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"that time of the day it was a place where there was "no refort of company. Accordingly, at the hour appointed, we went to Pifo's. We paffed the "time in converfing on different matters during our fhort walk from the double gate, till we came to "the academy, that justly celebrated fpot; which, " as we wished, we found a perfect folitude." 66 I "know not," (faid Pifo,)" whether it be a natural "feeling, or an illufion of the imagination founded "on habit, that we are more powerfully affected by "the fight of thofe places which have been much "frequented by illuftrious men, than when we either "liften to the recital, or read the detail, of their great "actions. At this moment, I feel strongly the emo"tion which I fpeak of. I fee before me, the per"fect form of Plato, who was wont to dispute in "this very place: these gardens not only recal him "to my memory, but prefent his very perfon to my "fenfes, I fancy to myself, that here ftood Speufip

pus; there Xenocrates, and here, on this bench, "fat his difciple Polemo. To me, our antient fenate"houfe feems peopled with the like vifionary Forms; "for, often, when I enter it, the fhades of Scipio, of "Cato, and of Lælius, and, in particular, of my ven"erable grandfather, rife to my imagination. In "fhort, fuch is the effect of local fituation in recall

ing affociated ideas to the mind, that it is not "without reason, some philofophers have founded "on this principle a fpecies of artificial memory."

This influence of perceptible objects, in awakening affociated thoughts and affociated feelings, feems to arife, in a great meafure, from their permanent operation as exciting or fuggefting caufes. When a train of thought takes its rife from an idea or conception, the firft idea foon disappears, and a series of others fucceeds, which are gradually lefs and less related to that with which the train commenced; but, in the cafe of perception, the exciting caufe re

mains fteadily before us; and all the thoughts and feelings which have any relation to it, crowd into the mind in rapid fucceffion; ftrengthening each other's effects, and all confpiring in the fame general impreffion.

I already obferved, that the connections which exift among our thoughts, have been long familiarly known to the vulgar, as well as to philofophers. It is, indeed, only of late, that we have been poffeffed of an appropriated phrase to exprefs them; but that the general fact is not a recent discovery, may be inferred from many of the common maxims of prudence and of propriety, which have plainly been fuggested by an attention to this part of our conftitution. When we lay it down, for example, as a general rule, to avoid in converfation all expreffions, and all topics of difcourfe, which have any relation, however remote, to ideas of an unpleasant nature, we plainly proceed on the fuppofition that there are certain connections among our thoughts, which have an influence over the order of their fucceffion. It is unneceffary to remark, how much of the comfort and good-humor of focial life depends on an attention to this confideration. Such attentions are more particularly effential in our intercourfe with men of the world; for the commerce of fociety has a wonderful effect in increafing the quickness and the facility with which we affociate all ideas which have any reference to life and manners; and, of

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* The superiority which the man of the world possesses over the recluse student, in his knowledge of mankind, is partly the result of this quickness and facility of association. Those trifling circumstances in conversation and beliavior, which, to the latter, convey only their most obvious and avowed meaning, lay open to the former, many of the trains of thought which are connected with them, and frequently give him a distinct view of a character, on that very side where it is supposed to be most concealed from his observation.

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confequence, it must render the fenfibility alive to many circumftances which, from the remotenefs of their relation to the fituation and hiftory of the parties, would otherwise have paffed unnoticed.

When an idea, however, is thus fuggefted by affociation, it produces a flighter impreffion, ot, at least, it produces its impreffion more gradually, than if it were prefented more directly and immediately to the mind. And hence, when we are under the neceffity of communicating any difagreeable information to another, delicacy leads us, inftead of mentioning the thing itself, to mention fomething else from which our meaning may be understood. In this manner, we prepare our hearers for the unwelcome intelligence.

The distinction between grofs and delicate flattery, is founded upon the fame principle. As nothing is more offenfive than flattery which is direct and pointed, praise is confidered as happy and elegant, in proportion to the flightness of the affociations by which it is conveyed.

To this tendency which one thought has to introduce another, philofophers have given the name of the Affociation of ideas; and, as I would not with, excepting in a cafe of neceffity, to depart from common language, or to expofe myfelf to the charge of delivering old doctrines in a new form, I fhall continue to make use of the fame expreffion. I am fenfible, indeed, that the expreffion is by no means unexceptionable; and that, if it be used (as it frequently has been) to comprehend those laws by which the fucceffion of all our thoughts and of all our mental op erations is regulated, the word idea muft be underftood in a fenfe much more extensive than it is commonly employed in. It is very juftly remarked by Dr. Reid, that memory, judgment, reafoning, "paffions, affections, and purposes; in a word, every operation of the mind, excepting those of fense, is

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"excited occafionally in the train of our thoughts: "so that, if we make the train of our thoughts to be "only a train of ideas, the word idea must be under"ftood to denote all thefe operations." In continuing, therefore, to employ, upon this fubject, that language, which has been confecrated by the practice of our best philofophical writers in England, I would not be understood to difpute the advantages which might be derived from the introduction of a new phrase, more precife and more applicable to the fact.

The ingenious author whom I last quoted, feems to think that the affociation of ideas has no claim to be confidered as an original principle, or as an ultimate fact in our nature. "I believe," (fays he,) "that "the original principles of the mind, of which we "can give no account, but that fuch is our conftitu❝tion, are more in number than is commonly "thought. But we ought not to multiply them without neceffity. That trains of thinking, which, by frequent repetition, have become familiar, fhould fpontaneously offer themselves to our fancy, "feems to require no other original quality but the "power of habit."

With this obfervation I cannot agree; because I think it more philofophical to refolve the power of habit into the affociation of ideas, than to refolve the affociation of ideas into habit.

The word habit, in the fenfe in which it is commonly employed, expreffes that facility which the mind acquires, in all its exertions, both animal and intellectual, in confequence of practice. We apply it to the dexterity of the workman; to the extemporary fluency of the orator; to the rapidity of the arithmetical accountant. That this facility is the effect of practice, we know from experience to be a fact: but it does not seem to be an ultimate fact, nor incapable of analysis.

In the Effay on Attention, I fhewed that the effects of practice are produced partly on the body, and partly on the mind. The muscles which we employ in mechanical operations, become ftronger, and become more obedient to the will. This is a fact, of which it is probable that philosophy will never be able to give any explanation.

But even in mechanical operations, the effects of practice are produced partly on the mind; and, as far as this is the case, they are refolvable into what philofophers call, the affociation of ideas; or into that general fact, which Dr. Reid himself has ftated, "that

trains of thinking, which, by frequent repetition, "have become familiar, fpontaneoufly offer them"felves to the mind." In the cafe of habits which are purely intellectual, the effects of practice refolve themselves completely into this principle: and it appears to me more precife and more fatisfactory, to ftate the principle itself as a law of our conftitution, than to flur it over under the concife appellation of habit, which we apply in common to mind and to body.

The tendency in the human mind to affociate or connect its thoughts together, is fometimes called (but very improperly) the imagination. - Between thefe two parts of our conftitution, there is indeed a very intimate relation; and it is probably owing to this relation, that they have been fo generally confounded under the fame name. When the mind is Occupied about abfent objects of fenfe, (which, I believe, it is habitually in the great majority of mankind,) its train of thought is merely a series of conceptions; or, in common language, of imaginations.* In the cafe, too, of poetical imagination, it is the af

* Accordingly, Hobbes calls the train of thought in the mind, "Consequentia sive series imaginationum." "Per seriem imagi"nationum intelligo successionem unius cogitationis ad aliam."— LEVIATHAN, cap. iii.