run.

United States v. Winona & St. P. R. Co. 165 U. S. 463, 475, 41 L. ed. 789, 795, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 368, affirming 15 C. C. A. 96, 32 U. S. App. 272, 67 Fed. 948; St. Louis Smelting & Ref. Co. v. Kemp, 104 U. S. 636, 26 L. ed. 875; Steel v. St. Louis Smelting & Ref. Co. 106 U. S. 447, 450, 27 L. ed. 226, 227, 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 389; Maxwell Land-Grant Case, 121 U. S. 325, 381, 30 L. ed. 949, 959, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1015.

It was unnecessary to pass the joint resolution of April 30, 1908, in order to enable the United States to assert its rights in respect to these lands and determine by an appropriate proceeding whether or not there had been a breach of the alleged condition subsequent, whether the actual-settler clause created a condition subsequent, and generally to fix the status of these lands. Such suit need not have been necessarily to set aside these patents as having been erroneously issued, but the general jurisdiction of a court of equity could have been asserted by the United States in this court to determine these questions.

United States v. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. 141 U. S. 358, 381, 35 L. ed. 766, 773, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 13; Whiteside County v. Burchell, 31 Ill. 78; Dunklin County v. District County Ct. 23 Mo. 456; Cooper v. Roberts, 18 How. 181, 15 L. ed. 341; Gaston v. Scott, 5 Or. 54; Steel v. St. Louis Smelting & Ref. Co. 106 U. S. 447, 27 L. ed. 226, 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 389; Small v. Lutz, 41 Or. 578, 67 Pac. 421, 69 Pac. 825.

While we may not quote the individual opinions of the members of Congress as expressed in the debates, to aid in the interpretation of the statute as passed (see United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Asso. 166 U. S. 290, 41 L. ed. 1007, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 540; United States v. Union P. R. Co. 91 U. S. 72, 23 L. ed. 224; Carter v. Hobbs, 92 Fed. 594; United States v. Oregon & C. R. Co. 57 Fed. 427), still we may consider what occurred in the passage of the measure, the evil to be remedied, or the historical background.

These patents, whether erroneously issued or otherwise, after the period of time named had elapsed, were absolute and undoubted title.

United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co. 209 U. S. 447, 449, 52 L. ed. 881, 886, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 579.

Patents constitute conclusive evidence that the grantee has complied with the conditions of the grant, and to that extent the grant was thereby relieved from the possibility of forfeiture for breach of its conditions.

Deseret Salt Co. v. Tarpey, 142 U. S. 241, 250, 35 L. ed. 999, 1002, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 158; United States v. Northern P. R. Co. 177 U. S. 435, 441, 44 L. ed. 836, 838, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 706.

If the formal contention is to be made that this suit is, as matter of form, a proceeding for a forfeiture, and not directly in form a proceeding to annul or cancel the patent, it is not maintainable-no such suit could be maintained-under U. S. Rev. Stat. § 1047, Comp. Stat. 1913, § 1712.

Welles v. Graves, 41 Fed. 467; Leffingwell v. Warren, 2 Black, 599, 17 L. ed. 261.

If this suit is to be treated as a proceeding to vindicate the settlers' clause, and in aid of the rights of settlers, the United States must be taken to be a formal party only, against which, in that view, the defenses of laches and limitation will be sustained.

United States v. Des Moines Nav. & R. Co. 142. U. S. 510, 538, 539, 35 L. ed. 1099, 1106, 1107, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 308.

The estate once having passed, the law of the state in which the property is situ ated, as determined by the supreme court of that state, will be followed, as a rule of property, in determining whether the language of the so-called "actual-settler" clause is a condition subsequent, or a covenant.

Wilcox v. Jackson, 13 Pet. 498, 517, 10 L. ed. 264, 273; Camp v. Smith, 2 Minn. 155, Gil. 143.

It is therefore unnecessary to interpolate words of forfeiture into the act of April 10, 1869, or of May 4, 1870, or to assume that any public land policy secondary in its purpose and character should control, and induce the court to adopt a construction which will destroy the estate granted, rather than sustain that estate. Stuart v. Easton, 170 U. S. 383, 42 L. ed. 1078, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 650; Wright v. Morgan, 191 U. S. 55-58, 48 L. ed. 89-93, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 6; Palatine Ins. Co. v. Ewing, 34 C. C. A. 236, 92 Fed. 114.

