rier issued to bankrupts for each 100 bales bills of lading then held, knew or should a port or ocean bill with same marks, etc., have known, and had reasonable cause to and placed cotton aboard the Texas. The believe, that a preference was thereby given bankrupts promptly indorsed the genuine and intended, and knew or should have bills and forwarded them by mail to Scheuch known that Steele, Miller, & Company was & Company, with directions to deliver to at said time insolvent, and that the effect banks holding corresponding fictitious ones of the mailing, the receipt and acceptance and return the latter. Deliveries were made and substitution of said bills of lading, was in Havre on April 26th, May 3d and 7th; to enable the said Scheuch & Company or but because of disquieting rumors concern- the said Bank of Mulhouse to obtain paying wrongful practices by others the banks ment of its said draft; and your orator retained both forged and genuine documents. now charges that the effect of the act They had no actual knowledge of the frauds hereinabove described, if maintained and practised upon them until May 8th, when in-permitted by this honorable court, will be formation was received [95] concerning the to enable the said Bank of Mulhouse or receiver's bill filed during the preceding day. Scheuch & Company, or both of them, to About April 20, 1910, the failure of obtain a greater per cent of their said Knight, Yancey, & Company, large export- debt than any other creditor of said banking cotton merchants at Lecatur, Alabama, rupt, and that such acts should be set aside. was announced, and shortly thereafter wide Your orator charges the acts herein above publicity was given to the fact that they complained of were performed within four had made extensive use of forged through months prior to the filing of the petition railroad bills of lading with foreign drafts. of involuntary bankruptcy herein, and your Steele, Miller, & Company suspended pay-orator is advised that the act or acts comment April 29th; bankruptcy proceedings plained of are voidable at his election, and were instituted against them May 4th; re- he does now elect to avoid the same and moval from New Orleans of cotton covered by the above-described ocean bills was enjoined in a proceeding by the receiver filed May 7th; and on August 18th the instant causes were begun. files this his bill to avoid said transfer." And it prays "that upon the final hearing of this bill this court will set aside the transfer of the said 900 bales of cotton by the said bankrupt to the said bank of Mulhouse or Scheuch & Company, or both of them, and hold the same void and of no effect, and decree that the title to the said cotton and the right of possession thereof is in your orator, and will permit your orator to take possession of said cotton and administer the same, or the proceeds thereof, for the benefit of the creditors." The bill in No. 226 (typical of all) alleges: "Steele, Miller, & Company, being then insolvent, with intent to prefer said bank of Mulhouse or Scheuch & Company, or both of them, over their other creditors, did deposit in the United States' mail the said port bills of lading, the said bills of lading being addressed to Scheuch & Company, and the same having been indorsed Appellant trustee maintains that he is by Steele, Miller, & Company, the object seeking to set aside a preference as auand purpose of forwarding said port bills thorized by statute; that the French banks of lading being to substitute the same for became mere ordinary unsecured creditors the forged and worthless bill or bills of of Steele, Miller, & Company by paying lading attached to the drafts held by drafts with forged bills of lading attached the said Bank of Mulhouse or Scheuch & as security; and that when genuine bills Company, or both of them, and that said were substituted for spurious ones these port bills of lading in due course were re-banks had [97] positive information of the ceived by Scheuch & Company and delivered to the Bank of Mulhouse. Your orator avers that the transmission of said port bills of lading to be substituted for the said fradulent bills of lading was done with the intent to prefer the said bank of Mulhouse, and that when the said bills of lading were mailed to the said Scheuch & Company for delivery to the bank of Mulhouse, and were received by the said Scheuch & Company and delivered to the bank of Mulhouse, the said Scheuch & Company and the said bank of Mulhouse, in accepting the said bills of lading and permitting the substitution [96] of the said valid and port or custody bills of lading for the worthless bankrupts' insolvency, and knew or should have known that they were receiving an intended preference. In behalf of the appellee banks it is insisted that the transactions between them and bankrupts were in the nature