on proposed French shipping bounties. "2100 tons gross, at 60 francs per ton, 107 fr. 126,000 36,000 fr. 162,000 being at 25.50 francs per £1, £6353, equivalent to £17, 16s. per cent. on the value of £35,700, or to £3 per gross register ton. 66 Assuming that this vessel might steam 48,000 miles in one year (equal to 240 miles per day for 200 days in the year), the separate bounties on her navigation would be as follows: If built out of France for French owners, 1400 nett register tons, at 11 francs per ton=2100 francs, 48,000 miles at 2100 francs per 1000 miles, or at 25.50 francs per £1, being £11, 1s. 5d. per cent. on £35,700. If built in France for French owners, at 11⁄2 francs per ton per 1000 miles, as above, . Additional bounty, at 15 per cent., Navigation bounty for first year, being £12, 14s. 8d. per cent. on £35,700. fr. 100,800 £3,953 3,953 593 £4,546 "On this footing, and after making allowance for the annual reduction of 5 centimes in the rate of bounty, the aggregate sums for the navigation bounties, for the ten years during which they are to continue, would amount to £33,590 if the ship were built out of France, or to £38,620 if built in France; and if to this latter sum be added the construction bounty of £6353, it is seen that the total bounty is brought up to £44,973. Sums like these are amply sufficient to return an excellent profit on ships under the French flag, even if no profit at all can be gained from them in any other way. position of "It should be kept in view that British ships have no commercial Threatened privileges over those of any other nationality. They can engage in British no trade in which all comers are not free to compete on equal terms, ships. These bounties, however, are sufficient to give French shipowners an overwhelming advantage in this competition, and the result may be to drive British shipowners out of trades all over the world, developed and hitherto retained mainly through their own skill and enterprise. Whether so intended or not, the bounties may come to be a bid, and a heavy one, for the transfer to France of the maritime commerce now chiefly in British hands. British shipowners may be compelled to retire from an impossible competition, and to dispose of their ships to Competition those who can turn them to great advantage independently of any may be imworking profits, or they may be induced to domicile themselves in France, and to acquire the rights of French citizens on purpose to secure the enormous premiums for carrying on such business as theirs under the flag of France. "Your memorialists believe that a scheme of so extraordinary and exceptional a character, fitted as it is to produce the most serious and far-reaching consequences to British maritime commerce, ought to possible. receive the immediate and anxious consideration of Her Majesty's Government. They think that all reasonable efforts should be used to prevent its being carried out, or, if carried out, to counteract the prejudicial effects that may be anticipated from it." Bounties even in British coasting trade. Shipbuilding in France. A national question. R. EXTRACTS FROM MEMORIAL PRESENTED, Nov. 26, TO "This bounty is not to be confined to vessels engaged in the trade with France, but may be claimed by all French vessels running between any foreign termini-thus, a French line running between this country and New York would be entitled to the bounty, and perhaps between one port in the United Kingdom and another, certainly between one British colony and another. "The bounty on French-built ships is computed to yield about £12,000 on the first cost of a vessel costing about £60,000 in this country. "This will stimulate the shipbuilding of France, and encourage the establishment of English shipbuilders in that country. Approaches have already been made to some British houses with that object. But, doubtless, the first effect of the new French law will be highly beneficial to the home industries of this country, for a great increase of business in our shipbuilding yards will be the immediate result. "It will, however, prove a delusive benefit if we have simply forged weapons to be turned against ourselves- if we have supplied the means whereby the maritime supremacy of Great Britain may be destroyed, her mercantile marine and her carrying trade taken from her, and her seamen and shipowners possibly induced to transfer their services and their capital to France. "We venture to submit to your Lordship that the question involved in this French bounty to shipping is not merely a commercial question affecting our industry, but is a national question affecting the well-being of the State, and of the utmost gravity to the nation, to which it will be well that the Legislature give consideration ere it be too late. "We do not offer any suggestions to your Lordship to meet the case; no merely local remedy seems to us suited to deal with it. It is matter for instant diplomatic action and for consideration in our commercial treaties. The proposed Bill is represented by some authorities to be at variance with existing treaties between this country and France, but of this we are not fully informed." S. FRENCH SHIPPING BOUNTIES.1 To the Editor of the " Shipping and Mercantile Gazette." to enter into "SIR,-When such bodies as the Edinburgh and Glasgow Chambers of Commerce denounce in the strongest terms the threatened French shipping bounties as a proceeding fraught with consequences in the extremest degree injurious to the shipping interests of our country, there is no occasion to multiply testimonies and warnings, although that I might do,-(especially in your columns). Let me, in a few words, adduce some considerations which may well be present in the minds of the deputations who, I am glad to learn, will be received to-morrow by. the patriotic Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. The aim of our Deputation good neighbour across the channel is to make France, by the trans- Granville. ference hence of as much as she can obtain of our commerce, our manufactures, our shipbuilding, our shipping, our packet lines, and our warehousing business, greater commercially, and to make her more powerful politically as well as stronger in ways too familiar to require mention here. Why should Britons help her in this? Its intention and effect obviously are not such as British statesmanship should go an inch out of its way to facilitate. If the Treaty of Commerce which French Not the time statesmen wish our nation to enter into is at all like the Treaty which is new Treaty now in force, we shall most unnecessarily, and, I do not doubt, also most with France. decidedly hamper our own action, and be helping France to carry out her bold and not fully developed designs. We do not know what arrows she, who is very astute, as we now find, may have in her quiver. These may be very awkward ones I fear. Surely at a time when Germany and the