It is apparent that the general statements made in the bill to the effect that Federal considerations were essential to the determination of the cause of action were but conclusions of law affording no jurisdiction apart from the right to entertain the cause which would arise from the substantive and essential facts upon which the bill was based. Indeed, when the averments of the bill are analyzed there is no escape from the conclusion that the jurisdiction to entertain it could not have been exerted without disregarding the plain letter of the statute in force since 1882. In fact, this inevitable result does not depend upon the mere text of the statutes referred to, since there is an absolute legal identity between this and the Whittemore Case, and that case hence forecloses every contention here relied upon. was dismissed, and the case is here on a di- | form of statement was resorted to, since rect appeal upon the theory that the power paragraph 16 opens by conferring Federal of the court as a Federal court to enter- jurisdiction only in those classes of cases tain the cause is involved, and that that sin- which were kept within that jurisdiction by gle question is to be determined. the concluding clause of § 4 of the act of 1888, and hence no jurisdiction was given as to the other classes of cases which were excluded from such jurisdiction by the act of 1888. The re-enacted section in other words, instead of generally stating what was excluded from jurisdiction and then carving out exceptions, as was done in the act of 1888, gave jurisdiction only in the cases where it was intended to give it, and then proceeded to declare that in all other cases within the [118] contemplation of the section there should be no jurisdiction, thus making the lines clear and broad and leaving no room for controversy or doubt. Aside from this it is to be moreover observed that the intention of Congress to make by the adoption of the Judicial Code so radical a change from the rule which had prevailed for so long a period is not to be indulged in without a clear manifestation of such purpose. But it is said that conceding these con- Besides, as there is no ground for distinclusions inevitably result from the statute guishing between the restrictions as to jurislaw as it existed prior to the Judicial Code, diction imposed by paragraph 16 of § 24, the Judicial Code has made a radical change it must follow that the argument now made, in the law, which now requires a different based upon the omission of the words which interpretation. [117] But we think the con- were found in the act of 1888, would apply tention on the face of the statute is without to all of paragraph 16, and therefore none foundation, and that a brief consideration of the restrictions as to jurisdiction in that of the text of the act of 1888 and of para-paragraph would be operative. Thus in graph 16 of § 24 of the Judicial Code will make this clear. both aspects the contention must come to this: that on the one hand, because the provisions of paragraph 16 are comprehensively all-embracing, they must be held to be restrictive, and on the other hand, that because the provisions of the act of 1888 were re-enacted, they were repealed. As it follows that the court below was right in dismissing the bill for want of jurisdiction as a Federal court to consider it, its decree is therefore affirmed. The proposition rests upon the omission from the Judicial Code of the certain words in the act of 1888 through which in the quotation which we have previously made a line has been passed. But when paragraph 16 of § 24 of the Judicial Code and § 4 of the act of 1888 are considered together, the omission of the words referred to serves at once to destroy the proposition here relied upon for these reasons: Section 4 of the act of 1888, as will be seen, opened with the provisions which excluded national banks from the Federal jurisdiction which other- [119] wise would have attached to controversies concerning them. This being done, the stat KAPIOLANI ESTATE, Limited, Appt., V. and E. M. Watson. (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 119-139.) Judgment - res judicata -land titles fraud of