of one Senator who has a very keen feeling in this subject and I think a feeling that is really shared by the American people in varying ways. I think out of these hearings, allowing both sides and all sides to be heard, that we can reach some conclusions as to what is the best way to get around this. I think myself that it will ultimately involve a constitutional amendment.

Mr. BINGHAM. Thank you very much, Senator.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Nix. I deeply appreciate again your appearance, Senator. I want to say this. The Secretary of State took 3 months after requests had been made on him to define his position. They gave us the benefit of their thinking yesterday. I reminded them that if it took 3 months they must have gone to graduate school in order to draw up that answer, and even after having done that it was most inadequate. So I definitely appreciate the testimony here and the statement submitted to the record because it is of substance and that is what we need. Senator GOLDWATER. Thank you.

Mr. Nix. I think the people of this country are entitled to opinions held by certain people as against the opinions of others and those opinions are to be substantially set forth in order that the people have something upon which to arrive at a judgment. So I am deeply appreciative for what you have given us.

Senator GOLDWATER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. I appreciate it.

Mr. Nix. Thank you.

I call Mr. Bingham. Mr. Warneke, and Mr. Chayes.

I welcome you gentlemen on behalf of the subcommittee. Whatever order you decide to follow is agreeable to the committee. You may proceed.

STATEMENT OF HON. JONATHAN B. BINGHAM, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, I am honored to be in such distinguished company here. I would like to submit my statement for the record. It is a rather long statement and in the interest of time and, to hear these experts, I would like simply to make a few brief comments if that is agreeable, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Nix. Without objection, the statement of Mr. Bingham will be incorporated at this point in the record.

[The statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CONGRESSMAN JONATHAN B. BINGHAM

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to testify before the Subcommittee today on the need for legislation to stop the bombing in Cambodia and to prevent a resumption of bombing or other combat operations in or over Vietnam. The time is overdue for Congressional action to ensure an end to United States military involvement in Indochina. Various proposals have been offered to accomplish this, and I urge that they be given prompt and thorough attention. My proposal, H.J. Res. 514, to end the war in Indochina, I am pleased to note, has your support, Mr. Chairman, as well as that of many others, including members of the Committee. If enacted, it would prohibit further expenditures of Federal funds for any military operations in or over Cambodia, as well as Laos or North or South Vietnam. This is an updated version of my previous resolution, H.R. 3349. reflecting the fact that American prisoners of war have now been

released and our troops withdrawn from South Vietnam. It clearly prohibits the continuation of bombing in Cambodia, as well as a resumption of bombing in Laos or Vietnam. At the same time it has the advantage of being simple and brief. I feel that H.J. Res. 514 offers a straightforward expression of the Congress' determination to restore its Constitutional prerogatives and to end a Presidential war that has no Constitutional or statutory basis.

Today I welcome the chance to address the pressing question of the Administration's war in Cambodia. The escalation of United States bombing, undertaken in recent months without the approval of Congress or the American people, has the earmarks of a costly military gamble, which is far from over. Not only have these efforts failed to force a ceasefire in Cambodia and to secure the South Vietnamese border, but we seem to be ever more deeply involved in shoring up the Phnom Penh government in a civil struggle of uncertain duration. United States B-52s, fighter bombers and gunships have been carrying out greatly stepped up air strikes in Cambodia since mid-February. We have already lost a pilot killed and two other Americans are reported missing in action. The bombing is estimated to cost over four million dollars per day.

Civilian casualties and destruction from our bombing are hard to estimate in precise terms. But we know in general terms what B-52s do to civilians, and we know all too well from Vietnam how bombing can force a deeply rooted peasant society to become a nation of refugees. It is estimated that over one-third of the Cambodian population has been uprooted by the war, in which our air strikes have become a major factor.

Our involvement in Cambodia is of two types. In the past we have tried to interdict supplies being transported through Cambodia from North Vietnam to South Vietnam, and to disrupt sanctuaries in Cambodia from which our troops in Vietnam could be attacked. There is no Cambodian Government control over this area, and nobody seriously suggests that the Phnom Penh government will be able in the foreseeable future to assert such control.

