patch to its destination, and intimate that further correspondence will not be likely to serve any useful purpose.

I am instructed by his excellency to say, in reply, that your refusal to forward his dispatch to the government seems extraordinary, and that he is unwilling to believe your course would have the sanction of His Majesty were he aware of the real facts. It is hardly possible that His Majesty would so far disregard the established rules common among all nations as deliberately to obstruct all channels of communication between an ambassador of a friendly nation and the government of Corea; thus closing the door to all attempts at the settlement of differences that now exist, or that may hereafter arise, by amicable negotiation.

I am further instructed by his excellency to say that, as he contemplates a prolonged stay in the vicinity of the capital, he has concluded to retain the dispatch until means are found to forward it to its destination; and he indulges the hope that you will, upon reflection, conclude to transmit it, or make known to His Majesty that his excellency desires to send one. This is especially desirable; for if His Majesty frustrates all efforts to open negotiation the situation will be relieved of embarrassment in case the minister and admiral are compelled to seek other means to bring the business with which his excellency is intrusted to the notice of the court. A refusal by order of the government will also show to the nations of Europe, as well as to the United States, that Corea persistently declines to hold communication with an ambassador especially sent on an errand of peace and humanity.

If, however, you conclude to adhere to the determination indicated in your note, I deem it my duty distinctly to inform you that for your refusal to perform a service incumbent upon all officials of every nation, the same responsibility will attach to His Majesty as if the act was done by his express order.

TUNG CHIH, 10th year, 5th moon, 1st day, (June 18, 1871.)

No. 18.

Translation of a dispatch from the prefect of Foo Ping to Mr. Drew; received June 20, 1871.

Li, guardian general of Foo Ping prefecture, makes a communication in reply. To the reply which I had the honor to send you the other day, I had not expected there would be a rejoinder. But I have now to acknowledge your answer, expressing surprise that I do not dare to forward his excellency's dispatch to the court, and inquiring into the matter. An explanation of my reasons is therefore indispensable. Although the place where your honored ships came to anchor on their arrival here* was amply suitable for intercourse and correspondence, yet you, ascending the tide, entered the narrows, and thus caused those holding the place to open fire upon you. As we had written, expressing regret at the infelicity of that affair, you might have passed it over; but no!-on the contrary, you went up a second time and fought a battle, in which many of our people were killed or wounded. Our court is terribly incensed at this, and no longer believes in the [alleged] peaceful nature of your visit. Under these circumstances, although his excellency wishes a dispatch to be forwarded, yet, in view of the utter irreconcilability of a foreign minister's writing our sovereign direct on terms of equality with what is due to rauk, dignity, and ceremonial propriety, how could I, an humble official, venture to transmit it? Our court would certainly severely censure and disgrace me for such an act; and how could I escape this punishment? And is this a matter of no concern to his excellency? It is, after repeatedly and unremittingly revolving the matter in my mind, that, dreading the law and holding to the canons of usage, I dare not recklessly forward the dispatch.

The business which his excellency has encountered the hardships of a long voyage to consult about and arrange can, in all probability, I presume, be nothing else than that he does not fully know why, of two vessels [which came to our shores] one was rescued and the other destroyed; and because he is solicitous for the future, lest in the course of their voyages vessels may perhaps again meet with unforeseen disasters, he therefore desires to make a compact of peace, [treaty,] forever preventing the infliction of injury, and this is the way matters stand.

But can this be pronounced other than a manifestation of extreme over-anxiety and the taking of unnecessary trouble? As to the case of the vessel which was involved in misfortune by those on board her, who brought the catastrophe upon themselves, this affair was verily of a kind totally unexpected to us. As to vessels losing their course in fogs at sea, or being driven in by stress of weather, these, and all similar dangers and disasters, concern human life; that this country will with fidelity rescue mariDers and send them forward by land, as they desire, is recorded as our established law, enduring as the elements. In this we imitate Heaven's fostering care of mankind, and

* Either Isle Boisée or Rose's Roads.

make no discrimination between those nations which are remote and those which are near. Therefore it is that the local officials along the coast are, without exception, in a state of anxious concern day and night; and among these officials I am an unworthy With the spirits of heaven and earth watching above and about me, how dare I use empty or deceitful expressions? I only hope that his excellency will no longer be over-solicitous and needlessly trouble himself about these matters.

one.

Although you have not consulted about and settled any business, yet granted that you had done so, the results would have been to the above effect and nothing more. There is no need for a compact of peace, and friendly feeling will be naturally found in what I have above stated.*

Of what the unworthy officer writing has heard of as the discussions of the crowded halls of our court he has now made frank disclosure; yet, his own proper duties are limited to holding his jurisdiction or doing battle, and to these things only.

A necessary reply. To the American Chief Secretary.

TUNG CHIH, 10th year, 5th moon, 2d day, (20th June, 1871.)

No. 75.]

No. 36.

Mr. Low to Mr. Fish.

