Arguing for Atheism: An Introduction to the Philosophy of ReligionRoutledge, 02 սեպ, 2003 թ. - 184 էջ First Published in 2004. In Arguing for Atheism, Robin Le Poidevin addresses the question of whether theism-the view that there is a personal, transcendent creator of the universe - solves the deepest mysteries of existence. Philosophical defences of theism have often been based on the idea that it explains things which atheistic approaches cannot: for example, why the universe exists, and how there can be objective moral values. The main contention of Arguing for Atheism is that the reverse is true: that in fact theism fails to explain many things it claims to, while atheism can explain some of the things it supposedly leaves mysterious. It is also argued that religion need not depend on belief in God. Designed as a text for university courses in the philosophy of religion and metaphysics, this book’s accessible style and numerous explanations of important philosophical concepts and positions will also make it attractive to the general reader. |
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Must the universe have a cause? | 3 |
Is God necessary? | 17 |
Could the universe have an explanation? | 33 |
Are we the outcome of chance or design? | 44 |
Does the universe have a purpose? | 59 |
Are God and ethics inseparable or incompatible? | 73 |
Is there a problem of evil? | 88 |
Is God a Fiction? | 107 |
Is Does God exist? a real question? | 124 |
Should the atheist fear death? | 135 |
Glossary | 147 |
155 | |
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actual world adopt agents analogy analytically true answer anthropic principle B-theory begins to exist behaviour believe Big Bang Carnap causal explanation causal reductionism cause chance Chapter compatibilism conception contain a universe contingent creator death depends determined our actions Don Cupitt emotions entities ethics everything example F-type fact false fiction framework frequency theory future gene human freedom hypothesis idea incompatibilist intentions internal question justification kind laws of nature make-believe means merely meta-ethical argument metaphysical modal cosmological argument modal realism moral explanation moral properties moral values natural properties necessarily necessary truths notion ontological argument outcome Oxford past perspective philosophy of religion position positivism possible worlds premise present probability problem of evil proposition reality reason religious response selfish gene sense simply statements suffering suggestion suppose talk teleological argument teleological explanation temporal theism theistic theological things University Press weak anthropic principle