miserable roads, without any strong lines of positions-render it impossible for the armies of Russia operating simultaneously on the prodigious frontiers of the empire to render any assistance to each other. The two different modes of attack to which an empire like that of Russia may be exposed offer a simple but striking contrast. The campaign of Napoleon in 1812 was directed against the centre of the monarchy. In spite of the enormous forces then united under the imperial eagle of France, the plan of operations was framed on that system of central movement which Napoleon had carried to the highest perfection. But the enormous extent of the territory invaded drew out the line of operations to excess, and rendered a defeat disastrous, and a retreat all but impracticable. The campaign of 1812 carried the French army to Moscow, but it ended there, and was followed by the most frightful disaster in military history; for though the actual force of the Russian army at that time did not exceed 200,000, the vastness of the territory proved the grave of the invader. These conditions would be entirely reversed in operations of war directed not against the centre but the circumference of the empire; for, from the extent of the territory, the frontier is in many parts more accessible to the enemy than to the Russian forces. Moreover,

as any part of the maritime provinces may suddenly be attacked, all must to a certain extent be prepared, and the concentration of the army becomes almost impossible. Let us briefly consider the number and force of the divisions or separate armies absolutely required for the defence of the Russian territory when threatened by sea, and from the contiguous states by land. To begin from the north Finland demands an army of at least 40,000 men to garrison Helsingfors and the Isles of Åland, and to keep in check the population excited by the possibility of a Swedish invasion, whilst the allied fleets may operate simultaneously or alternately on the northern and southern coasts of the Gulf of Finland. The corps of grenadiers, and a large division of artillery, would be retained to garrison Cronstadt and defend the capital. The guards, forming another army of 40,000 men, with their cavalry and artillery, advance to the Baltic provinces to cover Riga, Revel, and the road to St. Petersburgh, whilst they observe, not without suspicion, the Prussian troops concentrated round Königsberg and Dantzig. Warsaw and the kingdom of Poland are the advanced positions of the Russian grand army of operations, consisting still of the 1st and 2nd divisions of the army, and numbering at least 100,000 men. Some portion of this force has been moved by échelons on Volhynia and Bessarabia; but in the present state of the relations of Russia with the German Powers, it will be impossible for her to weaken that vital part of her dominions.

dominions. The 3rd and 4th divisions form the army of operations under Prince Gortschakoff in the Principalities; and the 6th division, usually quartered in or near Moscow, is now advancing to reinforce these corps, which have already suffered most severely. The 5th or General Lüders' division occupies Odessa and the neighbourhood, whilst a part of it has been sent to the Caucasus. The defence of the Crimea, especially when the Black Sea is held by an enemy of superior maritime power, requires an army of 40,000 men or more to garrison Sebastopol, as well as Kaffa, or to provide against the contingency of an invasion. This force is wholly cut off from direct communication with any other corps. Reinforcements and supplies can only be transmitted to it over a vast extent of sandy deserts and steppes; if indeed the isthmus and lines of Perecop may not be threatened. The Sea of Azow, from Kertch to Taganrog, is too shallow to be exposed to formidable attacks, but the flotilla which defends it must be manned. Troops are necessarily scattered along the places on the Circassian coast, for even in the wretched little frontier fort of Chevketil the Turks found upwards of 1000 men; and by similar military posts, all liable to sudden attack, the communications are kept up with the Trans-Caucasian provinces. The army of the Caucasus, including the Georgian levies, certainly exceeds 100,000 men, and consists of excellent troops; but these again are exclusively engaged in local warfare, their reinforcements and supplies are rendered very difficult, and they can contribute nothing at all to the general defence of the empire. We say nothing of the corps on the frontier of Orenberg, or of the forces still required for the service of the interior, which cannot be inconsiderable. But we affirm that this enormous dissemination of troops over thousands of miles of frontiers entirely prevents that concentration which is the first element of success in war. Half a million of men are lost in these sporadic detachments, and the radius of the empire is so great that it is physically impossible to operate with rapidity from the centre on any point of so vast a circumference. The modern additions to the art of war, which enable us as a maritime power to convey an army with all the velocity of steam, are unattainable by Russia. Time and space in the campaign of 1812-13 were in her favour, and destroyed at last the prestige of Napoleon's victories. Time and space are, on the contrary, much more within our control than they are in hers, and may consequently be turned against her. It is an event without a parallel in history since the days of the Roman empire for a state to be simultaneously conducting hostilities in defence of its own territories from the Gulf of Bothnia to the shores of the Caspian, and from

the

the Eruba to the Vistula. In war a concentric mode of attack is always superior to a divergent system of defence, and the same principle holds good in strategy and in tactics. The Russians have gone on repeating that it is the destiny of the empire of the Czars to conquer and supplant the empire of the Caliphs-that the Muscovite race is waiting for the hour which is to give it the empire of the world-and that all the other nations and races of Europe are effete and exhausted-until these propositions have become part of the national faith. But that faith is based on ignorance and fanaticism. Russia has yet to learn that her schemes upon the East or against Europe are wholly impracticable unless she has found means to paralyse the resistance they are calculated to excite. When that resistance is aroused and organized Russia is unable to surmount it.

