"troduced the hiftory of the King, and of the treache ery of those who furrendered his perfon to his en"emies; this again introduced the treachery of Ju"das Ifcariot, and the fum of money which he re"ceived for his reward.-And all this train of i"deas," fays Hobbes, " paffed through the mind of "the fpeaker in a twinkling, in confequence of the "velocity of thought." It is by no means improbable, that if the speaker himself had been interrogated about the connection of ideas, which led him afide from the original topic of discourse, he would have found himfelf, at first, at a loss for an answer.

In the inftances which have been last mentioned, we have also a proof, that a perception, or an idea, which paffes through the mind, without leaving any trace in the memory, may yet ferve to introduce other ideas connected with it by the laws of affociation. Other proofs of this important fact fhall be mentioned afterwards.

When a perception or an idea paffes through the mind, without our being able to recollect it next moment, the vulgar themfelves afcribe our want of memory to a want of attention. Thus, in the instance already mentioned, of the clock, a perfon, upon obferving that the minute hand had juft paffed twelve, would naturally fay, that he did not attend to the clock when it was ftriking. There feems, therefore, to be a certain effort of the mind upon which, even in the judgment of the vulgar, memory in some measure depends; and which they diftinguish by the name of attention.

The connection between attention and memory has been remarked by many authors. "Nec dubi"um eft," (fays Quinctilian, fpeaking of memory,) "quin plurimum in hac parte, valeat mentis inten❝tio, et velut acies luminum a profpectu rerum quas "intuetur non averfa." The fame obfervation has

been made by Locke,* and by most of the writers on the subject of education.

But although the connection between attention and memory has been frequently remarked in general terms, I do not recollect that the power of attention has been mentioned by any of the writers on pneumatology, in their enumeration of the faculties of the mind t; nor has it been confidered by any one, fo far as I know, as of fufficient importance to deferve a particular examination. Helvetius, indeed, in his very ingenious work, De l'Efprit, has entitled one of his chapters, De l'inegale capacitè d'Attention; but what he confiders under this article, is chiefly that capacity of patient inquiry, (or as he calls it, une attention fuivie,) upon which philofophical genius feems in a great measure to depend. He has also remarked, with the writers already mentioned, that the impreffion which any thing makes on the memory, depends much on the degree of attention

* "Memory depends much on attention and repetition." Locke's Essay, b. i. chap. x.

Some important observations on the subject of attention occur in different parts of Dr. Reid's writings; particularly in his Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, p. 62.; and in his Essays on the Active Powers of Man, p. 78, et seq.-To this ingenious author we are indebted for the remark, that attention to things external, is properly called observation; and attention to the subjects of our consciousness, reflection. He has also explained the causes of the peculiar difficulties which accompany this last exertion of the mind, and which form the chief obstacles to the progress of pneumatology. I shall have occasion, in another part of this work, to treat of habits of inattention in general, and to suggest some practical hints with respect to the culture both of the powers of observation and reflection. The view which I propose to take of attention at present, is extremely limited; and is intended merely to comprehend such general principles as are necessary to prepare the reader for the chapters which are to follow.

"C'est l'attention, plus ou moins grande, qui grave plus ou "moins profondément les objets dans la memoire."

we give to it; but he has taken no notice of that effort which is abfolutely effential to the lowest degree of memory. It is this effort that I propofe to confider at prefent ;-not thofe different degrees of attention which imprint things more or lefs deeply on the mind, but that act or effort without which we have no recollection or memory whatever.

With respect to the nature of this effort, it is perhaps impoffible for us to obtain much fatisfaction. We often fpeak of greater and lefs degrees of attention; and, I believe, in thefe cafes, conceive the mind (if I may use the expreflion) to exert itself with different degrees of energy. I am doubtful, however, if this expreffion conveys any diftinct meaning. For my own part, I am inclined to suppose, (though I would by no means be understood to fpeak with confidence,) that it is effential to memory, that the perception or the idea that we would wish to remember, fhould remain in the mind for a certain space of time, and fhould be contemplated by it exclufively of every thing elfe; and that attention confifts partly (perhaps entirely) in the effort of the mind, to detain the idea or the perception, and to exclude the other objects that folicit its no tice.