Mr. Joseph H. Call also filed a brief for the Railroad Companies:

The "sinking fund act" of Congress of May 7, 1878, ratified the transfer of the California & Oregon Railroad and its land grants in California to the Central Pacific Railroad Company, and operated to abrogate the "settler's clause" contained in the acts of April 10, 1869, and May 4, 1870.

Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U. S. 700, 730, 25 L. ed. 496, 505; United States v. Stanford, 161 U. S. 412-431, 40 L. ed. 751-759, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 576; United States v. Des Moines Nav. & R. Co. 142 U. S. 543-546, 35 L. ed. 1108-1110, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 308. This cause of action is barred and the title to the lands sought to be forfeited has been transferred to the defendants by virtue of U. S. Rev. Stat. § 1047, Comp. Stat. 1913, § 1712.

Welles v. Graves, 41 Fed. 467; Leffingwell v. Warren, 2 Black, 599-605, 17 L. ed. 261-263; Croxall v. Shererd, 5 Wall. 289, 18 L. ed. 580; Dickerson v. Colgrove, 100 U. S. 578-583, 25 L. ed. 618-620; Bicknell v. Comstock, 113 U. S. 149-152, 28 L. ed. 962, 963, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 399; Campbell v. Holt, 115 U. S. 620-625, 29 L. ed. 483-486, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 209; Winona & St. P. R. Co. v. United States, 165 U. S. 483, 41 L. ed. 798, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 381; United States ▼. Winona & St. P. R. Co. 165 U. S. 463, 41 L. ed. 789, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 368; United

United States v. Southern P. R. Co. 184 U. S. 49, 46 L. ed. 425, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 285; United States v. Winona & St. P. R. Co. 165 U. S. 463, 41 L. ed. 789, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 368; Winona & St. P. R. Co. v. United States, 165 U. S. 483, 41 L. ed. 798, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 381; Burke v. Southern P. R. Co. 234 U. S. 669-693, 58 L. ed. 15271550, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 907; United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co. 209 U. S. 447, 52 L. ed. 881, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 579; United States v. California & O. Land Co. 148 U. S. 38, 37 L. ed. 358, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 458.

Mr. John C. Spooner argued the cause, and, with Mr. John M. Gearin, filed a brief for the Union Trust Company:

Actual settlers are persons to whom lands susceptible of cultivation are sold, and who actually improve and cultivate the same.

Baker v. Millman, 77 Tex. 46, 13 S. W. 618; Gavitt v. Mohr, 68 Cal. 506, 10 Pac. 337; Adams v. Church, 193 U. S. 510, 48 L. ed. 769, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 512; Mosely v. Torrence, 71 Cal. 318, 12 Pac. 430; Clements v. Warner, 24 How. 394, 397, 16 L. ed. 695, 696.

When timbered lands had been surveyed and became valuable for the timber, it was found that they were not adapted to entry under the pre-emption or homestead laws, because not valuable, or not chiefly valu able, for cultivation.

United States v. Budd, 144 U. S. 154, 36 L. ed. 384, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 575.

It was the intention of Congress that the

pre-emption and homestead laws should apPly only to lands susceptible of cultivation, and that lands chiefly valuable for timber should be sold at their actual value. This intention having been to a considerable extent defeated by the administration of these acts, congressional intention was emphatically declared by subsequent legislation.

Johnson v. Bridal Veil Lumbering Co. 24 Or. 182, 33 Pac. 528; Patton v. Quackenbush, 35 Land Dec. 561; Rowley v. Hayes, 29 Land Dec. 606; Porter v. Throop, 6 Land Dec. 691; Finley v. Ness, 38 Land Dec. 394;

Greene v. O'Connor, 18 R. I. 56, 19 L.R.A. 262, 25 Atl. 692; Neely v. Hoskins, 84 Me. 386, 24 Atl. 882; Episcopal City Mission v. Appleton, 117 Mass. 326; Post v. Weil, 115 N. Y. 361, 5 L.R.A. 422, 12 Am. St. Rep. 809, 22 N. E. 145; Avery v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co. 106 N. Y. 142, 12 N. E. 619; Carroll County Academy v. Gallatin Academy Co. 104 Ky. 621, 47 S. W. 617.

