which to discover the meaning of language | Cross v. Carson, 44 Am. Dec. 759, note; employed in an act of Congress. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Asso. 166 U. S. 318, 41 L. ed. 1019, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 540; Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 50, 55 L. ed. 641, 34 L.R.A. (N.S.) 834, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 502, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 734; Lapina v. Williams, 232 U. S. 90, 58 L. ed. 519, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 196. If it was competent for Congress to pass the act of April 10, 1869, thereby placing upon the lands granted by the act of July 25, 1866, within the state of Oregon, the restrictions contained in the actual-settler clause, the enforcement thereof would in effect destroy the right of the California & Oregon Railroad Company to construct this continuous line to Portland and earn the grant under the original act, free from the restrictions of the actual-settler clause. Dubuque R. Co. v. Richmond, 19 Wall. 584, 22 L. ed. 173; Union P. R. Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. 163 U. S. 565, 589, 41 L. ed. 265, 274, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1173; Bowman v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 125 U. S. 465, 31 L. ed. 700, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 823, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 689, 1062. There is no presumption in favor of the United States that an estate granted in fee simple shall be destroyed by any act of the grantee which shall re-invest the United States with title. Estates granted by the United States wil not be enlarged by construction but when granted, there is no presumption that such estate will revert for any cause. The destruction of the estate will not be favored, whether the grant is public or private. Schulenberg v. Harriman, 21 Wall. 44, 60, 22 L. ed. 551, 554; United States v. Denver & R. G. R. Co. 150 U. S. 1, 14, 37 L. ed. 975, 979, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 11; Bradley v. New York & N. H. R. Co. 21 Conn. 294; Stuart v. Easton, 170 U. S. 383, 397, 42 L. ed. 1078, 1083, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 650; New York Indians v. United States, 170 U. S. 1, 24, 42 L. ed. 927, 935, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 531; Rice v. Minnesota & N. W. R. Co. 1 Black, 358, 378, 17 L. ed. 147, 153; Wright v. Morgan, 191 U. S. 55, 58, 48 L. ed. 89, 93, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 6; Davis v. Gray, 16 Wall. 203, 232, 21 L. ed. 447, 457; Philadelphia, W. & B. R. Co. v. Howard, 13 How. 307, 340, 14 L. ed. 157, 171; Bybee v. Oregon & C. R. Co. 139 U. S. 663, 667, 35 L. ed. 305, 306, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 641, 26 Fed. 589. Chapin v. School Dist. 35 N. H. 445; Emerson v. Simpson, 43 N. H. 477, 80 Am. Dec. 184, 82 Am. Dec. 168; Page v. Palmer, 48 N. H. 386; Wier v. Simmons, 55 Wis. 643, 13 N. W. 873; Curtis v. Board of Educa tion, 43 Kan. 144, 23 Pac. 98; Gadberry v. Sheppard, 27 Miss. 207; Brown v. Caldwell, 23 W. Va. 189, 48 Am. Rep. 376; Rawson v. School Dist. 7 Allen, 128, 83 Am. Dec. 670; Kilpatrick v. Baltimore, 81 Md. 192, 27 L.R.A. 643, 48 Am. St. Rep. 509, 31 Atl. 805; Gallaher v. Herbert, 117 Ill. 169, 7 N. E. 511; Elyton Land Co. v. South & North Ala. R. Co. 100 Ala. 406, 14 So. 207; Voris v. Renshaw, 49 Ill. 430; Hunt v. Beeson, 18 Ind. 382; Jeffersonville, M. & I. R. Co. v. Barbour, 89 Ind. 378; Sumner v. Darnell, 128 Ind. 43, 13 L.R.A. 173, 27 N. E. 162; Post v. Weil, 115 N. Y. 371, 5 L.R.A. 422, 12 Am. St. Rep. 809, 22 N. E. 145; Graves v. Deterling, 120 N. Y. 457, 24 N. E. 655; Cunningham v. Parker, 146 N. Y. 33, 48 Am. St. Rep. 765, 40 N. E. 635. This rule of strict construction is sustained and fortified where the United States, as here, has permitted the company, from the beginning, to sell its lands without regard to the restrictions or limitations