able confequences to which it leads, when under an improper regulation, only fhew, what an important inftrument of human improvement it might be rendered, in more skilful hands. If it be poffible to intereft the imagination and the heart in favor of error, it is, at least, no lefs poffible to intereft them in favor of truth. If it be poffible to extinguish all the most generous and heroic feelings of our nature, by teaching us to connect the idea of them with those of guilt and impiety; it is furely equally poffible to cherish and ftrengthen them, by eftablishing the na tural alliance between our duty and our happiness. If it be poffible for the influence of fashion to veil the native deformity of vice, and to give to low and criminal indulgences the appearance of spirit, of elegance, and of gaiety; can we doubt of the poffibility of connecting, in the tender mind, these pleasing asfociations, with purfuits that are truly worthy and honorable?-There are few men to be found, among those who have received the advantages of a liberal education, who do not retain, through life, that admiration of the heroic ages of Greece and Rome, with which the claffical authors once infpired them. It is, in truth, a fortunate prepoffeffion, on the whole, and one, of which I fhould be forry to counteract the influence. But are there not others of equal importance to morality and to happiness, with which the mind might, at the fame period of life, be infpired? If the first conceptions, for example, which an infant formed of the Deity, and its firft moral perceptions, were affociated with the early impreffions produced on the heart by the beauties of nature, or the charms of poetical defcription, those serious thoughts which are reforted to, by moft men, merely as a fource of confolation in adverfity; and which, on that very account, are frequently tinctured with fome degree of gloom, would recur fpontaneously to the mind, in its best and happieft hours; and would infenfibly

blend themselves with all its purest and most refined enjoyments.

In those parts of Europe, where the prevailing opinions involve the greatest variety of errors and corruptions, it is, I believe, a common idea with many refpectable and enlightened men, that, in every country, it is most prudent to conduct the religious inftruction of youth upon the plan which is prefcribed by the national establishment; in order that the pupil, according to the vigour or feebleness of his mind, may either shake off, in future life, the prejudices of the nursery, or die in the popular perfuafion. This idea, I own, appears to me to be equally ill-founded and dangerous. If religious opinions have, as will not be difputed, a powerful influence on the happiness, and on the conduct of mankind, does not humanity require of us, to rescue as many victims as poffi le from the hands of bigotry; and to fave them from the cruel alternative, of remaining under the gloom of a depreffing fuperftition, or of being diftracted by a perpetual conflict between the heart and the understanding?—It is an enlightened education alone, that, in moft countries of Europe, can fave the young philofopher from that anxiety and defpondence, which every man of fenfibility, who, in his childhood, has imbibed the popular opinions, muft neceflarily experience, when he firft begins to examine their foundation; and, what is of ftill greater importance, which can fave him, during life, from that occafional fcepticism, to which all men are liable, whofe tystems fluctuate with the inequalities of their fpirits, and the variations of the atmosphere.

I fhall conclude this fubject, with remarking, that, although in all moral and religious fyftems, there is a great mixture of important truth; and although it is, in confequence of this alliance, that errors and abfurdities are enabled to preferve their hold of the belief, yet it is commonly found, that, in proportion

1

as an established creed is complicated in its dogmas and in its ceremonies, and in proportion to the number of acceffory ideas which it has grafted upon the truth, the more difficult is it, for those who have adopted it in childhood, to emancipate themfelves completely from its influence; and, in those cases in which they at laft fucceed, the greater is their danger of abandoning, along with their errors, all the truths which they had been taught to connect with them. The Roman Catholic fyftem is fhaken off with much greater difficulty, than those which are taught in the reformed churches; but when it lofes its hold of the mind, it much more frequently prepares the way for unlimited fcepticifm. The caufes of this I may perhaps have an opportunity of pointing out, in treating of the affociation of ideas.

I have now finished all that I think neceffary to offer, at prefent, on the application of the philofophy of mind to the fubject of education. To fome readers, I am afraid, that what I have advanced on the fubject, will appear to border upon enthusiasm; and I will not attempt to juftify myself against the charge. I am well aware of the tendency, which fpeculative men fometimes have, to magnify the effects of education, as well as to entertain too fanguine views of the improvement of the world; and I am ready to acknowledge, that there are inftances of individuals, whofe vigor of mind is fufficient to overcome every thing that is pernicious in their early habits: but I am fully persuaded, that these inftances are rare ; and that, by far the greater part of mankind continue, through life, to pursue the fame track into which they have been thrown, by the accidental circumftances of fituation, inftruction, and example.

PART SECOND.

SECTION II.

Continuation of the fame Subject.

THE remarks which have been hitherto made, on the utility of the philosophy of the human mind, are of a very general nature, and apply equally to all descriptions of men. Besides, however, thefe more obvious advantages of the ftudy, there are others, which, though lefs ftriking, and lefs extenfive in their application, are nevertheless, to fome particular claffes of individuals, of the highest importance. Without pretending to exhaust the subject, I fhall offer a few detached obfervations upon it, in this fection.

I already took notice, in general terms, of the common relation which all the different branches of our knowledge bear to the philosophy of the human mind. In confequence of this relation, it not only forms an interefting object of curiofity to literary men of every denomination; but, if fuccefsfully prof ecuted, it cannot fail to furnish ufeful lights for directing their inquiries; whatever the nature of the fubjects may be, which happen to engage their attention.

In order to be fatisfied of the juftness of this obfervation, it is fufficient to recollect, that to the phi lofophy of the mind are to be referred, all our inquiries concerning the divifions and the claffifications of the objects of human knowledge; and alfo, all the various rules, both for the investigation, and the communication, of truth. Thefe general views of fcience, and these general rules of method, ought to form the subjects of a rational and useful logic; a ftudy, undoubtedly, in itself of the greateft impor

tance and dignity, but in which lefs progrefs has hitherto been made than is commonly imagined.

I shall endeavor to illuftrate, very briefly, a few of the advantages which might be expected to refult from fuch a fyftem of logic, if properly execu

ted.

I. And, in the first place, it is evident that it would be of the highest importance in all the sciences, (in fome of them, indeed, much more than in others,) to exhibit a precife and fteady idea of the objects which they present to our enquiry.-What was the principal circumftance which contributed to mislead the ancients, in their physical researches? Was it not their confused and wavering notions about the particular class of truths, which it was their business to investigate? It was owing to this, that they were led to neglect the obvious phenomena and laws of moving bodies; and to indulge themselves it conjectures about the efficient causes of motion, and the nature of thofe minds, by which they conceived the particles of matter to be animated; and that they fo often blended the hiftory of facts, with their metaphysical speculations. In the present state of science, indeed, we are not liable to fuch mistakes in natural philofophy; but it would be difficult to mention any other branch of knowledge, which is entirely exempted from them. In metaphyfics, I might almoft fay, they are at the bottom of all our controverfies. In the celebrated difpute, for example, which has been fo long carried on, about the explanation given by the ideal theory of the phenomena of perception, the whole difficulty arofe from this, that philofophers had no precife notion of he point they wished to afcertain; and now that the controverfy has been brought to a conclufion, (as I think all men of candour must confefs it to have been by Dr. Reid) it will be found, that his doctrine on the fubject throws no light whatever,