When a sovereign submits itself to a court of equity to maintain or enforce its equitable rights, and prays its aid, its claims and rights are and ought to be judiciable by the general principles and rules of equity applicable to the claims and rights of private parties under like circumstances.

United States v. International Harvester Co. 214 Fed. 1010; Davis v. Gray, 16 Wall. 203-232, 21 L. ed. 447-457; Iowa v. Carr, 112 C. C. A. 477, 191 Fed. 266.

A condition subsequent will not be implied from words used in a grant merely expressing the purpose for which the lands were to be used or employed.

Wright v. Morgan, 191 U. S. 55, 48 L. ed. 89, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 6.

The word "provided” may, indeed, be used in a statute merely for the purpose of noting an exception to the generality of former provisions; and in such instances the rules of construction require that the matter embraced in the proviso should be strictly construed.

United States v. Dickson, 15 Pet. 165, 10 L. ed. 698; White v. United States, 191 U. S. 545, 48 L. ed. 295, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep.

171.

Where a grant is made by the state in aid of the construction of some work of a public or quasi public character, the construction of the work is the consideration of the grant, and when that is accomplished the consideration is received and retained by the government.

Lake Superior Ship Canal, R. & Iron Co. v. Cunningham, 155 U. S. 354, 39 L. ed. 183, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 103.

This grant is taken out of the operation of the rule that public grants, in case of doubt, are to be construed most favorably to the government, by the fact that the government received and is to receive a full and adequate consideration for the lands granted.

17 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 14; United States v. Denver & R. G. R. Co. 150 U. S. 1, 14, 37 L. ed. 975, 979, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 11; Langdon v. New York, 93 N. Y. 145; Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 7

The opinions expressed by members of Congress in debate cannot properly be considered, especially when the measures advocated by such members were not finally enacted.

United States v. Union P. R. Co. 91 U. S. 79, 23 L. ed. 228; United States v. TransMissouri Freight Asso. 166 U. S. 290-318, 41 L. ed. 1007-1020, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 540; Lapina v. Williams, 232 U. S. 78-90, 58 L. ed. 515–519, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 196.

The policy of the government passing legislation is often an uncertain thing, as to which varying opinions may be formed, and may afford an unstable ground of statutory interpretation.

United States v. First Nat. Bank, 234 U. S. 245-260, 58 L. ed. 1298-1304, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 846.

The provisions of the act of 1869 and of the act of 1870 respecting actual settlers are restrictive covenants, and, if enforceable at all, are enforceable in a court of equity as to lands susceptible of settlement and cultivation only.

Chicago & A. R. Co. v. New York, L. E. & W. R. Co. 24 Fed. 516; Lumley v. Wagner, 1 DeG. M. & G. 604, 21 L. J. Ch. N. S. 898, 16 Jur. 871, 6 Eng. Rul. Cas. 652; Andrews v. Kingsbury, 212 Ill. 97, 72 N. E. 11; Singer Sewing Mach. Co. v. Union Buttonhole & Embroidery Co. Holmes, 253, Fed. Cas. No. 12,904; Wolverhampton & W. R. Co. v. London & N. W. R. Co. L. R. 16 Eq. 433, 43 L. J. Ch. N. S. 131; Doherty v. Allman, L. R. 3 App. Cas. 709, 39 L. T. N. S. 129, 26 Week. Rep. 513; Waskey v. McNaught, 90 C. C. A. 289, 163 Fed. 929; Newbold v. Peabody Heights Co. 3 L.R.A. 579, note.

The very fact that the injury is of a public character, and such that no damage could be calculated, is an added reason for the intervention of equity.

V.

Langan v. Supreme Council, A. L. H. 174 N. Y. 266, 66 N. E. 932; Brown v. Kling, 101 Cal. 295, 35 Pac. 995; Atty. Gen Algonquin Club, 153 Mass. 447, 11 L.R.A. 500, 27 N. E. 2; 22 Cyc. 859, 860; Elliott, Contr. §§ 2, 490-492, 528.

The party who undertakes to work a for

New York Indians v. United States, 170 U. S. 25, 42 L. ed. 935, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 531. Mr. A. W. Lafferty argued the cause and filed a brief for John L. Snyder et al.