of the actual-settler clause, and, at most, has permitted the company to follow the construction placed upon the act of April 10, 1869, by the opinion of Mr. Wilson, submitted to Attorney General Williams in 1872; that is, to sell to such persons as were actual settlers upon the land on April 10, 1869, and up to the definite location of the line of railroad, which was the practice of the company. Hewitt v. Schultz, 180 U. S. 139, 156, 45 L. ed. 463, 472, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 309. The construction of language claimed to create a condition subsequent, as announced and adhered to by the supreme court of the state, in which the lands are situated, becomes a rule of property, and is applicable to language in grants made by the United States which create a condition subsequent. Seymour v. Sanders, 3 Dill. 440, Fed. Cas. No. 12,690; United States v. Gratiot, 14 Pet. 526, 10 L. ed. 573; Wilcox v. Jackson, 13 Pet. 498, 516, 10 L. ed. 264, 273. The United States is bound by its contracts, and such contracts must be construed in the same way and in the same manner as contracts by private parties; and when the United States seeks to enforce these Conditions subsequent are construed contracts in a court of equity it comes into strictly. Morrill v. Wabash, St. L. & P. R. Co. 96 Mo. 174, 9 S. W. 657; Roanoke Investment Co. v. Kansas City & S. E. R. Co. 108 Mo. 50, 17 S. W. 1000; Farnham v. Thompson, 34 Minn. 337, 57 Am. Rep. 59, 26 N. W. 9; that court not as a sovereign, but as a suitor; and, with certain well-recognized exceptions, its rights must be measured by the same rules and according to the same standard as applied in the case of other suitors. United States v. Beebee, 4 McCrary, 12, | Co. v. Perdue, 40 W. Va. 442, 21 S. E. 755; 17 Fed. 37; United States v. White, 9 Sawy. Cass County v. Plotner, 149 Ind. 121, 48 125, 17 Fed. 565; United States v. Bostwick, N. E. 635; Woodruff v. Williams, 35 Colo. 94 U. S. 53-66, 24 J.. ed. 65, 66; The Siren, 28, 5 L.R.A. (N.S.) 986, 85 Pac. 90; Given 7 Wall. 152-159, 19 L. ed. 129-132; Brent v. Times Republican Printing Co. 52 C. C. v. Bank of Washington, 10 Pet. 596-615, A. 40, 114 Fed. 95; Indiana v. Milk, 11 9 L. ed. 547-555; United States v. McElroy, 25 Fed. 804; United States v. Ingate, 48 Fed. 251; United States v. Devereux, 32 C. C. A. 564, 61 U. S. App. 548, 90 Fed. 182; United States v. North American Commercial Co. 74 Fed. 151; United States v. Northern P. R. Co. 37 C. C. A. 290, 95 Fed. 880; United States v. Clark, 70 C. C. A. 584, 138 Fed. 299; United States v. Budd, 43 Fed. 634; Mountain Copper Co. v. United States, 73 C. C. A. 621, 142 Fed. 629; United States v. Flint, 4 Sawy. 58, Fed. Cas. No. 15,121, affirmed in 98 U. S. 61, 64, 25 L. ed. 93, 94; Lynch v. United States, 13 Okla. 144, 73 Pac. 1095; United States v. San Jacinto Tin Co. 125 U. S. 273, 285, 31 L. ed. 747, 751, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 850; United States v. Grand Rapida & I. R. Co. 91 C. C. A. 265, 165 Fed. 297; United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co. 200 U. S. 321, 339, 50 L. ed. 499, 506, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 282; United States v. Holmes, 105 Fed. 43; United States v. American Surety Co. 110 Fed. 913; David v. Gray, 16 Wall. 203-232, 21 L. ed. 447-457; Port Royal & A. R. Co. v. South Carolina, 60 Fed. 552; United States v. Budd, 144 U. S. 154, 160, 36 L. ed. 384, 386, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 575; People v. Stephens, 71 N. Y. 549; Carr v. State, 127 Ind. 206, 11 L.R.A. 370, 22 Am. St. Rep. 624, 26 N. E. 778; State v. Kilburn, 81 Conn. 12, 129 Am. St. Rep. 205, 69 Atl. 1023; People ex rel. Ambler v. Auditor General, 38 Mich. 750; Michigan State Bank v. Hastings, 1 Dougl. (Mich.) 252, 41 Am. Dec. 549; Daggett v. Bonewitz, 107 Ind. 279, 7 N. E. 900; Murray v. Charleston, 96 U. S. 432, 445, 24 L. ed. 760, 763; Camp v. Smith, 2 Minn. 155, Gil. 131. The doctrine of waiver and equitable estoppel is applicable to the