guardian. ute proceeded to provide that the exclusion MARY H. ATCHERLEY, Lyle A. Dickey, previously specified should not include certain classes of controversies which it was deemed best should come under the Federal jurisdiction, thus leaving those classes of cases under the general rule, since they were carved out by the last clause of the section from the provisions as to exclusion which were found in the first. In re-enacting these provisions of the act of 1888 in paragraph 6 of § 24 of the Judicial Code, obviously to make the purpose of the reenacted statute clearer, just the opposite 1. The right of a minor ward upon coming of age to obtain relief in equity under NOTE. On conclusiveness of judgments, generally-see notes to Sharon v. Terry, 1 L.R.A. 572: Bollong v. Schuyler Nat. Bank, 3 L.R.A. 142; Wiese v. San Francisco Musical Fund Soc. 7 L.R.A. 577; Morrill v. Mor the Hawaiian laws, against his guardian, | the land commission of title to the minor's who had, in fraud of the ward, presented a land. claim and obtained in his own name an award by the Hawaiian board of land commissioners of a title in fee simple to the ward's land, was not foreclosed by an af: firmance in the Federal Supreme Court of a decree of the Hawaiian supreme court adjudging that the award in question could only be attacked by a direct appeal by a party who had presented his claims to the board, where the vitally important fact of guardianship was not included in the findings of fact certified to the Federal Supreme Court. [For other cases, see Judgment, III. j, 2, b, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.] Appeal from Hawaiian courts lowing decision below. fol 2. The Federal Supreme Court will ordinarily defer to the rulings of the local courts with respect to the validity under the Hawaiian laws of a judgment of the Ha waiian courts. persons not [For other cases, see Appeal and Error, VIII. [For other cases, see Judgment, III. k, 2, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.] [No. 174.] Argued April 30, 1915. 1915. Re Kaniu, 2 Haw. 82; Re Kekauluohi, 6 Haw. 172; Kalakaua v. Keaweamahi 4 Haw. 577; Nakookoo v. Noholoa 19 Haw. 667; Wood v. Stark, 1 Haw. 9; Cockett v. Hubbard, 1 Haw. 101; Alo v. Blair, 1 Haw. 153; Dana v. Angel, 1 Haw. 196; Re Turner, 1 Haw. 266; Williams v. Kaea, 1 Haw. 236; Laanui v. Pouhu, 2 Haw. 161; Kapaakea v. Morrison, 2 Haw. 277; Montgomery v. Coady, 2 Haw. 329; Montgomery v. Montgomery, 2 Haw. 553; Ainini v. Kala, 6 Haw. 18; Kapea v. Moehonua, 6 Haw. 51; Davis v. Brewer, 3 Haw. 273; Davis v. Brewer, 3 Haw. 363; Wei See v. Young Sheong, 3 Haw. 489; Akcau v. Iakona, 13 Ilaw. 216; Norris v. Herblay, 9 Haw. 514; Mills v. Briggs, 4 Haw. 506; See Hop v. Parke, 6 Haw. 688; Hackfeld v. Bal, 6 Haw. 364; Sanford v. Sanford, 139 U. S. 642, 644, 35 L. ed. 290, 291, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 666; Johnson v. Towsley, 13 Wall. 72, 20 L. ed. 485; White v. Cannon, 6 Wall. 443, 18 L. ed. 923; Stark v. Starr, 6 Wall. 402, 419, 18 L. ed. 925; Ringo v. Binns, 10 Pet. 269, 9 L. ed. 420; United States v. Arredondo, 6 Pet. 691, 8 L. ed. 547; United States v. California & O. Land Co. 148 U. S. 31, 37 L. ed. 354, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 458; Johnson v. Waters, 111 U. S. 640, 665, 28 L. ed. 547, 556, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 619; Angle v. Chicago, St. P. M. & O. R. Co. 151 U. S. 1, 38 L. ed. 55, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 240; Felix v. Patrick, 145 U. S. 317, 36 L. ed. 719, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. Decided June 14, 862; Central Nat. Bank v. Connecticut Mut. PPEAL from the Supreme Court of the See same case below, 21 Haw. 441. Mr. David L. Withington argued the cause, and, with Messrs. Alfred L. Castle, W. A. Greenwell, and William R. Castle, filed a brief for appellant: A minor, on coming of age, could obtain relief in equity against a guardian who had, in fraud of his ward, presented a claim and obtained in his own name an award from rill, 11 L.R.A. 155; Shores v. Hooper, 11 L.R.A. 308; Bank of United States v. Beverly, 11 L. ed. U. S. 76; Johnson Steel Street Rail Co. v. Wharton, 38 L. ed. U. S. 