ON BOARD UNITED STATES FLAG-SHIP COLORADO, Harbor of Chefoo, China, July 6, 1871. (Received August 21.) SIR: I have the honor to report my arrival at this port on the 5th instant, having left the anchorage near Boisée Island on the 3d. In my former dispatches I endeavored to furnish you with a succinct narrative of events as they occurred after my arrival and during my stay on the coast of Corea; the efforts that were made to carry out your instructions and provide some adequate measures for the safety and rescue of shipwrecked mariners; the reasons for the hostile action of the fleet against the Corean government, and the considerations which induced the admiral and myself to confine the operations of the Navy within the narrowest limits compatible with the honor of the Government of the United States; the safety of our people navigating these seas, and those residing upon Chinese soil. I now have to inform you that all my efforts failed to induce the government of Corea to enter into negotiations with a view to concluding a treaty, such as my instructions contemplated, or to discuss with me that or any other question. In concluding the history of these proceedings, I deem it not inappropriate to review the whole question of intercourse with Corea, in which the safety, welfare, and interests of the citizens and subjects of civilized and Christian governments are so largely involved; the attitude of the Corean government in the past, and the small probability of any voluntary change in the future. I also deem it proper to offer some observations, which may be of service to the Government of the United States in determining the proper course to be pursued to prevent the lives and property of our citizens from being sacrificed. Corea is now the only nation on the earth claiming to be civilized; that absolutely refuses to hold intercourse of any sort with the Christian countries of Europe and America. Up to within a few years Corea has attracted little notice; and it may be presumed that her isolated position and the reputed poverty of her people would continue to afford immunity, notwithstanding her exceptional attitude toward foreign nations, did not considerations of humanity dictate a different course. The opening and rapid increase of trade with Japan, China, and Russian Manchuria, which required vessels to skirt the coasts of Corea in their voyages, brought prominently

* The promise to rescue distressed mariners.

into view the undesirability of allowing a country lying directly in the track of a great commerce, bounded on three sides by the sea, to remain with its coasts, outlying islands, and dangerous passages, totally unexplored. The Corean government would neither make these surveys itself, nor allow other nations to do it without incurring great risk. The history of all attempts to survey the coasts and islands goes to show that every obstacle was thrown in the way by the officials and the people-objection being made to the landing of surveying parties to make astronomical observations, while the lives of those engaged in such work were endangered when these warnings were disregarded. The wreck and total destruction of several foreign vessels and their cargoes, during the past ten years, and the massacre by the natives of the crew of one vessel certainly, and perhaps more, brought Corea into more general notice. The circumstances of the loss of the American schooner General Sherman, and the massacre of her crew, in 1866, are too well known to require mention of the details here.

The United States steamer Wachusett visited the coast in 1867 to inquire into the circumstances, without obtaining any information whatever, and the visit, by direction of the admiral in command of the fleet in these seas, of the United States steamer Shenandoah, in 1868, resulted in obtaining statements from the Corean local officials in regard to it, the truth of which is not supported by other and more reliable testimony, which I have been able to obtain. The commander of the Shenandoah was prohibited from going to the spot where the Sherman was wrecked to make inquiries and thus learn the real facts, and when her boats attempted to ascend the river they were fired upon from forts commanding its entrance, which compelled the vessel to return without obtaining further intelligence.

During his stay Captain Febiger desired to correspond with the government in order to obtain an official explanation, but was informed that, as he did not come in obedience to the direct orders of the Presi dent, correspondence between him and the court could not be permitted. During the same year another American schooner, the Surprise, had been wrecked and become a total loss, but the officers and crew were safely sent through to China by land. This circumstance led many to believe in the truth of the stories told by the Corean officials about the wanton acts of the persons on board the Sherman, which brought down the wrath of the people and caused the destruction of the vessel and those on board. This opinion was strengthened by a report which came to the consul-general at Shanghai concerning the anxiety of the Corean government in regard to the Sherman affair, and that it was proposed to send an embassy to the United States to explain the matter, a full account of which was embodied in his dispatches of 24th April, 1868, to the State Department. It is undoubtely true that the recommendation of the consul-general, that an attempt be made to open negotiations with Corea, was based chiefly upon the information before referred to. It is also true, I suspect, that it was this intelligence more than anything else that led the Government to anticipate favorable results from the recent attempt at friendly negotiation. It is proper for me to say here that all my experience and information lead me to believe that the safety of the crew of the Surprise is due to the fact that the vessel was a total wreck, and therefore the crew could not, if spared, charge the government and people with robbery and plunder of their property, or cause their Government to make demands for redress and reparation, which would not have been the case with the other vessel. I also feel bound to say that the consul-general's informant fabricated, for ulterior

and base purposes, the information embodied in the dispatches before referred to. There is no reason to suppose that it contained the least shadow of truth; on the contrary, the evidence is most conclusive that there never was any intention on the part of the government of Corea to offer an apology or afford the least reparation for what I am now convinced was a great outrage upon the persons and property of citizens of the United States. All the evidence obtainable goes to prove that the government of Corea was and is determined to maintain its original status-non-intercourse with any Western nation, and hostile resistance to all attempts of foreign governments to establish relations for whatever purpose.

