JUDGMENT (Continued.)

credit in every other State as it had in the courts of the State in which it was
rendered. Ibid.

4. Where there was a judgment which had been recorded under the laws of Louis-
iana, and thus made equivalent to a mortgage upon the property of the
debtor, and the plaintiff assigned this judgment, and was then himself sued
and had an execution issued against him, his rights under the recorded judg-
ment could not be sold under this execution, because he had previously trans-
ferred all those rights. Stockton v. Ford, 232.

5. It was not necessary for an assignee of this recorded judgment, who was de-
fending himself in chancery, by claiming under the assignment, to notice in
his pleading an allegation in the bill that a release of the judgment was im-
properly entered upon the record. His assignment was not charged as fraud-
ulent. Ibid.

6. The attorney who had recovered the judgment which was thus recovered and
assigned, was not at liberty to purchase it when his client became sued and
execution was issued against him. Ibid.

7. According to the practice in Pennsylvania, where a defendant pleads set-off,
the jury are allowed to find in their verdict the amount that the plaintiff is
indebted to the defendant, and according to their mode of keeping records
this result is entered by way of note; e. g. "new trial refused and judgment
on the verdict." Reeside v. Walker, 272.

8. Although this may be a good record in the courts of Pennsylvania, it does not
follow that it is so in the courts of the United States. Ibid.

9. The effect of such a judgment, that the plaintiff is indebted to the defendant,
is merely to lay the foundation for a scire facias to try this new cause of
action. Ibid.

10. Where the United States were the plaintiffs, and a verdict was rendered that
they were indebted to the defendant, and an application was made for a
mandamus to compel the Secretary of the Treasury to credit the defendant
upon the books of the Treasury with the amount of the verdict, and to pay
the same, the mandamus was properly refused by the Circuit Court. For a
mandamus will only lie against a ministerial officer to do some ministerial act
where the laws require him to do it and he improperly refuses to do so. Ibid.
11. Besides, there was no appropriation made by law, and no officer of the govern-
ment can pay a debt due by the United States without an appropriation by
Congress. Ibid.

12. To sanction a judgment under a plea of set-off would virtually be allowing the
United States to be sued, which the laws do not allow. Ibid.

13. It is the uniform practice of the Federal and State courts in Tennessee to test
executions as on the first day of the term; and as between creditors, the lien
attaches equally to all the judgments entered at the same term. Clements v.
Berry, 398.

14. Where a judgment by default, in an action upon a promissory note, was entered
upon the 8th day of the month, but not fully entered up as to the amount
due until the 10th, and upon the 10th, a few minutes before the court opened,
the debtor recorded a deed of trust conveying away all his property, this deed
cannot defeat the lien of the judgment. Ibid.

15. The judgment by default created the lien; it was a mere clerical duty to cal-
culate and enter up the amount due. Ibid.

16. To note the precise time when deeds are left for record is attended with no
difficulty as between deeds; but to settle the exact comparative creation of a
lien between a recorded deed and a judgment by a court is attended with
much embarrassment. The timepiece of the register cannot settle the validity
or invalidity of a judgment lien. Ibid.

17. The process act of 1828, passed by Congress, refers to State laws for the cre-
ation and effect of liens; but the preparatory steps by which they are created
depend upon the rules adopted by the United States courts. Ibid.

18. Where the legislature of the Territory of Iowa directed that suits might be in-
stituted against "the owners of the Half-breed lands lying in Lee County,"
notice thereof being given through the newspapers, and judgments were re-
covered in suits so instituted, these judgments were nullities.
Webster v.
Reid, 437.

19. There was no personal notice to individuals, nor an attachment or other pro-
ceeding against the land, until after the judgments. Ibid.

JUDGMENT (Continued).

20. The law moreover directed that the court should decide without the interven-
tion of a jury to determine matters of fact. This was inconsistent with the
Constitution of the United States. Ibid.

21. The court below erred in not permitting evidence to be offered to show that the
judgments were fraudulent. It erred also in not allowing the defendant to
give his title in evidence. Ibid.

22. The defendant ought also to have been allowed to give evidence that the judg-
ments had not been obtained in conformity with the law, which required cer-
tain preliminary steps to be taken. Ibid.

23. The rules of the common law require that the verdict must find the matter in
issue between the parties, and the judgment must follow the verdict. If not,
the judgment must be reversed. Bennett v. Butterworth, 669.

JURISDICTION.

par-

1. Where a vessel was libelled in the District Court and sold by agreement of
ties, and the proceeds of sale amounted only to $850, which was paid into
the registry, this is insufficient to bring the case within the jurisdiction of
this court, although an agreement by counsel was filed, admitting the value
of the vessel to be more than two thousand dollars. Gruner v. United

States, 163.

