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I fhall have occafion afterwards to fhew,* in treating of our moral powers, that experience diminishes the influence of paffive impreffions on the mind, but ftrengthens our active principles. A course of debauchery deadens the fenfe of pleasure, but increases the defire of gratification. An immoderate use of ftrong liquors destroys the fenfibility of the palate, but ftrengthens the habit of intemperance. The enjoyments we derive from any favourite pursuit gradually decay as we advance in years and yet we continue to profecute our favorite pursuits with increafing fteadiness and vigor.

On these two laws of our nature is founded our capacity of moral improvement. In proportion as we are accustomed to obey our fenfe of duty, the influence of the temptations to vice is diminished ; while, at the fame time, our habit of virtuous conduct is confirmed. How many paffive impreffions, for inftance, muft be overcome, before the virtue of beneficence can exert itself uniformly and habitually! How many circumftances are there in the diftreffes of others, which have a tendency to alienate our hearts from them, and which prompt us to withdraw from the fight of the miferable! The impreffions we receive from these, are unfavorable to virtue: their force, however, every day diminishes, and it may perhaps, by perfeverance, be wholly deftroyed. It is thus that the character of the beneficent man is formed. The paffive impreffions which he felt originally, and which counteracted his fenfe of duty, have loft their influence, and a habit of beneficence is become part of his nature.

It must be owned, that this reafoning may, in part, be retorted; for among thofe paffive impreffions, which are weakened by repetition, there are fome

*The following reasoning was suggested to me by a passage in Butler's Analogy, which the reader will find in Note [U] at the end of the voluine.

which have a beneficial tendency. The uneafinefs, in particular, which the fight of diftrefs occafions, is a ftrong incentive to acts of humanity; and it cannot be denied that it is leffened by experience. This might naturally lead us to expect, that the young and unpractifed would be more difpofed to perform beneficent actions, than those who are advanced in life, and who have been familiar with fcenes of mifery. And, in truth, the fact would be fo, were it not that the effect of cuftom on this paffive impreffion is counteracted by its effect on others; and, above all, by its influence in strengthening the active habit of beneficence. An old and experienced phyfician is lefs affected by the fight of bodily pain, than a younger practitioner; but he has acquired a more confirmed habit of affifting the fick and helpless, and would offer greater violence to his nature, if he fhould withhold from them any relief that he has in his power to beftow. In this cafe, we fee a beautiful provision made for our moral improvement, as the effects of experience on one part of our conftitution, are made to counteract its effects on another.

If the foregoing obfervations be well founded, it will follow, that habits of virtue are not to be formed in retirement, but by mingling in the fcenes of active life, and that an habitual attention to exhibitions of fictitious distress, is not merely useless to the character, but positively hurtful.

It will not, I think, be difputed, that the frequent perufal of pathetic compofitions diminishes the uneafinefs which they are naturally fitted to excite. A perfon who indulges habitually in such studies, may feel a growing defire of his ufual gratification, but he is every day lefs and lefs affected by the fcenes which are prefented to him. I believe it would be difficult to find an actor long hackneyed on the stage, who is capable of being completely interested by the diftreffes of a tragedy. The effect of such composi

tions and representations, in rendering the mind callous to actual diftrefs, is ftill greater; for as the imagination of the Poet almost always carries him beyond truth and nature, a familiarity with the tragic scenes which he exhibits, can hardly fail to deaden the impreffion produced by the comparatively trifling fufferings which the ordinary course of human affairs prefents to us. In real life, a provision is made for this gradual decay of fenfibility, by the proportional decay of other paffive impreffions, which have an oppofite tendency, and by the additional force which our active habits are daily acquiring. Exhibitions of fictitious diftrefs while they produce the former change on the character, have no influence in producing the latter on the contrary, they tend to ftrengthen those paffive impreffions which counteract beneficence. The icenes into which the Novelift introduces us are, in general, perfectly unlike thofe which occur in the world. As his object is to please, he removes from his defcriptions every circumftance which is difgufting, and prefents us with hiftories of elegant and dignified diftrefs. It is not fuch fcenes that human life exhibits. have to act, not with refined and elevated characters, but with the mean, the illiterate, the vulgar, and the profligate. The perufal of fictitious hiftory has a tendency to increase that disgust which we naturally feel at the concomitants of distress, and to cultivate a falfe refinement of taste, inconfiftent with our condition as members of fociety. Nay, it is poffible for this refinement to be carried fo far, as to withdraw a man from the duties of life, and even from the fight of thofe diftreffes which he might alleviate. And, accordingly, many are to be found, who, if the fituations of romance were realised, would not fail to display the virtues of their favorite characters, whofe fenfe of duty is not fufficiently ftrong to engage them in the humble and private fcenes of human mifery,

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To these effects of fictitious hiftory we may add, that it gives no exercise to our active habits. In real life, we proceed from the paffive impreffion to thofe exertions which it was intended to produce. In the contemplation of imaginary fufferings, we stop fhort at the impreffion, and whatever benevolent difpofitions we may feel, we have no opportunity of carrying them into action.

From these reasonings it appears, that an habitual attention to exhibitions of fictitious distress, is in every view calculated to check our moral improvement. It diminishes that uneafinefs which we feel at the fight of distress, and which prompts us to relieve it. It ftrengthens that difguft which the loathfome concomitants of diftrefs excite in the mind, and which prompts us to avoid the fight of mifery; while, at the fame time, it has no tendency to confirm those habits of active beneficence, without which, the best difpofitions are useless. I would not, however, be understood to difapprove entirely of fictitious narratives, or of pathetic compofitions. On the contrary, I think that the perufal of them may be attended with advantage, when the effects which I have mentioned are corrected by habits of real business. They foothe the mind when ruffled by the rude intercourfe of fociety, and ftealing the attention infenfibly from our own cares, fubftitute, instead of discontent and diftrefs, a tender and pleafing melancholy. By exhibitions of characters a little elevated above the common ftandard, they have a tendency to cultivate the tafte in life; to quicken our difguft at what is mean or offenfive, and to form the mind infenfibly to elegance and dignity. Their tendency to cultivate the powers of moral perception has never been difputed; and when the influence of fuch perceptions is powerfully felt, and is united with an active and manly temper, they render the character not only more amiable, but more happy in itself, and

more useful to others; for although a rectitude of judgment with respect to conduct, and strong moral feelings, do, by no means, alone conftitute virtue; yet they are frequently neceffary to direct our behavior in the more critical fituations of life; and they increase the intereft we take in the general profperity of virtue in the world. I believe, likewife, that by means of fictitious hiftory, displays of character may be moft fuccefsfully given, and the various weakneffes of the heart expofed. I only meant to infinuate, that a tafte for them may be carried too far; that the fenfibility which terminates in imagination, is but a refined and selfish luxury ; and that nothing can effectually advance our moral improvement, but an attention to the active duties which belong to our stations.

SECTION VI.

Continuation of the fame Subject.-Important Ufes to which the Power of Imagination is fubfervient.

THE faculty of Imagination is the great spring of human activity, and the principal fource of human improvement. As it delights in prefenting to the mind scenes and characters more perfect than those which we are acquainted with, it prevents us from ever being completely fatisfied with our prefent condition, or with our paft attainments, and engages us continually in the pursuit of fome untried enjoyment, or of fotne ideal excellence. Hence the ardor of the felfish to better their fortunes, and to add to their perfonal accomplishments; and hence the zeal of the Patriot and the Philofopher to advance the virtue and the happiness of the human race. Deftroy this faculty, and the condition of man will become as ftationary as that of the brutes.

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