compared with the demand on the part of And in the brief of counsel for the appelthe other.

4. That, in determining the validity of the statute, the doctrine that an act although "fair on its face" might be so unequally and oppressively administered by the public authorities as to amount to an unconstitutional discrimination by the state itself (Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 373, 30 L. ed. 220, 227, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1064) was not applicable, as there was no basis in the present case for holding that any discriminations by carriers which were unauthorized by the statute were practised under state authority.

lees, it is stated that the members of the legislature "were undoubtedly familiar with the character and extent of travel of persons of African descent in the state of Oklahoma, and were of the opinion that there was no substantial demand for Pullman car and dining car service for persons of the African race in the intrastate travel" in that state.

This argument with respect to volume of traffic seems to us to be without merit. It makes the constitutional right depend upon the number of persons who may be discriminated against, whereas the essence 5. That the act, in the absence of a differ- of the constitutional right is that it is a ent construction by the state court, must | personal one. Whether or not particular be construed as applying to transportation facilities shall be provided may doubtless exclusively intrastate, and hence did not be conditioned upon there being a reasoncontravene the commerce clause of the Fed-able demand therefor; but, if facilities are eral Constitution. Louisville, N. O. & T. R. Co. v. Mississippi, 133 U. S. 587, 590, 33 L. ed. 784, 785, 2 Inters. Com. Rep. 801, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 348; Chesapeake & O. R. Co. v. Kentucky, 179 U. S. 388, 391, 45 L. ed. 244, 246, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 101; Chiles v. Chesapeake & O. R. Co. 218 U. S. 71, 54 L. ed. 936, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 667, 20 Ann. Cas. 980.

6. That with respect to the existence of discriminations the allegations of the bill were too vague and uncertain to entitie the complainants to a decree.

In view of the decisions of this court above cited, there is no reason to doubt the correctness of the first, second, fourth, and fifth of these conclusions.

provided, substantial equality of treatment of persons traveling under like conditions cannot be refused. It is the individual who is entitled to [162] the equal protection of the laws, and if he is denied by a common carrier, acting in the matter under the authority of a state law, a facility or convenience in the course of his journey which, under substantially the same circumstances, is furnished to another traveler, he may properly complain that his constitutional privilege has been invaded.

There is, however, an insuperable obstacle to the granting of the relief sought by this bill. It was filed, as we have seen, by five persons against five railroad corporations to restrain them from complying with With the third, relating to § 7 of the stat- the state statute. The suit had been ute, we are [161] unable to agree. It is not brought before the law went into effect, questioned that the meaning of this clause and this amended bill was filed very shortis that the carriers may provide sleepingly after. It contains some general allegacars, dining cars, and chair cars exclusively tions as to discriminations in the supply for white persons, and provide no similar of facilities and as to the hardships which accommodations for negroes. The reasoning is that there may not be enough persons of African descent seeking these accommodations to warrant the outlay in providing them. Thus, the attorney general of the state, in the brief filed by him in support of the law, urges that "the plaintiffs must show that their own travel is in such quantity and of such kind as to actually afford the roads the same profits, not per man, but per car, as does the white traffic; or, sufficient profit to justify the furnishing of the facility; and that in such case they are not supplied with separate cars containing the same. This they have not attempted. What vexes the plaintiffs is the limited market value they offer for such accommodations. Defendants are not by law compelled to furnish chair cars, diners. nor sleepers, except when the market of fered reasonably demands the facility."

will ensue. It states that there will be "a multiplicity of suits," there being at least "fifty thousand persons of the negro race in the state of Oklahoma" who will be injured and deprived of their civil rights. But we are dealing here with the case of the complainants, and nothing is shown to entitle them to an injunction. It is an elementary principle that, in order to justify the granting of this extraordinary relief, the complainant's need of it, and the absence of an adequate remedy at law, must clearly appear. The complainant cannot succeed because someone else may be hurt. Nor does it make any difference that other persons who may be injured are persons of the same race or occupation. It is the fact, clearly established, of injury to the complainant-not to others—which justifies judicial intervention. Williams v. Hagood, 98 U. S. 72, 74, 75, 25 L. ed. 51,

