profeffional eminence, the acquifition of them will amply repay any lofs we may fuftain. It ought not to be the leading object of any one, to become an eminent metaphyfician, mathematician, or poet; but to render himself happy as an individual, and an agreeable, a refpectable, and an useful member of fociety. A man who lofes his fight, improves the fenfibility of his touch; but who would confent, for fuch a recompence, to part with the pleasures which he receives from the eye?

It is almost unneceffary for me to remark, how much individuals would be affifted in the proper and liberal culture of the mind, if they were previously led to take a comprehensive survey of human nature in all its parts; of its various faculties, and powers and fources of enjoyment; and of the effects which are produced on these principles by particular fituations. It is fuch a knowledge alone of the capacities of the mind, that can enable a perfon to judge of his own acquifitions; and to employ the most effectual means for fupplying his defects, and removing his inconvenient habits. Without fome degree of it, every man is in danger of contracting bad habits, before he is aware; and of fuffering fome of his powers to go to decay, for want of proper exercife.

If the bufinefs of early education were more thoroughly, and more generally, understood, it would be lefs neceffary for individuals, when they arrive at maturity, to form plans of improvement for themfelves. But education never can be fyftematically directed to its proper objects, till we have obtained, not only an accurate analyfis of the general principles of our nature, and an account of the most important laws which regulate their operation; but an explanation of the various modifications and combinations of thefe principles, which produce that diverfity of talents, genius, and character, we obferve among men. To inftruct youth in the languages,

and in the sciences, is comparatively of little importance, if we are inattentive to the habits they acquire; and are not careful in giving, to all their different faculties, and all their different principles of action, a proper degree of employment. Abftracting entirely from the culture of their moral powers, how extenfive and difficult is the business of conducting their intellectual improvement! To watch. over the affociations which they form in their tender years; to give them early habits of mental activity; to rouse their curiofity, and to direct it to proper objects; to exercise their ingenuity and invention; to cultivate in their minds a turn for fpeculation, and at the fame time preferve their attention alive to the objects around them; to awaken their fenfibilities to the beauties of nature, and to inspire them with a relish for intellectual enjoyment; these form but a part of the business of education; and yet the execution even of this part requires an acquaintance with the general principles of our nature, which feldom falls to the fhare of those to whom the inftruction of youth is commonly intrusted.Nor will fuch a theoretical knowledge of the human mind, as I have now described, be always fufficient in practice. An uncommon degree of fagacity is frequently requifite, in order to accommodate general rules to particular tempers, and characters.-In whatever way we chufe to account for it, whether by original organization, or by the operation of mor al causes, in very early infancy; no fact can be more undeniable, than that there are important differences difcernible in the minds of children, previous to that period at which, in general, their intellectual educa tion commences. There is, too, a certain hereditary character (whether refulting from phyfical conftitution, or caught from imitation and the influence of fituation,) which appears remarkably in particular families. One race, for a fucceffion of generations,

is diftinguished by a genius for the abstract sciences, while it is deficient in vivacity, in imagination, and in taste: another is no lefs diftinguished for wit, and gaiety, and fancy; while it appears incapable of patient attention, or of profound refearch. The fyftem of education which is proper to be adopted in particular cafes, ought, undoubtedly, to have fome reference to these circumstances; and to be calculated, as much as poffible, to develope and to cherish thofe intellectual and active principles, in which a natural deficiency is moft to be apprehended. Montesquieu, and other fpeculative politicians, have infifted much on the reference which education and laws fhould have to climate. I fhall not take upon me to fay, how far their conclufions on this fubject are juft; but I am fully perfuaded, that there is a foundation in philofophy, and good fenfe, for accommodating, at a very early period of life, the ed ucation of individuals to thofe particular turns of mind, to which, from hereditary propenfities, or from moral fituation, they may be prefumed to have a natural tendency.

There are few fubjects more hackneyed than that of education; and yet there is none, upon which the opinions of the world are ftill more divided. Nor is this furprifing; for moft of those who have fpeculated concerning it, have confined their attention chiefly to incidental questions about the comparative advantages of public or private inftruction, or the utility of particular languages or fciences; without attempting a previous examination of those faculties and principles of the mind, which it is the great object of education to improve. Many excellent detached obfervations, indeed, both on the intellectual and moral powers, are to be collected from the writings of ancient and modern authors; but I do not know, that in any language an attempt has been made to analyse and illustrate the principles of

human nature, in order to lay a philofophical foundation for their proper culture.

I have even heard fome very ingenious and intelligent men difpute the propriety of fo fyftematical a plan of inftruction. The moft fuccefstul and fplendid exertions, both in the sciences and arts, (it has been frequently remarked,) have been made by individuals, in whofe minds the feeds of genius were allowed to fhoot up, wild and free; while, from the most careful and fkilful tuition, feldom any thing refults above mediocrity. I fhall not, at prefent, enter into any difcuffions with refpect to the certainty of the fact on which this opinion is founded. Suppofing the fact to be completely established, it muft ftill be remembered, that originality of genius does not always imply vigor and comprehenfivenefs, and liberality of mind; and that it is defirable only, in fo far as it is compatible with thefe more valuable qualities. I already hinted, that there are fome pursuits, in which, as they require the exertion only of a small number of our faculties, an individual, who has a natural turn for them, will be more likely to distinguish himself, by being fuffered to follow his original bias, than if his attention were dif tracted by a more liberal course of study. But wherever fuch men are to be found, they must be confidered, on the most favorable fuppofition, as having facrificed, to a certain degree, the perfection and the happiness of their nature, to the amufement or inftruction of others. It is too, in times of general darkness and barbarifm, that what is commonly called originality of genius most frequently appears and furely the great aim of an enlightened and benevolent philofophy, is not to rear a small number of individuals, who may be regarded as prodigies in an ignorant and admiring age, but to diffufe, as widely as poffible, that degree of cultivation which may enable the bulk of a people to pof

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fefs all the intellectual and moral improvement of which their nature is fufceptible. Original gen ius" (fays Voltaire)" occurs but feldom in a nation "where the literary taste is formed. The number "of cultivated minds which there abound, like the "trees in a thick and flourishing foreft, prevent any fingle individual from rearing his head far above the

"reft.

Where trade is in few hands, we meet with "a fmall number of over-grown fortunes in the "midst of a general poverty: in proportion as it "extends, opulence becomes general, and great for"tunes rare. It is, precifely, because there is at prefent much light, and much cultivation, in "France, that we are led to complain of the want "of fuperior genius."

To what purpose, indeed, it may be faid, all this labor? Is not the importance of every thing to man, to be ultimately eftimated by its tendency to promote his happiness? And is not our daily experience fufficient to convince us, that this is, in general, by no means proportioned to the culture which his nature has received?-Nay, is there not fome ground for fufpecting, that the lower orders of men enjoy, on the whole, a more enviable condition, than their more enlightened and refined fuperiors?

The truth, I apprehend, is, that happiness, in fo far as it arifes from the mind itself, will be always proportioned to the degree of perfection which its powers have attained; but that, in cultivating these powers, with a view to this moft important of all objects, it is effentially neceffary that fuch a degree of attention be bestowed on all of them, as may preferve them in that ftate of relative ftrength, which appears to be agreeable to the intentions of nature. In confequence of an exclufive attention to the culture of the imagination, the taste, the reafoning faculty, or any of the active principles, it is poffible that the pleasures of human life may be diminished, or