429; and Southern P. R. Co. v. United States, 42 L. ed. U. S. 355. L. Ins. Co. 104 U. S. 54, 26 L. ed. 693; Cook v. Tullis, 18 Wall. 332, 342, 21 L. ed. 933, 938; 1hompson v. Los Angeles Farming & Mill. Co. 180 U. S. 72, 77, 45 L. ed. 432, 435, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 289; Botiller v. Dominguez, 130 U. S. 238, 32 L. ed. 926, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 525; Knight v. United Land Asso. 142 U. S. 161, 35 L. ed. 974, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 258; More v. Steinbach, 127 U. S. 70, 32 L. ed. 51, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1067; Ainsa v. New Mexico & A. R. Co. 175 U. S. 76, 44 L. ed. 78, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 28; Barker v. Harvey, 181 U. S. 481, 45 L. ed. 963, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 690; Thurston v. Bishop, 7 Haw. 421; Rose v. Yoshimura, 11 Haw. 30; Kenoa v. Meek, 6 Haw. 63; Kekiekie v. Dennis, 1 Haw. 42; Townsend v. Greeley, 5 Wall. 326, 335, 18 L. ed. 547, 549; Carpentier v. Montgomery, 13 Wall. 480, 20 L. ed. 698. Kinimaka as guardian had absolute control and management of the ward's property, with the power of disposition. Kamehameha v. Kahookano, 2 Haw. 118; Laanui v. Pouhu, 2 Haw. 161. It was his duty to present the land to the land commission for award. Thurston v. Bishop, 7 Haw. 421. His failure to present the land forfeited This is a matter of local law and custom, in which this court should follow the local courts, which have in this action three times A guardian is not allowed to set up title ruled the law with appellant. against his ward. John II. Estate v. Brown, 235 U. S. 342, Perry, Tr. § 863; Lono v. Phillips, 5 Haw. ante, 259, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 106; Lewers & 357. Cooke v. Atcherley, 222 U. S. 285, 292, 56 The guardian is under an equitable obli- L. ed. 202, 205, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 94. gation to account. New York L. Ins. Co. v. Bangs, 103 U. S. 435, 26 L. ed. 580; 21 Cyc. 166; Coulson v. Walton, 9 Pet. 62, 9 L. ed. 51; Dexter v. Hall, 15 Wall. 9, 21 L. ed. 73; White v. Joyce (White v. Miller) 158 U. S. 128, 39 L. ed. 921, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 788; Griffith v. Godey, 113 U. S. 89, 93, 28 L. ed. 934, 937, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 383; Barney v. Saunders, 16 How. 535, 542, 14 L. ed. 1047, 1051; Lamar v. Micou, 112 U. S. 452, 28 L. ed. 751, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 221; Hoyt v. Sprague, 103 U. S. 613, 26 L. ed. 585; Colt v. Colt, 111 U. S. 566, 28 L. ed. 520, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 553. This court should not interfere with the exercise of discretion by the supreme court of Hawaii in refusing to open up the decree of 1858 in aid of a speculator claiming title under a breach of trust by a wrongdoer, where this would result in mischief to innocent parties, and is not essential to the equities of the case. Lawrence Mfg. Co. v. Janesville Cotton Mills, 138 U. S. 552, 34 L. ed. 1005, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 402; Kapiolani v. Atcherly, 14 Haw. 663; Lewers & Cooke v. Atcherley, 222 U. S. 285, 56 L. ed. 202, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 94; Gay v. Parpart, 106 U. S. 679, 696, 699, The ward in the accounting can elect to 27 L. ed. 256, 263, 264, 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 456; take the property. New Orleans v. Fisher, 180 U. S. 185, 45 L. The minor never had his day in court until the actions in 1858. Yerger v. Jones, 16 How. 30, 37, 14 L. ed. 832, 835; Oliver v. Piatt, 3 How. 333, 401, 11 L. ed. 622, 653; May v. Le Claire, 11 Wall. 217, 235, 20 L. ed. 50, 54; Taylor v. Plumer, 3 Maule & S. 562, 2 Rose, 415, 16 Revised Rep. 361; United States v. State Nat. Bank, 96 U. S. 30, 34, 24 L. ed. 647, 648; Duncan v. Jaudon, 15 Wall. 165, 21 L. ed. 142; Cleveland v. Sprowl, 12 Rob. (La.) 172; Darlington v. Turner, 202 U. S. 231, 50 L. ed. 1007, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 630; 1236; Ochoa v. Hernandez y Morales, 230 U. Bl. Com. p. 461; Eyre v. Shaftsbury, 2 P. S. 139, 159, 57 L. ed. 1427, 