the same supreme authority. Thus the Austrian, Prussian, and Ottoman empires, are each composed of a variety of nations and people. So, also, the same nation or people may be subject to several States, as is the case with the Poles, subject to the dominion of Austria, Prussia, and Russia, respectively.

princes the

internation

§ 18. Sovereign princes may become the subjects of Sovereign international law, in respect to their personal right, or subjects of rights of property, growing out of their personal relations al law. with States foreign to those over whom they rule, or with the sovereigns or citizens of those foreign States. These relations give rise to that branch of the science which treats of the rights of sovereigns in this respect.12

als, or cor

of interna

§ 19. Private individuals, or public and private cor- Individuporations may, in like manner, incidentally, become the porations, subjects of this law in regard to rights growing out of the subjects their international relations with foreign sovereigns and tional law. states, or their subjects and citizens. These relations give rise to that branch of the science which treats of what has been termed private international law, and especially of the conflict between the municipal laws of different States.18

sovereign

nonymous

former used

But the peculiar objects of international law are those The terms direct relations which exist between nations and states. and State Wherever, indeed, the absolute or unlimited monarchical used syform of government prevails in any State, the person of ly, or the the prince is necessarily identified with the State itself: metaphorically for the l'Etat c'est moi. Hence the public jurists frequently use latter. the terms sovereign and State as synonymous. So also the term sovereign is sometimes used in a metaphorical sense merely to denote a State, whatever may be the form of its government, whether monarchical, or republican, or mixed.

§ 20. Sovereignty is the supreme power by which any SovereignState is governed. This supreme power may be exer- ty defined. cised either internally or externally.

Internal sovereignty is that which is inherent in the Internal people of any State, or vested in its ruler, by its muni- sovereignty. cipal constitution or fundamental laws. This is the object of what

[12 On the conflicting rights and duties of a person who is a sovereign over one State, and a subject in another, see Heffter, § 52.]—D.

[18 On this branch of Law, see Story's Conflict of Laws; Westlake's Private International Law; Burge's Commentaries; Fölix's Traitè du Droit International Privé; Savigny's System des Römischen Rechtes, vol. viii. (translated into French by

has been called internal public law, droit public interne, but which may more properly be termed constitutional law.

External External sovereignty consists in the independence of sovereignty. one political society, in respect to all other political societies. It is by the exercise of this branch of sovereignty that the international relations of one political society are maintained, in peace and in war, with all other political societies. The law by which it is regulated has, therefore, been called external public law, droit public externe, but may more properly be termed international law.

The recognition of any State by other States, and its admission into the general society of nations, may depend, or may be made to depend, at the will of those other States, upon its internal constitution or form of government, or the choice it may make of its rulers. But whatever be its internal constitution, or form of government, or whoever may be its rulers, or even if it be distracted with anarchy, through a violent contest for the government between different parties among the people, the State still subsists in contemplation of law, until its sovereignty is completely extinguished by the final dissolution of the social tie, or by some other cause which puts an end to the being of the State.

ty, how ac

Sovereign- § 21. Sovereignty is acquired by a State, either at the quired. origin of the civil society of which it is composed, or when it separates itself from the community of which it previously formed a part, and on which it was dependent. (a)

This principle applies as well to internal as to external sovereignty. But an important distinction is to be noticed, in this respect, between these two species of sovereignty. The internal sovereignty of a State does not, in any degree, depend upon its recognition by other States. A new State, springing into existence, does not require the recognition of other States to confirm its internal sovereignty. The existence of the State de facto is sufficient, in this respect, to establish its sovereignty de jure. It is a State because it exists.

Thus the internal sovereignty of the United States of America was complete from the time they declared themselves "free, sovereign, and independent States," on the 4th of July, 1776. It Guenoux, as Traité de Droit Romaine); Walker's Introd. to American Law, edit. 2, 647, &c.; and, for the general literature of this subject, see Mohl's Geschichte und Literatur der Staatswissenschaften, i. 441, &c.

(a) Klüber, Droit des Gens Moderne de l'Europe, § 23.

was upon this principle that the Supreme Court determined, in 1808, that the several States composing the Union, so far as regards their municipal regulations, became entitled, from the time when they declared themselves independent, to all the rights and powers of sovereign States, and that they did not derive them from concessions made by the British king. The treaty of peace of 1782 contained a recognition of their independence, not a grant of it. From hence it resulted, that the laws of the several State governments were, from the date of the declaration of independence, the laws of sovereign States, and as such were obligatory upon the people of such State from the time they were enacted. It was added, however, that the court did not mean to intimate the opinion, that even the law of any State of the Union, whose constitution of government had been recognized prior to the 4th of July, 1776, and which law had been enacted prior to that period, would not have been equally obligatory. (b) 14

The external sovereignty of any State, on the other hand, may rerequire recognition by other States in order to render it perfect and complete. So long, indeed, as the new State confines its action to its own citizens, and to the limits of its own territory, it may well dispense with such recognition. But if it desires to enter into that great society of nations, all the members of which recognize rights. to which they are mutually entitled, and duties which they may be called upon reciprocally to fulfil, such recognition becomes essentially necessary to the complete participation of the new State in all the advantages of this society. Every other State is at liberty to grant, or refuse, this recognition, subject to the consequences of its own conduct in this respect; and until such recognition becomes universal on the part of the other States, the new State becomes entitled to the exercise of its external sovereignty as to those States only by whom that sovereignty has been recognized.

