miliarife his mind completely with his fituation. A capacity for fyftem and for philofophical arrange ment, unless it has been carefully cultivated in early life, is an acquifition which can fcarcely ever be made afterwards; and, therefore, the defects which I already mentioned, as connected with earl and conftant habits of business, adopted from imitation, and undirected by theory; may, when once these habits are confirmed, be pronounced to be incurable.

I am also inclined to believe, both from a theoretical view of the subject, and from my own obfervations as far as they have reached, that if we wish to fix the particulars of our knowledge very permanently in the memory, the moft effectual way of doing it, is to refer them to general principles. Ideas which are connected together merely by cafual relations, prefent themselves with readiness to the mind, fo long as we are forced by the habits of our fituation to apply them daily to use; but when a change of circumftances leads us to vary the objects of our attention, we find our old ideas gradually to efcape from the recollection: and if it fhould happen that they escape from it altogether, the only method of recovering them, is by renewing thofe ftudies by which they were at firft acquired. The cafe is very different with a man whofe ideas, prefented to him at first by accident, have been afterwards philofophically arranged and referred to general principles. When he wishes to recollect them, fome time and reflection will, frequently, be neceffary to enable him to do fo; but the information which he has once completely acquired, continues, in general, to be an acquifition for life; or if, accidentally, any ar. ticle of it fhould be loft, it may often be recovered by a process of reasoning.

Something very fimilar to this happens in the ftudy of languages. A perfon who acquires a for

eign language merely by the ear, and without any knowledge of its principles, commonly fpeaks it, while he remains in the country where it is fpoken, with more readiness and fluency, than one who has ftudied it grammatically; but in the course of a few years abfence, he finds himself almoft as ignorant of it as before he acquired it. A language of which we once understand the principles thoroughly, it is hardly poffible to lose by difufe.

A philofophical arrangement of our ides, is attended with another very important advantage. In a mind where the prevailing principles of afsociation are founded on cafual relations among the various objects of its knowledge, the thoughts must neceffarily fucceed each other in a very irregular and diforderly manner; and the occafions on which they prefent themselves, will be determined merely by accident. They will often occur, when they cannot be employed to any purpofe; and will remain. concealed from our view, when the recollection of them might be useful. They cannot therefore be confidered as under our own proper command. But in the cafe of a philofopher, how flow foever he may be in the recollection of his ideas, he knows always where he is to fearch for them, fo as to bring them all to bear on their proper object. When he wishes to avail himself of his paft experience, or of his former conclufions, the occafion, itfelf, fummons up every thought in his mind which the occafion requires. Or if he is called upon to exert his powers of invention, and of discovery, the materials of both are always at hand, and are prefented to his view with fuch a degree of connection and arrangement, as may enable him to trace, with ease, their various relations. How much invention depends upon a patient and attentive examination of our ideas, in order to discover the lefs obvious relations which fubfift

Y Y

among them, I had occasion to show, at fome length, in a former Chapter.

The remarks which have been now made, are sufficient to illuftrate the advantages which the philof opher derives in the purfuits of fcience, from that fort of fyftematical memory which his habits of arrangement give him. It may however be doubted, whether fuch habits be equally favorable to a talent for agreeable conversation; at least, for that lively, varied, and unftudied converfation, which forms the principal charm of a promiscuous fociety. The converfation which pleafes generally, muft unite the recommendations of quickness, of eafe, and of variety and in all these three refpects, that of the philofopher is apt to be deficient. It is deficient in quicknefs, becaufe his ideas are connected by relations which occur only to an attentive and collected mind. It is deficient in ease, because these relations are not the cafual and obvious ones, by which ideas are affociated in ordinary memories; but the flow discoveries of patient, and often painful, exertion. As the ideas, too, which he affociates together, are commonly of the fame clafs, or at leaft are referred to the fame general principles, he is in danger of becoming tedious, by indulging himself in long and fyftematical difcourfes; while another, poffeffed of the most inferior accomplishments, by laying his mind completely open to impreffions from without, and by accommodating continually the courfe of his own ideas, not only to the ideas which are started by his companions, but to every trifling and unexpected accident that may occur to give them a new direction, is the life and foul of every fociety into which he enters. Even the anecdotes which the philofopher has collected, however agreeable they may be in themfelves, are feldom introduced by him into converfation, with that unftudied but happy propriety, which we admire in men of the world,

whofe facts are not referred to general principles, but are fuggefted to their recollection by the familiar topics and occurrences of ordinary life. Nor is it the imputation of tedioufnefs merely, to which the fyftematical thinker must submit from common obfervers. It is but rarely poffible to explain completely, in a promifcuous fociety, all the various parts of the moft fimple theory; and as nothing appears weaker or more abfurd than a theory which is partially ftated, it frequently happens, that men of ingenuity, by attempting it, fink, in the vulgar apprehenfion, below the level of ordinary understand. ings. "Theoriarum vires" (fays Lord Bacon) “in apta et fe mutuo fuftinente, partium harmonia et "quadam in orbem demonftratione confiftunt, ide66 oque per partes traditæ infirmæ funt."

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Before leaving the fubject of Cafual Memory, it may not be improper to add, that how much foever it may difqualify for fyftematical fpeculation, there is a fpecies of loose and rambling compofition, to which it is peculiarly favorable. With fuch performances, it is often pleasant to unbend the mind in folitude, when we are more in the humor for converfation, than for connected thinking. Montaigne is unquestionably at the head of this clafs of authors. "What, indeed, are his Effays," (to adopt his own account of them,) "but grotefque pieces of patch"work, put together without any certain figure; or any order, connection, or proportion, but what is "accidental ?"*

It is, however, curious, that in confequence of the predominance in his mind of this fpecies of Memory above every other, he is forced to acknowledge his total want of that command over his ideas, which can only be founded on habits of fyftematical arrangement. As the paffage is extremely characteriftical of the author, and affords a ftriking confirma*Liv. i. chap. 27.

tion of fome of the preceding obfervations, I fhall give it in his own words. "Je ne me tiens pas bien "en ma poffeffion et difpofition: le hazard y a plus "de droit que moy: l'occafion, la compagnie, le "branle même de ma voix tire plus de mon efprit, que je n'y trouve lors que je fonde et employe à part moy. Ceci m'advient auffi, que je ne me "trouve pass ou je me cherche; et me trouve plus par rencontre, que par l'inquifition de mon juge"ment."+

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The differences which I have now pointed out between philofophical and cafual Memory, conftitute the most remarkable of all the varieties which the minds of different individuals, confidered in refpect of this faculty, prefent to our obfervation. But there are other varieties, of a lefs ftriking nature, the confideration of which may alfo fuggeft fome ufeful reflections.

It was before remarked, that our ideas are frequently affociated, in confequence of the affociations which take place among their arbitrary figns. Indred, in the cafe of all our general fpeculations, it is difficult to fee in what other way our thoughts can be affociated; for, I before endeavored to fhew, that without the ufe of figns of one kind or another, it would be impoffible for us to make claffes or genera, objects of our attention.

All the figns by which our thoughts are expreffed, are addreffed either to the eye or to the ear; and the impreffions made on these organs, at the time when we firft receive an idea, contribute to give us a firmer hold of it. Vifible objects (as I observed in the Chapter on Conception) are remembered more eafily than thofe of any of our other fenfes; and hence it is, that the bulk of mankind are more aided in their recollection by the impreffions made on the eye, than by thofe made on the ear. Every

* Liv. i. chap. 10. (Du parler prompt ou tardif.)