rament, anxious to bring himself into notice by engaging in a diplomatic struggle with the Porte, and to increase his reputation by successfully advocating the claims of the Roman Catholics in the East. His first step was to ask formally of the Porte whether it recognised the treaty of 1740?-a question to which only an affirmative answer could be returned. He then demanded that, in order to settle definitely the nature and number of the sanctuaries claimed by France, a mixed commission should be appointed to inquire into the respective rights of the Greeks and Latins. It was composed of Emin Effendi, an officer of high rank in the service of the Porte; M. Botta, the French consul at Jerusalem; M. Schaeffer, the interpreter to the French embassy; and M. Aristarki, the grand logothete of the Greek patriarchate. The selection was not unfair; for though there were two Frenchmen in the commission, and but one Greek, the latter, by his high position, his great influence amongst his co-religionists, his long connexion with Russia, and his intimate knowledge of the matters in dispute, was fully competent to put forward and defend the rights of his party. Eight sanctuaries were claimed by France; but whilst the commissioners were discussing the evidence upon which her pretensions were founded, the Emperor Nicholas took the extraordinary step of addressing an autograph letter to the Sultan, accusing his Ministers of bad faith, and demanding the strict maintenance of the religious privileges of the Greeks in Jerusalem. The Porte, alarmed at the direct interference of the Emperor, and fearing to offend so formidable a neighbour, dissolved the mixed commission, and appointed a new one composed entirely of Ulemas, or doctors of the Mussulman law. And here, on the part of the Porte, commenced that course of double-dealing and shuffling which her fear of quarrelling with Russia on the one hand, and with France on the other, unfortunately led her to adopt. It would be profitless to describe the various phases through which the question passed. Suffice it to say that the commission, by its report, confirmed some of the claims of France; and that shortly after, to satisfy the Emperor of Russia, it issued a firman in favour of the Greeks, which was believed by France to be inconsistent with that already accorded to herself. M. de Lavalette was sent back to Turkey to demand the revocation of this document, and appeared, as it is well known, in a somewhat menacing attitude, having entered the Dardanelles contrary to treaty in a ninety-gun war steamer-the Charlemagne.* The ex*Each embassy is prohibited by treaty from having more than one ship of war in attendance at Constantinople, and the Charlemagne was a supernumerary. planations planations of the Porte were, however, accepted, and the firman remained in force. Fresh difficulties nevertheless arose on its public promulgation in Jerusalem, and especially as to the delivering of a key to the Church of Bethlehem to the Latins, who wished to make the building a thoroughfare to a sanctuary of their own in connexion with the main edifice, which is in the possession of their rivals. The French Government addressed fresh representations of a menacing character to the Porte, and the Russian mission as vigorously insisted upon the privileges of the Greeks. At length a compromise, to a certain extent satisfactory to France, was agreed upon. The Porte itself consented to replace the missing star, and the key of the Church of Bethlehem was conceded to the Latins. The French Government, wearied with the dispute to which a question, in itself so trivial, had given rise, and anxious to bring about a final settlement, recalled M. de Lavalette, to whose violent and injudicious proceedings the difficulties which had arisen were justly ascribed. In the mean while the affairs of Bosnia, the war in Montenegro, the alleged ill treatment of the Catholic Christians in the western provinces of Turkey in Europe, and other causes, had furnished a pretext for the interference of Austria. Count Leiningen was sent to Constantinople with a series of categorical demands, delivered in the form of an ultimatum, and accompanied by a threat of ulterior consequences in case of a refusal. This mode of proceeding was as objectionable as the demands themselves were, on the whole, unwarrantable. As the Porte, under the threat of war, conceded them, it is now of little consequence to discuss them; and Leiningen's mission is only mentioned to show that the interference of France in behalf of the Christians of the East was probably not the only cause of the appearance of Prince Menschikoff. Austria arrogated to herself the protection of the inhabitants of the provinces bordering upon her own dominions who professed the Roman Catholic faith, and these for the most part not strangers, or seceders from various sects, like those at Jerusalem, but constituting a considerable portion of the very popula tion itself, and that population a Sclavonian race, over which Russia has long considered herself to have exclusive rights. However much the mission of Prince Leiningen may have been lost sight of in subsequent proceedings, there is no doubt that these pretensions of Austria to interfere on behalf of a part of the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and of the tribes of Montenegro, were the cause of great jealousy and alarm to Russia. To the arbitrary and violent conduct of Austria in this matter, as much as to the mission of M. de Lavalette, may perhaps be attributed the embassy of Prince Menschikoff. There There were other reasons which, if not immediately, certainly remotely, induced the Emperor of Russia to make a great effort to recover, and establish on the surest and most extensive basis, his influence over the subjects of the Porte professing the Greek faith, viz. the spread of Roman Catholic, and of liberal or Protestant opinions among the Christians of Turkey, and the increasing prosperity of the Greeks themselves. We shall enlarge hereafter upon these subjects. It is not to be denied that the Porte, by its want of straightforwardness and its vacillation, had given real cause of offence to Russia. Putting aside the legality and justice of her claims, Russia had a right to insist that the Porte, having once entertained, and indeed, to a certain extent, admitted them, should act towards her with good faith. On the other hand, it must be remembered that the government of the Sultan was exposed to the pressure of two great Powers, who in their turn threatened it with consequences almost fatal to its very existence in case it did not comply with their imperative demands, which were at direct variance with each other. While the quarrel in fact was entirely between Russia and France, the Porte unfortunately had to bear all the consequences. ** If any Christian Power were to enjoy