The considerations which induced the United States to send a special mission to Corea this year are of course more fully known to the Department than to me. It is sufficient for me to say that my instructions appeared to contemplate such action as would be likely to induce the government of Corea to agree to a treaty which would have for its chief if not only object the protection and rescue of the lives and property of mariners who might by misfortune be cast upon these shores. In accordance with the letter and spirit of these instructions I undertook to carry them out. No time was designated for carrying them out, this being left to the discretion of myself and the admiral of the fleet, who was directed to accompany me.

Considerations affecting American interests in China, too important to be overlooked or disregarded, prevented an early compliance with the instructions; besides, I deemed it better to delay the matter until the Corean embassy should have visited Peking, which would afford the Chinese government an opportunity to explain the peaceful and humane purposes of the mission. In addition to this, I wrote a dispatch to the King of Corea, frankly explaining the purposes which I desired to accomplish, and giving assurances of our friendly disposition. To forward this letter to its destination, and make sure that it would reach the King of Corea, I sought and obtained the good offices of the Chinese government. To further guard against any question being raised which might furnish a pretext for declining to treat with me as the accredited agent of my Government, I waited until I could receive a "full power" before starting on my mission. My previous dispatches will have made known to you the anxiety I felt in regard to the matter, and the scrupulous care taken to avoid, if possible, all chance of hostilities, unless forced upon us in a manner from which there would be no honorable escape. That hostilities did occur under circumstances exhibiting great treachery and wantonness you have been fully advised; and also of our failure to obtain any word of apology or regret, either from the government or the local officials. It is a noteworthy fact, which should be stated in this connection, that the copy of the letter from the court to the Peking government (see inclosure 5 in dispatch No. 74) was not sent to me until the 6th June, five days after the attack upon our vessels, although the fact of our presence on the coast was known at the capital several days prior to the arrival of the fleet at the anchorage near Boisée Island. From this circumstance it would appear that the government did not desire that any warning should be given of its hostile intentions; but as soon as defeat had, in their opinion, overtaken us, the copy of the letter was sent for my information. This view is supported by documents and official orders found in the captured forts on the 10th and 11th instants. Everything goes to prove that the government was anxious to entrap the vessels in a position where great damage could be inflicted without chance of escape. No intimation was given in advance of their hostile

intent, which would have put the vessels on their guard; on the contrary, the people who came to see us, upon being informed of the admiral's intention to send out the surveying vessels, expressed no dissent, but rather gave tacit assurances of friendly treatment. Of the first attack, the delay afterward allowed the Coreans to afford an opportunity for apology and reparation, the efforts of both the admiral and myself to avoid further hostilities, with the reasons therefor, the engagement of the 10th and 11th June and the results, the attempt to open negotiations afterward, and the repeated refusal of the local authorities to forward my dispatch to the court, you will have learned from previous dispatches.

In the opinion of the admiral his forces were insufficient to justify an attempt to reach the capital without great risk, and feeling confident. that, unless this could be done, any advance would have no effect upon the government, further offensive movements seemed inexpedient. After waiting long enough to demonstrate the fact that there was no probability of the government responding to our overtures, I concluded to withdraw and submit the whole question to the President for his dePrior to leaving, I caused a dispatch to be sent to the prefect of Fu-Ping Fu, explaining the cause of my departure, copy of which you will find herewith. (Inclosure No. 1.)

The delicate situation of affairs in China rendered great caution necessary in our proceedings. The news of a defeat of our arms in Corea would be spread throughout China, enlarged and embellished as orientals only can do, and would seriously injure our prestige and endanger our people residing there. This consideration alone would have led me to point out to the admiral the absolute necessity for the second attack. It appeared to me indispensable that the fleet should not leave Corea while there remained any reasonable grounds for the Government to believe that we had been defeated by force of arms. As I anticipated would be the case, the Coreans believed that we were defeated on the 1st of June, and so reported it to China. This news spread far and near, causing much excitement among the Chinese and great anxiety to foreigners.

The same report was very likely sent to Europe and America by telegraph. It remains to be seen what form the native report of the second engagement will take. For the same reason I deemed it wise to exercise great caution after the events of the 10th and 11th of June. It did not seem prudent to take the risk of defeat, when any success we might probably achieve would not be likely to accomplish the main object for which I went.

In view of these considerations, and the additional one that hostile operations against a foreign country should not, except under the most peculiar circumstances, admitting of no delay, be carried on without the express sanction of the Government, previously obtained, I concluded to pursue the course above indicated.

Having exhausted the power in me vested by the instructions of the Department, it now remains for the Government of the United States to decide upon the policy to be pursued in the future. Having had the benefit of some personal experience, and an opportunity to gain considerable information, I deem it not inappropriate to submit some observations upon affairs in Corea, coupled with those in China.

The two are so closely connected that in considering the one the other should not be lost sight of.

So far as the object sought to be attained through the recent expedition to Corea is concerned, no question can, I imagine, be raised as to