through ether of a large portion of the energy of the visible universe that the doctrine as at present held can be maintained. Now the only addition that our theory demands is the gradual absorption of some part at least of this energy into the invisible universe; and we have said (Art. 147) that it has been supposed that there is evidence of an absorption of this nature. It may safely be said that our hypothesis is not upset, and never can be upset, by any experimental conclusion with regard to energy.

209. Objection Sixth (Scientific).—We cannot understand how individuality is to be preserved in the spiritual world.

Reply. This is no new difficulty. We are as much puzzled by what takes place in our present body as we can be with respect to the spiritual. Thus, let us allow that impressions are stored up in our brains, which thus form an organ connecting us with the past of the visible universe. Now thousands, perhaps even millions, of such impressions pass into the same organ, and yet, by the operation of our will, we can concentrate our recollection upon a certain event, and rummage out its details, along with all its collateral circumstances, to the exclusion of everything else. But if the brain or something else plays such a wonderful part in the present economy, is it impossible to imagine that the universe of the future may have even greater individualising powers? Is it not very hazardous to assert this or that mode of existence to be impossible in such a wonderful whole as we feel sure the universe must be?

210. Objection Seventh (Scientific).—Even if it be allowed that the invisible universe receives energy from the present, so that the conservation of energy holds true as a principle, yet the dissipation of energy must hold true also, and although the process of decay may be delayed by the

storing up of energy in the invisible universe, it cannot be permanently arrested. Ultimately we must believe that every part of the whole universe will be equally supplied with energy, and in consequence all abrupt living motion will come to an end.

Reply.-Perhaps the best reply to this objection is, to regard the universe as an infinite whole-a thought which will be developed in what follows of this book. For

it is clear that if the universe be infinite, and contain within itself an infinite supply of energy, we may imagine it to go on from eternity to eternity without the possibility of becoming effete. Besides, what is to prove dissipation in the universe of the future? We have seen (Art. 112) how Clerk-Maxwell's demons (though essentially finite intelligences) could be made to restore energy in the present universe without spending work. Much more may be expected in a universe free from gross matter.

211. Having replied to these objections, let us now endeavour to realise our present position. It is briefly as follows:-What we have done is to show that immortality is possible, and to demolish any so-called scientific objection that might be raised against it. The evidence in favour of the doctrine is not derived from us. It comes to us from two sources: in the first place, from the statements made concerning Christ; and, in the second place, from that intense longing for immortality which civilised man has invariably possessed. The case stands thus: certain evidence from these two sources in favour of our doctrine has been adduced, but scientific objections have been raised against the possibility of the doctrine itself, and these we have attempted to overcome. But while we may suppose the objections to the doctrine itself surmounted,

there yet remains an equally strong scientific objection to that portion of the evidence in favour of the doctrine which is derived from the Christian records. Granting, it may be said to us, that immortality is possible, what reason have we, beyond certain vague yearnings, for believing it likely ? No doubt, if Christ rose from the dead, the probability in favour of it would be very strong; but we have an objection to the resurrection of Christ no less formidable than that which you have overcome with regard to the doctrine itself.

212. It will now be our duty to examine the validity of this objection, and in so doing we must approach the problem of the universe not from the side of the future but from that of the past.

We have already (Art. 85) defined the principle of Continuity, in virtue of which we believe ourselves entitled to discuss every event that occurs in the universe, without one single exception, and to deduce from it, if we can, the condition of things that preceded the event-this being also in the universe. Now, we learn by means of that great physical principle, the dissipation of energy, that the visible universe cannot have lasted for ever, but must have made its appearance in time; and applying to this stupendous event, not irreverently, but in hopeful trust, the principle of Continuity, we ask ourselves the question, What state of things, also in the universe, what conceivable antecedent can have given rise to this unparalleled phenomenon—an antecedent, we need hardly say, that must have operated from the invisible universe? It is a great and awful phenomenon, but we must not shrink before size; we must not be terrified by the magnitude of the event out of reliance upon our principles of discussion.

Now, if we regard the appearance of the visible universe and approach it as we would any other phenomenon, we have only two alternatives before us. Creation is not one of these, inasmuch as we are carried by such an act out of the universe altogether. We are, therefore, driven to look to some kind of development as the cause of the appearance of the visible universe. This development may either have been through the living or through the dead; either it was the result of a natural operation of the invisible universe, or it was brought about by means of intelligence residing in that universe and working through its laws. To determine which of these two alternatives is most admissible, we must bear in mind the nature of the production, and argue about it just as we should argue about anything else.

213. Now, this production was, as far as we can judge, a sporadic or abrupt act, and the substance produced, that is to say the atoms which form the material substratum of the present universe bear (as Herschel and Clerk-Maxwell have well said) from their uniformity of constitution all the marks of being manufactured articles.

Whether we regard the various elementary atoms as separate productions, or (according to Prout and Lockyer) view them as produced by the coming together of some smaller kind of primordial atom-in either case, and even specially so in the latter case, we think that they look like manufactured articles. Indeed, we have already shown (Art. 164) that development without life, that is to say, dead development, does not tend to produce uniformity of structure in the products which it gives rise to.

214. Thus the argument is in favour of the production of the visible universe by means of an intelligent agency residing in the invisible universe.

But again let us realise the position in which we are placed by the principle of Continuity-we are led by it not only to regard the invisible universe as having existed before the present one, but the same principle drives us to acknowledge its existence in some form as a universe from all eternity. Now we can readily conceive a universe containing conditioned intelligent beings to have existed before the present; nay, to have existed for a time greater than any assignable time, which is the only way in which our thoughts can approach the eternal. But is it equally easy to conceive a dead universe to have existed in the same way during immeasurable ages? Is a dead universe a fully conditioned universe? For, regarding the laws of the universe as those laws according to which the intelligences of the universe are conditioned by the Governor thereof, can we conceive a dead universe to exist permanently without some being to be conditioned? Is not this something without meaning, an unreality-a make-believe? And if it be said that under these circumstances the conception in any form of immeasurable ages of time is unreal, we may reply by granting it, and asserting that in such a case we are driven not merely from the fully conditioned to the partially conditioned, but even to the unconditioned; in other words, the hypothesis of a permanently dead universe would hardly appear to satisfy the principle of Continuity, which prefers to proceed from one form of the fully conditioned to another.

215. For the benefit of our readers we shall now endeavour to review as clearly as we can the point at which we have arrived, and the steps which have brought us to it.

It will be remembered that in our definition (Art. 54) we agreed to look upon the Creator-the Absolute One, as