occupy the position to which Providence points, the next may bitterly regret and hopelessly reproach; but there will be no room for retracing of steps, no opportunity to rectify and recover what has been irretrievably thrown away or let slip. There are Solidarity of different ways in which the solidarity of the empire might be achieved. We have before us such bright examples as Switzerfederation. land, Germany, the United States of America. There are other em pires by liament can colonial members. varieties of form, yet but one underlying principle, that of equal and just representative power and responsibility. The representation might be in a new supreme body, not identical with, but such as the British Parliament, or in a new supreme council such as the British Cabinet. There is conceivable, of course, another form, representation in the mother country's present Parliament. This is the system of Spain, and more or less of France. But it would not work. Parliament has already too much to do, too British Par- many demands on its time to face; besides, the representatives not receive from the colonies would feel themselves, and would be viewed by their fellow-members and the people, as meddlers in home businesses which do not lie within their sphere, and with which they are not qualified to deal. They would feel their position uncomfortable and irksome. Still further, already the number of members in the British House of Commons is by many regarded asnay, by general consent declared to be-too large. This very circumstance, however—I mean the necessity that is so obvious for undertaking something of the nature of re-adjustment—may be welcomed as really conducive to the establishment of a better system of representation. If we must make a change anywise, let us do it rightly. I respectfully suggest that such a system as would be, on the whole, best, lies ready to our hand, and involves no very serious and a scarcely perceptible change in the position of the various Parliaments and Cabinets of the empire. I present my views in the form of a question. Why not institute a council, call it imperial or supreme, which shall have committed to it exclusive and entire control of all matters that are purely imperial, eliminating these from the cognisance of the British Parliament, which would thereby have more time at its disposal for the increasing and vastly important business of the United Kingdom? Indirectly the British Parliament would be able to exercise hardly less power than it does at present in regard to the matters that will be eliminated. I believe that a supreme representative council would, in the particular circumstances, not only be much more easily established, but would work better; that is, would do its work with less friction Supreme proposed. Constitution of a Supreme Imperial Council. 53 of the new and disturbance, and with more unity and efficiency and persistence and weight, than a supreme Parliament. To this council the mother country and the several groups of colonies Constitutio should be allowed to send representatives, chosen by each portion council. of the empire, on whatever principle, and for whatever period of service they severally think fit. I would make the entire number bear a proportion, compared with the population of the empire, that would give for the United Kingdom a share of representation corresponding to the number of persons who collectively form the British Cabinet. Assume that this number is fourteen, they would add to their provincial functions an imperial one, for which they would sit either personally or by substitutes elected by themselves as a body, or by the direct vote of the British Parliament. Canada might be entitled to a representation of four, Australia two or three, Africa one, other parts of the empire two, making a total of twenty-four or twenty-five, which would gradually be increased in proportion as the colonies and the mother country shall increase in population. India, provided she could be satis- India. fied with an amount of representation much short of that which, reckoned by mere numbers, would be her allotment, might be included and contribute six or seven, making a total of about thirty in all. This supreme council might be entitled to conduct a part of its business by a committee formed of its own members, and should meet at least once a month during the whole twelve months of the year. Ability to meet at very short notice, and, when it is required, to hold sessions in secret, gives great superiority to the principle of governing by council rather than by & Parliament. Indeed, even if a supreme Parliament were to be interposed, the actual government of the empire must needs be through a committee or cabinet, which is just another name for our council. That the system would work well there is little room to doubt. There would be no interference with the functions that properly belong to those who now rule in each of the several distinct portions of the empire. I will not call them states, because Contributhat would imply independence, but provinces or dominions. For general instance, the British Parliament would be free to pay its quota and defence. towards the general expenses of the empire by direct or indirect taxation, according to its own pleasure. It would be entitled to take its own means for procuring soldiers and sailors, either by conscription or bounty. The functions of the supreme council would be, at any rate until the central government became, in the opinion of the people, entitled, in the interest of the nation, to be entrusted with more authority confined to the business for tions to government to British which alone it exists, viz., what is imperial--business such as the management of foreign relations, the making of treaties with foreign powers, the fixing the nature and extent of defences wanted for the protection and strength of the empire as a whole and of its several provinces and constituent parts. Like the representation, the contributions of money and men would be, speaking roundly, in a diminishing ratio proportionate to population. So far as I can judge, we must not lay any stress on the advantage that might ultimately be attained by instiAdvantage tuting a great intra-imperial Zollverein. On a superficial view, Parliament. some of our home politicians might apprehend that the British Parliament would sink by such an imperial organisation into