Notwithstanding, however, the difficulty of afcertaining, in what this act of the mind confifts, every perfon must be fatisfied of its reality from his own confciousness; and of its effential connection with the power of memory. I have already mentioned feveral inftances of ideas paffing through the mind, without our being able to recollect them next moment. Thefe inftances were produced, merely to illuftrate the meaning I annex to the word attention; and to recall to the recollection of the reader, a few striking cafes, in which the poffibility of our carrying on a procefs of thought, which we are unable to attend to at the time, or to remember after

wards, is acknowledged in the received fyftems of philofophy. I fhall now mention fome other phenomena, which appear to me to be very fimilar to these, and to be explicable in the fame manner; although they have commonly been referred to very different principles.

The wonderful effect of practice in the formation of habits, has been often, and justly, taken notice of, as one of the most curious circumstances, in the human conftitution. A mechanical operation, for example, which we at first performed with the utmost difficulty, comes, in time, to be fo familiar to us, that we are able to perform it without the fmalleft danger of miftake; even while the attention appears to be completely engaged with other fubjects. The truth feems to be, that in confequence of the affociation of ideas, the different fteps of the process prefent themselves fucceffively to the thoughts, without any recollection on our part, and with a degree of rapidity proportioned to the length of our experience; fo as to fave us entirely the trouble of hesitation and reflection, by giving us every moment a precise and steady notion of the effect to be pro. duced.*

In the cafe of fome operations which are very fa miliar to us, we find ourselves unable to attend to, or to recollect, the acts of the will by which they were preceded; and accordingly, some philofophers of great eminence have called in queftion the exiftence of fuch volitions; and have reprefented our habitual actions as involuntary and mechanical. But

* I do not mean by this observation, to call in question the effects which the practice of the mechanical arts has on the muscles of the body. These are as indisputable as its effects on the mind. A man who has been accustomed to write with his right hand, can write better with his left hand, than another who never practised the art at all; but he cannot write so well with his left hand as, with his right. The effects of practice, therefore, it should seem, are produced partly on the mind, and partly on the body.

furely the circumftance of our inability to recollect our volitions, does not authorise us to difpute their poffibility; any more than our inability to attend to the procefs of the mind, in estimating the distance of an object from the eye, authorises us to affirm that the perception is inftantaneous. Nor does it add any force to the objection to urge, that there are inftances in which we find it difficult, or perhaps impoffible, to check our habitual actions by a contrary volition. For it must be remembered, that this contrary volition does not remain with us fteadily during the whole operation; but is merely a general intention or resolution, which is banished from the mind, as foon as the occafion prefents itfelf, with which the habitual train of our thoughts and volitions is affociated.*

It may indeed be faid, that thefe obfervations only prove the poffibility that our habitual actions may be voluntary. But if this be admitted, nothing more can well be required; for furely, if thefe phenomena are clearly explicable from the known and acknowledged laws of the human mind, it would be unphilofophical to devife a new principle, on purpofe to account for them. The doctrine, therefore, which I have laid down with refpect to the nature

* The solution of this difficulty, which is given by Dr. Porterfield, is somewhat curious.

"Such is the power of custom and habit, that many actions, "which are no doubt voluntary, and proceed from our mind, are "in certain circumstances rendered necessary, so as to appear alto"gether mechanical, and independent of our wills; but it does not " from thence follow, that our mind is not concerned in such mo❝tions, but only that it has imposed upon itself a law, whereby it "regulates and governs them to the greatest advantage. In all this, "there is nothing of intrinsical necessity; the mind is at absolute "liberty to act as it pleases; but being a wise agent, it cannot "chuse but to act in conformity to this law, by reason of the utility and advantage that arises from this way of acting."