If you should find confirmation of the above report and that such statements are being made, please ask the Ambassador whether he will intimate to Minister for Foreign Affairs confidentially that the President has the Russian question now under consideration and any statements at the present time regarding the views supposed to be held by various people are very likely to hinder the solution of this problem. LANSING File No. 861.00/2143b The Secretary of State to the Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell) Please report full statement: [Telegram] WASHINGTON, June 25, 1918, 5 p. m. (1) As to total number of Czecho-Slovak troops now at Vladivostok; (2) Number armed with rifles; (3) Character and quantity of other arms including machine guns, etc.; (4) Amount of ammunition they now have; (5) Are additional stores of ammunition available-if so where? (6) Morale of troops; (7) Character and number of higher officers; (8) Outline of military organization. Answer urgent soon as possible. Questions are to indicate general scope of inquiry, but reply need not be too precise. LANSING Request of the Czecho-Slovak Leaders for Aid in Establishing a New Eastern Front-Overthrow of the Vladivostok Soviet by the CzechoSlovaks-Landing of American Marines-Proclamation of the Protection of Vladivostok by Commanders of Allied and Associated ForcesProclamation of a Government by Horvat: Controversy with Other Political Organizations File No. 861.00/2180a The President of the Czecho-Slovak National Council (Masaryk) to the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs (Chicherin)1 [Telegram] WASHINGTON, June 25, 1918. In the interview with the Associated Press you explain your hostile attitude towards our Czecho-Slovak troops in Russia by saying that they have been counter-revolutionary since the days of the Kiev 1 Sent by the Department of State, at Dr. Masaryk's expense, as an ordinary telegram, not through American diplomatic channels. Rada, and that they even conspired against the Soviet government, as you can prove by documentary evidence in your possession. I was in Russia since May 1917 till March 1918; I organized the troops, I know every detail of their life during this period: with the full knowledge of all circumstances I must state that your assertion is incorrect, and that you are mistaken. You evidently allude to the fact that when the Kiev Bolsheviks rose against the Rada one of our regiments was brought to Kiev. But it seems you do not know that this was done by Russian military authorities under false pretext. This misuse of my name was soon ascertained, and the regiment was sent back at once; two or three of our people yielding to the false pretext were duly rebuked and punished. When the Bolshevik movement began I gave at once the strictest order to all regiments to abstain from all interference in Russian internal matters, and this order has under all conditions strictly been observed; the best proof is the fact that your Bolshevik Commander in Chief Muraviev, to whom the Kiev incident was explained, recognized the armed neutrality of our whole army. Our relations to the Rada were absolutely correct. I could prove to Muraviev that I did not accept the fourth Ukrainian Universal as I officially announced to Minister Shulgin the 26th of January, 1918. We agreed in this fundamental question of the relation of Ukrainia to Russia with the position taken by your Petrograd Soviet. I can prove by incontrovertible documents that I rejected every plan directed against your government submitted to me by your political adversaries: even of such adversaries who justly could not be called counter-revolutionist. I can prove that until lately I recommended to the Allies' statesmen to be on good terms with your government. We Czecho-Slovaks love Russia, and we wish her to be a strong and free democracy: it has been proved that our peoples did not accept the Slav plans of the old régime under Sturmer, though they were threatened with exile to Siberia. We have been absolutely loyal to Russia and correct in our attitude toward your government: in recognition of this loyalty Commander Muraviev granted our army free passage to France (February 16). and the same has been granted by the Soviet of Moscow. Being away from Russia three months, and having no detailed reports, I dare not express an opinion on what is happening now. It seems that some local soviet yielded to the Austrian and German intrigue and attacked our troops, who under given circumstances have been forced to defend themselves. I would not oppose your demand of disarmament if you can guarantee us free and unmolested passage to France. I assure you our soldiers' only wish is to fight the common enemy and help, by that, Russia. I ask you in the name of democracy to keep the promise given by your own commander. Please investigate carefully the matter, for it would be a disgraceful absurdity that a democratic and socialistic government should by mistake promote the interest of its greatest enemies. PROFESSOR MASARYK President of Czecho-Slovak National Council File No. 861.00/2137 The Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State [Telegram] VLADIVOSTOK, June 25, 1918, 7 p. m. 9. Allied consuls here just met with the two principal members Czech National Council, who state that even if willing, Soviets are powerless to prevent armed prisoners from interfering with movement Czech troops east, that Trotsky has ordered all Czech troops disarmed, arrested and imprisoned and that the 15,000 Czech troops now here must return west to assist their fellows. To do this they require arms and munitions, and these they request from Allies, together with a supporting armed Allied force. Allied Consuls all agreed to recommend to their respective Governments that favorable action be taken immediately on request of Czechs, both as to supplying arms and supplies, and also the sending of an Allied force into Siberia