certain privileges at Jerusalem, and to possess certain sanctuaries, it signified little to Turkey whether the Latins or the Greeks were the favoured sect. She would willingly have excluded both of them from Jerusalem; as it was, she could scarcely determine which had the better right to particular spots, which was the most orthodox, which the most pious. Consequently she had recourse to the usual resources of Oriental diplomacy; she played off one party against the other, hoping to gain time, and trusting to events to settle disputes, in which she was in no manner directly interested, in any way in which she would not herself be the sufferer. Had the Emperor of Russia in this stage of the question dispatched an ordinary mission to Constantinople to demand a guarantee for the privileges in dispute-had he insisted that, after the want of good faith displayed by the Porte, the question of the Holy Places should be put upon such a footing that conflicting claims should never again arise and no uncertainty prevail as to the precise rights of the Greek Church-there can be little doubt that, however objectionable such a step might have been in principle, however dangerous in its ultimate results, the Porte must have acceded to his demands, and would not have been supported, in case of a refusal, by its allies. No better proof of * M. Drouyn de Lhuys has very honourably admitted the difficult position of the Porte in his circular of the 25th June. this can be adduced than the selection made by the French Government of a successor to M. de Lavalette. M. de Lacour was known for his conciliatory manners and moderate opinions. He had represented the interests of France at the court of Vienna during a critical period, in a manner so satisfactory to the Austrian government, that his political tendencies were not viewed without suspicion in his native country. It was known that M. de Lavalette, on his return to France, had met with little favour, and that the Emperor had openly expressed his disapprobation of the policy which had led him into the difficulties connected with the Holy Places. The instructions given to M. de Lacour were in keeping with this declaration. His conduct during his mission appears to have been in every respect true to their spirit, and he acted cordially with the British ambassador in endeavouring to smooth the way to a settlement of the disputes with Russia. Many of the claims of France were quietly withdrawn-objections, which might fairly have been raised against those put forward by Russia, were left unurged-and the French Government was accused by the clergy and a large party in France of betraying the interests of the Church, and omitting to insist upon its just rights. The Emperor of Russia selected Prince Menschikoff- a nobleman of the highest rank, a minister, the organ of a very influential national party, and a general who had distinguished himself in the wars between Russia and the Porte-as his ambassador-extraordinary to proceed to Constantinople. Thus from the very commencement it was evident that this was no common mission, and that its objects were of such vital importance that the Emperor was prepared to run almost any risks rather than fail in obtaining them. For some time previous extraordinary military and naval preparations were being made in the south of Russia-corps-d'armées were ready to marchthe fleet was manned and victualled for sea. That these preparations were known to the French Government, and it may consequently be presumed to our own, is now proved by the statement to this effect contained in the last circular of M. Drouyn de Lhuys, officially published in the Moniteur.' It is indeed a matter of surprise that such indications of a coming storm should have been overlooked by the British Government, and that no efforts whatever were made at that time to meet or to avert it. On Menschikoff's arrival at Constantinople (28th February), his conduct at once proved the character of his mission. It has been urged in extenuation that it was not authorised by his Government. But the insufficiency of the excuse must be evi dent dent to any one acquainted with the relations which exist between the Emperor and his agents, even if his proceedings had not afterwards been fully approved by his Imperial Master. (See Nesselrode's Circular of May 31.) The ambassador was accompanied by a general officer, an admiral, and a very numerous suite. On his arrival every effort was made to get up a demonstration on the part of the Greeks of Constantinople-the subjects be it remembered of the Sultan-and at his disembarkation a large concourse of people were collected together through the exertions of the Russian mission. Not satisfied with this first step so offensive to the Porte, he followed it up by paying his visit of ceremony to the Grand Vizier in plain clothes, and by rudely turning from the door of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, upon whom, according to usage, he should also have called. In consequence of this insult Fuad Effendi resigned his office, and was succeeded by Rifat Pasha. Shortly afterwards the general and admiral who had accompanied the Prince were sent on special missions to Egypt and Athens, and rumours began to prevail that efforts were being made on all sides to excite rebellion among the Greek and Sclavonian subjects of the Porte. The first communication made by Menschikoff consisted of a note addressed to the Porte on the 16th of March, in which the Ministers of the Sultan are accused of having acted in direct violation of the firmans issued in favour of the Greeks, of having wounded the religious convictions of the Emperor, and of having been wanting in due respect to his person. It concluded by declaring that the Prince was instructed to demand not only the redress of these grievances, but also the conclusion of an arrangement which would put an end to the dissatisfaction of the Greek subjects of the Sultan, and would give them for the future certain and inviolable guarantees : 'Le Prince est chargé de demander non seulement le redressement de ces griefs, mais encore la conclusion d'un arrangement qui mette fin au mécontentement des sujets Grecs du Sultan, et leur donne, pour l'avenir, de sûres et inviolables garanties.' This communication it appears was accompanied by a threat, that any mention of the treaty or arrangement to be concluded between Russia and the Porte to the representatives of France and England would be considered an act of hostility to the Emperor. The Porte, however, hinted the contents of the note to the representatives of its allies, expressing its alarm as to the nature of the secret treaty demanded. This intimation, as is well known, induced Colonel Rose, her Majesty's chargé d'affaires, to summon the British fleet to the Dardanelles. The British Government has been condemned for not sending the |