, 11 L. ed. U. S. 76; Johnson Steel Street Rail Co. v. Wharton, 38 L. ed. U. S. 429; and Southern P. R. Co. v. United States, 42 L. ed. U. S. 355.

Superior Court of Baltimore City, in that state, in favor of plaintiff in an action in which defendant interposed a plea of res judicata, based upon certain proceedings in a court of bankruptcy. Affirmed.

See same case below, 120 Md. 381, 87 Atl. 927, Ann. Cas. 1915A, 702.

The facts are stated in the opinion. Messrs. Henry H. Dinneen and Arthur L. Jackson argued the cause and filed a brief for plaintiff in error:

It is clearly the intention of the bankrupt act that, when there are claims and counterclaims between the bankrupt and one of the creditors, these should be adjudicated in the bankruptcy proceedings and the net balance paid or collected by the trustee in bankruptcy.

Re Philip Semmer Glass Co. 67 C. C. A. 551, 135 Fed. 77.

Certainly that which is liquidated in fact should be liquidated in law.

Re Filer, 5 Am. Bankr. Rep. 582.