noted dictum by one of the highest judicial officers of the United States, in which the assertion was made in substance, if not in words, "A negro has no rights that a white man is bound to respect." And this startling announcement was approved of, apparently, by a large minority, if not a majority, of the people of the United States.

Foreigners residing here are much too prone to exhibit by acts, if not by words, their belief in the doctrine that " a Chinaman has no rights that a white man is bound to respect."

The present reigning dynasty is weak and effete, capable of being overthrown by a joint movement of the treaty powers, or even by any one of the first-class powers alone.

To

If the present government be overthrown, what then? What will take its place? No foreign government would, I imagine, undertake to conquer China and hold it as a dependency, nor would such a course be tamely acquiesced in by the other treaty nations, if attempted. divide and parcel out the territory among the western nations would also be impracticable, for there would be some-the United States among the number, probably-that would hesitate before accepting territory here if freely offered, and they would seriously object to any such scheme on the part of others. So that whatever may occur in the future, one thing may, I think, be safely set down as certain: China must be governed by the Chinese.

If there were men to be found in the non-official class of intelligence, breadth of mind, vigor of thought and courage, capable of and willing to do better if opportunity were offered them, than those now at the head of affairs, it might perhaps be policy for foreign nations, both in their own interests and for the future welfare of the Chinese, to favor the bringing of this new life into the government by aiding in the overthrow of the present effete dynasty. But, so far as I am able to learn, there are none to be found who would be likely to do better, or even as well, as the present officials. Those now at the head of the government have had the benefit of ten years' experience and direct contact with the foreign diplomatic representatives of other nations, in which time they have learned much, and can, therefore, better appreciate the power of the Western nations, and of the benefits to be derived by preserving amicable relations with them than any men in the empire.

But with all their advantages their progress in knowledge has been slow; so little that, in our moments of impatience, the task seems almost hopeless of ever being able to accomplish what all well-wishers to this government and people so much desire. But when we calmly consider the position in which these men are placed-foreign governments on the one hand demanding, oftentimes with menace, concessions possible and impossible, and on the other a nation of ignorance, superstition, and arrogance, that would not only prevent any forward movement, but would, if they could, undo all that has been done in the past-their difficulties and embarrassments appear to call for the exercise of charity and forbearance on the part of other nations. These difficulties the people at a distance do not see or appreciate, which accounts, in some measure, for the harsh, and, in many cases, unjust criticisms of the people and press of other nations upon the high officials here.

In view of all the difficulties herein detailed, I am of the opinion that foreign nations, in their intercourse with this government and people, should pursue a just and firm course, and at the same time be prepared to exercise patience and forbearance.

They should insist upon the due fulfillment of treaty engagements,

and be prepared to render protection to their own citizens and subjects, whenever the imperial government is either unable or unwilling to perform its duty. And while doing this with vigor and firmness, without unnecessary menace, every effort should be made to increase social and commercial intercourse, as fast as the government can make its power effective, and the increase be rendered safe and to the mutual advantage. Should a state of peace continue, this is the only prudent and practicable course to introduce reform. If, on the contrary, peaceful relations be interrupted, and the foundation of the government be shaken by foreign war, the education of the officials in the manner indicated will the better prepare them to accept and profit by innovations and radical changes that may, by pressure, be forced upon them. I have, &c.,

SIR: Referring to my dispatches Nos. 29, 31 and 34, in regard to the removal of the American missionaries from Tungchow, in consequence of apprehended danger, I have now the honor to inclose an extract from the report of Commander Kimberly, of the United States ship Benicia, which vessel was dispatched by Admiral Rodgers, in response to my suggestion, to convey the missionaries back to their homes.

You will also find inclosed translation of a note from the prefect at Tungehow to Commander Kimberly, in which assurance is given that the local authorities are able to and will protect the missionaries fully in the enjoyment of life and property, and in the peaceable pursuit of their calling.

The full report and the papers connected therewith, which the admiral sent me, are quite voluminous. Many of the papers do not seem important enough to send, nor is it possible to have copies of all made. without employing additional clerical force. If, however, any further information should be wanted, copies of all the papers can, I presume, be obtained at the Nayy Department.

In this connection I desire to say that I have had no information from the missionaries, except a short note from one of them saying that they had all reached Tungchow. Without expressing any opinion as to the real peril they were in, or whether there was or was not cause for the step they took, I am of the opinion that their removal and the manner of their return will, on the whole, result in good.

