Notwithstanding, however, the great merit of these writers, in defending and illuftrating the fyftem of the Nominalifts, none of them feem to me to have been fully aware of the important confequences to which it leads. The Abbé de Condillac was, I be lieve, the firft (if we except, perhaps, Leibnitz) who perceived that, if this fyftem be true, a talent for reafoning must confift, in a great measure, in a kil ful ufe of language as an inftrument of thought. The most valuable of his remarks on this subject are contained in a treatise De l'Art de Penfer, which forms the fourth volume of his " Cours d'Etude."

Dr. Campbell, too, in his Philofophy of Rhetoric, has founded, on the principles of Berkeley and Hume, a very curious and interefting fpeculation, of which I fhall have occafion afterwards to take notice.

The explanation which the doctrines of thefe writers afford, of the process of the mind in general reafoning, is fo fimple, and at the fame time, in my apprehenfion, fo fatisfactory, that, I own, it is with fome degree of furprise I have read the attempts which have lately been made to revive the fyftem of the Realifts. One of the ableft of thefe attempts is by Dr. Price; who in his very valuable Treatife on Morals, has not only employed his ingenuity in fupport of fome of the old tenets of the Platonic fchool, but has even gone fo far as to follow Plato's example, in connecting this fpeculation about univerfals, with the fublime queftions of natural theology. The obfervations which he has offered in fupport of these opinions, I have repeatedly perufed with all the attention in my power; but without being able to enter into his views, or even to comprehend fully his meaning. Indeed, I muft acknowledge, that it appears to me to afford no flight presumption against the principles on which he proceeds, when I obferve, that an author, remarkable, on moft occafions, for precifion of ideas, and for perfpicuity of ftyle, never

fails to lose himself in obfcurity and mystery, when he enters on thefe difquifitions.

Dr. Price's reasonings in proof of the existence of univerfals, are the more curious, as he acquiefces in fome of Dr. Reid's conclufions with refpect to the ideal theory of perception. That there are in the mind, images or resemblances of things external, he grants to be impoffible; but ftill he feems to fuppofe, that, in every exertion of thought, there is fomething immediately present to the mind, which is the ob ject of its attention. "When abstract truth is con"templated, is not" (fays he)" the very object itself prefent to the mind? When millions of intellects " contemplate the equality of every angle of a femi"circle to a right angle, have they not all the fame "object in view? Is this object nothing? Or is it "only an image, or kind of fhadow? Thefe inqui"ries," he adds, " carry our thoughts high.'

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The difficulty which has appeared fo puzzling to this ingenious writer, is, in truth, more apparent than real. In the cafe of Perception, Imagination,

* The whole passage is as follows: "The word idea is some"times used to signify the immediate object of the mind in think❝ing, considered as something in the mind, which represents the "real object, but is different from it. This sense of an idea is de"rived from the notion, that when we think of any external exist"ence, there is something immediately present to the mind, which "it contemplates distinct from the object itself, that being at a "distance. But what is this? It is bad language to call it an im66 age in the mind of the object. Shall we say then, that there is "indeed no such thing? But would not this be the same as to say "that, when the mind is employed in viewing and examining any object, which is either not present to it, or does not exist, it is "employed in viewing and examining nothing, and therefore does "not then think at all?-When abstract truth is contemplated, is "not the very object itself present to the mind? When millions of "intellects contemplate the equality of every angle in a semicircle "to a right angle, have they not all the same object in view? Is this object nothing? Or is it only an image or kind of shadow? These inquiries carry our thoughts high."

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and Memory, it has been already fully fhewn, that we have no reason to believe the existence of any thing in the mind diftinct from the mind itself; and that, even upon the fuppofition that the fact were otherwife, our intellectual operations would be juft as inexplicable as they are at prefent. Why then fhould we fuppofe, that, in our general fpeculations, there must exift in the mind fome object of its thoughts, when it appears that there is no evidence of the exiftence of any fuch object, even when the mind is employed about individuals?