United States, and upon the facts in this case the United States must be held to have waived its right by long-continued acquiescence and affirmative action, with full knowledge of continued breaches by the company from the earliest administration of the grants to the passage of the act of August 20, 1912 (socalled "innocent purchaser's act"), and the United States is estopped under the facts disclosed by the testimony to attempt to enforce the alleged condition subsequent. State ex rel. Douglas v. School Dist. 85 Minn. 233, 88 N. W. 751; 16 Cyc. 679; Sly v. Hunt, 159 Mass. 151, 21 L.R.A. 680, 38 Am. St. Rep. 403, 34 N. E. 187; Co. Litt. 352a; 40 Cyc. 254, notes 62, 63, 255; Norfolk & W. R. | Fed. 389; Bain v. Parker, 77 Ark. 168, 90 S. W. 1000; McClellan v. St. Louis & H. R. Co. 103 Mo. 295, 15 S. W. 546; State v. Illinois C. R. Co. 246 Ill. 234, 92 N. E. 814; Abbott v. New York & N. E. R. Co. 145 Mass. 450, 15 N. E. 91; People ex rel. McCauley v. Brooks, 16 Cal. 27; Grogan v. San Francisco, 18 Cal. 590, 609; State v. Buttles, 3 Ohio St. 319; Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Grinnell, 51 Iowa, 485, 1 N. W. 712; Chicago, St. P. M. & O. R. Co. v. Douglas County, 134 Wis. 205, 14 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1074, 114 N. W. 511; James v. Germania Iron Co. 46 C. C. A. 476, 107 Fed. 600; United States v. McLaughlin, 12 Sawy. 179, 200, 30 Fed. 161; United States v. Stinson, 60 C. C. A. 615, 125 Fed. 909; Walker v. United States, 139 Fed. 412; United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co. 81 C. C. A. 221, 152 Fed. 40, 209 U. S. 447, 52 L. ed. 881, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 579; Shaw v. Kellogg, 170 U. S. 312, 331, 42 L. ed. 1050, 1057, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 632; Com. ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. Bala & B. M. Turnp. Co. 153 Pa. 54, 25 Atl. 1105; Atty. Gen. v. Delaware & B. B. R. Co. 27 N. J. Eq. 1; Magee v. Doe, 22 Ala. 718; Menard v. Massey, 8 How. 293, 12 L. ed. 1085; Lessieur v. Price, 12 How. 59, 76, 13 L. ed. 893, 900; Lindsey v. Hawes, 2 Black, 554, 560, 17 L. ed. 265, 268; United States v. Winona & St. P. R. Co. 165 U. S. 463, 474, 41 L. ed. 789, 794, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 368; United States v. Winona & St. P. R. Co. 15 C. C. A. 96, 32 U. S. App. 272, 67 Fed. 955; Maxwell Land-Grant Case, 121 U. S. 325, 381, 30 L. ed. 949, 959, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1015; Irwin v. United States, 16 How. 513, 523, 14 L. ed. 1038, 1042; State v. Flint & P. M. R. Co. 89 Mich. 481, 51 N. W. 103, affirmed in 152 U. S. 363, 38 L. ed. 478, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 586; United States v. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. 37 Fed. 70; Hooper v. Cummings, 45 Me. 365; United States v. Arredondo, 6 Pet. 691, 728, 8 L. ed. 547, 561; Titus v. United States, 20 Wall. 475, 485, 22 L. ed. 400, 403; Jones v. United States, 96 U. S. 24, 29, 24 L. ed. 644, 646; Minneapolis & St. C. R. v. Duluth & W. R. Co. 45 Minn. 106, 47 N. W. 464; Barrie v. Smith, 47 Mich. 131, 10 N. W. 168; Wisconsin C. R. Co. v. Forsythe, 159 U. S. 46, 60, 40 L. ed. 71, 75, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1020; United States v. Wallamet Valley & C. M. Wagon Road Co. 42 Fed. 351, 140 U. S. 599, 622, 35 L. ed. 560, 567, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 988, 41 Fed. 493, 54 Fed. 809, 55 Fed. 718; United States v. California & O. Land Co. The case at bar is not the case of mere silence and inaction in the presence of a breach of a continuing obligation. It is a case of "nonaction in the special circumdisclosed." (United States V. Northern P. R. Co. 177 U. S. 435, 441, 44 L. ed. 836, 838, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 706.) It is a case of the express or implied assent of the government (Deseret Salt Co. v. Tarpey, 142 U. S. 241, 35 L. ed. 999, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 158); it is a case of accumulated and affirmative acts and conduct upon the part of the government, pointing irresistibly to the express or implied assent of the government to the administration of the grant as the company consistently administered it (United States v. Midwest Oil Co. 236 U. S. 459, 59 L. ed. 673, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 309). 