its pains increased; but the inconvenienees which are experienced in fuch cafes, are not to be ascribed to education, but to a partial and injudicious education. In fuch cafes, it is poffible, that the poet, the metaphyfician, or the man of tafte and refinement, may appear to disadvantage, when compared with the vulgar; for fuch is the benevolent appointment of Providence with refpect to the lower orders, that although not one principle of their nature be completely unfolded, the whole of these principles preferve among themselves, that balance which is favorable to the tranquillity of their minds and to a prudent and steady conduct in the limited sphere which is affigned to them, far more completely, than in those of their fuperiors, whofe education has been conducted on an erroneous or imperfect fyftem : but all this, far from weakening the force of the foregoing obfervations, only ferves to demonftrate how impoffible it always will be, to form a rational plan for the improvement of the mind, without an accurate and comprehenfive knowledge of the principles of the human conftitution.

The remarks which have been already made, are fufficient to illuftrate the dangerous confequences which are likely to refult from a partial and injudicious cultivation of the mind; and, at the fame time, to point out the utility of the intellectual philofophy, in enabling us to preferve a proper balance among all its various faculties, principles of action, and capacities of enjoyment. Many additional obfervations might be offered, on the tendency which an accurate analysis of its powers night probably have, to fuggeft rules for their farther improvement, and for a more fuccefsful application of them to their proper purposes: but this fubject I fhall not profecute at prefent, as the illuftration of it is one of the leading objects of the following work.-That the memory, the imagination, or the reafonig faculty, E

are to be instantly ftrengthened in confequence of our fpeculations concerning their nature, it would be abfurd to fuppofe; but it is furely far from being unreasonable to think, that an acquaintance with the laws which regulate these powers, may fuggeft some useful rules for their gradual cultivation; for remedying their defects, in the case of individuals, and even for extending those limits, which nature feems, at first view, to have affigned them.

To how great a degree of perfection the intellectual and moral nature of man is capable of being raised by cultivation, it is difficult to conceive. The effects of early, continued, and fyftematical education, in the cafe of thofe children who are trained, for the fake of gain, to feats of ftrength and agility, justify, perhaps, the moft fanguine views which it is poffible for a philofopher to form, with respect to the improvement of the fpecies.

I now proceed to confider, how far the philofophy of mind may be useful in accomplishing the fec ond object of education; by aflifting us in the management of early impreffions and affociations.

By far the greater part of the opinions on which we act in life, are not the refult of our own inveftigations; but are adopted implicitly, in infancy and youth, upon the authority of others. Even the great principles of morality, although implanted in every heart, are commonly aided and cherifhed, at least to a certain degree, by the care of our inftructors.-All this is undoubtedly agreeable to the intentions of nature; and, indeed, were the cafe otherwife, fociety could not fubfift; for nothing can be more evident, than that the bulk of mankind, condemned as they are to laborious occupations, which are incompatible with intellectual improvement, are perfectly incapable of forming their own opinions on fome of the most important fubjects that can employ the human mind. It is ev

ident, at the fame time, that as no system of education is perfect, a variety of prejudices muft in this way, take an early hold of our belief; fo as to acquire over it an influence not inferior to that of the moft incontrovertible truths. When a child hears, either a fpeculative abfurdity, or an erroneous principle of action, recommended and enforced daily, by the fame voice which first conveyed to it those simple and sublime leffons of morality and religion which are congenial to its nature, is it to be wondered at, that, in future life, it fhould find it fo difficult to eradicate prejudices which have twined their roots with all the effential principles of the human frame?-If fuch, however, be the obvious intentions of nature, with refpect to those orders of men who are employed in bodily labor, it is equally clear, that she meant to im. pofe it as a double obligation on those who receive the advantages of a liberal education, to examine, with the moft fcrupulous care, the foundation of all thofe received opinions, which have any connexion with morality, or with human happiness. If the multitude must be led, it is of confequence, furely, that it fhould be led by enlightened conductors; by men who are able to diftinguish truth from error; and to draw the line between those prejudices which are innocent or falutary, (if indeed there are any prejudices which are really falutary,) and those which are hoftile to the interefts of virtue and of mankind.