My thanks are due to Admiral Rodgers for the prompt assistance he rendered in bringing this matter to a satisfactory conclusion.

I have, &c.,

FREDERICK F. LOW.

Extract of a report made by Commander Kimberly, of the United States steamer Benicia, to Admiral Rogers, describing his trip from Chefoo to Tungchow, with the American missionaries on board.

OFF CHEFOO, October 22, 1870.

On the 20th instant, the translation having been finished, I received on board the American missionaries, their teachers and servants, also their children, amounting to a total of twenty-four persons, together with Mr. Solbe and servant, whose names are appended to a list appended to this letter, marked A, and at 10 a. m. got under way, and stood out of the harbor bound for Tungchow-foo, and anchored off that city at 2.15 p. m. the same day, and immediately sent an officer on shore to communicate with the chipfu (prefect) and to request an audience. The officer so sent returned, and informed me that I would be received at any time. I went on shore immediately, accompanied by several officers of the ship, and Mr. Solbe, the interpreter, and held the audience, being received in the usual way.

Your instructions to me (translated) were read by the interpreter in my presence, to the chipfu, (prefect,) who, in reply, said: "That there was no necessity for the missionaries ever leaving Tungchow-foo; that he had received orders from the governor-general of the province to receive and protect them; and, furthermore, that he was able to protect them in every way, and that he was willing, and would protect them." He requested that he might be allowed to retain the instructions read to him, which request I granted. I asked him to give me a letter stating that he was willing to and would and could protect the missionaries, which letter he sent off to the ship the next day.

*

After the audience with the chipfu (prefect) it was so late that the missionaries were not landed until Friday, the 21st instant, when, as I had requested at the interview with the chipfu, a messenger was sent on board of this vessel to invite them (the missionaries) on shore to return to their homes, which had been carefully cared for and protected by the authority of Tungchow-foo since the missionaries had fled. Having concluded the business successfully, and having safely landed the missionaries and their baggage, I got under way at 2.30 p. m. the same day, and arrived at this anchorage off Chefoo at 8.45 p. m.

The missionaries expresed themselves perfectly satisfied with everything that had been done in regard to returning them to their homes, and wished me to visit the shore and walk about the city with the officers of the ship in full uniform, which I declined to do, as, after the promises made by the Chinese officials, I considered it unnecessary, and the Chinese being perfectly willing, and pleased, as far as I could judge, that they had returned. From my interview, I came to the conclusion that there never existed any real danger at Tungchow-foo, but the missionaries were frightened by the threats of some Chinese not in authority. Mischievous persons are found in every community, and Tungchow-foo is not free from this infliction.

The massacre of Tien-tsin capped the climax, and the missionaries left in consequence. The missionaries, in conversation with me on the passage up to Tungchowfoo, complained that their grave-yard had been desecrated, in having some of the tombstones defaced. After the important business of the audience had been disposed of I took the oportunity of stating this complaint to the prefect, who earnestly replied that he would take all means in future to protect them, and to punish any person for any acts of the kind complained of.

Memorandum note from the Prefect Heng, of Tungchow, to Commander Kimberly, of the United Statessteamer Benicia, stationed at Chefoo.

In the interview held on the 20th instant, between Captain Kimberly and the prefect, Captain Kimberly stated that the foreign missionaries who, apprehensive of violence from the rumors which were circulating, and to which they had given ear, had removed from Tungchow, where now, their fears being dissipated, desirous of returning to and, as of old, taking up their abode in that city. In view of this, Captain Kimberly enjoined upon the resident officials their duty of protection according to treaty stipulations. In regard to this interview, the prefect has to remark that it is the duty of China's officials to afford full protection to the missionaries of all countries who may be quietly pursuing their calling in China, and not to allow them to meet with molestation or interference.

His humble brother Heng Kioang salutes Captain Kimberly.

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,

Peking, February 10, 1871.

(Received April 26.) SIR: By the terms of the French treaty of 1858 with China, the time has now arrived for its revision, in case one or both parties demand it. A few months since the chargé d'affaires of France gave formal notice that it was the intention of his government to demand a revision, the particular points of which would be made known at the proper time.

In communicating these facts to me verbally, Count Rochechouart appeared to be anxious to enlist the aid and support of all the treaty powers, so far as practicable, to the end that such modifications of the old concessions might be made, and such new ones obtained as would prove beneficial to all countries having intercourse and commercial relations with China.