148 U. S. 31, 38, 37 L. ed. 354, 358, 13 | Harway, 56 N. Y. 342; Sharon Iron Co. v. Sup. Ct. Rep. 458; Com. v. André, 3 Pick. Erie, 41 Pa. 351; McKildoe v. Darracott, 224; Cahn v. Barnes, 7 Sawy. 48, 5 Fed. 13 Gratt. 278. 326; Pengra v. Munz, 29 Fed. 830; Woodruff v. Trapnall, 10 How. 190, 206, 13 L. ed. 358, 389; Michigan v. Jackson, L. & S. R. Co. 16 C. C. A. 345, 37 U. S. App. 220, | 69 Fed. 116; Iowa v. Carr, 112 C. C. A. 477, stances 191 Fed. 266; United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co. 67 C. C. A. 1, 131 Fed. 677; United States v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 172 Fed. 271; United States v. Stinson, 197 U. S. 200, 204, 205, 49 L. ed. 724, 725, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 426; Deseret Salt Co. v. Tarpey, 142 U. S. 241, 35 L. ed. 999, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 158; United States v. Northern P. R. Co. 177 U. S. 435, 441, 44 L. ed. 836, 838, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 706; United States v. Midwest Oil Co. 236 U. S. 459, 59 L. ed. 673, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 309; 2 Pom. Eq. Jur. § 818; State v. Taylor, 28 La. Ann. 460; State v. Ober, 34 La. Ann. 359; State v. New Orleans, C. & L. R. Co. 104 La. 685, 29 So. 312; 2 Elliott, Railroads, § 806; Central Trust Co. v. Treat, 192 Fed. 942; McKnight v. United States, 98 U. S. 179, 25 L. ed. 115; United States v. Bostwick, 94 U. S. 53, 66, 24 L. ed. 65, 66; United States v. Bank of Metropolis, 15 Pet. 377, 392, 10 L. ed. 774, 779; Clark v. United States, 95 U. S. 539, 543, 544, 24 L. ed. 518-520; State v. Bailey, 19 Ind. 454; Verdier v. Port Royal R. Co. 15 S. C. Under the provisions of the act of Con482; Peck v. Burr, 10 N. Y. 297; Jewellgress of June 4, 1897, a record was kept Nursery Co. v. State, 4 S. D. 218, 56 N. W. 113; People ex rel. Chope v. Detroit & H. Pl. Road Co. 37 Mich. 198, 26 Am. Rep. 512; State ex rel. Smyth v. Kennedy, 60 Neb. 305, 83 N. W. 87; State ex rel. West v. Des Moines, 96 Iowa, 534, 31 L.R.A. 186, 59 Am. St. Rep. 381, 65 N. W. 818; State ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. Janesville Water Co. 92 Wis. 504, 32 L.R.A. 391, 66 N. W. 512; Duffield v. Hue, 129 Pa. 94, 18 Atl. 566, 17 Mor. Min. Rep. 253; Lehigh Coal & Nav. Co. v. Early, 162 Pa. 338, 29 Atl. 736. We are not, in the case at bar, dealing with the mere silence or inaction of a landlord in respect to the breach of a condition in a lease, where such condition is one of continuing obligation. As to such conditions, it has been held that mere silent acquiescence in the breach thereof will not discharge the condition, or disable the landlord from proceeding against a subsequent breach. Such rule has no application in any event to a condition subsequent, which, if taken advantage of, destroys the whole estate, since such condition, if once dispensed with, in whole or in part, is gone forever; for a condition, being an entire thing, cannot be apportioned except by act of law. 2 Washb. Real Prop. § 962; Murray v. Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 87, 132, 133, 3 L. ed. 162, 176, 177; Walker v. United States, 139 Fed. 412; Sanitary Dist. v. Metropolitan West Side Elev. R. Co. 241 Ill. 645, 89 N. E. 800; Pengra v. Munz, 29 Fed. 836; Shaw v. Kellogg, 170 U. S. 312, 42 L. ed. 1050, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 632; United States v. Hill, 120 U. S. 169, 180, 30 L. ed. 627, 631, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 510; Nicholas v. Austin, 82 Va. 824, 1 S. E. 132. in the Interior Department of the steps taken in the selection of forest reserve lieu lands, including a statement