Mr. John Mills Day argued the cause, and, with Mr. M. E. Brewer, filed a brief for interveners and appellants:

If, by the proviso in question, Congress had intended to engraft upon the title conveyed by the grant, a condition subsequent, for breach of which forfeiture might be had, it would certainly have amended § 8 to so specifically provide. We contend that the rule, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, should be applied in interpreting the grant; that the grant should be read and interpreted as though the amendment of April 10, 1869, were in fact a part of § 6 of the original act, which in law it is.

United States v. County Ct. 99 U. S. 582, 25 L. ed. 331; Johnson v. Southern P. Co. 54 C. C. A. 508, 117 Fed. 462, 12 Am. Neg. Rep. 398.

The only thing there is in the grant or in this proviso which can be construed as importing a right of forfeiture by the government is the word "provided." This word "provided" does not always import a condition.

Co. Litt. 146 b, 203 b; Cyclopedic L. Dict. 739; Stanley v. Colt, 5 Wall. 119, 18 L. ed. 502.

And when this word imports a condition, it does not always import a condition subsequent.

Cyclopedic L. Dict. 184.

The proviso in question is a condition which neither accomplishes a pre-existing covenant in the grant, nor provides for its avoidance on breach, but creates a change in the pre-existing covenant by requiring a certain disposal of the property conveyed.

Stanley v. Colt, supra.

The government may maintain a suit to promote the public welfare even though it had no pecuniary interest in the result of the litigation.

Re Debs, 158 U. S. 584, 39 L. ed. 1102, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 900; United States v. Hughes, 11 How. 552, 13 L. ed. 809; United States v. Minor, 114 U. S. 233, 29 L. ed. 110, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 836; United States v. San Jacinto Tin Co. 125 U. S. 273, 31 L. ed. 747, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 850; United States v. American Bell Teleph. Co. 128 U. S. 315, 32 L. ed. 450, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 90; Heckman v. United States, 224 U. S. 413, 56 L. ed. 820, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 424.

The government might maintain this

Dugan v. United States, 3 Wheat. 172, 4 L. ed. 362.

The language of the amendment, viz.: "That the lands granted by the act aforesaid shall be sold to actual settlers only, in quantities not greater than one-quarter section to one purchaser, and for a price not exceeding $2.50 per acre," is not only a covenant which is enforceable specifically, but it is also a restraint upon alienation of the lands. Any conveyance in violation of such a restraint is absolutely void and may be so decreed at the suit of the United States.

Heckman v. United States, 224 U. S. 413, 56 L. ed. 820, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 424; Bowling v. United States, 233 U. S. 528, 58 L. ed. 1080, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 659; United States v. Pelican, 232 U. S. 442, 58 L. ed. 676, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 396; United States v. Sandoval, 231 U. S. 28, 58 L. ed. 107, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1.

Whether the proviso is or is not a condition, it is a covenant.

1 Bouvier's Law Dict. p. 262; Hale v. Finch, 104 U. S. 261, 26 L. ed. 732; Platt, Covenants, 70, 71; Elyton Land Co. v. South & North Ala. R. Co. 100 Ala. 405, 14 So. 207; Parmelee v. Oswego & S. R. Co. 6 N. Y. 80; Countryman v. Deck, 13 Abb. N. C. 111; Paschall v. Passmore, 15 Pa. 307; Hartung v. Witte, 59 Wis. 292, 18 N. W. 175; 6 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 2d ed. 502, and note 9.

The purpose of Congress was to compel the railroad company to sell the land to setters in small quantities. Even if the words of the proviso were not sufficient to show this purpose, the purpose of Congress may be shown by the words and acts of Congress, in pari materia.

United States v. Union P. R. Co. 91 U. S. 72, 23 L. ed. 224; Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U. S. 457, 36 L. ed. 226, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 511.

The attorney general could not declare a forfeiture. The legislative body alone can do so.

Minnesota v. Duluth & I. R. Co. 97 Fed.

353.

A legislative declaration of forfeiture, to be effective, must be clear and unambiguous.

Ibid.

Equity will not lend its aid to enforce a penalty or forfeiture, or to devest an estate for breach of a condition subsequent.

Smith v. Jewett, 40 N. H. 530; Chute v. Washburn, 44 Minn. 312, 46 N. W. 555; Vicksburg & M. R. Co. v. Ragsdale, 54

Miss. 200.

This maxim is as true and applicable