tories of human imbecility are, in truth, the ftrongeft teftimonies which can be produced, to prove, how wonderful is the influence of the fundamental principles of morality over the belief; when they are able to fanctify, in the apprehenfions of mankind, every extravagant opinion, and every unmeaning ceremony, which early education has taught us to affociate with them.

That implicit credulity is a mark of a feeble mind, will not be difputed; but it may not, perhaps, be as generally acknowledged, that the cafe is the fame with unlimited fcepticifm: on the contrary, we are fometimes apt to afcribe this difpofition to a more than ordinary vigor of intellect. Such a prejudice was by no means unnatural at that period in the hiftory of modern Europe, when reason firft began to throw off the yoke of authority; and when it unquestionably required a fuperiority of underftanding, as well as of intrepidity, for an individual to refift the contagion of prevailing fuperftition. But in the prefent age, in which the tendency of fafhionable opinions is directly oppofite to thofe of the vulgar; the philofophical creed, or the philofophical fcepticism of by far the greater number of those who value themselves on an emancipation from popular errors, arifes from the very fame weaknefs with the credulity of the multitude: nor is it going too far to fay, with Rouffeau, that "He, who, in the end " of the eighteenth century, has brought himself to "abandon all his early principles without difcrimina❝tion, would probably have been a bigot in the days of the League." In the midft of these contrary impulfes, of fashionable and of vulgar prejudices, he alone evinces the fuperiority and the strength of his mind, who is able to difentangle truth from error; and to oppofe the clear conclufions of his own unbiaffed faculties, to the united clamours of fuperftition, and of falfe philofophy. Such are the

men, whom nature marks out to be the lights of the world; to fix the wavering opinions of the multitude, and to imprefs their own characters on that of their age.

For fecuring the mind completely from the weakneffes I have now been defcribing and enabling it to maintain a steady courfe of inquiry, between implicit credulity, and unlimited fcepticism, the most important of all qualities is a fincere and devoted attachment to truth; which feldom fails to be accompanied with a manly confidence in the clear conclufions of human reafon. It is fuch a confidence, united, (as it generally is) with perfonal intrepidity, which forms what the French writers call force of character; one of the rareft endowments, it must be confessed, of our species; but which, of all endowments, is the most effential for rendering a philofopher happy in himself, and a bleffing to mankind.

There is, I think, good reason for hoping, that the sceptical tendency of the prefent age, will be only a temporary evil. While it continues, however, it is an evil of the most alarming nature; and, as it extends, in general, not only to religion and morality, but in fome measure, alfo, to politics, and the conduct of life, it is equally fatal to the comfort of the individual, and to the improvement of fociety. Even in its most inoffenfive form, when it happens to be united with a peaceable difpofition and a benevolent heart, it cannot fail to have the effect of damping every active and patriotic exertion. Convinced that truth is placed beyond the reach of human faculties; and doubtful how far the prejudices we despise may not be effential to the well-being of fociety, we refolve to abandon completely all fpeculative inquiries; and fuffering ourselves to be carried quietly along with the ftream of popular opinions, and of fashionable manners, determine to amufe ourselves, the beft way we can, with business or pleature, during our

fhort paffage through this scene of illufions. But he who thinks more favourably of the human powers, and who believes that reafon was given to man to direct him to his duty and his happiness, will defpife the fuggeftions of this timid philofophy; and while he is confcious that he is guided in his inquiries only by the love of truth, wil. rest affured that their refult will be equally favourable to his own comfort, and to the beft intereft of mankind. What, indeed, will be the particular effects in the firft inftance, of that general diffusion of knowledge, which the art of printing muft fooner or later produce; and of that spirit of reformation with which it cannot fail to be accompanied, it is beyond the reach of human fagacity to conjecture; but unless we chufe to abandon ourselves entirely to a defponding fcepticism, we must hope and believe, that the progrefs of human reafon can never be a fource of permanent disorder to the world; and that they alone have caufe to apprehend the confequences, who are led, by the imperfection of our prefent inftitutions, to feel themfelves interefled in perpetuating the prejudices, and follies, of their species.

From the obfervations which have been made, it fufficiently appears, that in order to fecure the mind on the one hand, from the influence of prejudice; and on the other, from a tendency to unlimited fcepticism; it is neceffary that it fhould be able to diftinguish the original and universal principles and laws of human nature, from the adventitious effects of local fituation. But if, in the case of an individual, who has received an imperfect or erroneous education, fuch a knowledge puts it in his power to correct, to a certain degree, his own bad habits, and to furmount his own fpeculative errors; it enables him to be useful, in a much higher degree, to thofe whofe education he has an opportunity of fuperintending from early infancy. Such, and so perma

nent, is the effect of firft impreffions, on the character, that although a philofopher may fucceed, by perfeverance, in freeing his reafon from the prejudices with which he was entangled, they will ftill retain fome hold of his imagination, and his affections: 2nd, therefore, however enlightened his understanding may be in his hours of fpeculation, his philosophical opinions will frequently lofe their influence over his mind, in those very fituations in which their practical assistance is most required :—when his temper is foured by misfortune; or when he engages in the pursuits of life, and exposes himself to the contagion of popular errors. His opinions are fupported merely by fpeculative arguments; and, inftead of being connected with any of the active principles of his nature, are counteracted and thwarted by fome of the moft powerful of them. How different would the cafe be, if education were conducted, from the beginning, with attention and judgment? Were the fan e "pains taken, to imprefs truth on the mind in early infancy, that is often taken to inculcate error, the great principles of our conduct would not only be juster than they are; but, in confequence of the aid which they would receive from the imagination and the heart, trained to confpire with them in the fame direction, they would render us happier in ourselves, and would influence our practice more powerfully and more habitually. There is furely nothing in error, which is more congenial to the mind than truth. On the contrary, when exhibited separately and alone to the understanding, it fhocks our reafon, and provokes our ridicule; and it is only, (as I had occafion already to remark,) by an alliance with truths, which we find it difficult to renounce, that it can obtain our affent, or command our reverence. What advantages, then, might be derived from a proper attention to early impreffions and affociations, in giving fupport to those principles which are con

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nected with human happinefs? The long reign of error in the world, and the influence it maintains, even in an age of liberal inquiry; far from being favourable to the fuppofition, that human reafon is deftined to be for ever the sport of prejudice and abfurdity, demonftrates the tendency which there is to permanence in established opinions, and in established inftitutions; and promifes an eternal ftability to true philofophy, when it fhall once have acquired the afcendant; and when proper means fhall be employed to fupport it, by a more perfect fyftem of education.

Let us fuppofe, for a moment, that this happy æra were arrived, and that all the prepoffeffions of childhood and youth were directed to fupport the pure and fublime truths of an enlightened morality.With what ardour, and with what tranfport, would the understanding, when arrived at maturity, proceed in the search of truth; when, instead of being obliged to ftruggle, at every step, with early prejudices, its office was merely to add the force of philofophical conviction, to impreffions, which are equally delightful to the imagination, and dear to the heart! The prepoffeffions of childhood would, through the whole of life, be gradually acquiring ftrength from the enlargement of our knowledge; and, in their turn, would fortify the conclufions of our reason, against the sceptical fuggeftions of difappointment or melancholy.

Our daily experience may convince us, how fusceptible the tender mind is of deep impreffions; and what important and permanent effects are produced on the characters, and the happiness of individuals, by the cafual affociations formed in childhood among the various ideas, feelings, and affections, with which they were habitually occupied. It is the bufinefs of education not to counteract this conftitution of nature, but to give it a proper direction: and the mifer