of the action taken by the Secretary in approving or disapproving the lieu selections, and the deeds filed as bases therefor. Both the statute and the action of the Land Department waived the actual-settler clause in the act of April 10, 1869, and the act of May 4, 1870. These lands were all within the Cascade Forest Reserve, and this was likewise a waiver of this clause, even if the company had retained the title to these lands. Knight v. United Land Asso. 142 U. S. 161, 177, 178, 35 L. ed. 974, 979, 980, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 258; McDonald v. Union P. R. Co. 70 Neb. 352, 97 N. W. 440; Re Pleblo of San Francisco, 5 Land Dec. 494; Michigan Land & Lumber Co. v. Rust, 15 C. C. A. 335, 31 U. S. App. 731, 68 Fed. 165; United States v. Schwalby, 8 Tex. Civ. App. 679, 29 S. W. 90; People ex rel. Mathews v. Woodruff, 75 App. Div. 90, 77 N. Y. Supp. 722; Scofield Rolling Mill Co. v. State, 54 Ga. 642; State v. New Orleans, C. & L. R. Co. 104 La. 690, 29 So. 312; State v. Bailey, 19 Ind. 452; State v. Flint & P. M. R. Co. 89 Mich. 491, 51 N. W. 103. Facts set forth in the reports of public officers of the United States, and in such | 312; State v. Bailey, 19 Ind. 453; State v. reports as are directly made to and filed Flint & P. M. R. Co. 89 Mich. 491, 51 N. W. with Congress and kept on record with that 103; United States v. Stinson, 197 U. S. body, must be taken to be known both by 200, 205, 49 L. ed. 724, 725, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. Congress and by the government. State ex rel. Wilkins v. Hallock, 20 Nev. 73, 15 Pac. 472; Michigan Land & Lumber Co. v. Rust, 15 C. C. A. 335, 31 U. S. App. 731, 68 Fed. 155; Michigan v. Jackson, L. & S. R. Co. 16 C. C. A. 345, 37 U. S. App. 220, 69 Fed. 121; Shaw v. Kellogg, 170 U. S. 339, 42 L. ed. 1060, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 632; United States v. Midwest Oil Co. 236 U. S. 459, 59 L. ed. 673, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 309. The administration of the public land laws has been committed by Congress to the Land Department (McDonald v. Union P. R. Co. 70 Neb. 352, 97 N. W. 440), and the Secretary of the Interior, as the head of that Department, was charged by Congress with the supervision of all public business relating to the public lands. Knight v. United Land Asso. 142 U. S. 161, 177, 178, 35 L. ed. 974, 979, 980, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 258; Re Pueblo of San Francisco, 5 Land Dec. 494. It was the official duty of the Secretary, as the head of the Department, to pass upon and to approve or disapprove all of these various selections of lands made under the act of Congress in lieu of granted lands falling within the limits of forest reserves, and to pass upon and approve or disapprove the deeds constituting the base for such selections. In the performance of that duty, as indeed in all matters connected with the supervision of the public business relating to the public lands, the Secretary acted and acts as the agent of the government, duly and specially authorized to represent it in such matters. "He represents the government, which is a party in interest, in every case involving the surveying and disposal of the public lands." Michigan Land & Lumber Co. v. Rust, 15 C. C. A. 335, 31 U. S. App. 731, 68 Fed. 165; Knight v. United Land Asso. 142 U. S. 161, 191, 35 L. ed. 974, 984, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 258. His knowledge, therefore, in acting in respect to these various selections, and in acting upon the deeds constituting the base therefor, was the knowledge of the government, through its authorized representative, and the government and Congress must be charged with notice of any alleged breaches of what is now claimed to be a condition subsequent, which came to his knowledge while he was so acting. United States v. Schwalby, 8 Tex. Civ. App. 679, 29 S. W. 90; State v. New Or 426. The character of the granted lands, their situation and location, rendered them