1437, 33 Sup. Ct. Wms. 103. Rep. 1033. The right of the ward is a contractual or quasi contractual right against the guardian, not affected by a land commission award. Justinian, bk. 3, title 27, quoted in Scott's Cases on Quasi-Contracts, p. 1; Henry of Bracton, Laws and Customs of England, bk. 3, Folio 100, ¶ 10 (Scott, p. 4.); Keelikolani v. Robinson, 2 Haw. 514, 549; Laanui v. Pouhu, 2 Haw. 161; Kaaihue v. Crabbe, 3 Haw. 768; Jones v. Meek, 2 Haw. 9. This court should follow the law of the case decided by the supreme court of Hawaii when it was the court of last resort. Williams v. Conger, 125 U. S. 397, 415, 418, 31 L. ed. 778, 787, 788, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 933; Cleaver v. Traders' Ins. Co. 40 Fed. 21 Cyc. 186; Woerner, Guardianship, § 21; Schouler, Dom. Rel. p. 469; Galpin v. Page, 18 Wall. 350, 366, 21 L. ed. 959, 963; Old Wayne Mut. Life Asso. v. McDonough, 204 U. S. 8, 51 L. ed. 345, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. Mr. Lyle A. Dickey, pro se, argued the cause, and with Mr. E. M. Watson and Mrs. Mary H. Atcherley, in propriis personis, filed a brief for appellees: The supreme court of Hawaii did not err in holding that it must follow a United States Supreme Court decision, though that decision upholds a decision of the lower court on a matter of local law. 26 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 2d ed. 153; Steele v. Boley, 7 Utah, 66, 24 Pac. 755; Zerulla v. Supreme Lodge, O. M. P. 223 Ill. 520, 79 N. E. 160. A collateral attack on a judicial proceed ing is an attempt to avoid, defeat, or evade Kapiolani v. Atcherly, 14 Haw. 661. 711; Hill v. Chicago & E. R. Co. 140 U. S. 52, 35 L. ed. 331, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 690; Smith v. Vulcan Iron Works, 165 U. S. 518, 41 L. ed. 810, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 407; Henning v. Eldridge, 146 I. 305, 33 N. E. 754; Re Warner, 158 Cal. 441, 111 Pac. 352; Camp-stood that the case was an equitable one, bell v. Perth Amboy Mut. Loan, Homestead & Bldg. Asso. 76 N. J. Eq. 347, 74 Atl. 144; Silva v. Pickard, 14 Utah, 245, 47 Pac. 144: St. Croix Lumber Co. v. Mitchell, 4 S. D. 487, 57 N. W. 236. making an attack in equity on a judgment because of constructive fraud arising out of fiduciary relations between a ward and guardian. Lewers & Cook v. Atcherley, 18 Haw. 626, 222 U. S. 292-294, 56 L. ed. 204, 205, 32 41; 1 Greenl. Ev. §§ 522, 523; 23 Cyc. 1406; Sup. Ct. Rep. 94. Paahao v. Swinton, 20 Haw. 355; The ApolThe rule of the "law of the case" is not lon, 9 Wheat. 362, 6 L. ed. 111. involved here. King v. West Virginia, 216 U. S. 92, 100, 101, 54 L. ed. 396, 401, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 225; Lewers & Cooke v. Atcherly, 222 U. S. 285, 295, 56 L. ed. 202, 205, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 94; William W. Bierce v. Waterhouse, 219 U. S. 320, 337, 55 L. ed. 237, 243, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 241; 2 Cyc. 520; Hertz v. Woodman, 218 U. S. 205, 212, 54 L. ed. 1001, 1005, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 621, 31 Cyc. 350; Great Western Teleg. Co. v. Burnham, 162 U. S. 339, 341, 40 L. ed. 991, 992, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 850; Hamilton v. Marks, 63 Mo. 172; Jungk| v. Read, 12 Utah, 196, 42 Pac. 292; Reeves v. Petty, 44 Tex. 254; Norton v. Knapp, 64 Iowa, 112, 19 N. W. 867; Hastings v. Foxworthy, 45 Neb. 697, 34 L.R.A. 321, 63 N. W. 955; Pennsylvania Co. v. Platt, 47 Ohio St. 379, 25 N. E. 1028. The status of the Lewers & Cooke Case is that of a prior case, because judgment was first reached in it. Awards of the land commission have been held conclusive against every form of attack heretofore made on them. Claims of fraud, false testimony, infancy, and even the admission of the King that a party had a right to an award, have been of no avail. Kekiekie v. Dennis, 1 Haw. 42; Kukilahu v. Gill, 1 Haw. 54; Bishop v. Namakalaa, 2 Haw. 240; Keelikolani v. Robinson, 2 Haw. 539; Kanaina v. Long, 3 Haw. 335; Каhoomana v. Moehonua, 3 Haw. 640; Kalakaua v. Keaweamahi, 4 Haw. 579; Kaai v. Mahuka, 5 Haw. 354; Kenoa v. Meek, 6 Haw. 67; Kekauluohi's Estate, 6 Haw. 