tioned, notwithstanding the inaccurate and paradox. ical manner in which he has expreffed it.*

May I take the liberty of adding, that Dr. Reid's own opinion seems to me alfo to coincide nearly with that of the Conceptualists; or, at leaft, to coincide with the two propofitions which I have already fup. posed to contain a fummary of their doctrine? The abfurdity of the ancient opinion concerning univerfals, as maintained both by Plato and Ariftotle, he has exposed by the cleareft and most decifive arguments; not to mention, that by his own very ori ginal and important fpeculations concerning the ideal theory, he has completely deftroyed that natural prejudice from which the whole system of univerfal ideas gradually took rife. If, even in the cafe of individuals, we have no reafon to believe the existence of any object of thought in the mind, distinct from the mind itself, we are at once relieved from all the difficulties in which philofophers have involved themselves, by attempting to explain, in confiftency with that ancient hypothefis, the process of the mind in its general fpeculations.

On the other hand, it is no less clear, from Dr. Reid's criticifmns on Berkeley and Hume, that his opinion does not coincide with that of the Nominalists; and that the power which the mind poffeffes of reafoning concerning claffes of objects, appears to him to imply fome faculty, of which no notice is ta ken in the fyftems of thefe philofophers.

The long experience I have had of the candor of this excellent author, encourages me to add, that, in ftating his opinion of the fubject of univerfals, he has not expreffed himself in a manner fo completely fatisfactory to my mind, as on moft other occafions. That language is not an effential inftrument of thought in our general reafonings, he has no where pofitively afferted. At the fame time, as he has not * See Note [K.]

affirmed the contrary, and as he has declared himfelf diffatisfied with the doctrines of Berkeley and Hume, his readers are naturally led to conclude, that this is his real opinion on the fubject. His filence on this point is the more to be regretted, as it is the only point about which there can be any reafonable controverfy among those who allow his refutation of the ideal hppothefis to be fatisfactory. In confequence of that refutation, the whole difpute between the Realifts and the Conceptualifts falls at once to the ground; but the difpute between the Conceptualifts and the Nominalifts (which involves the great queftion concerning the use of figns in general fpeculation) remains on the fame footing as be

fore.

In order to justify his own expreffions concerning univerfals; and in oppofition to the language of Berkeley and Hume, Dr. Reid is at pains to illuftrate a diftinction between conception and imagination, which he thinks, has not been fufficiently attended to by philofophers. "An univerfal," fays he, " is not an object of any external fenfe, and there"fore cannot be imagined; but it may be distinctly * conceived. When Mr. Pope fays, "The proper "study of mankind is man;" I conceive his mean"ing diftinctly; although I neither imagine a black

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or a white, a crooked or a straight man. I can con"ceive a thing that is impoffible; but I cannot diftinct"ly imagine a thing that is impoffible. I can con"ceive a propofition or a demonstration, but I can"not imagine either. I can conceive understanding and will, virtue and vice, and other attributes "of the mind; but I cannot imagine them. In "like manner, I can diftinctly conceive univerfals; but I cannot imagine them."*

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It appears from this paffage, that, by conceiving univerfals, Dr. Reid means nothing more, than un

*P. 482.

derstanding the meaning of propofitions involving general terms. But the obfervations he has made (admitting them in their full extent) do not in the leaft affect the question about the neceffity of figns, to enable us to fpeculate about fuch propofitions. The vague ufe which metaphyfical writers have made of the word conception, (of which I had occafion to take notice in a former chapter,) has contributed in part to embarrass this fubject. That we cannot conceive univerfals in a way at all analogous to that in which we conceive an abfent object of fenfe, is granted on both fides. Why then fhould we employ the fame word conception, to exprefs two operations of the mind which are effentially different? When we speak of conceiving or understanding a general propofition, we mean nothing more than that we have a conviction,(founded on our previous use of the words in which it is expreffed,) that we have it in our power, at pleasure, to fubftitute, instead of the general terms, fome one of the individuals comprehended under them. When we hear a propofition announced, of which the terms are not familiar to us; we naturally defire to have it exemplified, or illuftrated, by means of fome particular inftance; and when we are once fatisfied by fuch an application, that we have the interpretation of the propofition at all times in our power, we make no fcruple to say, that we conceive or understand its meaning; although we fhould not extend our views beyond the words in which it is announced, or even although no particular exemplification of it fhould occur to us at the moment. It is in this fenfe only, that the terms of any general propofition can poffibly be understood: and therefore Dr. Reid's argument does not, in the least, invalidate the doctrine of the Nominalifts, that, without the use of language, (under which term I comprehend every fpecies of figns,) we fhould never have been able to extend our fpecula tions beyond individuals.

That, in many cafes, we may fafely employ in our reafonings, general terms, the meaning of which we are not even able to interpret in this way, and consequently, which are to us wholly infignificant, I had occafion already to demonftrate, in a former part of this fection.

SECTION IV.

Continuation of the fame Subject.-Inferences with refpect to the Ufe of Language as an Inftrument of Thought, and the Errors in Reafoning to which it occafionally gives rife.

IN the laft Section, I mentioned Dr. Campbell, as an ingenious defender of the system of the Nominalifts; and I alluded to a particular application which he has made of their doctrine. The reafonings which I had then in view, are to be found in the seventh chapter of the fecond book of his Philofophy of Rhetoric; in which chapter he propofes to explain how it happens, "that nonsense so often escapes be'ing detected, both by the writer and the reader." The title is fomewhat ludicrous in a grave philofophical work; but the difquifition to which it is fixed, contains many acute and profound remarks on the nature and power of figns, both as a medium of communication, and as an inftrument of thought.

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Dr. Campbell's fpeculations with refpect to language as an inftrument of thought, feem to have been fuggefted by the following paffage in Mr. Hume's Treatife of Human Nature. "I believe, ev

ery one who examines the fituation of his mind "in reafoning, will agree with me, that we do not annex diftinct and complete ideas to every "term we make use of; and that in talking of Gov

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*ernment, Church, Negociation, Conqueft, we fel"dom fpread out in our minds all the fimple ideas "of which thefe complex ones are compofed. It is, however, obfervable, that, notwithstanding this imperfection, we may avoid talking nonsense on "these fubjects; and may perceive any repug"nance among the ideas, as well as if we had a full "comprehenfion of them. Thus if, instead of say

ing, that, in war, the weaker have always re"courfe to negociation, we fhould fay, that they "have always recourfe to conqueft; the cuftom "which we have acquired, of attributing certain "relations to ideas, ftill follows the words, and "makes us immediately perceive the abfurdity of "that propofition."

In the remarks which Dr. Campbell has made on this paffage, he has endeavored to explain in what manner our habits of thinking and fpeaking, gradually establish in the mind, fuch relations among the words we employ, as enable us to carry on proceffes of reafoning by means of them, without attending in every inftance to their particular fignification. With most of his remarks on this fubject I perfectly agree; but the illuftrations he gives of them, are of too great extent to be introduced here; and I would not wish to run the risk of impairing their perfpicuity, by attempting to abridge them. I must therefore refer fuch of my readers as wifh to profecute the fpeculation, to his very ingenious and philosophical treatise.

"In confequence of thefe circumftances," (fays Dr. Campbell," It happens that, in matters which "are perfectly familiar to us, we are able to reafon 66 by means of words, without examining, in every "inftance, their fignification. Almost all the poffi"ble applications of the terms (in other words, all "the acquired relations of the figns) have become customary to us. The confequence is, that an un

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