insignificance. The answer to this is, to do its work well is the highest honour, and it would undoubtedly do its work better than at present. It would, however, still, according to the proportions which I have indicated, contribute fourteen out of twentyfive, or, including India, out of thirty or thirty-two members of council. The talent and patriotism of the United Kingdom, associated as it would be with the first minds and best hearts of the whole empire, would have a wider, I might almost call it a sublime, scope for world-benefiting activity; and, as the colonies or provinces would be entitled to nominate as their representatives British subjects belonging to any part of the empire, often conspicuous and eminent Britons would be selected. Thus, even though the mother country were to relinquish the predominance of numbers which her numerical strength and great resources would entitle her to claim, she would still in practice have full power; in fact she would lead. As to the colonies, if ambition is commendable and rightly regulated, though with another name, it is so in the highest degree—their great men, who now want an adequate sphere for the development and the exercise of their energy and aspirations, would, after training in the colonies, contribute to the grandest council that ever existed on the earth's surface, probably the most valuable and healthful and beneficent constituent elements. One thought more in conclusion. With all charitableness of judgment, and the strongest desire to think well of other nations, two considerations of the utmost weight and stimulating force claim earnest attention. These are, the empire's need to be independent and strong, seeing we have no warmly attached allies, no friendly States on whom we can depend as having a common interest and aim in those causes and objects which the British people cherish and espouse pre-eminently. We shall as a nation continue our pacific and amicable policy, but it A noble ambition. An Article in the "Times." 55 influence. will be pursued with all the more success in proportion as friendly relations are not needed by us, but, on the contrary, as desire is felt by other States to cultivate and reciprocate friendliness. For too long, let me add, even high statesmanship has been an affair of Increased party. Shortsightedness, attention to immediate interests and disregard of the remote, could not but prevail. We must rise to an elevated level. The choice for the nation lies between consolidation with greater influence, on the one hand, or disintegration, along with feebleness, yet with old traditions fostering a dangerous pride, threatens a fall, on the other. Speremus meliora. Many will read with pain an article in the Times of 6th January on the empire. It contains much truth-truth either stated or implied in the preceding paper. I make the following remarks :It is said of the 1. The colonies cause the mother country danger and expense. A right view No doubt therefore we desire a constitutional connection such as colonies. will equalise these. The colonists do not object to bear their fair : share of both. 2. Too much of the precious time of Parliament is engrossed with subjects arising from India and the colonies. No doubt: therefore let us hail the council for the empire, which will give us desired relief, and at same time lead to improved administration thereof. 3. Whereas the United States are geographically compact, the British dominions are scattered over the globe. No doubt: for some purposes this is what, if Heaven gave us the choice, we might not prefer. But for other purposes, it is a decided and great advantage, and it is an existing fact which should content us. 4. Some colonies protect their trade. Well, it is not fatal to us. We voluntarily invested them with the power to do so (and gratuitously with splendid unoccupied lands). They would not be displeased to have an imperial customs-union, and would be ready to receive any overtures to that end. 56 tory mode of IV. IMPROVEMENTS IN THE WORKING OF THE A Paper prepared for the Social Science Congress, 1880. THE working of the Parliamentary machine is clumsy in the extreme. The machine itself is, for most purposes for which it is applicable, perfectly satisfactory. We have heard lately much Unsatisfac- about obstruction. We are continually saddened by disappointpassing bills. ments every session experienced; members work hard and spend a great deal of time on the preparing and passing from one stage to another of important and useful Bills, which, like the stone of Sisyphus, when almost at the top, where success would reward labour, must return to the ground at the bottom of the hill, to be again as laboriously rolled up. But we do not know how many reforms and advantages we miss through the discouragement these fruitless labours, these hopeless undertakings infuse, nor the instructive and effective discussions which are not initiated, simply because there is not time for them, in consequence of the weary hours wasted on the other business. An easy remedy that has often been suggested remains to be carried out; Bills should be allowed to stand in either House on the next session at the stage to which they had advanced on the session when they were first introduced. This would be practically an immense addition to the time of the House. It would equalise in availableness the different months of the session, and greatly suit the House of Lords, whose constitutional functions and power of work are in abeyance in the early part of every session. It would also prevent at the end of every session excessive pressure and much hasty legislation. Another effect I for one estimate highly, it would give more time for bills being sent by members to constituencies for consideration there,—an advantage to all parties, and, though that is a small matter, a comfort to members, who naturally wish to carry out the wishes and avail themselves of the knowledge of the experienced parties and interests whom they represent, and whom at present they seldom are able to sufficiently consult. If this system of passing Bills were in practice, Parliament would have more time for local bills. But the day is evidently approaching when the provinces will be charged with the responsibility of settling many local matters without an appeal to Parliament, or at any rate without protracted and expensive and unsatisfactory Can be amended. |