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" ufual application of any term is inftantly detected; "this detection breeds doubt, and this doubt occa "fions an immediate recourfe to ideas. The re"courfe of the mind, when in any degree puzzled "with the figns, to the knowledge it has of the "things fignified, is natural, and on fuch fubjects "perfectly eafy. And of this recourse the difcove

ce ry of the meaning, or of the unmeaningness of "what is faid, is the immediate effect. But in mat"ters that are by no means familiar, or are treated " in an uncommon manner, and in fuch as are of an "abftruse and intricate nature, the cafe is widely "different." The inftances in which we are chiefly liable to be inpofed on by words without meaning are, (according to Dr. Campbell,) the three following:

Firft, Where there is an exuberance of metaphor. Secondly, When the terms most frequently occurring, denote things which are of a complicated nature, and to which the mind is not fufficiently familiarifed. Such are the words, Government, Church, State, Constitution, Polity, Power, Commerce, Legislature, Jurifdiction, Proportion, Symetry, Elegance.

Thirdly, When the terms employed are very abftract, and confequently of very extenfive fignification.* For an illuftration of these remarks, I muft

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**The more general any word is in its signification, it is the "more liable to be abused by an improper or unmeaning applica"tion. A very general term is applicable alike to a multitude of "different individuals, a particular term is applicable but to a few. "When the rightful applications of a word are extremely numerous, they cannot all be so strongly fixed by habit, but that, for greater security, we must perpetually recur in our minds from "the sign to the notion we have of the thing signified; and for "the reason aforementioned, it is in such instances difficult precise"ly to ascertain this notion. Thus the latitude of a word, though "different from its ambiguity, hath often a similar effect."-Philosophy of Rhetoric, vol. ii. p. 122.

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refer the reader to the ingenious work which I just now quoted.

To the obvervations of these eminent writers, I shall take the liberty of adding, that we are doubly li able to the mistakes they mention, when we make ufe of a language which is not perfectly familiar to us. Nothing, indeed, I apprehend, can fhew more clearly the use we make of words in reafoning than this, that an observation which, when expreffed in our own language, feems trite or frivolous, often acquires the appearance of depth and originality, by being tranflated into another. For my own part, at leaft, I am confcious of having been frequently led, in this way, to form an exaggerated idea of the merits of ancient and of foreign authors; and it has happened to me more than once, that a fentence, which feemed at firft to contain fomething highly ingenious, and profound, when tranflated into words familiar to me, appeared obviously to be a trite or a nugatory propofition.

The effect produced by an artificial and inverted ftyle in our own language, is fimilar to what we experience when we read a compofition in a foreign one. The eye is too much dazzled to fee diftinctly. "Aliud ftyli genus," (fays Bacon,) "totum in eo eft, "ut verba fint aculeata, fententiæ concifæ, oratio " denique potius verfa quam fufa, quo fit, ut omnia, per hujufmodi artificium, magis ingeniofa vide"antur quam re vera fint. Tale invenitur in Sene"ca effufius, in Tacito et Plinio fecundo moderati, " us."

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The deranged collocation of the words in Latin compofition, aids powerfully the impofition we have now been confidering, and renders that language an inconvenient medium of philofophical communica. tion; as well as an inconvenient inftrument of accurate thought. Indeed, in all languages in which this latitude in the arrangement of the words is admit

ted, the affociations among words must be loofer, than where one invariable order is followed; and of confequence, on the principles of Hume and Campbell, the mistakes which are committed in reafonings expreffed in fuch languages, will not be fo readily detected.

