My application has never been noticed. This neglect alone ought early to have admonished me that I had no hope of support at Washington, in any attempt I might make (against certain officers) to maintain necessary discipline in the army I was about to lead into the field.

I left Washington highly flattered with the confidence and kindness the President had just shown me, in many long personal interviews on military matters. For more than two months my expressions of gratitude were daily and fervent, nor were they much less emphatic towards the head of the War Department. Proceeding with zeal and confidence in my most hazardous duties, I learned, January 27, at the Brazos San Jago, that an attempt was on foot to create a lieutenant general to take command in the field over me. Shocked and distressed, I allowed of no relaxation in my efforts to serve my country, resolved that, for the short time I was likely to remain in commission, to be

"True as the dial to the sun,
Altho' it be not shined upon.”

A yet greater outrage soon followed: failing to obtain an act for the citizen lieutenant general, a bill was pressed upon Congress to authorize the placing a junior major general, just appointed, (the same individual,) in command over all the old major generals then in front of the enemy!

I will not here trust myself to add a soldier's comment upon those attempts, but I may thank God that He did not allow them, or subsequent injuries, to break down, entirely, the spirit and abilities (such as they are) with which He had endowed me.

Foreseeing at Washington that, from the great demands of commerce at the moment, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to take up, perhaps at any price, a sufficient number of vessels at New Orleans and Mobile to transport the regiments of my expedition from the Rio Grande frontier to Vera Cruz, I endeavored to impress upon the War Department the necessity of sending out from the northern and eastern ports a certain number of large ships in ballast, in order that the ex edition might not be delayed, and in view of the fixed fact," the return of the vomito at Vera Cruz in the spring of the year, a delay of a few weeks was likely to prove a total defeat.

In a paper transmitted to me, headed "memorandum for the .quartermaster general," marked "War Department, December 15, 1846," and signed by the secretary, which I received January 8, it is said: "Independently of this number of transports for troops and ordnance stores, [from the north] there will be required, say, five ships for the transportation of the [surf] boats now being prepared, besides which, ten vessels must be taken up and sent out in ballast, [for troops] unless stores can be put on board, to make up the number (40) required by the commanding general."

The date of this memorandum is December 15, more than three weeks after my requisition and departure from Washington. Of not one of the "ten vessels," in ballast, or with stores, (leaving room

for troops,) have I heard up to this day. Relying upon them, confidently, the embarkation was delayed in whole or in part, at the Brazos and Tampico, from the 15th of January to the 9th of March, leaving, it was feared, not half the time needed for the reduction of Vera Cruz and its castle before the return of the yellow fever. But half the surf boats came at all, and of the seige train and ordnance stores, only about one-half had arrived when the Mexican flags were replaced by those of the United States on those formidable places. We succeeded at last in reaching the point of attack, in the midst of frightful northers, by means, in great part, of trading craft, small and hazardous, picked up accidently at the Brazos and Tampico, and when the army got ashore, its science and valor had to supply all deficiencies in heavy guns, mortars, and ordnance stores.

The first letter that I received from the department, after entering the captured city, contained an elaborate rebuke, (dated February 22,) for having ordered Colonel Harney, 2d dragoons, to remain in the command of the cavalry with Major General Taylor, so as to leave Major Sumner, of the same regiment, the senior of that arm, in my expedition. There was no great difference in the number of cavalry companies with the two armies.

This rebuke was written with a complacency that argued the highest professional experience in such matters, and could not have been more confident in its tone if dictated to the greenest general of the recent appointments. Yet, without the power of selecting commanders of particular corps, no general-in-chief would venture to take upon himself the conduct of a critical campaign. Such selections were always made by the father of his country, and the principal generals under him. So in the campaign of 1814, I myself sent away, against their wishes, three senior field officers, of as many regiments, who were infirm, uninstructed, and inefficient, in favor of three juniors, and with the subsequent approbation of Major General Brown, on his joining me, and the head of the War Department. Both were well acquainted with the customs of war, in like cases, at home and abroad, and without that energy on my part, it is highly probable that no American citizen would ever have cited the battles of the Niagara without a sigh for his country. I am happy, however, that before a word had been received from the department, and indeed before it could have had any knowledge of the question, I had decided to take with me the frank and gallant colonel, and hope soon to learn that he and very many other officers have been rewarded with brevets for their highly distinguished services in the campaign that followed.