§ 22. The identity of a State consists in its having the Identity same origin or commencement of existence; and its dif- of a State. ference from all other States consists in its having a different origin or commencement of existence. A State, as to the individual members of which it is composed, is a fluctuating body; but in respect to the society, it is one and the same body, of which the existence is perpetually kept up by a constant succession of (b) Cranch's Rep. iv. 212, M'Ilvaine v. Coxe's Lessee. [14 Harcourt v. Gaillard, 12 Wheat. Rep. 527.]—D.

new members. This existence continues until it is interrupted by some change affecting the being of the State. (a)

How af

ternal revo

If this change be an internal revolution, merely alterfected by in- ing the municipal constitution and form of government, lution. the State remains the same; it neither loses any of its rights, nor is discharged from any of its obligations. (b)

The habitual obedience of the members of any political society to a superior authority must have once existed in order to constitute a sovereign State. But the temporary suspension of that obedience and of that authority, in consequence of a civil war, does not necessarily extinguish the being of the State, although it may affect for a time its ordinary relations with other States.

Conduct of foreign States towards an

involved in

civil war.

§ 23. Until the revolution is consummated, whilst the civil war involving a contest for the government continother nation ues, other States may remain indifferent spectators of the controversy, still continuing to treat the ancient government as sovereign, and the government de facto as a society entitled to the rights of war against its enemy; or may espouse the cause of the party which they believe to have justice on its side. In the first case, the foreign State fulfils all its obligations under the law of nations; and neither party has any right to complain, provided it maintains an impartial neutrality. In the latter, it becomes, of course, the enemy of the party against whom it declares itself, and the ally of the other; and as the positive law of nations makes no distinction, in this respect, between a just and an unjust war, the intervening State becomes entitled to all the rights of war against the opposite party. (a) 1

15

(a) Grotius, de Jur. Bel. ac Pac. lib. ii. cap. 9, § 3. Rutherforth's Inst. b. ii. c. 10, §§ 12, 13. Heffter, Das europäische Völkerrecht, § 24.

(b) Grotius, lib. ii. cap. 9, § 8. Rutherforth, b. ii. c. 10, § 14. Puffendorf, de Jur. Nat. et Gent. lib. viii. cap. 12, §§ 1-3.

(a) Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. ii. ch. 4, § 56. Martens, Précis du Droit des Gens, liv. iii. ch. 2, §§ 79-82.

[15 Recognition of Belligerency.· The occasion for the accordance of belligerent rights arises when a civil conflict exists within a foreign State. The reason which requires and can alone justify this step by the government of another country, is, that its own rights and interests are so far affected as to require a definition of its own relations to the parties. Where a parent government is seeking to subdue an insurrection by municipal force, and the insurgents claim a political nationality and belligerent rights which the parent government does not concede, a recognition by a foreign State of full belligerent rights, if not justified by necessity, is a gratuitous demonstration of moral support to the rebellion, and of censure upon the parent government. But the situation of a foreign State with reference

civil war

If the foreign State professes neutrality, it is bound to Parties to allow impartially to both belligerent parties the free exer- entitled to cise of those rights which war gives to public enemies rights of against each other; such as the right of blockade, and of each other.

war against

to the contest, and the condition of affairs between the contending parties, may be such as to justify this act. It is important, therefore, to determine what state of affairs, and what relations of the foreign State, justify the recognition.

It is certain that the state of things between the parent State and insurgents must amount in fact to a war, in the sense of international law; that is, powers and rights of war must be in actual exercise: otherwise the recognition is falsified, for the recognition is of a fact. The tests to determine the question are various, and far more decisive where there is maritime war and commercial relations with foreigners. Among the tests, are the existence of a de facto political organization of the insurgents, sufficient in character, population and resources, to constitute it, if left to itself, a State among the nations, reasonably capable of discharging the duties of a State; the actual employment of military forces on each side, acting in accordance with the rules and customs of war, such as the use of flags of truce, cartels, exchange of prisoners, and the treatment of captured insurgents by the parent State as prisoners of war; and, at sea, employment by the insurgents of commissioned cruisers, and the exercise by the parent government of the rights of blockade of insurgent ports against neutral commerce, and of stopping and searching neutral vessels at sea. If all these elements exist, the condition of things is undoubtedly war; and it may be war, before they are all ripened into activity.

As to the relation of the foreign State to the contest, if it is solely on land, and the foreign State is not contiguous, it is difficult to imagine a call for the recognition. If, for instance, the United States should formally recognize belligerent rights in an insurgent community at the centre of Europe, with no seaports, it would require a hardly supposable necessity to make it else than a mere demonstration of moral support. But a case may arise where a foreign State must decide whether to hold the parent State responsible for acts done by the insurgents, or to deal with the insurgents as a de facto government. (Mr. Canning to Lord Granville on the Greek War, June 22, 1826.) If the foreign State recognizes belligerency in the insurgents, it releases the parent State from responsibility for whatever may be done by the insurgents, or not done by the parent State where the insurgent power extends. (Mr. Adams to Mr. Seward, June 11, 1861, Dip. Corr. 105.) In a contest wholly upon land, a contiguous State may be obliged to make the decision whether or not to regard it as war; but, in practice, this has not been done by a general and prospective declaration, but by actual treatment of cases as they arise. Where the insurgents and the parent State are maritime, and the foreign nation has extensive commercial relations and trade at the ports of both, and the foreign nation and either or both of the contending parties have considerable naval force, and the domestic contest must extend itself over the sea, then the relations of the foreign State to this contest are far different. In such a state of things, the liability to political complications, and the questions of right and duty to be decided at once, usually away from home, by private citizens or naval officers, seem to require an authoritative and general decision as to the status of the three parties involved. If the contest is a war, all foreign citizens and officers, whether executive or judicial, are to follow one line of conduct. If it is not a war, they are to follow a totally different line. If it is a war, the commissioned cruisers of both sides may stop, search,