We have now passed rapidly in review, with the assistance of the works before us, the chief elements of Russia's power, as far as we can discover them from the existing institutions of the empire. In an absolute monarchy, in which the Government is everything, and the emperor is the Government, there exist, indeed, none of those checks or impediments to the direct and energetic action of authority which are to be met with in freer states; but neither is it possible that they should derive any additional strength from the external resources or free co-operation of public opinion or of society. In the person of Nicholas of Russia the world was long inclined to believe that the empire had found not only a ruler, but a civilising and progressive power, capable of wielding his enormous might exclusively for noble ends. His undaunted courage in moments of danger, his bold and imperial bearing, his indefatigable activity, and his strong sympathy with the national character of the Russian people, which none of his predecessors since Peter the Great have possessed in the same degree, undoubtedly marked him out for the head of a great empire; and we confess that it is not without painful regret that we have witnessed the fall of such a character from those engagements of truth and honour which he had himself invoked. But it is impossible to follow the narrative of the transactions of last year without arriving at the conviction that his craft is at least equal to his force, and that he has pursued his own visionary schemes with a criminal disregard to the welfare of his own subjects and to the peace of Europe. Without such a head the empire might languish, corruption and deceit would flourish unrebuked, the resources of the country would decline, and the progress of the nation be suspended. With such a head a more active and wholesome movement might undoubtedly be given to society, but it may also be given for mischievous

chievous purposes and injurious results. Under this condition a Government may seek to give an impulse to the nation, but it can receive none in return, for there is a total absence of spontaneous energy and original power. For this reason an appeal is made to religious fanaticism, which is probably the strongest independent sentiment of the Russian people-if, indeed, any sentiment can be termed independent when even devotion and religious enthusiasm have been studiously trained into a superstitious veneration for the person of the Czar. The Russians, however, will not easily be persuaded that their religion is attacked, and though such an event as the march of Napoleon to Moscow roused all the patriotic ardour of the country, we doubt whether the people of the maritime frontiers will have the same determination to face the dangers of impending hostilities. The nobles of Russia are, with few exceptions, quite unable to render to the Government any independent support. They are, as a class, embarrassed and frivolous men, who owe their only importance to the honours or duties the Government may vouchsafe to confer upon them. Moreover, it is to a great degree on them that the burden of war falls; for to raise levies of men, such as have recently taken place on their estates, is to take from them the most valuable portion of their property. Estates in Russia are computed not by the extent of desolate acres, but by the number of serfs, and to depopulate the country is to ruin the landowner. The voluntary contributions talked of for the war have chiefly been exacted by a power admitting of no refusal. In fact, the very first symptom of impending hostilities is a suspension of trade, a check to labour, and a scarcity of capital which must already be felt throughout the empire. These hardships fall as much on the mercantile classes as on the nobility, and it is difficult to foresee what compensation any aggressive war can bring to them who are the first to suffer by it. The peasants, who pay the heaviest of all contributions in life and blood, have not even the satisfaction of fighting the battles of free men. Military service emancipates them from serfdom, but it leaves them to perish in the ranks, or turns the veteran adrift on the world. The army which such a war compels the Emperor to call into existence, if he hopes even to protect himself agains humiliation and defeat, is the burden and the curse of his dominions. Men he may sacrifice without stint or limit, though. in Russia the vast amount of the collective population is no test of local population, which is sparse and rare in almost all parts of the empire. But with a revenue not amounting to 20 millions sterling, and no facilities for contracting loans, how are materials of war, clothes, arms, food and supplies to be furnished to a

million

million of combatants, at distances of thousands of miles from each other and from the capital? The magnitude of these military preparations is an additional cause of weakness, for to defend one point which is attacked a hundred others must be prepared for resistance.

For all these reasons we hold it to be a political error of the first magnitude on the part of the Emperor Nicholas to have challenged the two greatest maritime powers in the world to bring to the test his powers of endurance, to prove that Russia is assailable both in the Black Sea and in the Baltic, and to hazard a campaign which must in great part destroy the prestige of his forces. Even in the last winter campaign of the Turks, Russia has lost an incalculable amount of reputation, and she can only escape from her present position by the loss of a great deal more. The Western Powers have staked their honour and influence in the world upon the restoration of peace in the East by honourable means, and we trust that, having once engaged in this quarrel, they will not lay down their arms until they have obtained trustworthy securities for the future. Russia, on the other hand, has staked and forfeited the alliances she professed to cherish, her old connexion with England, the deferential gratitude of Austria, the affectionate esteem of Prussia, and, what the Emperor valued most, the leadership of the counterrevolutionary party in Europe. Success in this career is impossible for him; for even if he were to break up the Western alliances, to complete the overthrow of Turkey, or to wrest from the trembling Sultan compliance with his demands, the only result would be to prolong a fierce and terrible war, which he cannot even hope to direct to its close. We see no reason to believe that the Russian empire possesses either the genius or the resources which can carry a sovereign with success through such a struggle; and if this contest is to be waged between the forces of civilization and liberty against those of a semi-barbarous empire aspiring to crush the independence of Europe, we neither doubt nor dread the issue of the war in which England and France have been compelled to engage.

ART.