In such a state of society as that in which we live, the prejudices of a moral, a political, and a religious nature, which we imbibe in early life, are fo various, and at the fame time fo intimately blended with the belief we entertain of the moft facred and important truths, that a great part of the life of a philofopher must neceffarily be devoted, not fo much to the ac quifition of new knowledge, as to unlearn the er rors to which he had been taught to give an impli cit affent, before the dawn of reafon and reflection.

And unless he submit in this manner to bring all his opinions to the test of a fevere examination, his ingenuity, and his learning, instead of enlightening the world, will only enable him to give an additional currency, and an additional authority, to established errors. To attempt fuch a struggle against early prejudices, is, indeed, the profeffed aim of all philofophers; but how few are to be found who have force of mind fufficient for accomplishing their object; and who, in freeing themselves from one fet of errors, do not allow themselves to be carried away with another? To fucceed in it completely, Lord Bacon feems to have thought, (in one of the most remarkable paffages of his writings,) to be more than can well be expected from human frailty."Nemo adhuc tanta mentis conftantia inventus eft, "ut decreverit, et fibi impofuerit, theorias et no❝tiones communes peuitus abolere, et intellectum

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abrafum et æquum ad particularia, de integro, ap"plicare. Itaque illa ratio humana, quam habemus, "ex multa fide, et multo etiam cafu, nec non ex puerilibus, quas primo haufimus, notionibus, far"rago quædam eft, et congeries. Quod fiquis, ætate matura, et fenfibus integris, et mente repurgata, "fe ad experientiam, et ad particularia de itegro applicet, de eo melius fperaudum eft."

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Nor is it merely in order to free the mind from the influence of error, that it is useful to examine the foundation of established opinions. It is fuch an examination alone, that, in an inquifitive age like the prefent, can fecure a philofopher from the danger of ultimated fcepticifm. To this extreme, indeed, the complexion of the times is more likely to give him a tendency, than to implicit credulity. In the former ages of ignorance and fuperftition, the intimate affociation which had been formed, in the prevailing systems of education, between truth and error, had given to the latter an afcendant over the

minds of men, which it could never have acquired, if divested of fuch an alliance. The cafe has, of late years, been moft remarkably reverfed: the common fense of mankind, in confequence of the growth of a more liberal spirit of inquiry, has revolted against many of those abfurdities, which had fo long heid human reafon in captivity; and it was, perhaps, more than could reasonably have been expected, that, in the first moments of their emancipation, philofophers fhould have stopped fhort, at the precife boundary, which cooler reflection, and more moderate views, would have prescribed. The fact is, that they have paffed far beyond it; and that, in their zeal to destroy prejudices, they have attempted to tear up by the roots, many of the beft and happiest and most effential principles of our nature. Having remarked the powerful influence of education over the mind, they have concluded, that man is wholly a factitious being; not recollecting, that this very fufceptibility of education prefuppofes certain original principles, which are common to the whole fpecies; and that, as error can only take a permanent hold of a candid mind by being grafted on truths, which it is unwilling or unable to eradicate; even the influence, which falfe and absurd opinions occasionally acquire over the belief, instead of being an argument for univerfal scepticism, is the most decifive argument against it; inasmuch as it fhews, that there are fome truths fo incorporated and identified with our nature, that they can reconcile us even to the abfurdities and contradictions with which we fuppofe them to be infeparably connected. The sceptical philofophers, for example, of the present age, have frequently attempted to hold up to ridicule, thofe contemptible and puerile fuperftitions, which have disgraced the creeds of fome of the most enlightened nations; and which have not only commanded the affent, but the reverence, of men of the moft accomplished understandings. But thefe his