2. This agreement would be evidence of the value, if nothing to the contrary ap-
peared in the record. But the decision of the court would only determine
the right to the proceeds of sale, viz. $850, and the case must therefore be
dismissed, for want of jurisdiction. Ibid.

3. By the laws of Mississippi, where a joint action is brought upon a bond or note,
the case must be finally disposed of in the court below with respect to all the
parties upon the record, before it is carried up to the appellate court; other-
wise it is error. United States v. Girault, 22.

4. Where this error occurs, the practice of this court is to dismiss the case for
want of jurisdiction, and remand it to the court below to be proceeded in and
finally disposed of. Ibid.

5. Where the marshal of the United States had levied an execution upon certain.
property under a judgment in the Circuit Court, which was taken out of his
custody by a writ of replevin issued by a State court, and the Supreme Court
of the State decided adversely to the claim of the marshal, it is within the
jurisdiction of this court to review that decision. Clements v. Berry, 398.
6. Where a judgment was rendered by the Supreme Court for Iowa Territory, and
the record certified to this court by the Supreme Court of the State of Iowa,
after her admission into the Union, and the subject-matter is within the juris-
diction of this court, it will take jurisdiction over the case.
Webster v. Reid,
437.

7. Where the Admiralty Court decreed that a vessel should pay salvage to the
amount of one fifth of her value, and that value was shown to be $2,600, an
appeal to this court would not lie, for want of jurisdiction. Spear v. Place,
8. It is the amount of salvage, and not of the vessel, which tests the jurisdiction;
the salvage only being in controversy. Ibid.

522.

9. The master could not properly represent (without special authority) the con-
signees of the cargo who had received their respective consignments before
the filing of the libel. They lived in the place where the court was held, and
ought to have represented their own interests. Ibid.

10. The master, therefore, cannot appear for them all conjointly, and in this case
the amount of salvage to be paid by the largest consignee would be only
$1,136.80. Ibid.

11. Neither the salvage upon the vessel or cargo, therefore, is sufficient in amount
to bring the case within the jurisdiction of this court. Ibid.

12. In 1839 a treaty was made between the United States and Mexico, providing
for the "adjustment of claims of citizens of the United States on the Mexican
Republic." Gill v. Oliver's Executors, 529.

13. Under this treaty a sum of money was awarded to be paid to the members of
the Baltimore Mexican Company, who had subscribed money to fit out an
expedition against Mexico under General Mina, in 1816. Ibid.

14. The proceeds of one of the shares of this company were claimed by two par-
ties, one as being the permanent trustee of the insolvent owner of the share,.

JURISDICTION (Continued).

and the other as being the assignee of the provisional trustee, and afterwards
the assignee of the insolvent himself. Ibid.

15. The judgment of the Court of Appeals of Maryland, that the latter claimant is
entitled to the money, is not reviewable by this court under the twenty-fifth
section of the Judiciary Act. Ibid.

16. The deeds of conveyance filed as exhibits show the property to have been sold
for two thousand dollars, and that it was afterwards converted into a sugar
estate. This is sufficient to maintain the jurisdiction of this court. United
States v. Hughes, 552.

JURY.

1. How far the jury are to judge of the responsibility of the collector of the cus-
toms for treasury-notes purloined, &c., see United States v. Morgan, 154.

2. The question whether or not the grant to the Baron de Bastrop was a perfect
and complete grant, was one for the court, and not for the jury. United States
v. Turner, 663.

LANDS, PUBLIC.

1. In adjudicating upon an imperfect title under a Spanish concession, this court
again adopts the rule laid down in 10 Peters, 330, 331; viz. Can a court of
equity, according to its rules and the laws of Spain, consider the conscience
of the king so affected by the acts of his lawful authorities in the province,
that he became a trustee for the claimant, and held the land claimed by an
equity upon it, amounting to a severance of so much from the public domain,
before and at the time the country was ceded to the United States? United
States v. Boisdoré et al., 63.

2. This rule, applied to the following case, brings out the results stated below. Ibid.
3. In 1783, in consequence of a memorial from Boisdoré, Miro, the acting Gover-
nor of Louisiana, issued the following order to Trudeau, the Surveyor-Gen-
eral, viz.: "Don Carlos Laveau Trudeau will establish Louis Boisdoré upon
the extent of ground which he solicits in the preceding memorial, situated in
the section of country commonly called Achoucoupoulous, commencing in
front from the plantation belonging to Philip Saucier, a resident of said coun-
try, down to the bayou called Mosquito Village Bayou, with the depth down
to Pearl River; the same being vacant, and no prejudice being caused to the
neighbors living as well in front as upon the depth; which measures he will
reduce to writing, signing with the aforesaid parties, and will remit the same
to me, in order that I may furnish the party interested with a corresponding
title in due form." Ibid.