Before committing myself to any definite course of action, I asked, as a preliminary step, that he would give me, in writing, a short memorandum of the alterations he thought necessary and practicable, that I might be able to consider the matter intelligently, and, if necessary, communicate with my Government, with a view to asking instructions. He accordingly addressed me a note, in which these points are briefly stated, a translation of which I beg to inclose herewith.

In the conversation referred to, I was informed that, prior to the rejection by the British government of the convention of 1869, an agreement had been come to between France and England, by which joint action would be taken in the matter of treaty revision under and by virtue of the stipulation contained in the French treaty.

What effect the war and the overthrow of the government of the empire may have upon such an arrangement, if made, you can judge of better when this reaches you than I can at this moment.

In order that you may be in possession of my views, based upon the best information I have been able to gather, I beg, most respectfully, to offer some suggestions upon the several points raised by the French chargé d'affaires.

First. The question of audience.

In my opinion, it is unwise to raise or discuss this question until the Emperor attains his majority. The government of the empire being the same now that it has been since diplomatic relations were established at Peking, and as all foreign governments have, up to this time, waived the right of audience because of the Emperor's minority, this course should be continued until a valid reason can be assigned for a change. An earnest attempt to effect a change now would be likely to result in injury instead of benefit.

It would, I think, be quite impossible for the regency to enter into any engagement by which the Emperor would feel bound to grant andience to the foreign representatives at any fixed date in the future. It is doubtful if the Emperor would consider himself bound by such a contract, if made; and any attempt of the kind by Prince Kung and his associates would arouse all the hostile reactionary forces in the capital and in the provinces to resist the innovation.

In considering the propriety of insisting upon this point now, an estimate should be made of the advantages or disadvantages likely to result from an immediate change in the government, and also of an entire change in the personnel of the Foreign Office.

If a solution of the problem be insisted upon now, and the Chinese conclude that there is no way of evading or postponing the matter, it would result, undoubtedly, in the immediate setting aside of the regency and bringing forward the young Emperor, a youth scarcely fifteen years of age, to assume the duties and responsibilities of sovereign de facto; thus throwing upon him the responsibility of acceding to, or refusing to comply with, the demand. What he would do under such circumstances cannot be conjectured with any certainty.

From the meager knowledge we have of this youth and his surroundings, I infer that he is being trained, in the mode pointed out by Confucius, by tutors who have seen little and know less of foreigners or their relations. It is altogether likely that the views and feelings of these people would, if known by us, be considered anti-progressive and reactionary, and their influence with the Emperor could not be otherwise than harmful.

Their opinions would be sought as a guide instead of those of Prince Kung and the members of the Foreign Office, and when a difference of opinion occurred, the former would outweigh the latter. And, besides, there are to be found in China, as in every other country, men anxious to obtain place and power, who would resort to every kind of artifice and intrigue to supplant the present officials in the good opinion of the Emperor, the result of which, if successful, would be to displace Prince Kung and his associates, and fill their places by new men, conceited and supercilious, ignorant of their duties and obligations. It would require a war and years of experience to teach them what the present officials have already learned.

In view of these considerations, I would advise patience on the part of all foreign governments. It is the part of wisdom to hold fast to the men now in power, until more mature years will insure a sounder judg ment to guide the young Emperor, when he emerges from his seclusion to assume the responsibilities of an actual sovereign.

There will be no loss of dignity by continuing for a few years longer the course pursued for the last ten; and besides, if the question be postponed until the Emperor becomes of age, according to his own laws and customs, there will then be a distinct and definite ground for making the claim without regard to treaty, which will be recognized as valid by the civilized world. It will also furnish a plausible excuse, if one is needed, for conceding to a demand which can no longer be postponed or resisted.

But while arguing in favor of postponement, I am entirely opposed to abandoning or giving it up without a struggle.

When the time comes for the Emperor to assume his duties de facto, whether it be sooner or later, my opinion is clear and decided that it will be the duty of all foreign governments to demand for their repre sentatives the same rights, privileges, and courtesies that were accorded to the diplomatic representatives of China, when they visited the courts and capitals of Europe and America; and in case of peremptory refusal, I should not hesitate to advise the withdrawal of legations from Pekin, and a resort to such other measures as might be found necessary to enforce a compliance with the demand.

If it is expected that the plan now inaugurated shall be carried outtreating China as one nation, and the imperial government as the only responsible power-it is absolutely necessary that the rights, privileges, and immunities of the diplomatic corps, customary in all civilized and enlightened countries, shall be recognized by the supreme authority of China.