unfit for disposition under the settlement laws in accordance with the terms of the condition. Shiver v. United States, 159 U. S. 491, 497, 40 L. ed. 231, 232, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 54; Stone v. United States, 167 U. S. 178, 193, 42 L. ed. 127, 133, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 778; United States v. Ball, 31 Fed. 668; United States v. Murphy, 32 Fed. 379; Stone v. United States, 12 C. C. A. 451, 29 U. S. App. 32, 64 Fed. 676; United States v. Niemeyer, 94 Fed. 147; Conway v. United States, 37 C. C. A. 200, 95 Fed. 617; United States v. Budd, 43 Fed. 630, s. c. 144 U. S. 154, 166, 36 L. ed. 384, 388, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 575; Whitney v. Spratt, 25 Wash. 62, 87 Am. St. Rep. 738, 64 Pac. 919; Thayer v Spratt, 189 U. S. 346, 47 L. ed. 845, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 576; Ward v. Montgomery, 15 Land Dec. 280; Kelly v. Ogan, 15 Land Dec. 564; Merritt v. Philp, 16 Land Dec. 404; Robert v. Brownell, 18 Land Dec. 216; Gibson v. Smith, 18 Land Dec. 249; Gosling v. Murphy, 18 Land Dec. 308; United States v. Searles, 19 Land Dec. 258; Jones v. Aztec Land & Cattle Co. 34 Land Dec. 116; Harper v. Eiene, 26 Land Dec. 151; Rowley v. Hayes, 29 Land Dec. 606; Patton v. Quackenbush, 35 Land Dec. 561; Davis v. Gibson, 38 Land Dec. 265; Finley v. Ness, 38 Land Dec. 394; Winninghoff v. Ryan, 40 Land Dec. 342. Even though the language used shall be construed as a condition subsequent, such condition was impossible of performance. 6 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 2d ed. 506; Scovill v. McMahon, 21 L.R.A. 58, and note, 62 Conn. 378, 36 Am. St. Rep. 350, 26 Atl. 479; 4 Kent, Com. 130; United States v. Arredondo, 6 Pet. 691, 745, 8 L. ed. 547, 567; Mahoning County v. Young, 8 C. C. A. 27, 16 U. S. App. 253, 59 Fed. 96; Jones v. Chesapeake & O. R. Co. 14 W. Va. 523; Vanderslice v. Hanks, 3 Cal. 41; Burnham v. Burnham, 79 Wis. 557, 48 N. W. 661. If an agreement is so uncertain and ambiguous that the court is unable to collect from it what the parties intended, or if the court cannot for that reason enforce it, there is no obligation, and therefore no contract. 9 Cyc. 248. The contract of sale must be certain, or it must be so certain as that it can be made certain. 29 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 2d ed. 592. If the "actual-settler" clause be a con leans, C. & L. R. Co. 104 La. 690, 29 So.'dition subsequent, certain and definite, so as to be otherwise enforceable, then it was repugnant to the grant, and could not have been enforced without destruction of the primary and dominant purpose of Congress to aid in the construction of the road. If the land thus subject to sale could not have been so sold in time to give the aid intended, the condition was destructive of the fee intended to be granted, and the condition must give way, as repugnant to the grant. Independently of any question of estoppel or waiver, where the rights of the parties have vested, as here, the contemporaneous and practical construction will be followed by the courts. lands under the homestead or pre-emption law, unless a preferred right of purchase was given to the actual settler up to the time when the rights of the company be came fixed and definite by issuance of patent. McDonald v. Union P. R. Co. 70 Neb. 346, 97 N. W. 440; Hutton v. Frisbie, 37 Cal. 481; Clements v. Warner, 24 How. 394, 397, 16 L. ed. 695, 696; United States Oregon & C. R. Co. 176 U. S. 28, 47, 44 Varner v. Rice, 44 Ark. 250; McDonoghv. v. Murdoch, 15 How. 367, 412, 14 L. ed. L. ed. 358, 366, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 261; 732, 752. Leavenworth, L. & G. R. Co. v. United States, 92 U. S. 733, 748, 23 L. ed. 634, 640; Northern P. R. Co. v. Amacker, 175 U. S. 564, 567, 44 L. ed. 274, 275, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 236; Holmes v. United States, 55 C. C. A. 489, 118 Fed. 999; Southern P. R. Co. v. Bell, 183 U. S. 675, 679, 46 L. ed. 383, 386, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 232; Kansas P. R. Co. v. Dunmeyer, 113 U. S. 629, 638, 28 L. ed. 1122, 1125, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 566. 