4. Boisdoré, in his memorial, had stated that he wished to form an establishment
for the whole of his numerous family, on which he might employ all his ne-
groes, and support a large stock of cattle which would be useful to the neigh-
boring city. Ibid.

5. The grantee took only a trifling possession of the land, by placing a single slave
there, and Trudeau never made, nor attempted to make, a survey. In 1808
the Spanish Governor of Florida gave directions to the Surveyor-General of
Florida, who drew a figurative plan of a survey, but the Governor of Florida
at that time had no jurisdiction over the land. Ibid.

6. If Trudeau had made a survey and returned a certificate, it would have been
binding, although it might not have conformed strictly to the lines of the
original grant. But the description of the tract is so vague and uncertain,
that it cannot now be surveyed by an order of the court. The mode directed
by the District Court would include four hundred thousand acres; and it is
unreasonable to suppose that the conscience of the king of Spain would have
been bound to confirm such a grant, when the grantee neglected to fulfil the
obligations which were incumbent upon him. Ibid.

"

7. Besides, there being no given point from which to commence the survey, or to
establish the second corner, if the court were to order the mode in which the
survey was to be made, it would not be a judicial decree, but an exercise of
political jurisdiction. Ibid.

8. In 1816 the register and receiver of a land-office, acting under the authority
of a law, reported as follows: "We are of opinion that all the claims included
under the second species of the first class are already confirmed by the act of
Congress of the 12th of April, 1814." Blanc v. Lafayette, 104.

LANDS, PUBLIC (Continued).

9. In 1820 Congress passed an act (3 Stat. at Large, 573) confirming all those
claims which were recommended in the report for confirmation. Ibid.

10. But where the commissioners erred in placing a claim in the second species of
the first class, and erred in supposing that such a claim was already confirmed
by the act of 1814, these errors prevent the act of 1820 from confirming the
claim. It is cousequently invalid. Ibid.

11. Where the petition for a Spanish concession was for a tract of land without any
definite boundaries, and the petition was referred to the solicitor-general, with
instructions to put the petitioner in possession, if in so doing no prejudice
would result to third persons, this condition required some subsequent action
of the government in order to make the grant absolute. Lecompte v. United
States, 115.

12. A part of the duty of the solicitor-general was to supervise the severance of the
object to be granted from the royal domain, and apportion the extent of the
grant to the means which the petitioner possessed towards carrying out the
objects of the government. Ibid.

13. The preceding decisions of this court have established the doctrine, that, in or-
der to constitute a valid grant, there must be a severance of the property
claimed from the public domain, either by actual survey or by some ascer-
tained limits or mode of separation recognized by a competent authority.
Ibid.

14. In the present case, the proof of occupation, settlement, or cultivation is insuffi-
cient. Ibid.

15. The United States have a right to bring an action of trespass quare clausum
fregit against a person for cutting and carrying away trees from the public
lands. Cotton v. United States, 229.

16. Where a person entered land according to law, but omitted to obtain a patent
for it, and another person afterwards obtained a patent from the United States
by proceeding as if it were vacant land, knowing at the same time that it was
not vacant, the patent thus obtained will be set aside. United States v. Hughes
et al., 552.
17. Nor is it a sufficient objection to a decree, that the process was by an informa-
tion in the nature of a bill in chancery, filed by the attorney for the United
States. A simple bill in equity would have been better, but this process be-
ing so in substance, the case will not be dismissed for want of form. Ibid.
18. An individual owner of land would, in such a case, be entitled to the relief of
having the patent set aside; and the United States, as a landholder, must be
entitled to the same. Ibid.

19. The deeds of conveyance filed as exhibits show the property to have been sold
for two thousand dollars, and that it was afterwards converted into a sugar
estate. This is sufficient to maintain the jurisdiction of this court
Ibid.

20. The twelfth section of the regulations of O'Reilly in 1770 required, that there
should be an order of survey, a process verbal by the surveyor of the province,
three copies of the plat made out by him, one of which should be deposited
in the office of the scrivener of the government, and Cabildo, a second deliv-
ered to the governor, and the third to the proprietor, to be annexed to the
titles of the grant. United States v. Power's Heirs, 570.

21. Where a grant was alleged to have been issued by the Spanish governor of
Louisiana in 1781, and the only evidence of it was a copy taken from a no-
tary's book, the title was invalid. Ibid.