Still, however, it may be urged, that, although, in fuch cafes, there fhould be no object of thought in the mind, there muft exift fomething or other to which its attention is directed. To this difficulty I have no answer to make, but by repeating the fact which I have already endeavored to establish; that there are only two ways in which we can poffibly fpeculate about claffes of objects; the one, by means of a word or generic term; the other, by means of one particular individual of the clafs which we confider as the reprefentative of the reft; and that these two methods of carrying on our general fpeculations, are at bottom fo much the fame, as to authorife us to lay down as a principle, that, without the ufe of figns, all our thoughts muft have related to individuals. When we reafon therefore, concerning claffes or genera, the objects of our attention are merely figns; or if, in any inftance, the generic word fhould recal fome individual, this circumftance is to be regarded only as the confequence of an accidental affociation, which has rather a tendency to disturb, than to affift us in our reafoning.

Whether it might not have been poffible for the Deity to have fo formed us, that we might have been capable of reafoning concerning claffes of objects, without the use of figns, I fhall not take upon me to determine. But this we may venture to affirm with

confidence, that man is not fuch a being. And indeed, even if he were, it would not therefore neceffarily follow, that there exifts any thing in a genus, diftinct from the individuals of which it is compofed; for we know that the power which we have of thinking of particular objects without the medium of figns, does not in the leaft depend on their existence or non-existence, at the moment we think of them.

It would be vain, however, for us, in inquiries of this nature, to indulge ourselves in fpeculating about poffibilities. It is of more confequence to remark the advantages which we derive from our actual conftitution; and which, in the present instance, appear to me to be important and admirable: inafmuch as it fits mankind for an eafy interchange of their intellectual acquifitions; by impofing on them the neceffity of employing, in their folitary fpeculations, the fame inftrument of thought, which forms the established medium of their communications with each other.

In the very flight sketch which I have given of the controverfy between the Nominalifts and the Realifts about the existence of univerfals, I have taken no notice of an intermediate fect called Conceptualists; whose distinguishing tenet is faid to have been, that the mind has a power of forming general conceptions. From the indiftinctnefs and inaccuracy of

*"Nominales, deserta paulo Abelardi hypothesi, universalia in "notionibus atque conceptibus mentis ex rebus singularibus ab“stractione formatis consistere statuebant, unde conceptuales dicti "sunt."BRUCKER, vol. iii. p. 908. (Lips. 1766.)

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“Nominalium tres erant familiæ. Aliqui ut Rocelinus, univer"salia meras esse voces docuerunt. Alii iterum in solo intellectu possuerunt, atque meros animi conceptus esse autumarunt, quos conceptuales aliqui vocant, et a nominalibus distinguunt, quanquam alii etiam confundant. Alii fuerunt, qui universalia quæsiverunt, non tam in vocibus, quam in sermonibus integris, quod

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their language on the subject, it is not a very eafy matter to afcertain precisely what was their opinion on the point in queftion; but, on the whole, I am inclined to think, that it amounted to the two fol, lowing propofitions: first, that we have no reason to believe the exiftence of any effences, or univerfal ideas, corresponding to general terms; and fecondly, that the mind has the power of reafoning concerning genera, or claffes of individuals, without the mediation of language. Indeed I cannot think of any other hypothefis which it is poffible to form on the subject, diftinct from thofe of the two celebrated sects already mentioned. In denying the existence of universals, we know that the Conceptualists agreed with the Nominalifts. In what, then, can we fuppose that they differed from them, but about the neceffity of language as an inftrument of thought, in carrying on our general fpeculations?

With this fect of Conceptualifts, Dr. Reid is dif pofed to rank Mr. Locke; and I agree with him fo far as to think, that, if Locke had any decided opinion on the point in difpute, it did not differ materially from what I have endeavored to exprefs in the two general propofitions which I have juft now ftated. The apparent inconfiftencies which occur in that part of his Effay in which the question is difcuffed, have led subsequent authors to represent his fentiments in different lights; but as these inconfiftencies plainly fhew, that he was neither satisfied with the fyftem of the Realifts nor with that of the Nominalists; they appear to me to demonftrate that he leaned to the intermediate hypothefis already men.

"Joh. Sarisberiensis adscribit Pet, Abelardo; quo quid intelligat "ille, mihi non satis liquet."MORHOF. Polyhistor. Tom. Sec. lib. i. cap. xiii. § 2.

I have taken no notice of the last class of Nominalists here mentioned; as I find myself unable to comprehend their doetrine.