United States and Russia, and probably other Powers, are contemplating legislation similar to that of France in favour of their shipping and navigation, it would be most unwise-because in ways that we cannot foresee hazardous-to tie our hands and to put ourselves into a position from which we cannot, till ten long years elapse, extricate ourselves and recover that liberty of action, the value and necessity for which bitter experience will have taught us. Let us therefore avoid new treaties, and retain the power of discriminating, or, if your readers prefer the word, of retaliation-a word which I do not like, by not binding ourselves through any instrument to admit the produce and manufactures of other countries free of duty. Let us avoid the obligation to supply other countries with coal free of export duty; let us, above all, regain the power of filling our exchequer by import duties, if ever circumstances shall make it expedient to spend money largely. If the French know that the Chancellor of the Exchequer has this very large source of income to draw upon, and that at the same time he, by differential duties, can mark dissatisfac- Power to tion with Powers who do not respond in a friendly manner to our 1 From the Shipping Gazette of 25th November 1880. retaliate. Weighty opinions mercial treaties. liberal admission of their goods, they deriving, as they do, truly vast advantages from admission on favourable terms to the British market, will certainly be much more careful not to endanger the inestimable privilege, for such it is, and will, beyond a doubt, be much more conciliatory and amiably responsive. I, for my part, have not the smallest doubt that the present Treaty engagements are very pernicious. They have justly against com- been pronounced objectionable, or inconsistent with sound principles of commercial policy, by such ardent free-traders as Messrs. Hugh Mason and John Slagg, members of Parliament, in their 1872 report regard ing the French Treaty, presented to the Manchester Chamber of Commerce, and, I presume, adopted by that very influential Chamber. To go no further for evidence than the distasteful twistings in respect to wine duties which the unfortunate French Treaty has necessitated, surely the troubles that are accumulating upon our negotiators, even in that single and secondary matter, are enough to sicken and arouse 'shrewd statesmen. All I can say is, after looking at the Blue-Book on French industry and commercial Treaty questions, and with the knowledge that reaches me from different quarters of what practical men think on the subject, the Foreign Secretary need not apprehend that his ceasing to treat with the French will cause regrets in commercial circles.-Yours, etc., "AN EX-MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT. "EDINBURGH, Nov. 24." T. From the Shipping Gazette of 27th November 1880: "We published on Thursday a letter from an ex-member of Parliament, in which the views of those who compose this movement are clearly set forth. Our correspondent describes, without, as it seems to us, any exaggeration, the aim of our good neighbour across the channel' when he says that it is to make France, by the transference hence of as much as she can obtain of our commerce, our manufactures, our shipbuilding and shipping, and of our packet lines and our warehousing business, greater commercially, and more powerful politically, as well as stronger in ways too familiar to require mention.' And he Why should asks-'Why should Britons help her to do it?' The question is pertinent, although the answer to it is not a very easy one. It is true that we have commercial treaties with France which are under notice of expiration, and that we have an unrepealed law on the Statute Book which enables any Administration, with the assent of the Sovereign, to adopt a retaliatory policy without applying for the sanction of Power to re- Parliament. The retaliatory clauses in the Customs Consolidation made use of. Act (16 and 17 Vict., cap. 106 and 107) have been law for over a quarter of a century, but they have never been acted upon; nor is it likely, so far as we can see, that they will be, inasmuch as their opera Britons help? taliate not by treaty tion would practically involve a reversal of the commercial policy which this country has finally adopted. But we are about to revise our treaty arrangements with France; and this is the opportunity to which our correspondent, and those who think with him, look forward to put a legitimate pressure upon the French Government and Legislature. There is no doubt that the Commercial Treaty of 1860, and France the international arrangements which have followed it, have proved in gained more their operation more beneficial to France than to this country. This than Britain. is a fact which has been vouched for on the authority of the French returns, which show that under these treaties the exports of French produce to the United Kingdom have far exceeded in amount and value the imports from the United Kingdom into France. . . . The commercial circles in this country-even those most interested in the trade with France—are becoming alive to the fact that the French have long France's gain been turning us to account, and are now bent upon achieving a great expense. commercial position mainly at the expense of England. This is what the adoption of the bounties on shipping and navigation really means. To be forewarned is, it is said, to be forearmed, and the British Government who would neglect the warning, would incur a heavy responsibility. France is a wealthy country. She has a splendid trade, large resources, and great industrial intelligence and power. She has no necessity to resort to such poor-we had almost said contemptible -expedients as those of special bounties to native industry. . . . But if France chooses to adopt this mistaken policy, and, by persisting in it, to alienate her best customers to set, in fact, the whole world against her—she must be prepared for the consequences, which cannot fail to be disastrous to her best commercial interests." at England's U. EXTRACTS FROM PRIVATE LETTERS. "18th November 1880. "Nothing is likely to be done with the Government by friendly deputations or 'talkee talkee' of any kind, but they will move fast enough under the pressure of a public outcry backed up by the working-man's vote. I would like to have explained the kind of negotiations that are 'upon the tapis' in regard to shipping, and which serve to close the mouths of those who ought to speak out. My own "Squaring." interest even might, in certain circumstances, be served by the bounty system, which I abominate. Steamers, you know, are cosmo politan. . . . A policy which, as I believe, has already worked infinite mischief, and which, although it may be profitable to individuals who know how to work matters for their own ends, leads only to ruin so far as the country is concerned." |