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have been habitually exercifed in childhood in get. ting by heart grammar rules,) have an extraordinary facility in acquiring and retaining the most barbarous and the moft infignificant verfes; which another person would find as difficult to remember, as the geographical and chronological details of which it is the object of this art to relieve the memory. Allowing, therefore, the general utility of the art, no one method, perhaps is entitled, to an exclufive preference; as one contrivance may be beft uited to the faculties of one perfon, and a very different one to those of another.

One important objection applies to all of them, that they accuftom the mind to affociate ideas by accidental aud arbitrary connexions; and, therefore, how much foever they may contribute in the course of converfation, to an oftentatious difplay of acquired knowledge, they are, perhaps, of little real fervice to us, when we are seriously engaged in the pursuit of truth. I own, too, I am very doubtful with refpect to the utility of a great part of that information which they are commonly employed to impreft on the memory, and on which the generality of learned men are difpofed to value themselves. It certainly is of no ufe, but in fo far as it is fubfervient to the gratification of their vanity; and the acquifition of it confumes a great deal of time and attention, which might have been employed in extending the boundaries of human knowledge. To thofe, however, who are of a different opinion, fuch contrivances as Mr. Grey's may be extremely useful : and to all men they may be of fervice, in fixing in the memory thofe infulated and uninterefting particulars, which it is either neceffary for them to be acquainted with, from their fituation; or which cuf tom has rendered, in the common opinion, effential branches of a liberal education. I would, in particular, recommend this author's method of recollecting

dates, by fubftituting letters for the numeral cy phers; and forming thefe letters into words, and the words into verfes. I have found it, at least in my own cafe, the most effectual of all fuch contrivan ces of which I have had experience,

SECTION VII.

Continuation of the fame Subject.-Importance of making a proper Selection among the Objects of our Knowledge, in order to derive Advantage from the Acquifitions of Memory.

THE cultivation of Memory, with all the helps that we can derive to it from art, will be of little use to us unless we make a proper selection of the particulars to be remembered. Such a felection is neceffary to enable us to profit by reading; and still more fo, to enable us to profit by obfervation, to which every man is indebted for by far the most valuable part of his knowledge.

When we first enter on any new literary purfuit, we commonly find our efforts of attention painful and unfatisfactory. We have no difcrimination in our curiofity; and by grafping at every thing, we fail in making thofe moderate acquifitions which are fuited to our limited faculties. As our knowledge extends, we learn to know what particulars are likely to be of ufe to us; and acquire a habit of directing our examination to thefe, without diftracting the attention with others. It is partly owing to a fimilar circumftance, that most readers complain of a defect of memory, when they firft enter on the ftudy of hiftory. They cannot feparate important from trifling facts, and find themfelves unable to retain any thing, from their anxiety to fecure the whole.

In order to give a proper direction to our atten

tion in the courfe of our studies, it is useful, before engaging in particular pursuits, to acquire as familiar an acquaintance as poffible with the great outlines of the different branches of fcience; with the moft important conclufions which have hitherto been formed in them, and with the most important defiderata which remain to be fupplied. In the cafe too of thofe parts of knowledge, which are not yet ripe for the formation of philofophical fyftems, it may be of use to study the various hypothetical theories which have been propofed for connecting together and arranging the phenomena. By fuch general views alone we can prevent ourselves from being loft, amidst a labyrinth of particulars, or can engage in a course of extenfive and various reading, with an enlightened and difcriminating attention. While they withdraw our notice from barren and infulated facts, they direct it to fuch as tend to illuftrate principles which have either been already established, or which, from having that degree of connection among themfelves, which is neceffary to give plaufibility to a hypothetical theory, are likely to furnish, in time, the materials of a jufter system.

Some of the followers of Lord Bacon have, I think, been led, in their zeal for the method of induction, to cenfure hypothetical theories with too great a degree of feverity. Such theories have certainly been frequently of ufe, in putting philofophers upon the road of difcovery. Indeed, it has probably been in this way, that moft difcoveries have been made; for although a knowledge of facts must be prior to the formation of a juft theory, yet a hypothetical theory is generally our beft guide to the knowledge of useful facts. If a man, without forming to himself any conjecture concerning the unknown laws of nature, were to fet himself merely to accumulate facts at random, he might, perhaps, ftumble upon fome important discovery; but by far the

greater part of his labors would be wholly useless. Every philofophical inquirer, before he begins a fet of experiments, has fome general principle in his view, which he fufpects to be a law of nature :* and although his conjectures may be often wrong, yet they serve to give his inquiries a particular direction, and to bring under his eye a number of facts which have a certain relation to each other. It has been often remarked, that the attempts to discover the philofopher's stone, and the quadrature of the circle, have led to many useful discoveries in chemistry and mathematics. And they have plainly done fo, merely by limiiting the field of obfervation and inquiry, and checking that indifcriminate and defultory attention which is fo natural to an indolent mind. A hypothetical theory, however erroneous, may anfwer a fimilar purpose. "Prudens interrogatio," (fays Lord Bacon,)" eft dimidium fcientiæ. Vaga "enim experientia et fe tantum fequens mera palpatio eft, et homines potius ftupefacit quam informat What, indeed, are Newton's queries, but fo many hypothefes which are proposed as fubjects of examination to philofophers? And did not even the great doctrine of gravitation take its firft rife from a fortunate conjecture?

While, therefore, we maintain with the followers of Bacon, that no theory is to be admitted as proved, any farther than it is fupported by facts, we should, at the fame time, acknowledge our obligations to thofe writers who hazard their conjectures to the world with modefty and diffidence. And it may not be improper to add, that men of a systematizing

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*"Recte siquidem Plato, " Qui aliquid quærit, id ipsum, quod "quærit, generali quadam notione comprehendit: aliter, qui fieri potest, ut illud, cum fuerit inventum, agnoscat?" Idcirco quo "amplior et certior fuerit anticipatio nostra ; eo magis directa et compendiosa erit investigatio."

De Aug. Scient. lib v. cap. 3.

turn are not now fo useless as formerly; for we are already poffeffed of a great ftock of facts; and there is fcarcely any theory fo bad as not to bring together a number of particulars which have a certain degree of relation or analogy to each other.

The foregoing remarks are applicable to all our various ftudies; whether they are conducted in the way of reading, or of obfervation. From neither of these two fources of information can we hope to derive much advantage, unless we have fome general principles to direct our attention to proper objects.

With refpect to obfervation, fome farther cautions may be ufeful; for in guarding against an indifcriminate accumulation of particulars, it is poffible to fall into the oppofite extreme, and to acquire a habit of inattention to the phenomena which present themfelves to our fenfes. The former is the error of men of little education; the latter is more common a. mong men of retirement and ftudy.

One of the chief effects of a liberal education, is to enable us to withdraw our attention from the prefent objects of the perceptions, and to dwell at pleasure on the past, the abfent, or the future. But when we are led to carry these efforts to an excess, either from a warm and romantic imagination, or from an anxious and fanguine temper, it is eafy to fee that the power of obfervation is likely to be weakened, and habits of inattention to be contracted.The fame effect may be produced by too early an indulgence in philofophical pursuits, before the mind has been prepared for the ftudy of general truths by exercifing its faculties among particular objects, and particular occurrences. In this way, it contracts an averfion to the examination of details, from the pleasure which it has experienced in the contemplation or in the discovery of general principles. Both of these turns of thought, however, prefuppofe a certain degree of obfervation; for the materials of