of sales, and by marking and shipping the cotton before bankruptcy it was appropriated to the contracts; that bankrupts had no purpose to give a preference; and certainly the banks had no reasonable cause to believe they were receiving an intended preference. The trial judge, relying upon The Idaho, 93 U. S. 575, 23 L. ed. 978, held the cotton was appropriated before bankruptcy to prior contracts between the parties. He stances we cannot say they either believed further said: "I am not convinced that the bankrupts' crimes; and in the circumSteele, Miller, & Company intended a preference, as it seems to me they uniformly discounted drafts purporting to be secured by bills of lading for cotton, which were in reality forged, and thereafter shipped the cotton to prevent discovery of their dishonest methods, and that their transactions with the bank were in the usual course of business and without any intention on their part other than to conceal their true methods. Furthermore, while the facts on which they might be charged with notice ought to have excited the suspicion of the bank, I am not prepared to say that they had knowledge, constructive or actual, of Steele, Miller, & Company's insolvency, or that a preference was intended." The bill was accordingly dismissed and the circuit court of appeals affirmed this action upon authority of Lovell v. Isidore Newman & Son, 113 C. C. A. 39, 192 Fed. 753, and Henry Hentz & Co. v. Lovell, 113 C. C. A. 48, 192 Fed. 762. Admitting that title to the cotton in question passed, the trustee now seeks annulment of the consummated transfer because a preference would result therefrom. In Lovell v. Isidore Newman & Son, supra. recovery was asked upon the theory that the title had remained in the bankrupts. By the statute's very words in order to set aside such a [98] transfer and recover the property it must appear that "the person receiving it, or to be benefited thereby, or his agent acting therein, shall have had reasonable cause to believe that it was intended thereby to give a preference." Whether such "reasonable cause to believe" existed is a question of fact and the burden of proof is upon the trustee. Coder v. Arts, 213 U. S. 223, 240, 53 L. ed. 772, 780, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 436, 16 Ann. Cas. 1008; Wright v. Sampter, 152 Fed. 196, 198; McNaboe v. Columbian Mfg. Co. 83 C. C. A. 81, 153 Fed. 967, 968; Tumlin v. Bryan, 21 L.R.A.(N.S.) 960, 91 C. C. A. 200, 165 Fed. 166-168; Reber V. Shulman 106 C. C. A. 110, 183 Fed. 564, 565; Kimmerle v. Farr, 111 C. C. A. 27, 189 Fed. 295, 299-300; Mayes v. Palmer, 125 C. C. A. 325, 208 Fed. 97, 98, 101. Considering the whole record we are unable to conclude that appellee banks had reasonable cause to believe that, by transferring the genuine bills of lading to them, a preference was intended or given; and accordingly, without undertaking to decide other interesting questions raised, we must affirm the decree of the court below. Prior to May 8, 1910, the banks thought the forged bills in their keeping represented cotton actually moving from designated points of shipment. They were unaware of [99] JOSÉ McMICKING, App, V. ROBERT G. SCHIELDS. (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 99-107.) Appeal court from Philippine supreme [For other cases, see Appeal and Error, III. error 2. The denial of the accused's request for time to answer and to prepare a defense, even if contrary to general order No. 58, in force in the Philippine Islands, did not warrant his discharge on habeas corpus on the ground that he was thereby deprived of his right, under the Philippine organic act of July 1, 1902 (32 Stat. at L. 691, chap. 1369, Comp. Stat. 1913, § 3804), § 5, to due process of law, but is at most a mere error of law which cannot be revised by habeas corpus, where the cause-admitted to be within the jurisdiction of the courtstood for trial on an appeal from a judgment of a municipal court, and the accused had known for weeks the nature of the charge, had notice of the hearing, was prestestified in his own behalf, introduced other ent in person and represented by counsel, evidence, and seems to have received an im NOTE. On the appellate jurisdiction of the Federal Supreme Court over the supreme court of the Philippine Islands-see note to Martinez v. International Bkg. Corp. 55 L. ed. U. S. 438. On habeas corpus in the Federal courtssee notes to Re Reinitz, 4 L.R.A. 236; State ex rel. Cochran v. Winters, 10 L.R.A. 616; and Tinsley v. Anderson, 43 L. ed. U. S. 91. As to questions reviewable by habeas corpus-see notes to State v. Jackson, 1 L.R.A. States v. Hamilton, 1 L. ed. U. S. 491; Ex 373; Bion's Appeal, 11 L.R.A. 694; United parte Carll, 27 L. ed. U. S. 288; Re Oteiza y Cortes, 34 L ed. U. S. 464; and Pearce v. Texas, 39 L. ed. U. S. 164. - S. W. 234; Stephens v. State, Tex. Crim. Rep., 147 S. W. 235; State v. Harris, 100 Iowa, 188, 69 N. W. 413; State v. King, 97 Iowa, 440, 66 N. W. 735; State v. Jordan, 87 Iowa, 86, 54 N. W. 63; State v. De Wolfe, 29 Mont. 418, 74 Pac. 1084; Nokes v. State, 6 Coldw. 