fequence of our bringing to view the lefs obvious relations among our ideas, we frequently divert the current of our thoughts into a new channel. If, for example, when I am indolent and inactive, the name of Sir Ifaac Newton accidentally occur to me, it will perhaps fuggeft, one after another, the names of fome other eminent mathematicians and astronomers, or of fome of his illuftrious contemporaries and friends and a number of them may pass in review before me, without engaging my curiofity in any confiderable degree. In a different state of mind, the name of Newton will lead my thoughts to the principal incidents of his life, and the more striking features of his character: or, if my mind be ardent and vigorous, will lead my attention to the fublime discoveries he made; and gradually engage me in fome philofophical investigation. To every object, there are others which bear obvious and striking relations; and others, alfo, whose relation to it does not readily occur to us, unlefs we dwell upon it for fome time, and place it before us in different points of view.

But the principal power we poffefs over the train of our ideas, is founded on the influence which our habits of thinking have on the laws of Affociation; an influence which is fo great, that we may often form a pretty fhrewd judgment concerning a man's prevailing turn of thought, from the tranfitions he makes in converfation or in writing. It is well known, too, that by means of habit, a particular affociating principle may be ftrengthened to fuch a degree, as to give us a command of all the different ideas in our mind, which have a certain relation to each other; fo that when any one of the clafs occurs to us we have almost a certainty that it will fuggeft the reft. What confidence in his own powers must a fpeaker poffefs, when he rifes without premeditation, in a popular affembly, to amufe his audience with a

lively or an humorous fpeech! Such a confidence, it is evident, can only arife from a long experience of the ftrength of particular affociating principles.

To how great a degree this part of our conftitu tion may be influenced by habit, appears from facts which are familiar to every one. A man who has an ambition to become a punster, feldom or never fails in the attainment of his object; that is, he feldom or never fails in acquiring a power which other men have not, of fummoning up, on a particular occasion, a number of words different from each other in meaning, & refembling each other, more or lefs, in found. I am inclined to think that even genuine wit is a habit acquired in a fimilar way; and that, although fome individuals may, from natural conftitution, be more fitted than others to acquire this habit; it is founded in every cafe on a peculiarly ftrong affociation among certain claffes of our ideas, which gives the perfon who poffeffes it, a command over those ideas which is denied to ordinary men. But there is no inftance in which the effect of habits of affociation is more remarkable, than in those men who poffefs a facility of rhyming. That a man fhould be able to exprefs his thoughts perfpicuously and elegantly, under the restraints which rhyme impofes, would ap pear to be incredible, if we did not know it to be fact. Such a power implies a wonderful command both of ideas and of expreffons; and yet daily experience fhews, that it may be gained with very little practice. Pope tells us with refpect to himself, that he could exprefs himself not only more concisely, but more easily, in rhyme than in profe.*

* "When habit is once gained, nothing so easy as practice. "Cicero writes, that, Antipater the Sidonian could pour forth " hexameters extempore; and that, whenever he chose to versify," "words followed him of course. We may add to Antipater, the "antient rhapsodists of the Greeks, and the modern improvisatori "of the Italians.” HARRIS'S Phil. Inq. 109, 110.

Nor is it only in thefe trifling accomplishments that we may trace the influence of habits of affociation. In every inftance of invention, either in the fine arts, in the mechanical arts, or in the sciences, there is fome new idea, or fome new combination of ideas, brought to light by the inventor. This, undoubtedly, may often happen in a way which he is unable to explain; that is, his invention may be fuggefted to him by fome lucky thought, the origin of which he is unable to trace. But when a man poffeffes an habitual fertility of invention in any particular art or science, and can rely, with confidence, on his inventive powers, whenever he is called upon to exert them, he must have acquired, by previous habits of study, a command over certain claffes of his ideas, which enables him, at pleasure, to bring them under his review. The illuftration of these fubjects may throw light on fome proceffes of the mind, which are not in general well understood: and I fhall, accordingly, in the following Section, of fer a few hints with refpect to thofe habits of affociation which are the foundation of wit; of the power of rhyming; of poetical fancy; and of invention in matters of fcience.

SECTION IV.

Illuftrations of the Doctrine ftated in the preceding Section.

I. Of Wit.

ACCORDING to Locke, Wit confifts" in the હે affemblage of ideas; and putting those together "with quickness and variety, wherein can be found any refemblance or congruity."* I would add to

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* Essay on Human Understanding, book ii, chap. H.

K K

this definition, (rather by way of explanation than amendment,) that Wit implies a power of calling up at pleasure the ideas which it combines and I am inclined to believe, that the entertainment which it gives to the hearer, is founded, in a confiderable degree, on his furprise, at the command which the man of wit has acquired over a part of the conftitution, which is fo little fubject to the will.

That the effect of wit depends partly, at least, on the circumftance now mentioned, appears evidently from this, that we are more pleased with a bon mot, which occurs in converfation, than with one in print; and that we never fail to receive disgust from wit, when we fufpect it to be premeditated. The pleafure, too, we receive from wit, is heightened, when the original idea is started by one person, and the rélated idea by another. Dr. Campbell has remarked, that "a witty repartee is infinitely more pleafing, "than a witty attack; and that an allufion will ap

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pear excellent when thrown out extempore in con"verfation, which would be deemed execrable in "print." In all these cafes, the wit confidered abfolutely is the fame. The relations which are discov ered between the compared ideas are equally new: and yet, as foon as we fufpect that the wit was premeditated, the pleasure we receive from it is infinitely diminished. Inftances indeed may be mentioned, in which we are pleased with contemplating an unexpected relation between ideas, without any reference to the habits of affociation in the mind of the perfon who discovered it. A bon mot produced at the game of cross-purposes, would not fail to create amusement; but in fuch cafes, our pleasure seems chiefly to arife from the furprise we feel at fo extraordinary a coincidence between a queftion and an anfwer coming from perfons who had no direct communication with each other.

Of the effect added to wit by the promptitude

with which its combinations are formed, Fuller appears to have had a very juft idea, from what he has recorded of the focial hours of our two great Englifh Dramatifts. "Johnson's parts were not fo rea"dy to run of themselves, as able to answer the spur; fo that it may be truly faid of him, that he had an elaborate wit, wrought out by his own induftry."Many were the wit-combats between him and "Shakespeare, which two I behold like a Spanish "great galleon, and an Englifh man of war.

John

"fon (like the former) was built far higher in learn"ing; folid, but flow in his performances. Shake"fpeare, with the English man of war, leffer in bulk, "but lighter in failing, could turn with all tides, tack "about and take advantage of all winds, by the quickness of his wit and invention."*

I before obferved, that the pleasure we receive from wit is increased, when the two ideas between which the relation is discovered, are fuggufted by different perfons. In the cafe of a bon mot occurring in converfation, the reason of this is abundantly obvious; because, when the related ideas are fuggefted by different perfons, we have a proof that the wit was not premeditated. But even in a written compofition, we are much more delighted when the fubject was furnished to the author by another perfon, than when he chufes the topic on which he is to difplay his wit. How much would the pleafure we receive from the Key to the Lock be diminished, if we fufpected that the author had the key in view when he wrote that poem; and that he introduced fome expreffions, in order to furnish a subject for the wit of the commentator? How totally would it destroy the pleasure we receive from a parody on a poem, if we fufpected that both were productions of the fame author? The truth feems to be, that

History of the Worthies of England. London, 1662.