The errors in reasoning, to which we are exposed in confequence of the ufe of words as an inftrument of thought, will appear the less surprising, when we confider that all the languages which have hitherto exifted in the world, have derived their origin from popular ufe; and that their application to philofoph ical purposes, was altogether out of the view of those men who first employed them. Whether it might not be poffible to invent a language, which would at once facilitate philofophical communication, and form a more convenient inftrument of reafoning and of invention, than those we poffefs at prefent, is a queftion of very difficult difcuffion; and upon which I fhall not prefume to offer an opinion, The fail, ure of Wilkin's very ingenious attempt towards a real character, and a philofophical language, is not perhaps decifive againft fuch a project; for, not to mention fome radical defects in his plan, the views of that very eminent philofopher do not feem to have extended much farther than to promote and extend the literary intercourfe among different nations, Leibnitz, fo far as I know, is the only author who has hitherto conceived the poffibility of aiding the powers of invention and of reasoning, by the use of a more convenient inftrument of thought; but he has no where explained his ideas on this very interefting fubject. It is only from a converfation of his with Mr. Boyle and Mr. Oldenburgh, when he was in England in 1673, and from fome imperfect hints in different parts of his works,* that we find

*See Note [L.]

it had engaged his attention. In the course of this converfation he obferved, that Wilkins had miftaken the true end of a real character which was not merely to enable different nations to correfpond eafily together, but to affift the reason, the invention, and the memory. In his writings, too, he fomewhere fpeaks of an alphabet of human thoughts, which he had been employed in forming, and which, probably, (as Fontenelle has remarked) had fome relation to his univerfal language.*

The new nomenclature which has been introduced inte chymistry, feems to me to furnish a striking illuftration of the effect of appropriated and well-defined expreffions, in aiding the intellectual powers; and the period is probably not far diftant, when fimilar innovations will be attempted in fome of the oth er sciences.

*" M. Leibnitz avoit conçu le projet d'une langue philo"sophique et universelle. Wilkins Evêque de Chester, et "Dalgarno y avoient travaillé ; mais dès le tems qu'il etoit "en Angleterre, il avoit dit à Méssieurs Boyle et d' Old"enbourg qu'il ne croyoit pas que ces grands hommes eussent encore frappé au but. Ils pouvoient bien faire

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que des nations qui ne s'entendoient pas eussent aisément "commerce, mais ils n'avoient pas attrappé les véritables "caractères réels, qui étoient l'instrument le plus fin dont "l'esprit humain se pût servir, et qui devoient extrême66 ment faciliter et le raisonnement, et la memoire, et l'in"vention des choses. Ils devoient ressembler, autant qu'il " étoit possible, aux caractères d'algebre, qui en effet sont "très simples, et très expressifs, qui n'ont jamais ni super"fluité ni équivoque, et dont toutes les varietés sont rai"sonnées.a parlé en quelque endroit, d'un alphabet "des pensées humaines, qu'il meditoit. Selon toutes les "apparences, cet alphabet avoit rapport à sa langue universelle." Eloge de M. LEIBNITZ par M. de FONTENELLE.

SECTION V.

Of the Purposes to which the Powers of Abstraction and Generalifation are fubfervient.

IT has been already fhewn, that, without the use of figns, all our knowledge muft neceffarily have been limited to individuals, and that we should have been perfectly incapable, both of claffification and general reafoning. Some authors have maintained, that without the power of generalifation, (which I have endeavored to fhow, means nothing more than the capacity of employing general terms,) it would have been impoffible for us to have carried on any fpecies of reafoning whatever. But I cannot help thinking that this opinion is erroneous; or, at least, that it is very imperfectly ftated. The truth is, it appears to me to be juft in one sense of the word reafoning, but falfe in another; and I even suspect it is false in that fenfe of the word in which it is most commonly employed. Before, therefore, it is laid down as a general propofition, the meaning we are to annex to this very vague and ambiguous term, fhould be afcertained with precifion.

It has been remarked by feveral writers that the expectation which we feel of the continuance of the laws of nature, is not founded upon reafoning; and different theories have of late been propofed to account for its origin. Mr. Hume refolves it into the affociation of ideas. Dr. Reid, on the other hand, maintains, that it is an original principle of our conftitution, which does not admit of any explanation; and which, therefore, is to be ranked among thofe general and ultimate facts, beyond which, philofophy is unable to proceed.* With

* In inquiries of this nature, so far removed from the common course of literary pursuits, it always gives me

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