297; Taylor v. State, 11 Lea, 712; Gonzales v. Cunningham, 164 U. S. 621, 41 L. ed. 575, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 182; State v. Hunter, 171 Mo. 435,'71 S. W. 675; Re Submitted May 12, 1915. Decided June 1, Barton, 6 Utah, 264, 21 Pac. 998; Crawford A 1915. PPEAL from the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands to review a decree in a habeas corpus proceeding discharging appellee from custody. Reversed and remanded for further proceedings. See same case below, 23 Philippine, 526. Mr. S. T. Ansell submitted the cause for appellant: This court has jurisdiction of this appeal. Fisher v. Baker, 203 U. S. 180, 51 L. ed. 143, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 135, 7 Ann. Cas. 1018. A judgment is not subject to collateral attack by habeas corpus unless it is clearly void by reason of its having been rendered by a court without jurisdiction, or by reason of the 'court's having exceeded its jurisdiction. Whether the judgment is absolutely void or not is merely a question of jurisdiction. Ex parte Watkins, 3 Pet. 202, 7 L. ed. 653; Re Frederich, 149 U. S. 70, 37 L. ed. 653, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 793; Re Moran, 203 U. S. 102, 51 L. ed. 108, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 25; Ex parte Harding, 120 U. S. 782, 30 L. ed. 824, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 780; Re Wilson, 140 U. S. 575, 35 L. ed. 513, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 870. The right to time for preparation for trial is not a fundamental right affecting jurisdiction, but is a matter resting in the sound discretion of the court. Franklin v. South Carolina, 218 U. S. 161, 168, 54 L. ed. 980, 985, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 640; Ratcliffe's Case, Fost. C. L. 41; Isaacs v. United States, 159 U. S. 487, 40 L. ed. 229, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 51; Woods v. Young, 4 Cranch, 238, 2 L. ed. 607; Ex parte Haase, 5 Cal. App. 541, 90 Pac. 946; People v. Fredericks, 106 Cal. 554, 39 Pac. 944; People v. Winthrop, 118 Cal. 85, 50 Pac. 390; People v. Harper, 139 App. Div. 344, 124 N. Y. Supp. 12; Evans v. State, 36 Tex. Crim. Rep. 32, 35 S. W. 169; Reed v. State, 31 Tex. Crim. Rep. 35, 19 S. W. 678; Johnson v. State, Tex. Crim. Rep., 49 S. W. 618; King v. State, Tex. Crim. Rep. 56 S. W. 926; Counts v. State, 49 Tex. Crim. Rep. 329, 94 S. W. 220; Templeton v. State, Tex. Crim. Rep. —, 146 S. W. 933; Partridge v. State, Tex. Crim. Rep. - 147 v. Independent Stone Pipe Works, 83 Cal. 631, 24 Pac. 836; Boulter v. State, 6 Wyo. 66, 42 Pac. 606; Logan v. United States, 144 U. S. 302, 36 L. ed. 442, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 617; Hickory v. United States, 151 U. S. 303, 308, 38 L. ed. 170, 173, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 334. The requirements of due process of law were fully met in the trial court. Ong Chang Wing v. United States, 218 U. S. 272, 280, 54 L. ed. 1040, 1041, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 15; Ex parte Harding, 120 U. S. 782, 30 L. ed. 824, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 780; Kohl v. Lehlback, 160 U. S. 293, 40 L. ed. 432, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 304; Felts v. Murphy, 201 U. S. 123, 129, 50 L. ed. 689, 692, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 366; Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U. S. 172, 175, 44 L. ed. 119, 120, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 77; Valentina v. Mercer, 201 U. S. 131, 50 L. ed. 693, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 368. Habeas corpus was not the proper remedy, and the supreme court not only abused the writ, but violated its own jurisdictional power. State ex rel. Schulman v. Phillips, 73 Minn. 77, 75 N. W. 1029; State ex rel. Scott v. Crinklaw, 40 Neb. 759, 59 N. W. 370; Ex parte Harding, 120 U. S. 782, 30 L. ed. 824, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 780; State ex rel. Peterson v. Barnes, 3 N. D. 131, 54 N. W. 541; Ex parte Mitchell, 104 Mo. 121, 24 Am. St. Rep. 324, 16 S. W. 118; Kohl v. Lehlback, 160 U. S. 293, 40 L. ed. 432, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 304; Humphries v. District of Columbia, 174 U. S. 190, 43 L. ed. 944, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 637; Re Manning, 139 U. S. 504, 35 L. ed. 264, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 624; Garland v. Washington, 232 U. S. 642, 58 L. ed. 772, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 456; Felts v. Murphy, 201 U. S. 123, 50 L. ed. 689, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 366. No appearance for appellee. Mr. Justice McReynolds delivered the opinion of the court: The Philippine supreme court by final decree in a habeas corpus proceeding discharged appellee from custody [102] and the director of prisons has appealed. The controversy fairly involves the application of § 5, organic act of the Islands (act of Congress, July 1, 1902, chap. 1369, 32 Stat. at L. 691, 692, 695, Comp. Stat. 1913, §§ 3804, 3808, 3818); and under § 10 of that statute we have jurisdiction of the appeal. and having further brought this case here Fisher v. Baker, 203 U. S. 174, 51 L. ed. on appeal, the presumption is that such 142, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 135, 7 Ann. Cas. 1018; ! plea continued, and to allow delays for the Paraiso v. United States, 207 U. S. 368, 52 | reiteration of such a plea would be an L. ed. 249, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 127. empty formality. The law does not require a vain and useless thing, and the provision in question must be construed as applying to cases where a new complaint is filed in this court. But aside from this, we think that the time of trial caused no prejudice to the accused. As we have seen, the complaint was filed on December 1st, and the accused had more than three weeks to prepare before the trial in this court. During this period there were evidently one or more continuances, and finally, it seems, the defendant had to be called into the municipal court by a bench warrant. Upon bringing the case here it was incumbent upon him to follow it up and to be ready and waiting its disposition by this court. Notice of the trial was sent both to him and to his counsel the day before, and it was not claimed that defendant could have produced any further testimony if the case had been postponed. On the contrary, it appears that he called one witness who did not testify in the court below. After all, the question in the case is mainly one of law. The principal controversy as to the [104] facts relates to the question of the alleged permission to take articles, and this, as we have seen, would not have excused the defendant, even had it been proved, though he admits that himself and Frandon are the only witnesses on that point." Appellee, Schields, presented a petition to the supreme court January 4, 1911, wherein, after setting out his alleged wrongful imprisonment under a judgment entered in the court of first instance, city of Manila, he further alleged and prayed: "That said imprisonment and deprivation of his liberty are illegal, because said court of first instance denied him the due process of law guaranteed by the Philippine Bill of Rights. The said illegalities are as follows: That on December 21st, 1910, the petitioner appealed from a judgment of the lower court sentencing him for the crime of theft. That on December 23d the petitioner, without having been asked to answer the complaint, was notified that the case would be heard at 10 A. M. on the 24th. When the case was called at 10 A. M. on December 24th, and while the petitioner was arraigned, he asked for time in which to answer the complaint, which request was denied by the court, who ordered the clerk to enter on the record that the petitioner pleaded 'Not guilty' to the complaint. Thereupon the petitioner's attorney also asked for time in which to prepare a defense, which petition was also denied by the same court, to which ruling the petitioner's attorney excepted and asked that the exceptions, together with the requests of the petitioner which had been denied, be entered on the record. Wherefore, the petitioner prays the Honorable supreme court to issue a writ of habeas corpus in his favor, reversing the judgment pronounced by the lower court as being contrary to law, and that the petitioner be set at liberty." Responding to a rule to show cause why the writ should [103] not issue, appellant answered that by virtue of an order of the court of first instance petitioner was in his custody in Bilibid prison to serve a sentence of four months and one day of arresto mayor imposed upon conviction of theft. Copies of the commitment and judgment were made parts of the return. In course of that judgment the judge said: "At the beginning of the trial the defendant asked for further time to prepare, and invoked certain sections of general order 58, which, in our judgment, were not applicable to this case. The prosecution did not file a new complaint in this court. Defendant was tried on the identical complaint which was presented in the court below as long ago as December 1st. To that complaint, as the record shows, he pleaded not guilty, General order No. 58, promulgated from the office of the United States military gov ernor April 23, 1900, and now in effect. amended the Code of Criminal Procedure theretofore