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fociation of ideas that fupplies the materials out of which its combinations are formed; and when fuch an imaginary combination is become familiar to the mind, it is the affociation of ideas that connects its different parts together, and unites them into one whole. The affociation of ideas, therefore, although perfectly diftinct from the power of imagination, is immediately and effentially fubfervient to all its exertions.

The laft obfervation feems to me to point out, alfo, the circumstance which has led the greater part of English writers, to use the words Imagination and Fancy as fynonymous. It is obvious that a creative imagination, when a perfon poffeffes it fo habitually that it may be regarded as forming one of the characteristics of his genius, implies a power of fummoning up, at pleasure, a particular clafs of ideas; and of ideas related to each other in a particular manner; which power can be the refult only, of certain habits of affociation, which the individual has acquired. It is to this power of the mind, which is evidently a particular turn of thought, and not one of the common principles of our nature, that our best writers (fo for as I am able to judge) refer, in general, when they make ufe of the word fancy: Ifay, in general; for in difquifitions of this fort, in which the beft writers are feldom precife and fteady in the employment of words, it is only to their prevailing practice that we can appeal as an authority. What the particular relations are, by which thofe ideas are connected that are fubfervient to poetical imagination, I fhall not enquire at prefent. I think they are chiefly those of refemblance and analogy. But whatever they may be, the power of fummoning up at pleasure the ideas fo related, as it is the ground-work of poetical genius, is of fufficient importance in the human conftitution to deferve an appropriated name; and, for this

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purpose, the word fancy would appear to be the most convenient that our language affords.

Dr. Reid has fomewhere observed, that "the part "of our conftitution on which the aflociation of ideas depends, was called, by the older English ❝ writers, fantafy or fancy;" an ufe of the word, we may remark, which coincides, in many inftances, with that which I propose to make of it. It differs fromit only inthis, that these writers applied it to the affociation of ideas in general, whereas I reftrict its application to that habit of afsociation, which is subfervient to poetical imagination.

According to the explanation, which has now been given of the word Fancy, the office of this power is to collect materials for the Imagination; and therefore the latter power prefuppofes the former, while the former does not neceffarily fuppofe the latter. A man whofe habits of affociation present to him, for illuftrating or embellishing a subject, a num ber of refembling or of analogous ideas, we call a man of fancy; but for an effort of imagination, various other powers are neceffary, particularly the powers of tafle and of judgment; without which, we can hope to produce nothing that will be a fource of pleasure to others. It is the power of fancy which fupplies the poet with metaphorical language, and with all the analogies which are the foundation of his allufions; but it is the power of imagination thạt creates the complex fcenes he describes, and the fictitious characters he delineates. To fancy, we apply the epithets of rich or luxuriant ; to imagination, thofe of beautiful or fublime.

SECTION II.

Of the principles of affociation among our ideas.

THE facts which I stated in the former section, to illuftrate the tendency of a perception, or of an idea, to fuggeft ideas related to it, are fo obvious as to be matter of common remark. But the relations which connect all our thoughts together, and the laws which regulate their fucceffion, were but little attended to before the publication of Mr. Hume's writings.

It is well known to those who are in the leaft converfant with the prefent ftate of metaphyfical science, that this eminent writer has attempted to reduce all the principles of affociation among our ideas to three Refemblance, Contiguity in time and place, and Cause and Effect. The attempt was great, and worthy of his genius; but it has been fhewn by feveral writers fince his time,* that his enumeration is not only incomplete, but that it is even indistinct, fo far as it goes.

* See in particular, Lord Kaimes's Elements of Criticism, and Dr. Gerard's Essay on Genius. See also Dr. Campbell's Philosophy of Rhetoric, vol. i. p. 197.

It is observed by Dr. Beattie, that something like an attempt to enumerate the laws of association is to be found in Aristotle; who, in speaking of Recollection, insinuates, with his usual brevity, that" the relations, by which we are led from one thought to an"other, in tracing out, or hunting after," (as he calls it,) "any particular thought which does not immediately occur, are chiefly "three; Resemblance, Contrariety, and Contiguity."

See Dissertations, Moral and Critical, p. 9. Also P. 145.

The passage to which Dr. Beattie refers, is as follows: Όταν ἓν αναμιμνησκωμένα, κινέμεθα των προτέρων τινα κινήσεων, έως και κινηθώμεν, μεθ' ην εκείνη ειωθε. Διο και το εφεξής θηρευομεν νοήσαντες απο τα νυν, η αλλε τινος, και αφ' όμοια, η εναντις, η τε συνεγγυς. Στο γίνεται η ανάμνησις.

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ARISTOT. de Memor. et Reminisc. vol. i. p. 681. Edit. Du VAL.

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It is not neceffary for my prefent purpose, that I fhould enter into a critical examination of this part of Mr. Hume's fyftem; or that I should attempt to specify thofe principles of affociation which he has omitted. Indeed it does not feem to me, that the problem admits of a fatisfactory folution; for there is no poffible relation among the objects of our knowledge, which may not ferve to connect them together in the mind; and, therefore, although one énumeration may be more comprehenfive than another, a perfectly complete enumeration is fcarcely to be expected.

Nor is it merely in confequence of the relations among things, that our notions of them are affo ciated they are frequently coupled together by means of relations among the words which denote them; fuch as a fimilarity of found, or other cir cumstances still more trifling. The alliteration which is fo common in poetry, and in proverbial fayings, feems to arise, partly at least, from affociations of ideas founded on the accidental circumftance, of the two words which exprefs them beginning with the fame letter.

"But thousands die, without or this or that,
"Die; and endow a College, or a Cat.”

Pope's Ep. to Lord BATHURST.

"Ward tried, on Puppies, and the poor, his drop."

Id. Imitat. of HORACE.

"Puffs, powders, patches; Bibles, billets doux."

RAPE of the Lock.

This indeed pleases only on flight occafions, when it may be supposed that the mind is in fome degree playful, and under the influence of thofe principles of affociation which commonly take place when we are careless and difengaged. Every perfon must be offended with the fecond line of the following couplet,

which forms part of a very fublime description of

the Divine power:

"Breathes in our soul, informs our mortal part, "As full, as perfect, in a Hair as Heart."

ESSAY ON MAN, Ep. i.

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To these observations, it may be added, that things which have no known relation to each other are often affociated, in confequence of their producing fimilar effects on the mind. Some of the finest etical allufions are founded on this principle; and occordingly,if the reader is not poffeffed of fenfibility congenial to that of the poet, he will be apt to overlook their meaning, or to cenfure them as abfurd. To fuch a critic it would not be eafy to vindicate the beauty of the following ftanza, in an Ode addreffed to a Lady by the Author of the Seafons.

Oh thou, whose tender, serious eye
Expressive speaks the soul I love ;
The gentle azure of the sky,

The pensive shadows of the grove.

I have already faid, that the view of the subject which I propose to take, does not require a complete enumeration of our principles of affociation. There is, however, an important diftinction among them, to which I fhall have occafion frequently to refer ; and which, as far as I know, has not hitherto attracted the notice of philofophers. The relatione upon which fome of them are founded, are perfectly obvious to the mind; thofe which are the founda tion of others, are discovered only in confequence of particular efforts of attention. Of the former kind, are the relations of Refemblance and Analogy, of Contrariety, of Vicinity in time and place, and those which arise from accidental coincidences in the found of different words. Thefe, in general, connect our thoughts together, when they are fuffered to take

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