52; Marye v. Parsons, 114 U. S. 325, 328, |ing cars, dining cars, or chair cars; or that 329, 29 L. ed. 205, 206, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. any of these five companies has ever noti932, 962; Tyler v. Registration Ct. Judges, fied any one of [164] these complainants 179 U. S. 405, 406, 45 L. ed. 252, 253, 21 that such accommodations would not be furSup. Ct. Rep. 206; Turpin v. Lemon,nished to him, when furnished to others, 187 U. S. 51, 60, 47 L. ed. 70, 74, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 20; Davis & F. Mfg. Co. v. Los Angeles, 189 U. S. 207, 220, 47 L. ed. 778, 781, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 498; Hooker v. Burr, 194 U. S. 415, 419, 48 L. ed. 1046, 1050, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 706; Braxton County Ct. v. West Virginia, 208 U. S. 192, 197, 52 L. ed. 450, 451, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 275; Collins v. Texas, 223 U. S. 288, 295, 296, 56 L. ed. 439, 443, 444, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 286.

The allegations of the amended bill, so far as they purport [163] to show discriminations in the conduct of these carriers, are these:

upon reasonable request and payment of the customary charge. Nor is there anything to show that in case any of these complainants offers himself as a passenger on any of these roads and is refused accommodations equal to those afforded to others on a like journey, he will not have an adequate remedy at law. The desire to obtain a sweeping injunction cannot be accepted as a substitute for compliance with the general rule that the complainant must present facts sufficient to show that his individual need requires the remedy for which he asks. The bill is wholly destitute of any sufficient ground for injunction, and unless we are to ignore settled principles governing equitable relief, the decree must be affirmed.

Decree affirmed.

Mr. Chief Justice White, Mr. Justice Holmes, Mr. Justice Lamar, and Mr. Justice McReynolds concur in the result.

LOUISIANA RAILWAY AND NAVIGA-
TION COMPANY, Plff. in Err.,

V.

of New Orleans.

"That notwithstanding the terms of said act of Congress and of the Constitution of the state of Oklahoma, the said abovenamed defendants and each of them are making distinctions in the civil rights of your orators and of all other persons of the negro race and persons of the white race in the conduct and operation of its trains and passenger service in the state of Oklahoma, in this, to wit: that equal comforts, conveniences, and accommodations will not be provided for your orators and other persons of the negro race; that said passenger coaches are not constructed or maintained so as to enable persons of MARTIN BEHRMAN, Mayor of the City the negro race to be provided with separate and equal toilet and waiting rooms for male and female passengers of said negro race, nor have equal smoking car accommodations, nor separate and equal chair cars, sleeping cars, and dining car accom. modations by providing for your orators and other persons of the negro race who may become passengers on said railroad, that separate waiting rooms with equal comforts and conveniences have been or are bound to be constructed by said defendants and each of them for your orators and other persons of the negro race desiring to become passengers on said railroad, and that said orators are not being and will not be provided with equal accommodations with the white race under the provisions of said

act."

(See S. C. Reporter's ed. 164–178.)

Error to state court - - Federal question impairing contract obligations decision on non-Federal ground.

1. A judgment of the highest state court enjoining a railway company from constructing or operating a belt line rail

NOTE. On the general subject of writs of error from United States Supreme Court to state courts-see notes to Martin v. Hunter, 4 L. ed. U. S. 97; Hamblin v. Western Land Co. 37 L. ed. U. S. 267; Re Buchanan, 39 L. ed. U. S. 884; and Kipley v. Illinois, 42 L. ed. U. S. 998.

On what adjudications of state courts can be brought up for review in the Supreme Court of the United States by writ of error to those courts-see note to Apex Transp. Co. v. Garbade, 62 L.R.A. 513.

On how and when questions must be raised and decided in a state court in order to make a case for a writ of error from the Supreme Court of the United States-see note to Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. McGrew, 63

We agree with the court below that these allegations are altogether too vague and indefinite to warrant the relief sought by these complainants. It is not alleged that any one of the complainants has ever traveled on any one of the five railroads, or has ever requested transportation on On error to state courts in cases presentany of them; or that any one of the coming questions of impairment of contract obplainants has ever requested that accommo- ligations-see note to Osborne v. Clark, 51 dations be furnished to him in any sleep-L. ed. U. S. 619.