It was in reference to the same rebuke that, in acknowledging your communication, I said, from Vera Cruz, April 5. "I might very well controvert the military principles so confidently laid down by the department, [in the letter of the 22d February,] but believing that the practice of the United States army, in the two wars with Great Britain, would have no weight in the particular case, I waive further reply; having, at the moment, no leisure and no inclination for controversy."

Alluding to the heavy disappointments, in respect to transports, seige train, and ordnance stores, then already experienced, I wrote to the department from Lobos, February 28: "Perhaps no expedition was ever so unaccountably delayed-by no want of foresight, arrangement, or energy on my part, as I dare affirm-and under circumstances the most critical to this entire army; for every body relied upon and knew, from the first, as well as I knew, it would be fatal to us to attempt military operations on this coast after, probably, the first week in April; and here we are at the end of February. Nevertheless this army is in heart; and crippled as I am in the means required and promised, I shall go forward, and expect to take Vera Cruz and its castle in time to escape, by pursuing the enemy, the pestilence of the coast."

The city and castle were captured March 29, and, with about onefourth of the necessary means for a road train, (no fault of mine,) the retreat, in pursuit of the enemy, was vigorously commenced April 8. The battle of Cerro Gordo soon followed, and we occupied Jalapa and Perote, where we were obliged to wait for supplies from Vera Cruz. In those positions I was made to writhe under another cruel disappointment.

In my four memorials, to the department, on the further prosecution of the war against Mexico, written at Washington, and dated, respectively, October 27, November 12, 16, and 21, (it was only intimated to me in the night of November 18, that I might prepare myself for the field,) papers in which I demonstrated that Vera Cruz was the true base of operations, and that the enemy's capital could not, probably, be reached from the Rio Grande, I estimated that after taking that great seaport, "about 20,000 men," or "an army of more than 20,000 men may be needed; 1. To beat, in the field and in passes, any accumulated force in the way; 2. To garrison many important points in the rear, to secure a free communication with Vera Cruz; and 3. To make distant detachments, in order to gather in, without long halts, necessary subsistence." And that force, I supposed, including volunteers, and aided by land and money bounties, might be raised in time by adding ten' or twelve new regiments of regulars, and filling up the ranks of the old.

A bill was introduced for raising ten additional regular regiments, and I certainly do not mean to charge the department with the whole delay in passing the bill through Congress. But it was passed, February 11, 1847, and under it, by early in April, some few thousand men had been already raised and organized. My distress may be conceived, by any soldier, on learning at Jalapa, April 27th, that the whole of that force had been sent, under Brigadier General Cadwalader, to the Rio Grande frontier.

In my letter to the department, written the day after, I said, I had expected that "detachments of the new regiments, would, as you had promised me, begin to arrive in this month, and continue to follow perhaps into June." "How many (volunteers) will re-engage under the act approved March 3, (only received two days ago,) I know not; probably but few. Hence, the greater my disappointment caused by sending the new troops to the Rio Grande; for,

1

besides their keeping the road in our present rear open for many weeks, by marches in successive detachments, I had intended, as I advanced, to leave strong garrisons in this place, [Jalapa,] in Perote, and Puebla, and to keep at the head of the movement, a force equal to any probable opposition. It may now depend on the number of the old volunteers who may re-engage, and the number of new troops that may arrive from the Brazos, in time; as also, in some degree, upon the advance of Major General Taylor, whether I shall find this army in strength to leave the garrisons and to occupy the capital."

I may add, that only about fifty individuals of the old volunteers re-engaged under the provisions of the act of March 3; that the remainder were discharged May 4; that Major General Taylor made no movement in advance of Saltillo, and that the new regulars, including Cadwalader's brigade, only began to come up with me, at Puebla, in July, but not in sufficient numbers till August The next day the army commenced its advance upon the capital with a little more than 10,000 effective men.