11 Enc. U. S. Sup. Ct. Rep. 136-140; Northern P. R. Co. v. United States, 36 Fed. 282; Brown v. United States, 113 U. S. | 570, 28 L. ed. 1079, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 648; Re Northern P. R. Co. 8 Land Dec. 13; United States v. Burlington & M. River R. Co. 98 U. S. 341, 25 L. ed. 200; United States v. Philbrick, 120 U. S. 58, 30 L. ed. 561, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 413; United States v. Graham, 110 U. S. 219, 28 L. ed. 126, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 582; Robertson v. Downing, 127 U. S. 607, 32 L. ed. 269, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1328; Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 140 U. S. 1, 35 L. ed. 363, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 699. By the term "actual settlers only" is necessarily meant that class of preferred purchasers who entered upon these lands before they were surveyed, or in advance of construction, and at some time before the finding of the Land Department that the company had earned the particular lands and was entitled to a patent therefor. "Settler," Black's Law Dict. 2d ed. p. 1080; "Actual," Black's Law Dict. 2d ed. p. 28; Webster's New Int. Dict.; Standard Dict.; Hume v. Gracy, 86 Tex. 671, 27 S. W. 584; Davis v. Young, 2 Dana, 299; McIntyre v. Sherwood, 82 Cal. 139, 22 Pac. 937; Astor v. Merritt, 111 U. S. 202, 28 L. ed. 401, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 413; Kelly v. Supreme Council, C. M. B. A. 46 App. Div. 79, 61 N. Y. Supp. 394; State v. Wells, 31 Conn. 210; "Actual," Century Dict.; Adams v. Coates, 38 Land Dec. 180; Johnson v. Squires, 55 Cal. 104; Urton v. Wilson, 65 Cal. 11, 2 Pac. 411; Dillon v. Saloude, 68 Cal. 267, 9 Pac. 162; Gavitt v. Mohr, 68 Cal. 506, 10 Pac. 337; Bratton v. Cross, 22 Kan. 673; Baker v. Millman, 77 Tex. 46, 13 S. W. 618; Osborne v. San Diego Land & Town Co. 178 U. S. 22, 38, 44 L. ed. 961, 968, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 860. Congress had in mind a class of actual settlers who had entered upon these lands, who might otherwise be deprived of their improvements and of their right to take the Judicial opinion as to the effect of the clause in the act of July 1, 1862, granting lands to the Union Pacific Railroad Company, which provided that the lands thereby granted, which should not be sold or disposed of by the company within three years after the entire road shall have been completed, should be subject to settlement and pre-emption like other lands, at a price not exceeding $1.25 per acre, to be paid to the company, is interesting, in that the courts attempt to harmonize and give effect to all of the provisions of the act. Platt v. Union P. R. Co. 99 U. S. 48, 25 L. ed. 424; Union P. R. Co. v. McShane, 22 Wall. 444, 22 L. ed. 747, 3 Dill. 310, Fed. Cas. No. 14,382; Heath v. Northern P. R. Co. 38 Land Dec. 77. The United States cannot by this suit do indirectly what it could not do in the face of the act of March 3, 1891, and the act of March 2, 1896, limiting the time in which suits to set aside patents may be brought to the period stated. United States v. Arredondo, 6 Pet. 691, 728, 8 L. ed. 547, 561. This suit is in effect a collateral attack upon these patents in this that if the United States should prevail and these lands should be forfeited and the title of the United States quieted, there would be a decree directly in the face of the formal conveyance of this title by these many patents. United States v. Winona & St. P. R. Co. 15 C. C. A. 96, 32 U. S. App. 272, 67 Fed. 957. It was the duty of the United States, acting by its Land Department, to see that the conditions of the grant were observed by the company, and this duty was a continuing one from the inception of the title to the date of issuance of patent, and even |