in force within the Islands. Kepner v. United States, 195 U. S. 100, 111 49 L. ed. 114, 117, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 797, 1 Ann. Cas. 655. It provides: "Sec. 19. If on the arraignment, the defendant requires it, he must be allowed a reasonable time, not less than one day, to answer the complaint or information. He may, in his answer to the arraignment, demur or plead to the complaint or information. "Sec. 30. After his plea the defendant shall be entitled, on demand, to at least two days in which to prepare for trial." Sec. 528 of the Code of Civil Procedure enacted by the Philippine Commission August 7, 1901, provides: “If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in custody of an officer under process issued by a court or magistrate, or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or magistrate had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appear after the writ is allowed, the per- | court rested upon something which [106] son shall not be discharged by reason of any occurred after the jurisdiction referred to informality or defect in the process, judg- had attached and after the trial had begun. ment, or order." It rested upon the proposition that, while The pertinent part of § 5 of the organic the trial court had jurisdiction in the first act, approved July 1, 1902, "The Philip-place, it either lost that jurisdiction during pine Bill of Rights," is as follows: "That the progress of the trial, or so transcended no law shall be enacted in said Islands its powers as to render its judgment void." which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection of the laws. That in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to demand the nature and cause of [105] the accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the wit-cause-admitted to be within the jurisdicnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his behalf. ." Kepner v. United States, 195 U. S. 117, 118, 49 L. ed. 119, 120, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 797, 1 Ann. Cas. 655. We are unable to agree with the conclusion of the supreme court that the judgment pronounced by the court of first instance was void and without effect. Under the circumstances disclosed denial of the request for time to answer and to prepare defense was at most matter of error which did not vitiate the entire proceedings. The tion of the court-stood for trial on appeal. The supreme court having heard the cause upon petition and reply held-one judge dissenting that the writ of habeas corpus should be allowed, and discharged the prisoner. Among other things it declared: "The denial to the accused of the time, at least two days, to prepare for trial, expressly given to him by mandatory statute, there being absolutely no discretion lodged in the court concerning the matter, is in effect the deprivation of the constitutional right of due process of law, to a trial before condemnation, said statute being for the purpose of making practically effective in benefit of the accused said constitutional provision. . The denial to the accused of a constitutional right does one of two things,-it either ousts the court of jurisdiction to enter a judgment of conviction, or it deprives the record of all legal virtue, and a judgment of conviction entered thereon is a nullity, it having nothing to support it. He applied for a writ of habeas corpus upon the ground | that the judgment was void as a matter of law, as he had been convicted without due process of law. The refusal of the time in which to prepare for trial, and the consequent forcing of the defendant to his defense on the instant, is, under the provisions of our law, equivalent, in our judg-case properly subject to its cognizance, canment, to a refusal of a legal hearing. It amounts in effect to a denial of a trial. It is an abrogation of that due process of law which is the country's embodied procedure, without which a defendant has, in law, no trial at law. . . . Nobody has denied the initial jurisdiction of the trial court. It has never been discussed or even questioned in this court. That jurisdiction has always been freely conceded. The decision of this "Mere errors in point of law, however serious, committed by a criminal court in the exercise of its jurisdiction [107] over a not be reviewed by habeas corpus. That writ cannot be employed as a substitute for the writ of error. Ex parte Parks, 93 U. S. 18, 21, 23 L. ed. 787, 788; Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 371, 375, 25 L. ed. 717, 718; Ex parte Royall, 117 U. S. 241, 250, 29 L. ed. 868, 871, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 734; Re Freder ich, 149 U. S. 70, 75, 37 L. ed. 653, 656, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 793; Baker v. Grice, 169 U. S. 284, 290, 42 L. ed. 748, 750, 18 Sup. Ct. |