philofophy of the human mind; and it is the province of the logician, to ftate these in fuch a manner, as to lay a folid foundation for the fuperftructures which others are to rear.-It is in ftating fuch principles, accordingly, that elementary writers are chiefly apt to fail. How unfatisfactory, for example, are the introductory chapters in moft fyftems of natural philofophy; not in confequence of any defect of phyfical or of inathematical knowledge in their authors, but in confequence of a want of attention to the laws of human thought, and to the general rules of just reafoning! The fame remark may be extended to the form, in which the elementary principles of many of the other fciences are commonly exhibited; and, if I am not mistaken, this want of order, among the first ideas which they prefent to the mind, is a more powerful obftacle to the progrefs of knowledge, than is generally im. agined.

I fhall only obferve farther, with respect to the utility of the philofophy of mind, that as there are fome arts, in which we not only employ the intellectual faculties as inftruments, but operate on the mind as a fubject; fo, to thofe individuals who aim at excellence in fuch purfuits, the ftudies I have now been recommending are, in a more peculiar manner, interefting and important. In poetry, in painting, in eloquence, and in all the other fine arts, our fuccefs depends on the skill with which we are able to adapt the efforts of our genius to the human frame; and it is only on a phylofophical analysis of the mind, that a solid foundation can be laid for their farther improvement. Man, too, is the fubject on which the practical moralift and the enlightened ftatesman have to operate. Of the former, it is the profeffed object to engage the attention of individuals to their own best interests; and to allure them to virtue and happiness, by every confidera

tion that can influence the understanding, the imagination, or the heart. To the latter, is affigned the fublimer office of feconding the benevolent intentions of Providence in the adminiftration of human affairs; to diffuse as widely and equally as poffible, among his fellow citizens, the advantages of the fo cial union; and, by a careful study of the conftitution of man, and of the circumftances in which he is placed, to modify the political order, in such a manner as may allow free fcope and operation to those principles of intellectual and moral improvement, which nature has implanted in our fpecies.

In all these cafes, I am very fenfible, that the util ity of fyftematical rules has been called in queftion by philofophers of note; and that many plaufible arguments in fupport of their opinion, may be derived from the fmall number of individuals who have been regularly trained to eminence in the arts, in comparison of those who have been guided merely by untutored genius, and the example of their predeceffors. I know, too, that it may be urged with truth, that rules have, in some cases, done more harm than good; and have mifled, inftead of directing, the natural exertions of the mind. But, in all fuch inftances, in which philofophical principles have failed in producing their intended effect, I will venture to affert, that they have done fo, either in confequence of errors, which were accidentally blended with them; or, in confequence of their poffesfing only that flight and partial influence over the genius, which enabled them to derange its previously acquired habits; without regulating its operations, upon a fyftematical plan, with fteadiness and efficacy. In all the arts of life, whether trifling or important, there is a certain degree of fkill, which may be attained by our untutored powers, aided by imitation; and this skill, inftead of being perfected by rules, may, by means of them, be diminished or deftroyed,

if these rules are partially and imperfectly apprehended; or even if they are not fo familiarized to the understanding, as to influence its exertions uniformly and habitually. In the case of a mufical performer, who has learned his art merely by the ear, the first effects of fyftematical inftruction are, I believe, always unfavourable. The effect is the fame, of the rules of elocution, when first communicated to one who has attained, by his natural tafte and good fenfe, a tolerable propriety in the art of reading. But it does not follow from this, that, in either of these arts, rules are useless. It only follows, that, in order to unite eate and grace with correctness, and to preserve the felicities of original genius, amidst those restraints which may give them an useful direction, it is neceffary that the acquifitions of education fhould, by long and early habits, be rendered, in fome measure, a fecond nature. The fame obfervations will be found to apply, with very flight alterations, to arts of more ferious importance.-In the art of legislation, for example, there is a certain degree of kill, which may be acquired merely from the routine of bufinefs; and when once a politician has been formed, in this manner, among the details of office, a partial ftudy of general principles, will be much more likely to lead him aftray, than to enlighten his conduct. But there is nevertheless a science of legiflation, which the details of office, and the intrigues of popular affemblies, will never communicate; a science, of which the principles must be fought for in the conftitution of human nature, and in the general laws which regulate the course of human affairs; and which, if ever, in confequence of the progrefs of reafon, philofophy fhould be enabled to affume that afcendant in the government of the world, which has hitherto been maintained by accident, combined with the paffions and caprices of a few leading individuals, may, perhaps, produce more

perfect and happy forms of fociety, than have yet been realized in the hiftory of mankind.

I have thus endeavored to point out, and illustrate, a few of the most important purposes to which the philofophy of the human mind is fubfervient. It will not, however, I flatter myself, be supposed by any of my readers, that I mean to attempt a fyftematical work, on all, or any of the fubjects I have now mentioned; the moft limited of which, would furnish matter for many volumes. What I have ained at, has been, to give, in the first place, as distinct and complete an analysis as I could, of the principles, both intellectual and active, of our nature; and, in the fecond place, to illuftrate, as I proceed, the application of thefe general laws of the human conftitution, to the different claffes of phenomena which refult from them. In the felection of these phenomena, although I have fometimes been guided chiefly by the curiofity of the moment or the accidental course of my own ftudies; yet, I have had it in view, to vary, as far as poffible, the nature of my fpeculations, in order to fhow how numerous and different the applications are, of which this philofophy is susceptible. It will not, therefore, I hope, be objected to me, that I have been guilty of a blameable violation of unity in the plan of my work, till it be confidered how far fuch a violation was useful for accomplishing the purposes for which I write. One fpecies of unity, I am willing to believe, an attentive reader will be able to trace in it; I mean that uniformity of thought and defign, "which" (as Butler well reinarks,) "we may always expect to meet "with in the compofitions of the fame author, when " he writes with fimplicity, and in earnest,"

ELEMENTS

OF THE

PHILOSOPHY

OF THE

HUMAN MIND.

CHAPTER FIRST.

OF THE POWERS OF EXTERNAL PERCEPTION.

0:0

SECTION I.

Of the Theories which have been formed by Philofophers, to explain the manner in which the MIND perceives external Objects.

AMONG the various phenomena which the human mind prefents to our view, there is none more calculated to excite our curiofity and our wonder, than the communication which is carried on between the fentient, thinking, and active principle within us, and the material objects with which we are furrounded. How little foever the bulk of mankind may be disposed to attend to fuch inquiries, there is fcarcely a perfon to be found, who has not occafionally turned his thoughts to that myfterious