for the double purpose of assisting a splendid body of Allied troops in their just fight against armed war prisoners, and of checking German activity in Siberia. The strength of Soviets is decreasing, that of armed war prisoners is increasing constantly. Only a few days ago, the most important official of Soviet in eastern Siberia stated in the presence of Consul Macgowan, in answer to question put by private American, that Soviets will never ask foreign help. I believe intervention is necessary, and there is evidently no use in waiting for it to be requested by Soviets. If intervention is to be undertaken, favorable situation created by holding of large section of railway by Czechs should be taken advantage of. Czechs [say] that action must be begun here within three weeks. They estimate that they require 13,000 rifles, three mounted batteries, 100 machine guns and 1,000,000 cartridges, and should be supported by from 50 to 100,000 Allied troops, to establish permanent front against Germany. CALDWELL File No. 861.00/2139 The Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State 10. For Military Staff: [Telegram] VLADIVOSTOK, June 25, 1918, noon. Ten thousand armed war prisoners in central and eastern Siberia, number increasing rapidly; Soviet arming prisoners not internationalists, and not requiring naturalization. Armed prisoners becoming independent of Soviet, but are chief source Soviet strength. Armed prisoners make agreement between Czechs and Red Guard impossible. Fighting continues in central western Siberia. Establishment of anti-Bolshevik Siberian government probable. This government genuinely eager resume hostilities against Germany. Czechs total 50,000: 15,000, Vladivostok, remainder west of Irkutsk. Evacuation via Archangel abandoned. This force is a splendidly adequate nucleus for new Siberian army. With Allied support an army of minimum 200,000 can be organized in Siberia from best elements by next spring, to operate against Germans in European Russia. This may well result in bringing Russia also back into war. Information concerning European Russia limited to statements of Czech officers recently arrived from Ukraine, who are unanimous that European Russian sentiment would be friendly to such an effort to extent of joining in large numbers an army given Allied support. They state effective Bolshevik opposition impossible. Strongly urge consideration this plan as conceivably offering quick and effective aid Allied cause. Refer cable from Admiral Knight this date.1 Drysdale. Copy telegraphed Peking. CALDWELL File No. 861.00/2146 2 Mr. Alexandre Konovaloff to the Secretary of State WASHINGTON, June 26, 1918. MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: During our interview you requested me to present further expression of my views in regard to certain questions raised during our conversation; namely, you expressed the desire to have my opinion as to the effect it would have on the Russian people that, in case of inter-Allied action in Siberia, the predominant part of troops would have to be necessarily Japanese; further what would be the attitude towards Japanese military commandership and ultimately what use could be possibly made of the Czecho-Slovak troops. 2 See telegram of June 26, post, p. 230. From March to June 1917, and again in the fall of 1917, Russian Minister of Commerce and Industry. I take pleasure in presenting to you my answers with all frankness and liberty of opinion which, may I request, you will treat absolutely confidential and private. I As I have told you, some months ago when the question of a Japanese intervention into Russia was raised I was opposed to such idea. If I do at present with all emphasis urge active inter-Allied action in the Far East, this is for the following reasons: Firstly, since then, German progress in Russia and the sufferings of the people have performed a deep change in the spirit of the Russian people. This change has manifestly reflected itself in the opinion of leaders both in Russia and abroad. It is but a few days that a new confirmation of this change was received from Far East groups representing different political parties which, convened in Harbin, adopted resolutions calling active Allied assistance to Russia. The resolution explicitly mentions the participation of Japanese in an Allied expedition and I call your attention to the fact that feeling in the Far East is especially delicate. On the other hand at the present moment the very conception of the aims and procedure of action in Russia appears entirely different. No mention is any longer made of independent Japanese action and especially no plans are entertained of forceful passage of numerous Japanese troops through Russian territory without consideration to the attitude of the people, their spirit and needs. The aim of the enterprise is conceived as an endeavor to assist the Russians in a process of self-organization, it being expected that the Allied force will encourage the development of national feeling and patriotism which through consolidation will enable the people to throw aside German grip. It is a national movement brought into effect by the Russians themselves which is the basis of success. As I have stated in the notes that I have presented to you, I perceive two phases in the development of the proposed action. In the initial I visualize a relatively small inter-Allied force entering Russia under an Allied and not a Japanese supreme chief. To this could be added numerous detachments of Czecho-Slovaks. In this phase, as I foresee, activities would largely tend to encourage and assist the people to organize themselves. Military operations will be more of a passive character. Although Japanese troops will form the majority, the whole operation would bear a distinctively inter-Allied character. Further Japanese troops, possibly in large numbers, would be necessary only in a later stage when the national movement |