ed acquifitions of the vulgar. The truth of thefe remarks is now fo univerfally admitted, and is indeed fo obvious in itself, that it would be fuperflu ous to multiply words in fupporting them; and I fhould fcarcely have thought of ftating them in this Chapter, if fome of the most celebrated philofophers of antiquity had not been led to difpute them, in confequence of the mistaken opinions which they entertained concerning the nature of univerfals. Forgetting that genera and Species are mere arbitrary creations which the human mind forms, by withdrawing the attention from the dif tinguishing qualities of objects, and giving a common name to their resembling qualities, they conceived univerfals to be real exiftences, or, (as they expref fed it) to be the effences of individuals; and flattered themselves with the belief, that by directing their attention to thefe effences in the first inftance, they might be enabled to penetrate the fecrets of the univerfe, without fubmitting to the study of nature in detail. These errors, which were common to the Platonifts and the Peripatetics, and which both of them feem to have adopted from the Pythagorean fchool, contributed, perhaps, more than any thing elfe, to retard the progrefs of the ancients in phyfical knowledge. The late learned Mr. Harris is almoft the only author of the prefent age who has ventured to defend this plan of philofophifing, in oppofition to that which has been fo fuccessfully fol lowed by the difciples of lord Bacon.

"The Platonifts," fays he, "confidering science "as fomething afcertained, definite, and fteady, "would admit nothing to be its object which was vague, indefinite, and paffing. For this reafon "they excluded all individuals or objects of fenfe, "and (as Ammonius expreffes it) raifed themselves "in their contemplations from beings particular to beings univerfal, and which, from their own na

A a

ture, were eternal and definite."-" Confonant to "this was the advice of Plato, with refpect to the "progrefs of our fpeculations and inquiries, to de"fcend from thofe higher genera, which include ma

ny fubordinate species, down to the lowest rank " of fpecies, thofe which include only individuals. "But here it was his opinion, that our inquiries "fhould stop, and, as to individuals, let them whol❝ly alone; because of these there could not poffibly "be any science."*

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"Such," continues this author, "was the method "of ancient philofophy. The fashion, at prefent, appears to be fomewhat altered, and the bufinefs "of philofophers to be little else than the collecting " from every quarter, into voluminous records, an "infinite number of fenfible, particular, and uncon"nected facts, the chief effect of which is to excite "our admiration."-In another part of his works the fame author obferves, that "the mind, truly "wife, quitting the ftudy of particulars, as knowing "their multitude to be infinite and incomprehenfi"ble, turns its intellectual eye to what is general "and comprehenfive, and through generals learns to "fee, and recognife whatever exifts."+

If we abftract from these obvious errors of the ancient philofophers, with refpect to the proper order to be obferved in our inquiries, and only fuppofe them to end where the Piatonifts faid that they fhould begin the magnificent encomiums they be ftowed on the utility of thofe comprehenfive truths which form the object of science (making allowance for the obfcure and mysterious terms in which they expreffed them) can fcarcely be regarded as extravagant. It is probable that from a few accidental inftances of fuccessful investigation, they had been

* HARRIS'S Three Treatises, page 311, 312.

+Ibid. p. 227.

ftruck with the wonderful effect of general principles in increasing the intellectual power of the human mind; and, mifled by that impatience in the study of particulars which is so often connected with the consciousness of fuperior ability, they labored to per fuade themselves, that, by a life devoted to abstract meditation, fuch principles might be rendered as immediate objects of intellectual perception, as the individuals which compofe the material world are of our external fenfes. By connecting this opinion with their other doctrines concerning univerfals they were unfortunately enabled to exhibit it in fo myfterious a form, as not only to impofe on themfelves, but to perplex the understandings of all the learned in Europe, for a long fucceffion of ages.

The conclufion to which we are led by the fore going obfervations is, that the foundation of all hu man knowledge must be laid in the examination of particular objects and particular facts; and that it is only as far as our general principles are refolvable into these primary elements, that they poffefs either truth or utility. It must not, however, be under. ftood to be implied in this conclufion, that all our knowledge muft ultimately reft on our own proper experience. If this were the cafe, the progress of science, and the progress of human improvement, must have been wonderfully retarded; for, if it had been neceflary for each individual to form a claffifi cation of objects, in confequence of obfervations and abstractions of his own, and to infer from the actual examination of particular facts, the general truths on which his conduct proceeds; human affairs would at this day remain nearly in the fame ftate to which they were brought by the experience of the firft gen. eration. In fact, this is very nearly the fituation of the species in all thofe parts of the world, in which the existence of the race depends on the separate ef forts which each individual makes, in procuring for

himself the neceffaries of life; and in which, of confequence, the habits and acquirements of each individual must be the result of his own perfonal experience. In cultivated fociety, one of the first acquifitions which children make, is the ufe of language; by which means they are familiarifed, from their earliest years, to the confideration of claffes of objects, and of general truths; and before that time of life at which the favage is poffeffed of the knowledge neceffary for his own preservation, are enabled to appropriate to themselves the accumulated discoveries of ages.

Notwithstanding, however, the ftationary condition in which the race muft, of neceffity, continue, prior to the feparation of arts and profeffions; the natural difpofition of the mind to afcend from particular truths to general conclufions, could not fail to lead individuals, even in the rudeft state of fociety, to collect the refults of their experience, for their own inftruction and that of others. But, without the use of general terms, the only poffible way of communicating fuch conclufions, would be by means of fome particular example, of which the general application was ftriking and obvious. In other words, the wisdom of fuch ages will neceffarily be expreffed in the form of fables or parables, or in the ftill fimpler form of proverbial instances; and not in the scientific form of general maxims. In this way, undoubtedly, much useful instruction, both of a prudential and moral kind, might be conveyed at the fame time, it is obvious, that, while general truths continued to be expressed merely by particular exem. plifications, they would afford little or no opportunity to one generation to improve on the fpeculations of another; as no effort of the understanding could combine them together, or employ them as premifes, in order to obtain other conclufions more remote and comprehenfive. For this purpose, it is abfolute,

ly neceffary that the fcope or moral of the fable fhould be feparated entirely from its acceffory circumstances, and stated in the form of a general propofition.

From what has now been faid, it appears, how much the progress of human reason, which neceffarily accompanies the progrefs of fociety, is owing to the introduction of general terms, and to the ufe of general propofitions. In confequence of the gradual improvements which take place in language as an inftrument of thought, the claffifications both of things and facts with which the infant faculties of each fucceffive race are converfant, are more just and more comprehensive than those of their predeceffors: the discoveries which, in one age, were confined to the studious and enlightened few, becoming in the next the established creed of the learned; and in the third, forming part of the elementary principles of education. Indeed, among those who enjoy the advantages of early inftruction, fome of the moit remote and wonderful conclufions of the human intellect, are, even in infancy, as completely familiarifed to the mind, as the most obvious phenomena which the material world exhibits to their fenfes.

If these remarks be juft, they open an unbounded profpect of intellectual improvement to future ages; as they point out a provifion made by nature to facilitate and abridge, more and more, the procefs of ftudy, in proportion as the truths to be acquired increase in number. Nor is this profpect derived from theory alone. It is encouraged by the past history of all the fciences; in a more particular manner, by that of mathematics, in which the ftate of discovery, and the prevailing methods of inftruction, may, at all times be eafily compared together. In this laft obfervation I have been anticipated by a late eminent mathematician, whofe eloquent and philofophical ftatement of the argument cannot fail to carry