Bombing in this eastern region now accounts for about 20% of our airstrikes in Cambodia, a decrease from approximately 80% in February. Given the escalation of bombing, however, this 20% represents an increase in sorties. The cost/ effectiveness of sorties in the eastern region seems questionable, in light of past experience. It seems clear that the North Vietnamese do continue to have relatively unhampered access to South Vietnam through Cambodia.

An estimated 80% of our bombs are now dropped against Cambodian insurgent forces in the western two-thirds of the country, including forces which have advanced to within a few miles of Phnom Penh. Targets for these sorties are chosen by the Phnom Penh government. The observation has been made by those with knowledge of the military situation in Cambodia that continued heavy American bombing is all that is preventing an insurgent takeover of Phnom Penh. Even the most confirmed optimist can cite few reasons to hope that the Lon Nol government can do more than hang on. The rainy season may ease some of the military pressure, and President Lon Nol has appointed a council with whom he will share power. However, the council has not yet met, and its ability to end the corruption and create an effective administration is questionable.

None of the justifications which were given for our involvement in Vietnam apply to Cambodia. The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, used especially by the Johnson Administration as evidence of Congressional support for the war, has been repealed. The SEATO treaty, which was also used to justify our military assistance to South Vietnam, has no bearing on the situation in Cambodia-a fact recognized by all parties, including the present government in Phnom Penh.

The introduction of United States ground forces into Cambodia in 1970 was then justified by the Administration as being necessary to protect our forces as they were being withdrawn from South Vietnam. President Nixon stated in his Interim Report to the Nation on June 3, 1970, that:

"Communist forces launched a series of attacks against a number of key cities in neutral Cambodia. Their objective was unmistakable-to link together bases they had maintained in Cambodia for 5 years in violation of Cambodian neutrality. The entire 600-mile Cambodia-South Vietnam border would then have become one continuous hostile territory from which to launch assaults upon American and allied forces.

"This posed an unacceptable threat to our remaining forces in South Vietnam. It would have meant higher casualties. It would have jeopardized our program for troop withdrawals . . ."

In the face of the strong domestic reaction in the United States against the incursion, Administration officials denied any widening of the war in Indochina or commitment to the Cambodian Government. In the same report just cited, President Nixon stated:

"The only remaining American activity in Cambodia after July 1 [1970] will be air missions to interdict the movement of enemy troops and material where I find that is necessary to protect the lives and security of our men in South Vietnam."

The President's Report on the Cambodian Operation on June 30, 1970, downplayed the significance of a takeover of Phnom Penh, saying:

"I concluded that, regardless of the success of Communist assaults on the Cambodian Government, the destruction of the enemy's sanctuaries would remove a grave potential threat to our remaining men in South Vietnam. . ."

Secretary of State Rogers in a CBS interview on June 7, 1970, was more explicit in deflating the importance of possible Communist control of all of Cambodia. Asked if Communist control of all of Cambodia would be "intolerable," he replied:

"No, I don't think so. I mean, the reason he (the President) found intolerable the sanctuaries is because they were using those sanctuaries to fire on American troops. Now, that is not true if they moved to the west in Cambodia."

The Secretary subsequently, when asked in a news conference on June 25, 1970, about alleged United States air support for Cambodian forces, replied:

"It is obvious, of course, that there will be times when, in the process of interdicting supply lines or communication lines of the enemy, that that will be of direct benefit to the present government in Cambodia. But I think the main thrust of our policy is to use our Air Force for the purpose of interdicting supply lines and communication lines to protect Americans in South Vietnam."

What justification can there be for the bombing now?

Senator Goldwater apparently takes the view that the President is entitled to take whatever military action he feels is in the interest of the country. The Administration spokesmen have not been so frank, at least on the record, although something of the same thinking seemed to be reflected in Ambassador Sullivan's off-the-record comment reported as attributing the reason to be the reelection of the President. Secretary Richardson, in indicating an intention to continue bombing no matter what, has come close to confirming this view.