L.R.A. 33.

way under a municipal ordinance which the railway company claims gives it contract rights that it avers are unconstitutionally impaired by a later ordinance is reviewable in the Federal Supreme Court, although the state court rests its decision upon the ground that any contract created by the earlier ordinance had become inoperative because of the impossibility of realization of a suspensive condition to which the contract was subject, where the whole object of the suit was to establish the right of the city to carry out the municipal scheme of construction and operation under the subsequent ordinance which conflicted with and repealed the earlier ordinance so far as it might be construed to give the rail way company the particular privileges therein described, and this object was at tained under the final judgment by which the municipal construction and operation were protected against the claim of contract right.

reason of the successful opposition of a public board, it was precluded from building that portion of the proposed line which was within the jurisdiction of such board, where the city agreed to furnish a clear legal right of way for the entire construction, and by a later ordinance provided, in case the company should default "without legal excuse," for the construction of such line by another railway company to which should be returned all the securities deposited by it to secure performance of its obligation in case it should be prevented "from building said belt tracks or any portion of the same on account of the city not furnishing the right of way," or "by causes beyond its control," such company to have the right, in case the other company should only complete a part of the line, to use such portion as should be constructed.

[No. 49.]

[For other cases, see Appeal and Error, 1376, Argued November 4 and 5, 1914. Decided in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.]

Railway franchise

dition

suspensive conevent not happening.

November 30, 1914.

of Louisiana to review a decree N ERROR to the Supreme Court of the

which affirmed a decree of the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans, in that state, enjoining a railway company from constructing and operating a belt line railway. Affirmed.

See came case below, 127 La. 775, 54 So.

2. All rights of a railway company under a municipal ordinance giving it the right to use the tracks of a belt line railway which another railway company had been authorized by the city to construct were terminated upon the latter's legally excusable failure to build, where such ordinance provided that the rights therein granted were upon condition that the grantee railway company should make a The facts are stated in the opinion. cash payment after operating over such tracks for thirty days, and that in case Mr. R. E. Milling argued the cause, and, the other company failed "without legal ex-with Mr. M. J. Foster, filed a brief for plaincuse" to build the line, it should do so itself, such construction to be in lieu of the cash payment. Railroads

approval of dedication for

condition.

25.

tiff in error:

If a Federal question is fairly presented by the record, and its decision is actually necessary to the determination of the case, a judgment which rejects the claim, but avoids all reference to it, is as much against the right, within the meaning of U. S. Rev. Stat. § 709, as if it had been specifically referred to and the right directly refused.

Chapman v. Goodnow (Chapman v. Crane) 123 U. S. 540, 548, 31 L. ed. 235, 238, .8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 211.

3. The conditions subject to which the New Orleans dock board approved the dedication for belt line railway purposes of the portion of the proposed route under its jurisdiction, viz., that the road should be "operated and controlled by a public commission," would be violated by a municipal ordinance under which the belt line tracks were to be constructed by a railway comIt has been the practice of this court whenpany, and upon completion turned over to the "immediate ownership of the city," and ever necessary to look at the record of proshould be under the "control and manage ceedings of the inferior state court in connecment" of the public belt authority, where tion with the proceedings of the highest the ordinance further provided for arbitra-court, in order to deduce therefrom the tion of all controversies relating to the points decided by the latter. movement and handling of cars, trains, and traffic, between the railway company and the public belt authority, or any other company or companies to which the use of the tracks might be granted. Railroads default.

construction - excuse for

4. A railway company under contract with a municipal corporation to build a belt line was not legally obligated to construct any portion of the line specified if, by'

Neilson v. Lagow, 12 How. 110, 13 L. ed. 914.

When a contract right springs from a legislative enactment, and that right has been taken away or abridged by subsequent legislation, on writ of error from the court of last resort of a state, the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United States attaches, and this is true even when the state court rests its decision on the invalidity of the

prior statute, and ignores the subsequent en- | municipal tax on a bridge on the ground actment. The Supreme Court in such case is authorized to examine. the record to determine the validity of the prior statute.

that the bridge company, by accepting its franchise from the city, voluntarily agreed that the bridge should be subject to taxation, rests upon a ground broad enough to dispose of the case without reference to the Federal question involved in the contention that the tax ordinances of the city impaired the obligations of its charter from the state, and of a contract which the bridge company entered into with a railroad company for the maintenance and operation of the bridge.