178; Thurston v. Bishop, 7 Haw. 428. See also Meader v. Norton, 11 Wall. 442, 457, 20 L. ed. 184, 187; Carpentier v. Montgomery, 13 Wall. 480, 495, 20 L. ed. 698, 701. Mr. Justice McKenna delivered the opinion of the court: Appeal to review a decree of the supreme 23 Cyc. 1113; 1 Van Fleet, Former Adjudi- court of Hawaii which reversed a decree of cation, 87, § 9. Appellant, having sold all equitable title in the land to Lewers & Cooke, Ltd., has no equitable interest in the subject-matter to sustain this suit. Dick v. Foraker, 155 U. S. 414, 416, 39 L. ed. 205, 206, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 124; Bissell v. Kellogg, 60 Barb. 629; Chapman v. Jones, 149 Ind. 438, 47 N. E. 1065, 49 N. E. 347; Smith v. Brittenham, 109 Ill. 550; Glos v. Goodrich, 175 Ill. 25, 51 N. E. 643; Page County v. Burlington & M. R. Co. 40 Iowa, 525; Gilbert v. Cooley, Walk. Ch. (Mich.) 494; Huntington v. Allen, 44 Miss. 654; Hutchinson v. Howe, 100 Ill. 19. A multiplicity of suits is against the principles of equity. If this suit be allowed, a separate one might be brought by every grantor in a chain of title who might be injured by a decree against his grantee, each waiting until the conclusion of the suit of his grantee. Albert v. Hamilton, 76 Md. 304, 25 Atl. 343; Roby v. Eggers, 130 Ind. 424, 29 N. E. 365. The Lewers & Cooke decree should be fol the circuit judge of the first judicial circuit, enjoining the prosecution of an action of ejectment brought by Mary H. Atcherley, one of the appellees, against appellant for the recovery of certain described lands, decreeing that appellant had the equitable title to the lands, and that appellees, including Dickey and Watson, who were made parties pending the suit, held the naked legal title thereto as tenants in common, one half thereof by Mary H. Atcherley and one quarter thereof by each of the other appellees, as trustees of appellant. The decree required that the appellees execute a conveyance of such title to appellant. The bill alleges that one David Kalakaua, under and through whom the appellant company (designated hereinafter as complainant) claims, on or about December 29, 1856, litigated his title with the following parties, under whom defendant Atcherley claims title, to wit: Kinimaka, Pai, his wife, and their children, in the supreme court of the Hawaiian Islands, lowed in this case because it is res judicata. to the lands in trust and as guardian [125] in equity, alleging that Kinimaka held title McCandless v. Castle, 19 Haw. 515; Spear of Kalakaua, and not otherwise, and praying v. Hill, 54 N. H. 89; William W. Bierce v. Waterhouse, 219 U. S. 334, 335, 55 L. ed. that he, Kinimaka, be declared trustee of the lands for Kalakaua, and be decreed to 242, 243, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 241; Leslie v. Bonte, 130 Ill. 498, 6 L.R.A. 62, 22 N. E. convey the same in fee to Kalakaua; that 594; Soward v. Coppage, 10 Ky. L. Rep. 436, summons was duly issued and served on 9 S. W. 389; Pace v. Maxwell, 62 Ga. 98; Kinimaka, who, before filing answer, died, Chew v. Brumagen, 13 Wall. 497, 505, 20 leaving a will devising the lands to his L. ed. 663, 666; Lovejoy v. Murray, 3 Wall. children, whom he left surviving him, and 1, 18, 19, 18 L. ed. 129, 134; Tootle v. Cole-his widow. Pai; that these facts were sugman, 57 L.R.A. 120, 46 C. C. A. 132, 107 Fed. 'gested to the court, and it was prayed that the widow and children be made parties to all ways as his own, and continued to do so the suit, and a guardian ad litem be until he disposed of said property." appointed for the children, it being alleged The bill here made "all the papers, pleadthat they became trustees of the propertyings, and exhibits of whatever kind in said in the same manner and under the same equity proceedings" a part of it, and asked trust as Kinimaka. That subsequently (March 8, 1858) Kalakaua filed a petition for administration upon the estate of one Kaniu, deceased, under whom he claimed title to the lands, and for the appointment of a guardian ad litem for the minor children of Kinimaka. That upon the filing of such petition George E. Beckwith, administrator of the estate of Kinimaka, was appointed guardian ad litem of the minor children of Kinımaka, and notice was served on him as such administrator and guardian, and upon Pai to show cause why letters of administration might not issue to Kalakaua upon the estate of Kaniu, deceased. That upon proceedings being had a decree was rendered adjudging Kalakaua to be the devisee of Kaniu, and directing letters to be issued to him. That on June 19, 1858, Kalakaua filed a further petition alleging the same facts substantially which he had alleged in the petitions of December 29, 1856, and March 16. 