All this emphasis on the necessity of unilateral United States military activity in Cambodia is in sharp contrast to President Nixon's press conference statements of November 21, 1971, when he cited Cambodia as an example of the Nixon Doctrine in its purest form. Now, a year and a half later, we have a situation which little resembles the model in which a country assumes primary responsibility for its own defense. American pilots and American planes are now said to be essential to prevent the collapse of a government, which is unable to defend itself and which has only the most tenuous claim to any base of popular support. The extent of the corruption of this government became painfully clear for the American taxpayer with the disclosure that approximately one-third of the Cambodian army, which we pay for in large part, existed only on paper. Mr. Nixon's statement of November 1971 is clearly, to use the current terminology, no longer "operative," and he owes us a frank and up-to-date explanation of what he is up to.

The recently released Presidential Report on United States Foreign Policy does not shed much light on the subject (p. 73):

"We aim for an independent, neutral and stable country in Cambodia. We do not insist on any particular political orientation, but we believe any course should be the free choice of the people themselves, not one imposed by North Vietnamese arms. Nor should Cambodia be used as a sanctuary or staging area for Vietnamese Communist assaults on South Vietnam. . . The Cambodians, like the Lao. . . are carrying the brunt of the battle for their self-defense, while we supply military and economic assistance and, when specifically requested, air support."

The secrecy surrounding air operations in Cambodia and the long silence by the Administration, when asked to justify the bombing, have rightfully raised our suspicions. Why was the State Department, with all of its legal resources, so

tongue-tied? Did it feel itself to be without much of a legal case, or did the Administration fear the reaction to public disclosure of information concerning the scope and nature of bombing in Cambodia, or both?

Finally, on April 30, more than a month after the release of the last American prisoner, during which time United States bombers carried out some $150-million worth of air strikes in Cambodia, Secretary Rogers provided the Senate Foreign Relations Committee with the Administration's position. This is a most remarkable and disturbing document. Nowwhere does it give a clear explanation of the authority for the present bombing. In part, it relies on bootstrap reasoning that, since the President made the ceasefire agreement, he therefore has unilateral authority to enforce it as he sees fit. The statement also makes the specious argument that what is going on now in Cambodia is just a continuation of what we were doing before.

For example, on page 2 of the version provided on April 30, it is stated, in reference to Article 20 of the Vietnam Agreement, that:

"This Article is of central importance as it has long been apparent that the conflicts in Laos and Cambodia are closely related to the conflict in Vietnam and, in fact, are so interrelated as to be considered parts of a single conflict."

Are we to assume that the Administration now equates a Khmer Rouge takeover of Phnom Penh with an NLF victory in Saigon? Is fighting between Cambodians a vital threat to South Vietnam? Are all "parts" of this "single conflict" equal? That this may be the argument is suggested by another reference, also to Article 20, on page 6 of the statement, maintaining that:

"The importance of this article cannot be overestimated, because the continuation of hostilities in Laos and Cambodia and the presence there of North Vietnamese troops threatens the right of self-determination of the South Vietnamese people, which is guaranteed by the Agreement." How much longer will we be bombing the outskirts of Phnom Penh to protect the "right of self-determination of the South Vietnamese people"? Page 3 of the statement claims that:

"At the time the Vietnam Agreement was concluded, the United States made clear to the North Vietnamese that the armed forces of the Khmer Government would suspend all offensive operations and that the United States aircraft supporting them would do likewise. We stated that, if the other side reciprocated, a de facto cease-fire would thereby be brought into force in Cambodia. However, we also stated that, if the Communist forces carried out attacks, government forces and United States air forces would have to take necessary counter measures .."

This does not seem to square with Dr. Kissinger's public assertion in explaining the Vietnam Agreement that there were no secret agreements or understandings among the signatories. What was Hanoi's response to this proposal? Did we really expect that North Vietnam would or could stop hostilities in Cambodia?

The President's Report on United States Foreign Policy does not reflect much confidence that there would be an early cessation of hostilities in Cambodia. While Hanoi would obviously support Cambodians who oppose the Phnom Penh government, it does not necessarily follow that the North Vietnamese can stop the Cambodians from fighting. According to a number of observers of the Cambodian scene, including American officials, the Cambodian insurgents are split into several factions. This has been cited as one of the complications in attempting to negotiate a cease-fire.

