prefented to us, both by our powers of perception and conception, in a ftate of union. Such abftractions, in truth, are familiar to the moft illiterate of mankind; and it is in this very way that they are infenfibly formed. When a tradesman speaks of the length of a room, in contradiftinction to its breadth; or when he speaks of the diftance between any two objects; he forms exactly the fame abftraction, which is referred to by Euclid in his fecond definition; and which most of his commentators have thought it neceffary to illuftrate by prolix metaphyfical difquifitions.

I shall only observe farther, with respect to the nature and province of this faculty of the mind, that notwithflanding its effential fubferviency to every act of claffification, yet it might have been exercised, although we had only been acquainted with one individual object. Although, for example, we had nev er feen but one rofe, we might still have been able to attend to its color, without thinking of its other properties. This has led fome philofophers to fuppose, that another faculty besides abftraction, to which they have given the name of generalization, is neceffary to account for the formation of genera and fpecies; and they have endeavored to fhew, that although generalization without abstraction is impoffible; yet that we might have been fo formed, as to be able to abftract, without being capable of generalizing. The grounds of this opinion, it is not neceffary for me to examine, for any of the purpofes which I have at present in view.

SECTION II.

Of the Objects of our Thoughts, when we employ genérai

Terms.

FROM the account which was given in a former chapter, of the common theories of perception, it appears to have been a prevailing opinion among philofophers, that the qualities of external objects are perceived, by means of images or fpecies tranfmitted to the mind by the organs of fenfe: an opinion of which I already endeavored to trace the origin, from certain natural prejudices fuggefted by the phenomena of the material world. The fame train of thinking has led them to fuppofe that, in the cafe of all our other intellectual operations, there exift in the mind certain ideas diftinct from the mind itself; and that these ideas are the objects about which our thoughts are employed. When I recollect, for example, the appearance of an abfent friend, it is fuppofed that the immediate object of my thought is an idea of my friend; which I at first received by my fenfes, and which I have been enabled to retain in the mind by the faculty of memory. When I form to myself any imaginary combination by an effort of poetical invention, it is fuppofed in like manner, that the parts which I combine, existed previously in the mind; and furnish the materials on which it is the province of imagination to operate. It is to Dr. Reid we owe the im-. portant remark, that all these notions are wholly hypothetical; that it is impoffible to produce a fhadow of evidence in fupport of them; and that, even although we were to admit their truth, they would not render the phenomena in queftion more intelligible. According to his principles, therefore, we have no ground for fuppofing, that, in any one op

eration of the mind, there exifts in it an object diftinct from the mind itself; and all the common expreffions which involve fuch a fuppofition are to be confidered as unmeaning circumlocutions, which ferve only to disguise from us the real history of the intellectual phenomena.*

3 In order to prevent misapprehensions of Dr. Reid's meaning, in his reasonings against the ideal theory, it may be necessary to explain, a little more fully than I have done in the text, in what sense he calls in question the existence of ideas; for the meaning which this word is employed to convey in popular discourse, differs widely from that which is annexed to it by the philosophers whose opinion he controverts. This explanation I shall give in - his own words:

"In popular language, idea signifies the same thing as concep❝tion, apprehension, notion. To have an idea of any thing, is "to conceive it. To have a distinct idea, is to conceive it dis"tinctly. To have no idea of it, is not to conceive at all.-When the word idea is taken in this popular sense, no man can possibly doubt whether he has ideas."

"According to the philosophical meaning of the word idea, it "does not signify that act of the mind which we call thought, or "conception, but some object of thought. Of these objects of "thought called ideas, different sects of philosophers have given very different accounts."

"Some have held them to be self-existent; others to be in the "divine mind; others in our own minds; and others in the brain, or sensorium." p. 213.

46

"The Peripatetic system of species and phantasms, as well as "the Platonic system of ideas, is grounded upon this principle, that in every kind of thought, there must be some object that "really exists; in every operation of the mind, something to work 46 upon. Whether this inmediate object be called an idea with "Plato, or a phantasm or species with Aristotle; whether it be "eternal and uncreated, or produced by the impressions of external objects, is of no consequence in the present argument." Ibid. p. 388.

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"So much is this opinion fixed in the minds of philosophers, that, I doubt not but it will appear to most, a very strange paradox, or rather a contradiction, that men should think without "ideas. But this appearance of contradiction arises from the ambiguity of the word idea. If the idea of a thing means only the "thought of it, which is the most common meaning of the word, "to think without ideas, is to think without thought; which is

T

"We are at a lofs to know," (fays this excellent philosopher,)" how we perceive diftant objects; "how we remember things paft; how we imagine

things that have no exiftence. Ideas in the mind "feem to account for all these operations; they are "all by the means of ideas reduced to one opera❝tion; to a kind of feeling, or immediate percep"tion of things prefent, and in contact with the percipient; and feeling is an operation fo familiar, that we think it needs no explanation, but may serve to explain other operations."

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"But this feeling, or immediate perception, is as "difficult to be comprehended, as the things which

cr

we pretend to explain by it. Two things may be “in contact, without any feeling or perception; "there must therefore be in the percipient, a power "to feel, or to perceive. How this power is produ"ced, and how it operates, is quite beyond the reach "of our knowledge. As little can we know, wheth"er this power must be limited to things prefent, " and in contact with us. Neither can any man "pretend to prove, that the Being who gave us the power to perceive things prefent, may not give "us the power to perceive things diftant, to remem"ber things paft, and to conceive things that never "exifted."*

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In another part of his work, Dr. Reid has occasion

"undoubtedly a contradiction. But an idea, according to the def❝inition given of it by philosophers, is not thought, but an object "of thought, which really exists, and is perceived, &c." Ibid. p. 390.

I have only to add, that when, in this work, I make use of the word idea in stating my own opinions, I employ it uniformly in the popular sense, and not in the philosophical sense, as now explained; it would be better, perhaps, to avoid it altogether; but 1 have found it difficult to do so, without adopting unusual modes of expression. I flatter myself that I have used it with due caution.

* Essays on the Intellectual Powers, p. 214.

to trace the origin of the prejudice which has led philofophers to fuppofe, that, in all the operations of the understanding, there must be an object of thought, which really exifls while we think of it. His remarks on this fubject, which are highly ingenious and fatisfactory, are contained in his account of the different theories concerning conception.*

As in all the ancient metaphyfical fyftems it was taken for granted, (probably from the analogy of our external perceptions,) that every exertion of thought implies the existence of an object diftinct from the thinking being; it naturally occurred, as a very curious queftion, What is the immediate object of our attention, when we are engaged in any general fpeculation? or, in other words, what is the nature of the idea correfponding to a general term? When I think of any particular object which I have formerly perceived, fuch as a particular friend, a particular tree, or a particular mountain, I can comprehend what is meant by a picture or reprefentation of fuch objects; and therefore the explanation given by the ideal theory of that act of the mind which we formerly called Conception, if not perfectly fatisfactory, is at least not wholly unintelligible. But what account fhall we give, upon the principles of this theory, of the objects of my thoughts, when I employ the words, friend, tree, mountain, as generic terms? For, that, all the things I have ever perceived are individuals; and confequently, that the ideas denoted by general words, (if such ideas exist,) are not copied from any originals that have fallen under my obfervation; is not only felf-evident, but almost an identical propofition.

In anfwer to this question, the Platonifts, and at a ftill earlier period, the Pythagoreans, taught, that, although these univerfal ideas are not copied from