1857, with the additional fact that one Richard Armstrong had been appointed guardian of the minor children of Kinimaka, and prayed that he might be ordered to convey the lands to Kalakaua; and that a summons was duly served upon Armstrong as guardian of the children and upon Pai; that Armstrong and Pai subsequently answered; that evidence was taken, the case heard upon [126] the merits, and on November 2, 1858, the court duly entered the following decree: "David Kalakaua against Richard Armstrong, guardian of David Leleo, Kaniu, and Kinimaka, minor children of Kini. maka, deceased. The court did order, adjudge, and decree in this matter that Mr. Armstrong, the guardian of David Leleo, Kaniu, and Kinimaka, minor children of Kinimaka, deceased, do convey to David Kalakaua, the plaintiff in this case, the land named Onoulimaloo, on the island of Molokai, and the first Apana of land set forth in Royal Patent 1602 filed in this cause." That it did not appear either from the records of the court or from the registry of deeds in Honolulu that the decree of the court was in fact obeyed, but, it is alleged, that after the decree Kalakaua "ceased to be molested in any way by either the widow and heirs aforesaid of said Kinimaka, or by the said Armstrong in their behalf, and retained open, notorious, and indisputable possession and dealt with the said land in leave to refer to them as if actually incorporated therein. Then came the following: "And in this connection the plaintiff attaches hereto a copy of the original Land Commission award and royal patent [they were not previously referred to in the bill] and copies of the original record of evidence given before the Land Commission in support of said Land Commission award and royal patent, the same being referred to and made part of the evidence in said equity proceedings instituted in the years 1856 and 1857 above referred to, which said copies are made part of this bill." That the successors in title of Kalakaua (the conveyances being set out) had retained and had been in the same kind of possession and exercised the same disposition [127] as he. That such possession in Kalakaua and his successors was known to the children of Kinimaka; that they attained their majority respectively in 1867, 1871, and 1877, and at no time did they or any of them assert any claim to the land or deny the rights of Kalakaua or his successors, but acquiesced in his and their possession. The manner by which defendants obtained the title they assert was set out, and it was alleged that owing to the failure of Armstrong to obey the decree of the court and convey the interest of the children of Kinamaka, as ordered by the court, complainant's required chain of title was incomplete, and that the action in ejectment of Mary H. Atcherley, one of the defendants, sought "to take unconscionable advantage of the above-mentioned technical error in the chain of title." A cloud upon the title of complainant was asserted hence to follow, and that it would be inequitable to permit her to prosecute her action of ejectment, and that as naked trustee of the title she should be required to convey it to appellant. An injunction, temporary and permanent, was prayed, and that Mary H. Atcherley, the defendant, be declared trustee and be required to convey the property to complainant. Copies of the proceedings referred to in the bill were annexed to it as exhibits. Among these, we have seen, were the award of the Land Commission and the royal title. The latter recites that "Whereas the Board of Commissioners to Quiet Land Titles has awarded to Kinimaka by award No. 129 a freehold estate |