22. At the date of the grant, viz. 1st August, 1781, the Spanish governor of Louis-
iana was only the military commandant of that part of West Florida in which
the lands granted were situated. He held the country by right of conquest.
The Spanish laws had not been introduced into the country, and it was not
ceded to Spain by Great Britain until 1783. The governor had therefore no
authority to grant land in 1781. Ibid.

23. Under the acts of Congress of 1824 and 1844, the District Court had no power
to act upon evidence of mere naked possession, unaccompanied by written
evidence, conferring, or professing to confer, a title of some description. Ibid.
24. Under the various acts of Congress relating to land titles in that tract of coun-
try between the Iberville, the Perdido, and the thirty-first degree of north
latitude, a complete title, unrecorded, is not barred against the United States,
although it is barred against any private claim derived from the United States.
Ibid.

LANDS, PUBLIC (Continued).

25. The decision of this court in the United States v. Reynes (9 Howard, 127),
again affirmed, to wit, that under the acts of Congress of May 26, 1824
(4 Stat. at Large, 52), and June 17, 1844 (5 Stat. at Large, 676), the courts
of the United States have no power to decide upon complete or perfect titles
to land. United States v. Philadelphia and New Orleans, 609.

26. The contract made between the Baron de Bastrop and the Spanish govern-
ment did not vest a perfect title in Bastrop, and therefore this court can exer-
cise jurisdiction over the claim. Ibid.

27. The grant of twelve leagues square, given to Bastrop by the Spanish governor,
only pointed out the place where the families were to settle which Bastrop
was to bring in. The land was destined and appropriated to this purpose.
There were to be five hundred families, who were to grow wheat, and Bastrop's
interest was intended to be in the monopoly of manufacturing flour and ex-
porting it to Havana and other places under the jurisdiction of the Spanish
crown. With this view, he obtained separate grants for the bayous or mill-
seats, and was bound to erect at least one mill within two years from the date
of the grant. Ibid..

28. The families which were introduced took their titles from the Spanish govern-
ment, and not from Bastrop. Ibid.

29. This case stands upon the same ground as the case of the United States v.
King et al., 7 Howard, 833. Ibid.

30. The decision of this court in the case of the United States v. King and Coxe (3
Howard, 773, and 7 Howard, 833) again affirmed, viz. that the contract be-
tween the Baron de Carondelet and the Marquis de Maison-Rouge conveyed
no interest in the land to Maison-Rouge, but was merely intended to mark
out by certain and definite boundaries the limits of the establishment which
he was authorized to form. United States v. Turner, 663.

31. The contract must be judged of according to the laws of Spain; but under
those laws, whenever there was an intention to grant private property, words
were always used which severed the property from the public domain. Ibid.
32. The absence in this case of the royal order of 1795, and of all testimony re-
specting the genuineness of the certificate of survey by Trudeau, makes no dif-
ference in the decision of the court. The construction of the grant was the
main point of that case, and is also of this. Ibid.

33. Whether or not the instrument was a perfect and complete grant by the laws
of Spain, was a question for the court, and not for the jury. Ibid.
34. The case of the United States v. King and Coxe explained. Ibid.

LEX LOCI.

See CONFLICT OF LAWS. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

LIMITATION OF ACTIONS, AND STATUTE OF.

1. Where the Circuit Court instructed the jury, that they might consider the acts
of one of the daughters and her husband, in acquiescing in a partition and in
receiving a small tract of land, as a recognition of the true construction of a
will to be, that the daughters were not entitled to an equal share, the acts of
partition being accompanied by long adverse possession, say thirty or forty
years, this instruction was erroneous. The daughter was a minor when she
married, and continued covert until within a short time before she brought the
suit. No presumption, arising from her acts, could therefore be made against
her. Weatherhead's Lessee v. Baskerville, 330.

2. And a recognition by her, when freed from coverture, of a sale which she had
made in conjunction with her husband, amounted to no more than a ratifica-
tion of that particular sale. Ibid.

3. According to the statute of limitations passed by the State of Illinois, a defend-
ant in ejectment who had been in possession of the land by actual residence
thereon, having a connected title in law or equity deducible of record from
the State or the United States, or from dny public officer or other person au-
thorized by the laws of the State to sell such land for the non-payment of
taxes, &c., might defend himself by pleading that he had been in possession as
aforesaid for seven years. Moore v. Brown, 414.

4. But where a defendant offered a deed in evidence, purporting to be a deed
from an officer authorized to sell for taxes, and the deed upon its face showed
that the officer had not complied with the requisitions of the statute, this was
a void deed, made in violation of law, and did not bring the defendant within
the benefit of the statute of limitations. Ibid.