Henderson Bridge Co. v. Henderson, 141 U. S. 679, 35 L. ed. 900, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 114. Where the state court rested its judgment

McCullough v. Virginia, 172 U. S. 102, 43 L. ed. 382, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 134; Carondelet Canal & Nav. Co. v. Louisiana, 233 U. S. 362, 377, 58 L. ed. 1001, 1006, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 627; Story, Const. 1391; Louisiana ex rel. Hubert v. New Orleans, 215 U. S. 170, 54 L. ed. 144, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 40; Wolff v. New Orleans, 103 U. S. 358, 26 L. ed. 395. A contract of a municipality granting the use of rail tracks (tracks existing and others to be constructed) for a monied consideration, and an alternative consideration re-enforcing the payment of taxes on railway quiring the company to construct the tracks not yet built in lieu of the money consideration in the event they are not built by the person already under contract to construct them, does not rest on a suspensive condition -a condition precedent; it is purely a commutative contract and controlled by the general law of contracts.

property, not upon the ground that such
property was rendered taxable by any law
passed subsequent to the company's char-
ter, but that, under the terms of the charter
itself, such property was taxable, the Su-
preme Court of the United States is without
jurisdiction to review that judgment.
St. Paul, M. & M. R. Co. v. Todd County,

Gayden v. Louisville, N. N. O. & T. R. Co. 142 U. S. 282, 35 L. ed. 1014, 12 Sup. Ct. 39 La. Ann. 269, 1 So. 792.

Mr. I. D. Moore argued the cause and filed a brief for defendant in error:

Where the state court bases its judgment entirely upon the effect and construction of the statutes claimed to create the contract, and upon grounds which would have been equally controlling if the latter acts had not been passed, the United States Supreme Court cannot review the judgment.

Kreiger v. Shelby R. Co. 125 U. S. 39, 31 L. ed. 675, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 752.

The decision of a state court that an alleged contract never existed because of the want of compliance with a state statute, whereupon judgment is given wholly without reference to a subsequent statute which is alleged to have impaired the obligation of the contract, does not involve a Federal ques

tion.

Bacon v. Texas, 163 U. S. 207, 41 L. ed. 132, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1023.

Before the Supreme Court of the United

States can be asked to determine whether a statute has impaired the obligation of a contract, it should appear that there was a legal contract subject to impairment.

New Orleans v. New Orleans Waterworks

Co. 142 U. S. 79, 35 L. ed. 943, 12 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 142.

The state court cannot be held to have decided a question as to the impairment of the obligation of a contract unless it has given effect to subsequent state legislation claimed to have accomplished that result.

Rep. 281.

Appellate jurisdiction by the United States Supreme Court cannot be sustained where the decision of the state court appealed from was made upon rules of general jurispruthemselves to sustain the judgment without dence, or other grounds broad enough in considering a Federal question appearing in the case, but not necessarily involved.

New Orleans v. New Orleans Waterworks Co. supra.

A decision of a state court on an independment cannot be reviewed by the Supreme ent ground broad enough to sustain the judgCourt of the United States on the ground that a Federal question was involved.

S.

556, 40 L. ed. 536, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 389. Missouri P. R. Co. v. Fitzgerald, 160 U. a Federal question in rendering a judgment, Where the supreme court of a state decides and also decides against the plaintiff in error upon an independent ground not involving a Federal question, which is broad enough to maintain the judgment, the writ of error will be dismissed without considering the Federal question.

Hammond v. Connecticut Mut. L. Ins. Co. 150 U. S. 633, 37 L. ed. 1206, 14 Sup. Ct. 31 L. ed. 454, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 443; Hale v. Rep. 236; Brooks v. Missouri, 124 U. S. 394, Akers, 132 U. S. 554, 33 L. ed. 442, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 171; Hopkins v. McLure, 133 U. S. 380, 33 L. ed. 660, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 407; Beatty v. Benton, 135 U. S. 244, 34 L. ed. 124, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 747; Beaupre v. Noyes, 138 U. S. 397, 34 L. ed. 991, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep.

Lehigh Water Co. v. Easton, 121 U. S. 296; East Tennessee, V. & G. R. Co. v. Fra388, 30 L. ed. 1059, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 916.

zier, 139 U. S. 288, 35 L. ed. 196, 11 Sup.

A decision of a state court upholding a 'Ct. Rep. 517; Delaware City, S. & P. S. B.