The statement on pages 3-4 says a key question is the following: "whether the Constitutional authority of the President to continue doing in Cambodia what the United States has lawfully been doing there expires with the withdrawal of U.S. armed forces from Vietnam and the return of American prisoners despite the fact that a cease-fire has not been achieved in Cambodia and North Vietnamese troops remain in Cambodia contrary to clear provisions of the Agreenient."

If the prior justification for action-the safe withdrawal of American forces from South Vietnam-no longer exists, it cannot be argued very convincingly that actions now are simply a "continuation." It is also misleading, in a quantitative and qualitative sense, to describe the escalated air war, concentrated against Cambodian forces, as a "continuation" of past actions.

On page 7 we find that the statement proclaims, “Under present circumstances, the United States air support and material assistance are needed to support the

armed forces of the Khmer Republic and thereby to render more likely the early conclusion of a ceasefire and implementation of Article 20 of the Agreement."

What sort of miracle does the Administration expect which will transform the military, political, and negotiating fortunes of the Lon Nol government? Or will these "present circumstances" continue indefinitely? The Administration has yet to provide any tangible evidence that a cease-fire is anywhere in sight. The same paragraph of the statement (page 7) continues,

"Thus, U.S. air strikes in Cambodia do not represent a commitment by the United States to the defense of Cambodia as such but instead represent a meaningful interim action to bring about compliance with this critical provision in the Vietnam Agreement." In the continued absence of a cease-fire, how is such "meaningful interim action" distinguishable from a commitment to the defense of Cambodia? This is especially hard to swallow given reports that all of our air strikes in the western two-thirds of Cambodia are carried out at the initiative of the Phnom Penh government.

From the Constitutional standpoint, does the President have the authority to undertake such military actions as massive bombing, without Congressional authorization, simply because he feels that North Vietnam has violated an understanding or the terms of the Vietnam Agreement? This matter is all the more serious when United States airpower is employed in what appear to be hostilities with strong civil war characteristics.

The return of our troops and prisoners should have ended our direct military involvement in hostilities in Indochina. The latest Harris survey, taken between April 18-23, shows that Americans feel, by an overwhelming margin of 70% to 21%, that our involvement in Vietnam was a mistake. The same poll showed grave public doubts that North and South Vietnam will abide by the cease-fire agreements, and reflected a public expectation that Cambodia "will fall to the Communists." At the same time, the American people do not want another Southeast Asia involvement, whatever justifications are put forward.

If the Administration wants to fight a war in Cambodia, it should seek explicit Congressional authority for such action. And such authority should not be granted unless it can be shown convincingly that vital United States security interests are at stake, and what the cost and duration of our involvement will be.

The Congress must make clear its opposition to further bombing in Cambodia and to any other unilateral military action by the Administration in Indochina without prior Congressional approval. It is important that we set the record straight. The Administration's April 30 statement clearly reflects the view that Congressional authorization and appropriation of funds for Indochina hostilities can be interpreted as support for Administration policies. Thus, it is most important that the Administration's request for $500 million in transfer authority, as contained in the Second Supplemental Appropriation Bill, be denied. However, even if that is done, the Administration has made clear that it intends to continue the bombing anyway. Therefore it will still be essential for the Congress to pass legislation to put a permanent stop to the bombing in Cambodia, and to prevent the resumption of hostilities elsewhere in Indochina.

The Administration has made clear that it is the President's policy to comply fully with provisions of law referring to Cambodia. In conformity with this policy, it has ostensibly honored legislation precluding the use of ground_troops in Cambodia, and limiting the number of United States personnel there. In conclusion, therefore, I hope this subcommittee will report out H.J. Res. 514.

Mr. Nix. You may proceed, Mr. Bingham.

Mr. BINGHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I certainly would like to commend you, Mr. Chairman, for holding these hearings and I appreciate the opportunity of appearing before the subcommittee on the need for legislation of the stop the bombing in Cambodia and to prevent a resumption of bombing or other combat operations in or over Vietnam.

The time is overdue for congressional action to assure an end to U.S. military involvement in Indochina. Various proposals have been offered to accomplish this and I urge that they be given prompt and thorough attention. My proposal-incorporated in House Joint Reso