I have only to observe farther, that, in proportion as these profpects, with refpect to the progrefs of reafon, the diffufion of knowledge, and the confequent improvement of mankind, fhall be realised; the political hiftory of the world will be regulated by fteady and uniform caufes, and the philofopher will be enabled to form probable conjectures with refpect to the future course of human affairs.

It is justly remarked by Mr. Hume, that "what "depends on a few perfons is, in a great measure, to "be afcribed to chance, or fecret and unknown

caufes: what arifes from a great number, may of"ten be accounted for by determinate and known "caufes." "To judge by this rule," (he continues,) "the domeftic and the gradual revolutions of a state "must be a more proper object of reafoning and ob"servation, than the foreign and the violent, which

are commonly produced by fingle perfons, and are "more influenced by whim, folly, or caprice, than "by general paffions and interefts. The depreffion "of the Lords, and rife of the Commons, in Eng"land, after the ftatutes of alienation and the in"creafe of trade and induftry, are more eafily ac"counted for by general principles than the depref"fion of the Spanish, and rife of the French monar"chy, after the death of Charles the Fifth. Had "Harry the Fourth, Cardinal Richlieu, and Louis "the Fourteenth, been Spaniards; and Philip the "Second, Third and Fourth, and Charles the Sec"ond, been Frenchmen; the history of these na❝tions had been entirely reversed.”

From these principles, it would feem to be a neceffary confequence, that, in proportion as the circumstances shall operate which I have been endeavoring to illuftrate, the whole fyftem of human affairs including both the domeftic order of fociety in particular states, and the relations which exift among different communities, in confequence of war and

negociation, will be fubjected to the influence of causes which are " known and determinate." Thofe domestic affairs, which, according to Mr. Hume, are already proper fubjects of reasoning and obfervation, in confequence of their dependence on general interefts and paffions, will become fo, more and more, daily, as prejudices fhall decline, and knowledge fhall be diffused among the lower orders: while the relations among the different ftates, which have depended hitherto, in a great measure, on the "whim, folly, and caprice," of fingle perfons, will be gradually more and more regulated by the general interefts of the individals, who compofe them, and by the popular opinions of more enlightened times. Already, during the very fhort interval which has elapfed fince the publication of Mr. Hume's writings, an aftonishing change has taken place in Europe. The mysteries of courts have been laid open; the influence of fecret negociation on the relative fituation of states has declined; and the ftudies of those men whose public fpirit or ambition devotes them to the service of their country, have been diverted from the intrigues of cabinets, and the details of the diplomatic code, to the liberal and manly pursuits of political philofophy.

CHAPTER FIFTH.

OF THE ASSOCIATION OF IDEAS.

THE fubject on which I am now to enter, naturally divides itself into two Parts. The firft, relates to the influence of Affociation, in regulating the fucceffion of our thoughts; the Second, to its influence on the intellectual powers, and on the moral character, by the more intimate and indiffoluble combinations which it leads us to form in infancy and in early youth. The two inquiries, indeed run into each other; but it will contribute much to the order of our fpeculations, to keep the foregoing arrangement in view.

PART FIRST.

OF THE INFLUENCE OF ASSOCIATION IN REGULATING THE SUCCESSION OF OUR THOUGHTS.

SECTION I.

General Obfervations on this Part of our Conftitution, and on the Language of Philofophers with respect to it.

THAT one thought is often fuggefted to the mind by another; and that the fight of an external object often recals former occurrences, and revives former feelings, are facts which are perfectly familiar, even to those who are the leaft difpofed to fpeculate concerning the principles of their nature. In paffing along a road which we have formerly travelled in the company of a friend, the particulars of the con

versation in which we were then engaged, are frequently fuggefted to us by the objects we meet with. In fuch a fcene, we recollect that a particular fubject was started; and, in paffing different houses, and plantations, and rivers, the arguments we were dif cuffing when we laft faw them, recur fpontaneoufly to the memory. The connection which is formed in the mind between the words of a language and the ideas they denote; the connection which is formed between the different words of a difcourfe we have committed to memory; the connection between the different notes of a piece of mufic in the mind of the musician, are all obvious inftances of the fame general law of our nature.

The influence of perceptible objects in reviving former thoughts and former feelings, is more particularly remarkable. After time has, in fome degree, reconciled us to the death of a friend, how wonderfully are we affected the first time we enter the house where he lived! Every thing we fee; the apartment where he ftudied; the chair upon which he fat, recal to us the happiness we have enjoyed together; and we should feel it a fort of violation of that refpect we owe to his memory, to engage in any light or indifferent difcourfe when fuch objects are before us. In the cafe, too, of those remarkable fcenes which intereft the curiofity, from the memorable perfons or transactions which we have been accuftomed to connect with them in the course of our ftudies, the fancy is more awakened by the actual perception of the scene itself, than by the mere conception or imagination of it. Hence the pleasure we enjoy in vifiting claffical ground; in beholding the retreats which infpired the genius of our favorite authors, or the fields which have been dignified by exertions of heroic virtue. How feeble are the emotions produced by the livelieft conception of

modern Italy, to what the poet felt, when, amidst the ruins of Rome,

"He drew th' inspiring breath of antient arts,

And trod the sacred walks

"Where, at each step, imagination burns !"*

The well-known effect of a particular tune on Swifs regiments when at a diftance from home, furnishes a very ftriking illuftration of the peculiar power of a perception, or of an impreffion on the fenfes, to awaken affociated thoughts and feelings; and numberless facts of a fimilar nature must have occurred to every person of moderate sensibility, in the course of his own experience.

"Whilst we were at dinner," (fays Captain King,) in this miferable hut, on the banks of the river "Awatska; the guests of a people with whose exift"ence we had before been scarce acquainted, and "at the extremity of the habitable globe; a folitary, "half-worn pewter fpoon, whofe fhape was familiar

to us, attracted our attention; and, on examina❝tion, we found it ftamped on the back with the "word London. I cannot pafs over this circumftance "in filence, out of gratitude for the many pleasant "thoughts, the anxious hopes, and tender remem"brances, it excited in us. Those who have expeerienced the effects that long abfence, and extreme sdiftance from their native country, produce on the "mind, will readily conceive the pleasure such a trifling incident can give."

The difference between the effect of a perception and an idea, in awakening affociated thoughts and feelings, is finely defcribed in the introduction to the fifth book De finibus.

"We agreed," (fays Cicero,) "that we should take our afternoon's walk in the academy, as at

Quacunque ingredimur," (says Cicero, speaking of Athens, in aliquam historiam vestigium ponimus."