6.

It is not extravagant to say that, if Brigadier General Cadwalader's forces had not been diverted from me, to the Rio Grande, where he was made to lose, without any benefit to Major General Taylor, much precious time, I might easily have taken this city in the month of June, and at one-fifth of the loss sustained in August. and September. The enemy availed himself of my forced delay, at Puebla, to collect, to treble, to organize, and discipline his forces, as also to erect numerous and powerful defences with batteries. Nearly all those extraordinary preparations, for our reception, were made after the middle of June. And it is known that the news of the victory of Buena Vista reached Washington in time to countermand Cadwalader's orders for the Rio Grande, before his departure from New Orleans. Two rifle companies with him received the countermand there and joined me early.

I know that I had the misfortune to give offence to the department by expressing myself to the same effect, from Jalapa, May 6. In a report of that date, I said:

"The subject of that order (No. 135-old volunteers) has given me long and deep solicitude. To part with so large and so respectable a portion of this army in the middle of a country, which, though broken in its power, is not yet disposed to sue for peace; to provide for the return home of seven regiments, from, this interior position, at a time when I find it quite difficult to provide transportation and supplies for the operating forces which remain; and all this without any prospect of succor or reinforcement, in perhaps, the next seven months-beyond some 300 army recruitspresent novelties utterly unknown to any invading army before. With the addition of ten or twelve thousand new levies in April and May-asked for, and, until very recently, expected-or even with the addition of two or three thousand new troops, destined for this army, but suddenly, by the orders of the War Department, diverted to the Rio Grande frontier, I might, notwithstanding the unavoidable discharge of the old volunteers-seven regiments and two indepen

dent companies-advance with confidence upon the enemy's capital. I shall nevertheless advance; but whether beyond Puebla, will depend on intervening information and reflection. The general panic given' to the enemy, at Cerro Gordo, still remaining, I think it probable that we shall go to Mexico, or, if the enemy recover from that, we must renew the consternation by another blow."

Thus, like Cortez, finding myself isolated and abandoned, and again like him, always afraid that the next ship or messenger might recall or farther cripple me, I resolved no longer to depend on Vera Cruz or home, but to render my little army "a self-sustaining machine "—as I informed everybody, including the head of the War Department-and advanced to Puebla.

It was in reference to the foregoing serious causes of complaint and others to be found in my reports at large-particularly in respect to money for the disbursing staff officers, clothing, and Mr. Trist, commissioner-that I concluded my report from Puebla, June 4, in these words:

"Considering the many cruel disappointments and mortification I have been made to feel since I left Washington, and the total want of support or sympathy on the part of the War Department, which I have so long experienced, I beg to be recalled from this army the moment it may be safe for any person to embark at Vera Cruz; which, I suppose, will be early in November. Probably all field operations will be over long before that time."

But my next report (July 25th) from Puebla, has, no doubt, in the end, been deemed more unpardonable by the department. In that paper, after speaking of the "happy change in my relations, both official and private, with Mr. Trist," I continued:

"Since about the 26th ultimo, [June,] our intercourse has been frequent and cordial, and I found him [Mr. T. | able, discreet, courteous, and amiable. At home, it so chanced, that we had had but the slightest possible acquaintance with each other. Hence, more or less of reciprocal prejudice, and of the existence of his feelings towards me, I knew (by private letters) before we met, that at least a part of the cabinet had a full intimation.

"Still, the pronounced misunderstanding between Mr. Trist and myself could not have occurred, but for other circumstances: 1. His being obliged to send forward your letter of Aprill 14th, instead of delivering it in person, with the explanatory papers which he desired to communicate; 2. His bad health in May and June, which, I am happy to say has now become good; and 3. The extreme mystification into which your letter-and particularly an interlineation-unavoidably threw me.

"So far as I am concerned, I am perfectly willing that all I have heretofore written to the department about Mr. Trist, should be suppressed. I make this declaration as due to my present esteem for that gentlemen; but ask no favor, and desire none, at the hands of the department. Justice to myself, however tardy, I shall

take care to have done.

"I do not acknowledge the justice of either of your rebukes con